Kagan v. El San Juan Hotel ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    September 9, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ___________________


    No. 93-1202




    MARSHALL J. KAGAN,

    Appellant,

    v.

    EL SAN JUAN HOTEL & CASINO, ET AL.,

    Appellees.

    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ___________________

    Marshall J. Kagan on brief pro se.
    _________________
    Daniel R. Dominguez, Marie E. Lopez-Adames and Dominguez &
    ____________________ _____________________ ___________
    Totti on brief for appellees El San Juan Hotel Corp. & Hans Lopez
    _____
    Stubbe.
    Carlos A. Quilichini and Ramon Lloveras Otero on brief for
    _____________________ ____________________
    appellee Rodrigo Otero Bigles.



    __________________


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    Per Curiam. Appellant Marshall J. Kagan appeals the
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    district court order affirming an order of the bankruptcy

    court. The district court found that Kagan's sole remedy for

    alleged harm following upon his dismissal from his position

    as comptroller of the El San Juan Hotel was pursuant to the

    Puerto Rico wrongful termination statute, 29 L.P.R.A. 185a.

    The court dismissed his other claims for relief. We affirm.



    The factual as well as the procedural background to this

    case are complex. We summarize from the facts found below.

    See Kagan v. San Juan Hotel Corp., 149 B.R. 263 (D.P.R.
    ___ _____ ______________________

    1992).

    Kagan was comptroller of the El San Juan Hotel when it

    filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in 1980. Kagan

    continued in his position under the court appointed

    bankruptcy trustee, Hector Rodriguez Estrada. After frequent

    disagreements between Kagan and Rodriguez as to how the

    estate should be managed, appellant was dismissed for

    unsatisfactory performance in December 1982. Kagan asserts

    that he was dismissed in retaliation for attempting to have

    the trusteeship of Rodriguez investigated.

    In March 1983, the Chapter 11 proceeding was converted

    to a Chapter 7 proceeding. In September 1983, Rodriguez was

    removed from the trusteeship by a unanimous vote of the

    creditors and replaced by appellee Lopez. Kagan urged Lopez



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    and Otero, the estate's attorney, to file suit against

    Rodriguez for abuse of his position. When they refused to

    file suit alleging that there was insufficient evidence

    against Rodriguez, Kagan accused Lopez and Otero of covering

    for Rodriguez. In 1985 suit was filed against Rodriguez by

    the United States as one of the estate's creditors.

    Rodriguez was found to have abused his trusteeship and a

    judgment of over 2 million dollars was imposed on Rodriguez

    on behalf of the estate. In Re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R.
    _________________________

    413 (D.P.R. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 847 F.2d
    _______________________________

    931 (1st Cir. 1988). Subsequently Rodriguez was convicted

    and sentenced for fraud.

    Kagan commenced suit against the estate and Rodriguez in

    March 1983. Kagan sought both compensation for wrongful

    termination and the removal from his personnel file of a

    letter indicating that he had been terminated for poor

    performance. When Lopez replaced Rodriguez, Kagan amended

    his suit and sought compensation, removal of the negative

    letter and a new letter of reference from Lopez and Otero.

    Although Lopez agreed to compensation for wrongful

    termination, he refused to remove the old letter or write a

    new one. Kagan asserts that the failure to remove the old

    letter from his file and to provide a new "corrected" letter

    prevented him from obtaining new employment for several years





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    and then resulted in his being compelled to accept a position

    at lower wages than he had previously earned.

    Kagan's suit "wend[ed] a torturous path through the

    judicial system." Kagan, 149 B.R. at 268. Trial in the
    _____

    bankruptcy court did not commence until May 1988. In

    September 1990 the bankruptcy court dismissed all claims

    against Lopez and Otero and allowed Kagan damages against the

    estate pursuant to 185a. The final order of the bankruptcy

    court did not issue until March 23, 1992. Kagan appealed the

    dismissal of his claims other than that under 185(a) to the

    district court which affirmed.

    On appeal to this court, Kagan seeks damages against

    Lopez and Otero for the failure to provide him with a new

    letter of reference. He also seeks additional damages from

    the estate for his wrongful dismissal.1



    Claims Against Lopez and Otero
    ______________________________



    ____________________

    1. In his prayer for relief, Kagan asks this court to
    "[r]emand to the Bankruptcy Court for appropriate action on
    the pending motion for Otero to disgorge his fees, and for
    Lopez to be removed from office and [to] forfeit[] his fees."
    The district court dismissed the claim against Otero on the
    ground that Kagan lacked standing to raise this claim in the
    context of a wrongful discharge suit. Kagan, 149 B.R. at
    _____
    270-72. We agree. Moreover, although the district court did
    not address the claim against Lopez, that claim would suffer
    the same defect. In any event, since Kagan has presented no
    argument to support this prayer in his brief, the issue is
    waived. Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir.
    ____ _______________
    1990) (issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory matter
    are deemed waived).

