United States v. Monteiro ( 2017 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
FRANCISCO MONTEIRO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Julia Pamela Heit for appellant.
David B. Goodhand, Attorney, Criminal Division, Appellate
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Carmen Ortiz, United
States Attorney, Christopher J. Pohl, Assistant United States
Attorney, Timothy E. Moran, Assistant United States Attorney,
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, and Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
were on brief for appellee.
September 15, 2017
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. In 2011 appellant Francisco
Monteiro and his accomplice Joseph Guarneri planned and executed
a robbery of fellow drug traffickers Stanley and Joshua Gonsalves.
Guarneri subsequently became a customer of Monteiro's, purchasing
fifty to one hundred grams of heroin from him on a weekly basis.
In early 2013, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents
apprehended Guarneri for drug trafficking and convinced him to
turn government's witness against his former co-conspirator.
After an eight-day trial, a jury found Monteiro guilty
on one count relating to the 2011 robbery and three counts relating
to the subsequent drug conspiracy. Monteiro challenges his
conviction and sentence on numerous grounds. Finding none of his
contentions meritorious, we affirm.
I. Background
We provide a summary of the essential facts of this case,
framed in the light most compatible with the jury's verdict, saving
additional detail for the analysis that follows. See United States
v. Manor, 633 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
A. The 2011 Robbery
Monteiro first became friendly with fellow Boston-area
drug trafficker Joseph Guarneri in 2009, and Guarneri began selling
him oxycodone. Eventually, Monteiro told Guarneri that he could
supply him pills at a better price. Soon after, the buyer-seller
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relationship flipped and Guarneri began purchasing batches of
fifty to one hundred oxycodone pills from Monteiro to resell.
Guarneri then began travelling to Florida to purchase
larger quantities of oxycodone from another supplier. He
eventually introduced two other Boston-area drug traffickers, the
brothers Stanley and Joshua Gonsalves, to his Florida supplier.
After Stanley Gonsalves purchased a large batch of pills from
Guarneri's supplier, he asked Guarneri to set up another purchase.
Guarneri and Monteiro responded to this request by formulating a
scheme to rob the Gonsalves brothers.
Guarneri told Stanley Gonsalves that he could secure
10,000 oxycodone pills in exchange for $225,000. On May 13, 2011
Guarneri lured the Gonsalves brothers to Monteiro's home to execute
the purported drug purchase. When the Gonsalves brothers arrived,
Guarneri brought Stanley into Monteiro's home, while Joshua
remained in his brother's blue Mercedes SUV with another associate
and approximately $225,000 in cash. Inside the home, Stanley told
Monteiro that he wanted to see the pills so that he could examine
and count them. Monteiro told Stanley that he would not show him
the pills until Stanley showed him the $225,000. Stanley agreed,
and sent Guarneri out to his car to fetch his brother Joshua and
the money.
After Guarneri reentered the home with Joshua and the
money, two other accomplices who had been lying-in-wait -- Tavares
- 3 -
Bonnett and Michael Fula -- drew their guns and trained them on
the Gonsalves brothers. Initially, Stanley refused to hand over
the cash to Monteiro. To overcome this resistance, Bonnett hit
Stanley on the side of the head with his gun. Stanley then handed
the money over to Monteiro and his accomplices. At Monteiro's
instruction, Guarneri again went outside to the Gonsalves vehicle
to secure any weapons the brothers might have brought with them.
After Guarneri found a gun in the vehicle, Monteiro, Bonnett, Fula,
and Stanley all rushed out of the house, and Guarneri handed the
weapon to Monteiro.
Disarmed, the Gonsalves brothers got into their Mercedes
and drove away. At that point, four other individuals who had
been hiding in the house rushed out, jumped into a parked Volvo,
and sped off in the same direction as the Mercedes. Eventually,
the Volvo passed the Gonsalves brothers' Mercedes, and the Mercedes
rammed the Volvo off the road. Meanwhile, Monteiro, Guarneri,
Bonnett, and Fula traveled to the home of Monteiro's grandmother,
where they divided the proceeds of the robbery. Monteiro kept
most of the money. Guarneri collected $70,000, and the remaining
cash was split between Bonnett and Fula.
B. The 2013 Drug Conspiracy
By 2012, Monteiro had begun selling heroin to Guarneri
in batches of either fifty or one hundred grams. Sometimes
Monteiro sold him powdered heroin. At other times the heroin was
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solid, either in the shape of a hockey puck or a tall, narrow
cylinder.
In early 2013, the DEA approached Guarneri and informed
him that he would soon be facing a federal indictment for drug
trafficking. Agents told Guarneri that he could reduce his prison
sentence if he cooperated in an investigation against Monteiro,
and Guarneri agreed to assist them.
