Barry v. Town of Rollinsford, NH ( 2004 )


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  •                Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 03-2599
    FREDERICK J. BARRY, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    TOWN OF ROLLINSFORD, NH, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Torruella and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges.
    Frederick J. and June M. Barry on brief pro se.
    Donald E. Gardner and Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., on
    brief for appellees.
    August 6, 2004
    Per Curiam.           The sole issue in this case is whether the
    district    court     properly     denied    the     plaintiffs'   motion    for
    reconsideration       of    the   underlying      judgment   granting    summary
    judgment for the defendants.          Because the plaintiffs' brief does
    not address the propriety of the order denying reconsideration, the
    issue is waived.       Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 
    370 F.3d 183
    , 188 (1st Cir. 2004).
    The denial of the motion for reconsideration was proper in any
    event.   The plaintiffs' motion sought to set aside the judgment as
    legally erroneous.         Such a motion is properly treated as a motion
    brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).              Feinstein v. Moses, 
    951 F.2d 16
    , 19 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991).          Rule 59(e) gives an aggrieved party
    ten days (excluding intermediate weekends and legal holidays)
    within which     to    file   a   motion    for    reconsideration.      Garcia-
    Velazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, 
    358 F.3d 6
    , 9 (1st Cir.
    2004).     The ten-day deadline is mandatory, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b),
    and a district court has no power or discretion to modify it.
    Vargas v. Gonzalez, 
    975 F.2d 916
    , 917 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
    In this case, the district court entered judgment on October
    7, 2003.    The Rule 59(e) motion was thus due on October 22, 2003.
    The plaintiffs did not file their motion until October 23, 2003.
    Therefore, the motion was untimely.               A district court is without
    jurisdiction to grant an untimely Rule 59(e) motion.                  Browder v.
    Director, Dep't of Corr., 
    434 U.S. 257
    , 263 & n.7 (1978); Garcia-
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    Velazquez, 
    358 F.3d at 11
    .      Accordingly, the order denying the
    motion for reconsideration was proper.1
    The plaintiffs' attempt to secure review of the underlying
    judgment is to no avail.   The plaintiffs ask that we excuse their
    untimely filings and review the merits of the judgment because of
    their pro se status and because they were "lulled" by the district
    court into believing that their notice of appeal was timely as to
    both the motion for reconsideration and the underlying judgment.
    While the Supreme Court has recognized that an untimely appeal may
    be heard under "unique circumstances," this exception "applies only
    where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would
    postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received
    specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been
    properly done." Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 
    489 U.S. 169
    , 178-79
    (1989).
    In this case, the district court did not take any action or
    make any statement regarding the timeliness of the motion for
    reconsideration, nor do the plaintiffs point to any such statement
    or   action.   Rather,   the   plaintiffs'   sole   support   for   their
    contention that they were "lulled into complacency" is the fact
    1
    Even if we consider the merits of the motion for
    reconsideration, it was still properly denied.         The motion
    essentially reiterated the arguments the plaintiffs made in
    opposing the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Relief under
    Rule 59(e) is for manifest errors of law or newly discovered
    evidence. Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 
    212 F.3d 607
    , 612 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs pointed to neither.
    -3-
    that the district court accepted their motion for reconsideration
    for filing and denied it without any explanation.                 The district
    court's acceptance and subsequent denial of the motion, without
    more, is simply not the sort of "specific assurance" required to
    justify the application of the "unique circumstances" exception.
    See Feinstein, 
    951 F.2d at 20
     (holding that order which erroneously
    granted motion to enlarge time for filing nondescript motion for
    reconsideration in no way excused late notice of appeal). Nor does
    the plaintiffs' pro se status absolve them from compliance with the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.            
    Id.
    Accordingly,      insofar    as   the   plaintiffs'   appeal    seeks   to
    challenge the October 7, 2003 judgment, it is dismissed for lack of
    appellate jurisdiction.          Insofar as it seeks to challenge the
    November   4,   2003    order    denying      the   plaintiffs'    motion    for
    reconsideration, the order is affirmed.
    It is so ordered.
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