Action for Children v. FCC ( 1993 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-2225

    ACTION FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVISION,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,

    Respondents.

    ____________________

    COALITION ON SMOKING OR HEALTH,

    Intervenor.
    ____________________

    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    ____________________


    Sharon L. Webber with whom Angela J. Campbell and Henry Geller
    _________________ ___________________ ____________
    were on brief for petitioner and intervenor.
    C. Grey Pash, Jr., Counsel, Federal Communications Commission,
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    with whom Renee Licht, Acting General Counsel, Federal Communications
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    Commission, Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal
    ___________________
    Communications Commission, Robert B. Nicholson, Attorney, United
    _____________________
    States Department of Justice, and Marion L. Jetton, Attorney, United
    _________________
    States Department of Justice, were on brief for respondents.


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    July 22, 1993
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    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Action for Children's Television
    _____________

    ("ACT") petitions for review of the decision of the Federal

    Communications Commission denying ACT's request that the FCC

    take action to combat "hidden commercials" on television that

    promote smoking. We deny the petition.

    In 1966, acting on a private citizen petition, the FCC

    required broadcasters, under the "fairness doctrine," to air

    anti-smoking messages in response to advertisements by

    cigarette companies. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C.
    ___ ______________

    Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).1 In 1969,
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    Congress enacted the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

    ("the Cigarette Act"), 15 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., which
    __ ___

    pertinently provided that "it shall be unlawful to advertise

    cigarettes or little cigars over any medium of electronic

    communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal

    Communications Commission." 15 U.S.C. 1335.

    In 1970, an organization called Action on Smoking and

    Health ("ASH") petitioned the FCC to require broadcasters to

    continue to air anti-smoking messages, despite the

    prohibition contained in the Cigarette Act, partly on the

    ground that the cigarette industry was using "hidden


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    1The fairness doctrine was an FCC rule requiring
    broadcasters to air contrasting views when controversial
    issues were addressed. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
    ___ ________________________________
    395 U.S. 367 (1968). The rule was abandoned by the
    Commission in August 1987. See Syracuse Peace Council v.
    ___ ___________________________
    FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
    ___ _____ ______
    1019 (1990).

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    commercials" to circumvent the Act. The quoted phrase, as

    ACT uses it, refers to cigarette company sponsorship of

    sporting events during which the cigarette brand name or logo

    is displayed on signs or banners, which in turn are broadcast

    during televised coverage of these events, such as the

    Marlboro Grand Prix auto race and the Virginia Slims tennis

    tournament. The FCC denied the ASH request. The agency said

    that it found no hard evidence of the use of "hidden

    commercials" by the cigarette industry, and concluded that

    "if such abuses do occur . . . , the appropriate action in

    such an eventuality would be to secure full and effective

    compliance with the 1969 law, and not to deal with it by

    offsetting anti-smoking messages." Formulation of
    ________________

    Appropriate Further Regulatory Policies Concerning Cigarette
    _____________________________________________________________

    Advertising and Antismoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453,
    __________________________________________

    458 n.5 (1970).

    In 1990, ACT filed with the FCC the petition at issue in

    this case. ACT claimed that there is now indisputable

    evidence that the cigarette industry is using "hidden

    commercials." According to the petition the Department of

    Justice has never initiated any enforcement proceedings under

    the Cigarette Act and therefore appears to have concluded

    that hidden commercials do not violate the statute, creating

    the need for FCC action. ACT requested the FCC to issue a

    "declaratory ruling" requiring licensees to air anti-smoking



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    messages to offset the harm caused by the hidden advertising.

    Because the fairness doctrine was no longer in existence, ACT

    relied on the "public interest standard" set forth in the

    Communications Act of 1934 to govern the regulation and

    licensing of broadcasters. 47 U.S.C. 303; see also id.
    ___ ____ __

    307(a), 309(a), 310(d).

    ACT's petition was denied by the Commission in August

    1992. In re Petition For Declaratory Relief Regarding Anti-
    ______________________________________________________

    Smoking Messages Filed by Action for Children's Television, 7
    __________________________________________________________

    F.C.C.R. 5466 (1992). The FCC said that this issue had been

    raised and resolved in the 1970 proceedings brought by ASH,

    and that ACT had presented nothing new. The Commission

    stated that it "continue[d] to believe that the Cigarette Act

    itself is properly looked to as defining both the conduct

    that is prohibited [with respect to cigarette advertising]

    and the remedies that are available to redress violations."