Guarneri first called Monteiro while serving as a DEA
informant on February 14, arranging to purchase 100 grams of heroin
at a price of $6,500. The following day, Guarneri drove to New
Bedford, Massachusetts and picked up Monteiro and Monteiro's
cousin, Manuel Lopes, to initiate the heroin sale. Monteiro and
Lopes directed Guarneri to a building, and Lopes took Guarneri
into an apartment there. Inside, Guarneri gave Lopes and another
individual $6,500 in exchange for 96.4 grams of heroin.
On February 20, Guarneri again met with Monteiro, this
time to set up a fifty-gram heroin purchase. The two spoke again
by phone two days later, and Monteiro directed Guarneri to purchase
the drugs from Lopes in New Bedford. When Guarneri met Lopes later
that day, however, Lopes told Guarneri that his source was not
able to procure the heroin, and Guarneri left empty-handed.
Guarneri again spoke with Monteiro by phone several days
later on February 25, and Monteiro confirmed that the sale would
go forward that day. He also told Guarneri that they would not be
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conducting the sale in the same apartment as the previous
transaction because Monteiro had robbed the occupant in the
interim. When Guarneri traveled to New Bedford to purchase the
drugs, he found Lopes rather than Monteiro at the site. Lopes
tried to coax Guarneri to advance him the money without providing
the heroin, but Guarneri refused. Lopes left the site, and
Monteiro showed up and berated Guarneri for not trusting his
accomplice. Monteiro convinced Guarneri to hand over the money,
and he purportedly left to get the heroin. However, Monteiro never
came back. Later, Monteiro called Guarneri and falsely told him
that he had been stopped by the police and they had seized the
purchase money.
Days later, law-enforcement authorities secured arrest
warrants for Monteiro and Lopes, and search warrants for their
respective residences. Police executed the warrants on March 1.
At Monteiro's home, police found $1,300 in currency with serial
numbers matching the money that DEA agents had given to Guarneri.
They also discovered seven small envelopes of heroin stamped with
the word "Future" in green ink. At Lopes's residence, police found
thousands of identically packaged envelopes with the green
"Future" identifier.
In September 2014, a federal grand jury in Massachusetts
issued a five-count superseding indictment charging Monteiro,
Lopes, and another individual with conspiring to possess with
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intent to distribute one hundred grams or more of heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); and possession with intent
to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (Count 3). The indictment also charged Monteiro, alone,
with conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 4); and using and carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 5).
After an eight-day trial in April 2015, a jury convicted
Monteiro on Counts 1 - 4 and acquitted him on Count 5. The district
court sentenced Monteiro to 250 months of imprisonment and 8 years
of supervised release. Monteiro timely appealed both his
conviction and sentence.
II. Discussion
Monteiro presses six primary claims of error on appeal,
asserting that: (1) the drug charges (Counts 1 - 3) and the robbery
charges (Counts 4 and 5) were improperly joined and should have
been severed; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to convict him for possession with intent to distribute heroin
(Count 3); (3) the district court admitted evidence that he views
as inappropriately prejudicial; (4) the district court erred in
curtailing his attorney's attempt to question defense witness
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Joshua Gonsalves on redirect; (5) the district court's jury
instructions relating to the terms "aiding and abetting" were
flawed; and (6) the district court improperly applied certain
sentencing enhancements when calculating his Guidelines Sentencing
Range. We address each argument in turn.
A. Joinder of Charges and Denial of Monteiro's Motion to Sever
Before trial Monteiro argued that the drug conspiracy
charges and robbery charges should have been tried separately and
that the decision to join them violated Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(a).1 He also unsuccessfully argued that even if
initial joinder was appropriate, the district should have severed
the charges pursuant to Rule 14(a).2 Monteiro renews both
arguments on appeal.
A "Rule 8 claim is primarily one of law, which we review
de novo, while [a] Rule 14 claim involves application of a general
standard to particular facts, such that deference to the lower
court is appropriate." United States v. Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76,
87 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
1Rule 8(a) states that "[t]he indictment or information may
charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if
the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character,
or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with
or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan."
2Rule 14(a) states: "[i]f the joinder of offenses . . . in
an indictment . . . appears to prejudice a defendant . . . the
court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendant['s]
trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires."
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v. Meléndez, 301 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2002)). Hence, we review
a trial court's denial of a Rule 14 motion to sever for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 694-95 (1st
Cir. 1994).
1. Joinder
Rule 8(a) states that joinder of charges is appropriate
if the offenses "are of the same or similar character" or if they
"are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or
plan." Boulanger, 444 F.3d at 87. We have stated that the rule's
joinder provision should be "generously construed in favor of
joinder." United States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623, 627 (1st Cir.
