Hyatt v. Gelb ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2404
CHARKEEM HYATT,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
BRUCE GELB, Superintendent,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
David M. Skeels and Committee for Public Counsel Services, on
brief for appellant.
Susanne Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau,
Appeals Division, and Maura Healey, Attorney General, on brief for
appellee.
October 19, 2016
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Charkeem Hyatt, petitioner-
appellant, contests the district court's denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hyatt argues
that Massachusetts state courts failed to apply the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
122 (1934), in denying his request to be present during the jury
view of the crime scene. After careful consideration, we affirm
the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief.
I. Background
On federal habeas review, the findings of fact of a state
court "shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);
see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592–93 (1982) (per curiam).
Accordingly, we must accept them unless convinced by clear and
convincing evidence that they are erroneous. Lynch v. Ficco, 438
F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d
24, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc)). We take the facts as presented
by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which affirmed Hyatt's
conviction, supplemented with other record facts consistent with
the state court's findings. Scoggins v. Hall, 765 F.3d 53, 54
(1st Cir. 2014).
A. Trial
In July 2009, Hyatt was involved in the shooting of four
people outside a bar in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston,
-2-
Massachusetts. A grand jury in Suffolk County indicted Hyatt on
the following counts: one count of unlawful possession of a
firearm, one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, one count
of possession of a loaded firearm, three counts of aggravated
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, three counts of
assault with a dangerous weapon, and four counts of possession of
a firearm in the commission of a felony.
Hyatt pled not guilty to all counts, and a jury trial
commenced on February 6, 2012, before Justice Brady of the
Massachusetts Superior Court. On February 8, Justice Brady
discussed the logistics and rules for a jury view of the scene
where the shooting took place, which would take place on the
following day. Hyatt's trial counsel requested Hyatt's presence
during the view. Justice Brady responded that Hyatt could not go
because of security reasons. He added, "He's in custody. I can't
bring him. I don't have enough security people for that. I've
never had a defendant [attend a view], other than one who's on the
street."
Later that day, Hyatt's counsel renewed her request that
Hyatt be allowed to accompany the jury on the view. In response
to the request, the court engaged in the following exchange:
THE COURT: Look, I'm sorry. He's in custody for very
serious charges. It's a very serious event. I'm not
going to allow him to come on the view because I just
don't have adequate security. Further, I can't have
-3-
him without chains out there, so the jury is going to
be there. It just isn't a workable situation. So I
understand that the [Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court] has never changed the Judge's discretion about
that, so if you want, you've made an objection, that's
fine, I've overruled it. But I'm not going to allow
it.
. . .
MS. ODIAGA: I think the jury is going to be made more
aware of the fact that he is in custody by his absence.
THE COURT: I probably have done maybe thirty views
without defendants there, and I never said anything
special. If you can think of anything you want me to
say, I'd be happy to do it, but I think probably most
lawyers feel that it's better left unsaid. Maybe the
jury will just assume that they never come. But if
you can think of anything tomorrow, by all means I'd
be happy to consider it, okay?
The next morning, the view proceeded as scheduled,
without Hyatt in attendance. Both Hyatt's counsel and the
prosecutor representing the Commonwealth were permitted to point
out certain features of the scene to the jury, but neither was
allowed to make any argument or offer other commentary. At no
point before or during the view did anyone draw any attention to
the fact of Hyatt's absence.
On February 16, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty on all counts except the three counts charging him with
assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Following the jury's
verdict, Hyatt was sentenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years
of imprisonment.