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    Kagan concedes that 29 L.P.R.A. 185a is the sole

    remedy for his claim of wrongful dismissal under Puerto Rico

    law. Weatherly v. International Paper Co., 648 F. Supp. 872,
    _________ _______________________

    878 (D.P.R. 1986) (citing cases). However, he notes that

    185a does not prohibit recovery when an employee "can

    establish that the employer committed an independent tortious

    act in the course of terminating employment." Id. at 877-78.
    __

    Kagan asserts that in this case Lopez and Otero committed the

    "independent tortious act of not correcting the record of

    dismissal and giving false bad references."2 He seeks

    recovery under 31 L.P.R.A. 5141 which provides that

    A person who by an act or omission causes
    damage to another through fault or negligence
    shall be obliged to repair the damage so
    done.

    To state a claim for damages under 5141, a plaintiff

    must show (1) that the defendants owed him a duty to prevent

    the harm suffered; (2) that the duty was negligently

    breached; and (3) that the breach caused the plaintiff harm.

    Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Grove Mfg. Co., 958 F.2d
    ______________________________ ______________

    1169, 1171 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing cases). In this case,

    Kagan has shown no basis for inferring that either Lopez or

    Otero had a legal duty to correct his references which had

    been given by the previous trustee Rodriguez ten months



    ____________________

    2. We assume, without deciding, that the failure to provide
    corrected references and the supplying of false ones would be
    within "the course of terminating employment."

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    before Lopez and Otero arrived on the scene. Even assuming

    that Lopez and Otero were employers of Kagan, they were under

    no obligation to provide any references to him. See 48
    ___

    Am.Jur.2d. Labor and Labor Relations 43 (in absence of

    statute "employer who discharges an employee is not liable to

    the employee for his refusal to give the employee a

    'character' or recommendation").3 Therefore, we cannot see

    why they would be required to provide "corrected" ones. "It

    is axiomatic that the failure to perform an act cannot give

    rise to a cause of action unless there was a legal duty to

    act." Torres v. United States, 621 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir.
    ______ ______________

    1980) (applying Puerto Rico law). Nor would it be reasonable

    to require Lopez and Otero to provide "corrected" references

    for an employee whom they never employed and whose

    performance they were therefore in no position to evaluate.

    Finally, while Lopez and Otero owe fiduciary duties to the

    bankrupt estate, see In Re Thompson, 965 F.2d 1136, 1145 (1st
    ___ ______________

    Cir. 1992), and to its creditors, In Re Consupak, Inc., 87
    ____________________

    B.R. 529, 539 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1988); Bankruptcy Code

    704(1), 11 U.S.C. 704(a) (duties of trustee), this duty






    ____________________

    3. Kagan's reliance on Ackerman v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 558,
    ________ ________
    202 S.W.2d 795 (1947), is in vain. In Ackerman, a state
    ________
    statute compelled the employer to provide a "service letter"
    upon terminating an employee. Puerto Rico has no such
    statute.

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    does not extend to Kagan who is seeking damages not as a

    creditor of the estate but as a former employee of it.4

    On appeal, Kagan also asserts that Lopez and Otero

    harmed him by providing false references. However, this

    claim was not raised below and therefore is not properly

    before us. Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894
    ________ _________________

    (1st Cir. 1979). In any event, Kagan admits that he never

    actually sought any references for a prospective employer

    from Lopez or Otero and that the uncorrected letter was never

    disseminated. His claim to have been harmed by receiving

    false references is devoid of merit.

    Similarly without merit is Kagan's reliance on 107,

    704 and 1106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1106(a),

    through incorporation of 704, provides that "[t]he trustee

    shall . . . unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such

    information concerning the estate and the estate's

    administration as is requested by a party in interest." 11

    U.S.C. 704(7). Section 107 provides that "the bankruptcy

    court shall . . . protect a person with respect to scandalous

    or defamatory matter contained in a paper filed in a case



    ____________________

    4. The district court found that Otero, as the estate's
    attorney, owed no duty to the employees of the estate.
    Kagan, 149 B.R. at 273. However, the district court did
    _____
    state that Lopez owed a duty to Kagan to act as a reasonable
    employer. Id. Since we find that Lopez owed no duty to Kagan
    __
    to provide corrected references, Kagan's claim would be
    subject to dismissal under the "reasonable employer" standard
    as well.