1996); see also Meléndez, 301 F.3d at 35. The two sets of charges
need not be identical, and "we assess similarity in terms of how
the government saw its case at the time of the indictment."
Boulanger, 444 F.3 at 87 (quoting Meléndez, 301 F.3d at 35).
Traditionally, we consider factors such as whether the charged
offenses fall under the same statute, whether the crimes involved
similar victims, locations, or modes of operation, as well as when
the purported conduct occurred. Id. Moreover, joinder is proper
if it "allows the jury to see the complete set of facts about the
alleged criminal enterprise." 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 143 (4th ed. 2016).
Hence, we also consider "the extent of common evidence" among the
charged offenses. Randazzo, 80 F.3d at 628.
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Based on these considerations, joinder of Monteiro's
charges was appropriate. Throughout the trial, the government
sought to prove that Monteiro was not only a drug dealer, but also
a "robbery artist" -- stealing both cash and drugs from other
dealers -- to finance his own enterprise. Moreover, Guarneri was
a key link between the two sets of crimes. He was not, as Monteiro
suggests, a happenstance prosecution witness who could have
testified at two different trials. Rather, Guarneri provided
crucial testimony that tied together the strands of Monteiro's
entire criminal enterprise, as he was both Monteiro's accomplice
in robbing the Gonsalves brothers (Counts 4 and 5) and Monteiro's
customer in the drug conspiracy (Counts 1 - 3). Furthermore, the
government presented evidence at trial indicating that Monteiro
had set up a drug deal with Guarneri, only to later steal
Guarneri's money, just as he did with the Gonsalves brothers.3
Although the sets of charges arose from events that occurred almost
3At trial, the government referred to this incident as a
"robbery." Monteiro objects to this characterization, pointing
out that "robbery" is a crime of violence and that he took
Guarneri's money without force. The government argues that
Monteiro used intimidating tactics to pressure Guarneri into
handing over the money, which would qualify as a robbery.
Ultimately, however, the formal characterization of the incident
with Guarneri -- whether it was a robbery or theft -- does not
matter for the joinder analysis. What matters is that the robbery
charged in the indictment and the incident with Guarneri show a
similar mode of operation -- Monteiro stealing money to fund his
drug enterprise.
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two years apart, that timing alone is not enough to overcome Rule
8(a)'s generous presumption in favor of joinder.
2. Motion to Sever
Rule 14(a) provides that a court "may order separate
trials of counts" if consolidating the charges "appears to
prejudice a defendant." See also Boulanger, 444 F.3d at 87.
Monteiro argues that he suffered the prejudice envisioned by Rule
14(a) because he desired to testify in his own defense on the
robbery charges, but wished to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent on the drug conspiracy charges. Indeed, we have
recognized this dilemma as a form of prejudice that sometimes makes
severance proper. See United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 42
(1st Cir. 1985).
To deserve a severance of charges in such circumstances,
a defendant must make "a convincing showing that he has both
important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need
to refrain from testifying on the other." Alosa, 14 F.3d at 695(quoting Scivola, 766 F.2d at 43) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To meet this standard, a defendant must "present enough
information -- regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to
give on one count and his reasons for not wishing to testify on
the other -- to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is
genuine" as well as "to enable it intelligently to weigh the
considerations of economy and expedition in judicial
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administration against the defendant's interest in having a free
choice with respect to testifying." United States v. Tracy, 989
F.2d 1279, 1283 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Baker v. United States,
401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Monteiro concedes that his pre-trial motion to sever did
not provide any information beyond a desire to testify as to the
robbery counts and not the drug conspiracy counts. The district
court thus denied his motion for failing to demonstrate "real and
substantial prejudice." When Monteiro attempted to renew the
motion to sever mid-trial, the court rejected the request as
untimely.
Before us, Monteiro does not dispute the district
court's specific rulings. Rather, he now argues for the first
time that our entire body of precedent requiring a defendant to
provide a proffer of potential testimony violates his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Because the argument
was not raised below, this challenge is procedurally flawed in a
multitude of ways. In any event, this panel does not have the
authority to overturn this court's well-established precedent.