-4-
B. Proceedings in Massachusetts Appellate Courts
Hyatt appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts
Appeals Court, alleging that his exclusion from the view violated
his constitutional rights to due process and his presumption of
innocence. The Appeals Court rejected his arguments and affirmed
the conviction. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, No. 12–P–1257, 2014 WL
2178782, at *1-3 (Mass. App. Ct. May 27, 2014). It noted that it
was bound by "a long-standing precedent that a defendant does not
have the right to be present for a view and that a defendant's
absence does not offend his rights under the United States
Constitution or [the Massachusetts] Declaration of Rights." Id.at *1 (citing cases). Relying on this precedent, the Appeals
Court held that Justice Brady had acted "well within his authority"
when he cited "security" as the reason to deny Hyatt's request to
attend the view. Id.The Appeals Court also noted that even if exclusion from
a jury view could constitute a due process violation, Hyatt had
failed to make the required showing that that violation had caused
him "substantial harm." Id. It also mentioned that it was
unpersuaded by Hyatt's attempt to analogize Justice Brady's
refusal to allow him to attend the view to allowing a defendant to
be seen by the jury in prison garb or shackles, which requires
particularized findings. Id.-5-
Hyatt petitioned the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court for further review, but his petition was denied.
Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 15 N.E.3d 762 (Mass. 2014).
Hyatt then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, alleging that the trial court violated
his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment when it denied his request to accompany the jury on a
view of the crime scene. The district court denied the petition,
but granted a certificate of appealability. Hyatt v. Gelb, 142
F. Supp. 3d 198, 205 (D. Mass. 2015). This appeal ensued.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's denial of habeas relief
de novo. Sánchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 293 (1st Cir. 2014).
"Our de novo review encompasses the district court's own
'determination of the appropriate standard of review of the state
court proceeding.'" Id. (quoting Zuluaga v. Spencer, 585 F.3d 27,
29 (1st Cir. 2009)). The district court is not entitled to
deference. Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
Rather, in these cases, we must "determine whether the habeas
petition should have been granted in the first instance."
Sánchez, 753 F.3d at 293.
-6-
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Standards
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Hodge v. Mendonsa, 739 F.3d 34, 41 (1st
Cir. 2013); Zuluaga, 585 F.3d at 29. Only a legal or factual
error that is objectively unreasonable warrants relief. Cooper
v. Bergeron, 778 F.3d 294, 299 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing White v.
Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)).
"An adjudication is on the merits[,] giving rise to
deference under § 2254(d) of AEDPA, if there is a decision finally
resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is
based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a
procedural, or other, ground." Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 99
(1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "[A] state-court adjudication of an issue framed in
terms of state law is nonetheless entitled to deference under
-7-
section 2254(d)(1) as long as the state and federal issues are for
all practical purposes synonymous and the state standard is at
least as protective of the defendant's rights." Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426
(1st Cir. 2009)).
"For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law." Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 122
(1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). "A state court's
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the
correctness of [the state court's] decision." Id. at 122-23(alteration in the original) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). "The more general the rule, the more leeway
courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations."
Id. at 123 (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664). "Thus, to obtain
federal habeas relief, a petitioner must show 'the state court's
ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id.(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).
-8-
C. Hyatt's Claims
Hyatt alleges that the Appeals Court's decision was
contrary to clearly established federal law because it did not
identify or apply the correct federal standard as to when a
defendant has a right to be present at a view. He points out that
the applicable standard was announced in Snyder, 291 U.S. 97, where
the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant's exclusion from
a view of the crime scene was a denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but notes that the Appeals Court did not
even mention it in its decision or cite any other federal authority
in support of its conclusions and, instead, relied on "a long line
of state court decisions." He also posits that "whether to exclude
a defendant from a view must be determined in the light of the
whole record," but the Appeals Court failed to do so.1
Hyatt is correct that the Appeals Court did not cite
Snyder or other federal precedent directly. We note, however,
that the precedent on which the Appeals Court relied did so.
Hyatt, 2014 WL 2178782, at *1 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 438
1 In the state courts and the district court Hyatt also claimed
that Justice Brady's refusal to permit his attendance at the view
undercut his presumption of innocence, as it is similar to
appearing before the jury in prison garb or shackles. Because
this argument was not meaningfully discussed in his brief as a
ground for relief before this Court, and it would fall outside of
the scope of the certificate of appealability, we limit our
discussion accordingly.
-9-
Mass. 142, 150-51 (2002) (citing Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08)).