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    under this title." 11 U.S.C. 107(b)(2). Alleging that the

    uncorrected reference was defamatory, Kagan seeks to find in

    these provisions a duty on the part of the trustee to provide

    proper references and to revise false ones. However (1) any

    duty under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent the dissemination

    of defamatory material is imposed on the court not the

    trustee; (2) the allegedly defamatory letter is not a "paper

    filed" in a bankruptcy case; and (3) as noted above, Kagan

    concedes that the letter was never disseminated.



    Claim Against the Estate
    ________________________

    Kagan asserts that he is entitled to relief under the

    federal common law for his wrongful dismissal. According to

    Kagan, he was dismissed because he tried to stop the

    bankruptcy trustee from violating federal law. Moreover, he

    alleges that the Puerto Rico wrongful dismissal statute

    provides insufficient protection because of the limited

    amount of compensation the statute provides. Citing the

    federal interest in seeing that federal law is not violated,

    Kagan asks this court to formulate federal common law based

    on analogous state court decisions which have found a "public

    policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine where an

    employee is terminated for refusing to participate in illegal

    acts.





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    The instances in which a federal court has the authority

    to formulate a federal common law remedy are "few and

    restricted." Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
    ________ _______

    Absent some statutory authorization to formulate substantive

    rules of decision, and none is alleged here, the court has

    authority to create a federal common law remedy only when it

    is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." Texas
    _____

    Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
    _______________ _______________________

    640 (1981) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
    ______________________ _________

    U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). It is not enough that a remedy

    "supplements federal enforcement and fulfills the object of

    the statutory scheme." Id. at 642. Federal common law is
    __

    appropriate only where "the authority and duties of the

    United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because

    the interstate or international nature of the controversy

    makes it inappropriate for state law to control." Id. at
    __

    641. Moreover, "[i]n deciding whether rules of federal

    common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding

    principle is that a significant conflict between some federal

    policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first

    be specifically shown." Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum
    ______ _______________________

    Corp., 384 U.S 63, 68 (1966).
    ____

    We find no such "uniquely federal interests" in this

    case which would warrant the formulation of federal common

    law. Furthermore, no conflict exists here between the



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    federal policy to be promoted and the application of state

    law. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, like most states,

    already provides protection for those dismissed for acting in

    accordance with law. Finally, the rationale on which Kagan

    relies--i.e., that the court ought to formulate a federal

    common law remedy to protect those dismissed for upholding

    federal law--would apply to all federal regulatory schemes.

    Yet, Congress has chosen to enact specific protections for

    "whistle-blowers" where it has thought appropriate. See
    ___

    Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful
    _____________________________________________________

    Discharge: the Public Policy Exception, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1931,
    _______________________________________

    1934 (1983) (listing federal statutes). In adopting Kagan's

    rationale, we would not only be extending this protection

    into areas where Congress has not thought appropriate but we

    would be ignoring the Supreme Court's advisory that the

    appropriate occasions for the formulation of federal common

    law are "few and restricted." Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651. We
    ________

    decline to do so.

    Kagan calls our attention to Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d
    ______ ______

    726 (7th Cir. 1982). In Barany, the court formulated a
    ______

    federal common law remedy for reinstatement of federal credit

    union employees allegedly dismissed in violation of federal

    laws. This case is distinguishable from Barany in two ways.
    ______

    First, the decision in Barany was based in part on the
    ______

    congressional desire to "insure uniform development in credit



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    unions." Id. at 733. In contrast, no similar desire for
    __

    national uniformity is found in congressional control over

    bankruptcy law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 n.9
    ______ _____________

    (1979) (bankruptcy law frequently recognizes state

    substantive law). Second, the rationale of Barany--that the
    ______

    federalization of the governance of an institution makes it

    of "uniquely federal interest"--was limited to federal credit

    unions and similar federal institutions. Barany, 670 F.2d at
    ______

    734. We see no principled way to limit the rationale for the

    remedy sought in the present case.5

    The opinion of the district court is affirmed.
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    ____________________

    5. We also note that the Fourth Circuit has disagreed with
    the Barany holding. Ridenour v. Andrews Federal Credit
    ______ ________ _______________________
    Union, 897 F.2d 715, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to
    _____
    fashion federal remedy as a matter of federal common law to
    create cause of action for federal credit union employees
    challenging adverse employment actions).

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