See United States v. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2013)
(explaining that "[t]he law of the circuit doctrine" binds future
"panel decision[s] absent any intervening authority"). Moreover,
we fail to see how requiring a proffer impedes Monteiro's Fifth
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Amendment right. "To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege,
a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542
U.S. 177, 189 (2004). A proffer in connection with a motion to
sever filed by a defendant's attorney could hardly be considered
testimonial. Nor could it be used by the prosecution to later
incriminate a defendant. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 390 (1968) (holding that defendant's testimony to establish
standing for purposes of claiming a Fourth Amendment violation
"should not be admissible against him at trial on the question of
guilt or innocence"). Hence, Monteiro's severance argument lacks
merit.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 3
Monteiro argues that the evidence presented by the
government at trial was insufficient to convict him on Count 3,
which charged possession with intent to distribute heroin. We
review sufficiency challenges de novo. United States v. Alejandro-
Montañez, 778 F.3d 352, 357 (1st Cir. 2015). We draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of conviction, and we must affirm
the guilty verdict so long as any "reasonable jury could find the
defendant[] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of
the charged offense." Id. (quoting United States v. Rosado-Pérez,
605 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2010)). Testimony from one witness,
alone, can be enough to sustain a finding of guilt. Id.- 13 -
At trial the government sought to prove that Lopes was
the principal who committed the possession-with-intent-to-
distribute crime and that Monteiro was guilty as an aider and
abettor. To establish aiding and abetting liability, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
"associated himself with the venture," "participated in [the
venture] as something that he wished to bring about," and that he
"sought by his actions to make the venture succeed." United States
v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 311 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2008)).
Although Monteiro does not contest that the government
proved that Lopes committed the crime as a principal, he claims on
three grounds that the government failed to establish his aiding
and abetting liability.
First, Monteiro states that the government offered no
evidence connecting him to Lopes on March 1, 2013, the date set
forth in Count 3 of the indictment. Pointing out that authorities
apprehended him at home at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of March 1, he
argues that he could not possibly have aided and abetted Lopes on
that date if he was sleeping from midnight through 6:00 a.m. and
under arrest from 6:00 a.m. onward. The indictment, however,
alleged that the crime occurred "on or about" March 1, and the
government therefore needed to prove only that Monteiro aided and
abetted Lopes's crime "within a reasonable time of the date stated
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in the indictment." United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017,
1020 (1st Cir. 1984); see also id. ("Where the time of an offense
is not important, it may be alleged generally, and 'on or about'
permits a reasonable variance in dates.").
Second, Monteiro suggests an inconsistency between the
jury finding him guilty of Count 3, yet failing to find that "100
grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
amount of heroin was attributable and reasonably foreseeable by
. . . Monteiro."4 The jury's findings present no inconsistency.
The jury could have decided that Monteiro aided and abetted Lopes's
heroin possession with intent to distribute, but that he did not
know the amount of drugs in Lopes's cache. In any event,
inconsistent findings are "not grounds for reversing a
conviction." United States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d 89,
104 (1st Cir. 2014).
Finally, Monteiro insists that to convict him on Count
3, the jury was necessarily forced to draw too many unreasonable
inferences from the presented evidence. We disagree. As discussed
above, the government offered ample evidence of Monteiro working
4
On the verdict sheet, Count 3 had a sub-part which the jury
was required to answer if it voted to convict on that count, which
read: "We further find beyond a reasonable doubt that 100 grams or
more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
heroin was attributable to and reasonably foreseeable by
defendant, Francisco Monteiro." The jury answered this sub-part
"Not Proven."
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in tandem with Lopes to sell Guarneri 96.4 grams of heroin on
February 14. Other evidence demonstrated that Monteiro attempted
to coordinate a second heroin purchase between Guarneri and Lopes
in the following two weeks. Also, when he was arrested, the police
discovered seven envelopes of heroin in Monteiro's home stamped
with the word "Future" in green ink, which were identical to
thousands of envelopes discovered at Lopes's residence. These
facts, in combination, were sufficient for a reasonable jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Monteiro aided and abetted
Lopes's possession with intent to distribute heroin.5
C. Admission of Purportedly Prejudicial Evidence
Monteiro argues that the district court admitted two
bodies of evidence at trial that were unfairly prejudicial: (1)
Guarneri's testimony that Monteiro stole his DEA-supplied money;
and (2) tape recordings that he views as overly inflammatory. We
address each in turn.
5 In his brief, Monteiro attempts to rationalize the evidence
presented against him by formulating an alternative explanation
for the events that occurred. This is an acceptable strategy
before a jury, but on appeal this strategy flips the sufficiency
issue on its head. Our job as an appellate court is not to second-
guess the jury's verdict by considering alternative accounts of
the facts. Rather, we must uphold a verdict so long as any
reasonable jury could have settled upon it. Alejandro-Montañez,
778 F.3d at 357.
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1. Theft of Guarneri's Money
As noted above, Guarneri testified at trial that
Monteiro took the $3,250 from him provided by the DEA, and never
provided Guarneri the drugs that he was attempting to purchase.