And, in any event, a state court need not cite or even be aware of
Supreme Court cases to be entitled to deference under § 2254(d)
"so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-
court decision contradicts them." See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.
3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).
In this case, the Appeals Court held that a defendant
does not have a right to be present for a view and that a
defendant's absence does not offend his constitutional rights.
The Appeals Court recognized that "the particular circumstances of
a case may be such that events at a view may deny a defendant a
fair proceeding and thereby deprive him of due process," but noted
that a defendant making such a claim must show substantial harm
and Hyatt failed to do so.
In Snyder, the Court noted that while a defendant has a
right to be present at trial, "a view is not a 'trial' nor any
part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at
common law." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 113. It further stated that "in
a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under
the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever
his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Id.
at 105-06. The Supreme Court clarified that "[n]owhere in [its]
-10-
decisions . . . is there a dictum, and still less a ruling, that
the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of presence when
presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow." Id. at
106-07. Accordingly, "[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only."2 Id. at 107-
08. And "the justice or injustice" of excluding a defendant in a
particular set of circumstances "must be determined in the light
of the whole record." Id. at 115. The Supreme Court concluded
in Snyder that the denial of the defendant's request to be present
when the jury viewed the crime scene and the prosecutor and defense
counsel pointed out to the jury specific things they wanted them
to observe, did not constitute a denial of due process. Id. at
122.
Hyatt seems to interpret Snyder as the default being in
favor of attendance unless a judge makes particularized findings
based on the entire record justifying a defendant's absence from
2 The Supreme Court noted that "fairness is a relative, not an
absolute concept." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116. "It is fairness with
reference to particular conditions or particular results. 'The
due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty to
establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with
every modern improvement and with provision against every possible
hardship that may befall.'" Id. at 116-17 (quoting Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1921).
-11-
a view. The Appeals Court's interpretation of federal law,
however, seems to be aligned with the district court's reading of
Snyder as holding "that the default is that a defendant has no
right to be at a view unless there are particular circumstances
making such exclusion unfair." Hyatt, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 204
(quoting Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996)
("The lesson of Snyder is that, if in any given case the exclusion
of the defendant from a jury view is found to be a deprivation of
due process, it is not because the Constitution guarantees the
defendant an absolute right to be present; it is only because his
absence, under the particular circumstances of his case, can be
said to have denied him a fair proceeding.")). It is unnecessary
to determine which interpretation is more consistent with Snyder,
as it suffices to say that the Appeals Court's decision did not
contradict, nor was it an unreasonable application of, the Supreme
Court's holding in Snyder. See Mendonsa, 739 F.3d at 41-43. We
acknowledge that there might be a case where a defendant's absence
from a view may deny the defendant "fair and just" proceedings
and, thus, constitute a due process violation. See Snyder, 291
U.S. at 105-08. We note, however, that Hyatt did not make any
showing to the Appeals Court that, under the circumstances of his
case, his exclusion from the view denied him of a fair and just
proceeding or thwarted his opportunity to defend against the
-12-
charges he was facing. The record shows that, as in Snyder,
counsel for both parties did not present any evidence during the
view, but merely pointed out particular aspects at the scene to
the jury. In addition, Hyatt and his counsel had the opportunity
to review existing photographs, video, and maps related to the
view prior to trial. At trial, his counsel cross-examined the
Commonwealth's identification witnesses about their opportunity to
view the shooter and their truthfulness. He presented testimony
of three witnesses to demonstrate that he was not the shooter.
Finally, in addition to the lack of substantial harm, Hyatt was on
trial for "very serious charges," and Judge Brady noted there was
a lack of sufficient security personnel available.
In light of the above, we cannot conclude that the
Appeal's Court ruling "was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Linton, 812
F.3d at 123 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).
III. Conclusion
The Appeals Court did not rule "contrary to" or
unreasonably apply "clearly established Federal law."
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Hyatt's
habeas corpus petition.
Affirmed.
-13-