    Id. It is undisputed that the Department of Justice, not the
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    FCC, is exclusively charged with enforcing the provisions of

    the Cigarette Act. See 15 U.S.C. 1339. ACT now petitions
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    this court for review.2


    ____________________

    2It appears that ACT, which had been a Massachusetts
    corporation, was formally dissolved as of December 31, 1992,
    after its petition was filed in this court. By letter, the
    FCC says that ACT's dissolution "raises the question whether
    it continues to be a party aggrieved" by the FCC's action.
    In response ACT points out that under Massachusetts law, a
    dissolved corporation "shall nevertheless be continued as a
    body corporate for three years . . . for the purpose of
    prosecuting or defending suits by or against it." Mass. G.L.

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    An agency's decision not to undertake a new project,
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    regulation, or enforcement action has been treated by courts

    as a somewhat unusual animal in the menagerie of agency

    actions that may be presented for judicial review. Of

    course, where there is a statutory obligation on the agency

    to take a relatively specific action, a court might easily

    conclude that it had both a standard to apply to a shirking

    agency and a duty to enforce the standard. More often,

    agencies make decisions not to act under rather broad

    statutory standards or, as is typically true of enforcement

    actions, under a general mandate to enforce the law.

    In such cases courts have been reluctant to second-guess

    agencies when they decline to act. In some areas,

    paralleling prosecutorial decisions not to seek indictment,

    courts are reluctant to intervene at all; in others, they

    have recognized great discretion in the agency when it

    declines to act and required only minimal justification. See
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    Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); United Church of
    _______ ______ _________________

    Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1990). As the circuit
    ______ ___

    most experienced in these matters said in another case,





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    ch. 155, 51; see also City Communications, Inc. v. Detroit,
    ________ ____________________________________
    888 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (6th Cir. 1989) (looking to state
    corporate law to determine standing of dissolved
    corporation). Given the statute coupled with the FCC's
    posture on the issue, we think that denial of the petition on
    the merits is the proper course.

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    Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d
    __________________________________________________

    1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citations omitted):

    An agency's discretionary decision not to regulate
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    a given activity is inevitably based, in large
    measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to
    judicial resolution -- e.g., internal management
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    considerations as to budget and personnel;
    evaluations of its own competence; weighing of
    competing policies within a broad statutory
    framework.

    This court has made similar observations, see, e.g.,
    ___ ____

    Ward v. Skinner, 943 F.2d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 1991), and the
    _______________

    standard of deference thus adopted controls this case. We

    need not conclude that the FCC's refusal to undertake a rule-

    making is automatically immune from judicial review, no

    matter how egregious the occasion or how troubling the

    agency's explanation. Here, the FCC's explanation is quite

    rational. In sum, the agency ruled that Congress provided a

    general ban on television cigarette advertising as part of a

    "comprehensive" federal program, 15 U.S.C. 1331, and, if

    the ban is being infringed at the margins, Department of

    Justice enforcement is the preferable course. Given the

    FCC's broad discretion as to how to deploy its limited

    resources, this is an adequate explanation.

    ACT says that the explanation is faulty to the extent

    that hidden commercials are a "loophole" in the law and thus








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    beyond the reach of the Department of Justice.3 Even if

    this were so, it would not make the FCC's position

    unreasonable. Instead, it could rationally leave to Congress

    the task of adjusting the balance it struck in its

    "comprehensive" statute. Plugging loopholes might also be a
    ____

    rational goal for the agency (we have no occasion here to

    consider preemption arguments); but agency resources are

    limited and selecting which rational goals to pursue is part

    of the agency's function.

    There is even less to ACT's alternative criticism that

    the FCC's decision in this case is inconsistent with its

    reasoning in its earlier decision declining to act on ASH's

    petition. ACT argues that the FCC there declined to act

    because it found a lack of evidence that hidden commercials

    were a significant problem and, ACT says, it has now provided

    the missing evidence. But the FCC went on to say in the ASH
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    case that, if the problem proved real, the solution would be

    "to secure full and effective compliance with the 1969 law,

    and not to deal with it by offsetting anti-smoking messages."

    27 F.C.C.2d at 458 n.5. There is no inconsistency.

    The petition for review is denied.
    ______




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    3There is in fact some indication that the Department of
    Justice has taken the view that hidden commercials violate
    the statute and has written to cigarette companies and
    broadcasters warning them of its position. Whether or not
    this is the Department's present view is not material.

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