During summation, the prosecutor referred to this occurrence as a
robbery. The prosecutor also repeatedly referred to Monteiro as
a "robber" throughout the closing argument.6
Monteiro argues that evidence of stealing Guarneri's
money was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).7 He
further contends that even if it could be properly admitted, it
should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.8
We review a district court's evidentiary rulings under Rules 404(b)
6 For example: "Francisco Monteiro is a drug dealer who robs
other drug dealers;" "if you're going to be a drug dealer who
robs other drug dealers, you need to have a sixth sense . . . ;"
and "[Monteiro] explains why Lopes has drugs in his possession at
his house available for Guarneri to pick up because they robbed
the guys they went to buy from a couple of days ago."
7 Rule 404(b)(1) states that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,
or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character." However, Rule 404(b)(2) provides
for an exception, stating that such "evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident."
8 Rule 403 states: "The court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
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and 403 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Villarman-
Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2003).
We detect no abuse of discretion in the court's admission
of the evidence. Rule 404(b)'s prohibition of evidence of "prior
bad acts" applies "to evidence that is extrinsic to the crime
charged, and is introduced for the purpose of showing villainous
propensity." United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 56 (1st
Cir. 2012). But when the evidence presented is "intrinsic to the
crime charged in the indictment . . . Rule 404(b) is really not
implicated at all." Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d at 11. When
Monteiro took Guarneri's money, tape-recorded evidence revealed
that Monteiro berated Guarneri for not handing the money over to
Lopes when the two had met earlier. Furthermore, Guarneri
testified that Monteiro persuaded him to hand over the DEA-supplied
money by promising to "go and get the drugs and bring them back."
The tape recording and Guarneri's testimony constituted direct
evidence intrinsic to the crime charged in the indictment
-- Monteiro's drug conspiracy with Lopes. Hence, Rule 404(b) does
not prohibit its admission.
Nor was the court obliged to exclude the evidence under
Rule 403. Determinations under Rule 403 require a "balancing act"
that "is a quintessentially fact-sensitive enterprise, and the
trial judge is in the best position to make such factbound
assessments." United States v. Mare, 668 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir.
- 18 -
2012) (quoting Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 15-16 (1st Cir.
2001)). We therefore only "rarely and in extraordinarily
compelling circumstances . . . reverse a district court's on-the-
spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value
and unfair [prejudice]." Id. Here, the district court's decision
to admit the evidence was reasonable under Rule 403's generous
standard. The evidence was significant in demonstrating a pattern
of conduct by Monteiro, and the court could reasonably conclude
that any resulting prejudice was not "unfair."9
2. February 20 Tape Recordings
At trial, the prosecution presented audio-recorded
evidence of a February 20, 2013 meeting between Monteiro and
Guarneri in which Monteiro was purportedly attempting to arrange
for Guarneri to purchase fifty grams of heroin from Lopes. In the
meeting, Guarneri complained to Monteiro about the past drug
purchase, when Guarneri had been instructed to meet with Lopes and
a third accomplice. Specifically, Guarneri protested that he did
not trust this other accomplice. Monteiro responded that Guarneri
need not worry about this additional person, stating: "Let me tell
you something. The motherfucker tries to do me dirty in New
9 As to Monteiro's complaints regarding the prosecutor
referring to him as a "robber" during his closing argument, we
find no impropriety. Count 4 charged Monteiro with committing a
robbery, and the prosecutor was free to state as much during his
closing argument.
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Bedford, he's already thinking repercussion is murder, my nigga."
At a later point in the recorded conversation, Monteiro complained
to Guarneri about a mutual female contact calling him seeking
drugs. Monteiro lamented that the woman would not stop pestering
him and told Guarneri that he finally said to her: "Don't call me.
. . . Bitch, I'll punch you in the fucking face, yo. You was just
in a raid."
These tape recordings provided pertinent direct evidence
of Monteiro's charged drug dealing. Specifically, the recordings
linked Monteiro to Guarneri's heroin purchase from Lopes.10 Even
if the language used could be seen as inflammatory, we cannot say
it "substantially outweighed" the probative value of the
recordings. Hence, Rule 403 does not foreclose their admission.
D. Redirect of Joshua Gonsalves
Joshua Gonsalves -- one of the victims of the May 13,
2011 robbery for which Monteiro was convicted on Count 4 --
testified as a defense witness at trial. Although the government
had presented evidence that Monteiro's accomplices damaged the
Gonsalves brothers' Mercedes on the evening of the May 13 robbery,
10We note that Monteiro argued in the sufficiency section of
his brief that the government proved, at best, that Monteiro and
Lopes had dealt drugs in the past and that the two happened to be
acquaintances, but that Monteiro was "not connected by any hard
evidence" to Lopes's drug possession and that he was subjected to
an "unconstitutional standard" of "guilt by association." The
February 20 recordings belie this assertion.
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Joshua testified that the car had actually been damaged when he
was driving it on May 10. He further testified that he spent the
evening of May 13 with his daughter. Monteiro's attorney did not
ask Joshua any questions directly related to the May 13 robbery.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Joshua a
series of questions regarding his brother, Stanley Gonsalves, and
Stanley's actions on the evening of May 13. The following exchange
occurred toward the end of this line of questioning:
PROSECUTOR: And did [Stanley] tell you about
that bag of cash and how on May 13 he brought
it to [a woman's] house?
JOSHUA: No, he did not.
PROSECUTOR: And how [Stanley] was concerned
after the robbery that someone would come
after the rest of the cash and that's why he
brought it to [her] house, right?
JOSHUA: No, he did not. He never mentioned
the robbery, a robbery to me, any robbery. He
never mentioned the bag of cash. I'm sure if
he was trying to hide a bag of cash, he
wouldn't have let too many people know if he
was hiding it or where he was hiding it.
On redirect, Monteiro's attorney asked Joshua: "You were
asked about a robbery on May 13, 2011, weren't you?" The
prosecutor immediately objected to this question, though Joshua
responded: "Yes." Before the court ruled on the objection, Joshua
offered, unsolicited: "I was never robbed." The prosecutor asked
the court to strike the response, and the court instructed the
jury: "Jurors, anything that was said when a question was not
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pending is not for you to consider." The court then sustained the
prosecutor's objection, noting that it recalled the question in
reference to be about "the bag of money" and not about "the
robbery." Precluded from questioning Joshua about the May 13
robbery, Monteiro's attorney ended his redirect.
Monteiro argues that his attorney was unfairly cut off
from fully questioning Joshua, a "key defense witness, whose
testimony could well have made a drastic difference" in the jury's
finding on whether the charged robbery occurred. "The scope of
redirect examination is discretionary with the trial court and
should be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion."
United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 226 (1st Cir. 1995).
Additionally, we have specifically noted that limiting redirect to
the "scope of cross" is a permissible exercise of a trial court's
discretion. United States v. Millan, 230 F.3d 431, 438 n.4 (1st
Cir. 2000).
Here, the district court stated that to the best of its
memory, Gonsalves was not asked about the May 13 robbery on cross-
examination. As the transcript indicates, the court's
recollection was incorrect, and hence the premise of its ruling
was faulty. But any error that occurred was harmless. Monteiro's
attorney desired to pursue his line of questioning to reinforce
that Joshua was not a victim of the May 13 robbery. Joshua had
already testified that his car was damaged on May 10 and that he
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had spent May 13 with his daughter. Even without the redirect
examination, Joshua clearly represented to the jury that he had
not been a victim of the May 13 robbery. Moreover, the evidence
of Monteiro's guilt was overwhelming.
E. Jury Instructions on Aiding and Abetting
Both the prosecution and defense submitted proposed jury
instructions before Monteiro's trial commenced. Because the
government sought to prove Monteiro's guilt on Counts 2 and 3 by
way of an aiding and abetting theory of liability, both sides
included proposed language on the definition of "aiding and
abetting." The government's proposed language adopted this
circuit's pattern jury instruction on aiding and abetting that was
in place at that time:
To "aid and abet" means intentionally to help
someone else commit the charged crime. To
establish aiding and abetting, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that someone [el]se committed the crime
of possession of heroin with intent to
distribute; and
Second, that the defendant consciously shared
the other person's knowledge of the possession
of heroin with intent to distribute, intended
to help that person, and took part in the
endeavor, seeking to make it succeed.
Defendant need not possess the heroin himself,
be present when the possession is performed,
or be aware of the details of its execution to
be guilty of aiding and abetting. But a
general suspicion that an unlawful act may
occur or that something criminal is happening
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is not enough. Mere presence at the scene of
the possession with intent to distribute and
knowledge that the possession with intent to
distribute is being committed are also not
sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.
But you may consider these among other
factors.11
Monteiro's attorney submitted the following alternative:
In order to prove that the defendant aided and
abetted th[e] possession with intent [to
distribute heroin] by Lopes[,] you must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Monteiro]
associated himself with that possession in
some way on or about March 1, and that he
affirmatively participated in the venture in
some fashion as to make it succeed.
The district court adopted the government's proposed instruction.
At the charge conference, Monteiro objected to the omission of
some of his proposed jury instructions, but he did not object to
the aiding and abetting instruction. Nor did he object after the
jury was instructed.
After jurors began deliberating, they sent a note to
the court which asked: "Why is aiding and abetting not on the
verdict form when it is mentioned on page thirty-five as to charges
Two and Three?" The court answered this question, without
objection, by stating: "[A]iding and abetting, as you were
11The model jury instruction on aiding and abetting was
updated in June 2016. However, the updated instruction made no
substantive changes to the instruction that was in place at the
time of Monteiro's trial. Compare 1st Cir. Model Jury Instruction
4.18.02(a) (2014) with 1st Cir. Model Jury Instruction 4.18.02(a)
(2016).
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instructed on page thirty-five, is an alternative theory of
culpability as to both Counts 2 and 3. It applies to Counts 2 and
3 and your verdict form."
After further deliberation, the jury sent back another
question: "Is merely aiding and abetting sufficient to convict on
a charge, specifically Counts 2 and 3? Also, please clarify 'an
alternative theory of culpability' in layman's terms." At this
point, Monteiro's attorney asked the court to submit his proposed
definition of "aiding and abetting" as an additional instruction
to the jury. The court denied this request and noted Monteiro's
objection. The court then answered the jury's question in the
following manner:
The response to your question is "yes." If
the government has proven aiding and abetting
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
convict the defendant on that count. Aiding
and abetting is explained on page thirty-five
of the jury instructions and applies to Counts
Two and Three.
What I meant by "alternative theory of
culpability" is that aiding and abetting can
be a basis for finding the defendant, Mr.
Monteiro, guilty of Count 2 or 3 as an
alternative to a theory of culpability as a
principal on those counts as explained on
pages thirty-two to thirty-three of the jury
instructions.
Aside from Monteiro's objection to the denial of his additional
jury instruction, neither party objected to the court's answer to
the jury's second set of questions.
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In his brief, Monteiro does not clearly state whether
his appeal challenges the district court's refusal to give his
instruction initially or its rejection of that instruction as a
response to the jurors' second set of questions -- or both. We
generally review preserved challenges to jury instructions de
novo, but when a defendant fails to preserve an objection to a
jury instruction at trial, our review is under the much stricter
plain error standard. United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d
167, 184 (1st Cir. 2014). However, we review a properly preserved
objection to a court's answer to jury questions mid-deliberation
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39,
46 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, Monteiro preserved an objection only to
the court's failure to use his proposed aiding and abetting
instruction to answer the jury's questions.
Under any standard of review, the district court's
actions were proper. It was entirely appropriate for the district
court to adopt the pattern jury instruction on aiding and
abetting.12 Nor was there a problem in how it answered the jury's
mid-deliberation questions. Even though the government may prove
guilt through an aiding and abetting theory -- and it sought to do
so on Counts 2 and 3 in this case -- the questions for each count
12
As we have often noted, in this circuit "although pattern
instructions are often helpful, their use is precatory, not
mandatory." United States v. Alverio-Meléndez, 640 F.3d 412, 423
n.5 (1st Cir. 2011).
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on the verdict form asked the jury only whether it found Monteiro
guilty of the underlying crimes charged in the indictment. The
jury's first note understandably asked the court why "aiding and
abetting" did not appear on the verdict form, to which the court
properly responded that it is an "alternative theory of
culpability." When the jury asked the court to clarify
"alternative theory of culpability," the court accurately defined
the phrase and correctly told the jury that proof of "aiding and
abetting" is indeed sufficient to convict a defendant for the
underlying criminal charge in the indictment. It "is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court" whether to provide
supplementary instructions in response to a jury's note after
deliberations have begun. Roberson, 459 F.3d at 46 (quoting
Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998)). Here
the court answered the jury's questions accurately and
appropriately.13
13Monteiro also implies -- for the first time on appeal --
that the jury instructions lacked the appropriate mens rea element
as required by our recent decision in United States v. Ford, 821
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2016). We disagree. In that case we vacated a
conviction because the jury instructions did not make clear that
a defendant had to have knowledge of her counterpart's prior
conviction in order to convict her for aiding and abetting a
felon's possession of a firearm. Id. at 76. Here, the jury
instruction clearly required that Monteiro "consciously share[]
the other person's knowledge of the possession of heroin with
intent to distribute." Likewise, we view Monteiro's contention
that the jury instructions required a reference to his conduct on
the precise date of March 1 as the same erroneous construction of
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F. Sentencing Factors
At sentencing, the court grouped Monteiro's narcotics
convictions (Counts 1 - 3) and concluded that he was at a minimum
responsible for 1,096.5 grams of heroin.14 Because the court found
Monteiro was responsible for more than one kilogram (but less than
three kilograms) of heroin, it assigned him a base offense level
of 30. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5). The district court then added
two levels each for enhancements based on Monteiro's threatened
use of violence in committing his crimes, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(2), Monteiro's pattern of criminal conduct, see
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E), and Monteiro's role as an organizer in
the commission of the crimes, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.(c). This
approach resulted in a final offense level of 36, combined with a
Criminal History Category of IV, producing a Guidelines Sentencing
Range ("GSR") of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment.15 Ultimately,
law we dismissed regarding his sufficiency of evidence claims
above.
14It arrived at this calculation by adding (1) Monteiro's
96.4-gram sale of heroin to Guarneri; (2) the 0.1 grams of heroin
found on Monteiro the day he was arrested; and (3) Guarneri's
testimony that he purchased 50-100 grams of heroin from Monteiro
every other week for the year leading up to the DEA's intervention.
(Using the lower estimate provided by Guarneri, the Probation
Office multiplied 50 grams by 20 weeks for a total of 1,000 grams
for the third portion of Monteiro's drug quantity calculation. It
chose twenty weeks as a multiplier rather than twenty-six to avoid
counting drugs Monteiro sold to Guarneri when Guarneri was working
as a confidential DEA informant.)
15
The court also calculated Monteiro's offense level for the
robbery count, but found that the robbery conviction did not
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the court varied downward and imposed a sentence of 250 months of
imprisonment.
Monteiro challenges the district court's drug quantity
determination -- and the resultant GSR that flowed from it -- as
well as the two-level enhancement that the court applied for
Monteiro's role as an organizer. We address each contention in
turn.
1. Drug Quantity Calculation
In Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155
(2013), the Supreme Court held that "any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum [sentence imposed upon a criminal defendant] is
an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury" and is required
to be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." The jury found one
hundred grams of heroin attributable to Monteiro's role in the
drug conspiracy.16 The mandatory sentence for a typical conviction
involving this amount of heroin is "not . . . less than 5 years
increase Monteiro's total offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.
Monteiro challenges a two-level serious bodily injury enhancement
applied to the calculation of the robbery count's offense level.
However, because the Guidelines calculation for the robbery count
did not affect Monteiro's sentence, we do not consider this
challenge any further. See United States v. Hinkley, 803 F.3d 85,
93-94 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating that any error in application of
individual guideline was harmless because the final Guidelines
calculation would not change).
16
Although the jury made this finding on the drug conspiracy
charge, Count 1, as noted above, the jury found that one hundred
grams of heroin was not attributable to Monteiro on the possession
with intent to distribute count, Count 3. See supra note 4.
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and not more than 40 years." See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i).
However, if the government establishes that such a defendant has
been convicted of a prior felony drug offense -- which it did in
Monteiro's case by filing an information with the court pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) -- the mandatory minimum sentence
increases to a term of imprisonment of "not . . . less than 10
years." Id. No Alleyne error occurred in calculating Monteiro's
statutory minimum sentence because the drug quantity that
triggered the ten-year minimum was proven to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Monteiro argues, however, that Alleyne's mandate applies
not only to the statutory minimum terms of imprisonment, but also
to the calculation of a defendant's base offense level under the
Guidelines. He asserts that the district court committed an
Alleyne error when it calculated his GSR and determined by a
preponderance of the evidence that more than one kilogram of heroin
was attributable to him. However, the Guidelines are merely
discretionary, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259
(2005), and Alleyne explicitly noted that its holding did "not
mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be
found by a jury," 133 S. Ct. at 2163. The Supreme Court has "long
recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial
factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment." Id. That is
why we have routinely rejected this exact Alleyne argument that
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Monteiro makes. See, e.g., United States v. González, 857 F.3d
46, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Cox, 851 F.3d 113, 120
(1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d 42, 48
(1st Cir. 2014). We do so again here.
2. Enhancement for Leadership or Organizing Role.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), the district court
imposed a two-level enhancement because it found Monteiro "was an
organizer, leader, or manager" in a criminal activity involving
fewer than five participants.17 Monteiro argues that the guideline
should be voided for unconstitutional vagueness. However, since
Monteiro filed his brief, the Supreme Court has held that because
the Guidelines are discretionary, they "are not subject to a
vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause." Beckles v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
Aside from his constitutional challenge, Monteiro
asserts that he should not be considered an organizer or leader
under the guideline. We have stated that "[a] defendant acts as
a leader if he or she exercises some degree of dominance or power
in a criminal hierarchy and has the authority to ensure that others
will follow orders" and that "[a] defendant qualifies as an
organizer if he or she 'coordinates others so as to facilitate the
17 Monteiro erroneously argues in his brief that the court
imposed a four-level enhancement for acting as an organizer or
leader in a criminal scheme involving five or more people. See
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
- 31 -
commission of criminal activity.'" United States v. Appolon, 695
F.3d 44, 70 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Tejada-
Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1995)). Here, the government
presented ample evidence of Monteiro dispatching orders to both
Lopes and Guarneri, as well as his coordination of the drug sales
between them. Thus, the district court did not err when it applied
the role-in-the-offense enhancement.
Affirmed.
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