Brierly v. Brierly ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    April 6, 1993
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 92-1916

    RAYMOND F. BRIERLY,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    VIRGINIA BRIERLY, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Raymond F. Brierly on brief pro se.
    __________________
    Chappell & Chappell on brief for appellee Virginia Brierly.
    ___________________
    James E. O'Neil, Attorney General, and Jacqueline G. Kelley,
    ________________ ______________________
    Special Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee Robert
    Fallon, Director, State of Rhode Island Department of Human Services.


    ____________________

    ____________________


















    Per Curiam. Plaintiff appellant challenges the
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    dismissal of his First Amended Complaint for failure to state

    a claim,1 denial of his motion for leave to file a Second

    Amended Complaint, and the award of attorneys' fees and costs

    to defendant Virginia Brierly.

    Although plaintiff appears here pro se, he was
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    represented by counsel below. His First Amended Complaint,

    styled as an action for damages and equitable relief under 42

    U.S.C. 1983, named as defendants his ex-wife, Virginia

    Brierly, and the Acting Director of the State of Rhode

    Island's Department of Human Services ["DHS"], Robert Fallon.



    Plaintiff's pleadings are difficult to recap with

    precision. We set out here the core facts distilled from the

    First Amended Complaint. Count One appears directed solely

    at Virginia Brierly. It recites that after his divorce from

    Virginia Brierly in 1981, plaintiff failed to make child

    support payments in accordance with the terms of the Rhode

    Island Family Court's decree. In March, 1986, plaintiff was





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    1. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss. Although one
    of the motions was couched as a motion for judgment on the
    pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), it in essence also
    raised a Rule 12(b)(6) objection by challenging the legal
    foundation for the complaint. It was properly dealt with on
    this basis by the district court. See Amersbach v.
    ___ _________
    Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979), cited with approval
    _________ ___________________
    in Whiting v. Maiolini, 921 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990); Charles
    __ _______ ________
    A. Wright et. al., 5A Federal Practice and Procedure 1369
    ______________________________
    at n.6 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).















    personally served with notice of a motion brought by Virginia



    Brierly to adjudge him in contempt. The hearing on the

    motion was continued beyond its first scheduled date.

    Allegedly due to Virginia Brierly's "failure to properly and

    lawfully serve any kind of notice [of the continued date]

    upon plaintiff," plaintiff was absent when the hearing was

    eventually held on September 30, 1986. As a result,

    plaintiff states, he was adjudged in contempt for failure to

    pay some $58,640 in arrearages. Also allegedly unbeknownst

    to plaintiff, a bench warrant issued for his arrest, pursuant

    to which he was arrested in February, 1988. He was then

    required to execute a deed in blank to the former marital

    residence to secure his release. He states that he

    petitioned for review of the contempt order, apparently

    without success, and appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme

    Court, which "after hearing, argument, and presentation of

    briefs" refused to grant a writ of certiorari in September,

    1990.

    Count Two appears directed solely at Robert Fallon

    in his capacity as Acting Director of the DHS. It alleges

    that DHS announced an amnesty program "whereby arrangements

    for the payment of child support arrearages could be made

    without fear of arrest or interest payments." Plaintiff

    sought, through counsel, to take advantage of this program by



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    opening negotiations with DHS toward establishing a payment

    schedule and other terms. The amnesty period terminated

    while plaintiff was awaiting a response from DHS about

    certain terms,2 but DHS allegedly represented that it "would

    honor the terms of the amnesty" until a final agreement had

    been reached. Nevertheless, plaintiff says that DHS filed an

    "unlawful petition" causing his arrest and incarceration for

    seven days in September, 1991. He was allegedly then

    required to execute a promissory note in the amount of

    $58,640.00, and was found liable by the Family Court for

    additional interest on arrearages. He states that he

    objected on the basis of DHS's alleged amnesty promise, but

    the Family Court failed to "recognize" the amnesty program.

    Our standard on review of dismissal of a complaint

    under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, construing the complaint in

    the light most favorable to the plaintiff, dismissal is

    appropriate because "it appears beyond doubt that the

    plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

    which would entitle him to relief." Roeder v. Alpha Indus.,
    ______ _____________

    Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Conley v.
    ____ ______

    Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Finnern v.
    ______ _________ _______


    ____________________

    2. The amnesty time period is not mentioned in the First
    Amended Complaint, but for the sake of clarity, we note that
    the proposed Second Amended Complaint states that the program
    was announced in April, 1990 and ran through May 25, 1990,
    while plaintiff's appeal from his first contempt citation was
    pending. The authority for, and mechanics of, the amnesty
    program are not disclosed in the pleadings.

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    Sunday River Skiway Corp., 984 F.2d 530, 537 (1st Cir. 1993)
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    ("If a trial court accepts plaintiff's facts and can envision

    no reasonable application of the law that would entitle

    plaintiff to relief, the court may rightly dismiss the

    case.").

    The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Federal

    Rules' "liberal system of notice pleading" in a civil rights

    action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a municipality.

    Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
    __________ ____________________________________________

    Coordination Unit, 61 U.S.L.W. 4205 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1993).
    __________________

    However, "minimal requirements are not tantamount to

    nonexistent requirements." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851
    ______ ________________

    F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). The court need not "conjure

    up unpled allegations or contrive elaborately arcane scripts"

    in order to craft a cognizable legal theory where none seems

    to exist. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514.
    ______

    Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is deficient in

    numerous ways, most of which were well described by the trial

    judge. In line with his rulings, we interpret the complaint

    as asserting that each defendant's separate conduct reflected

    a deviation from an established state rule, policy or

    statute. It may well be, as the district court held, that

    the claim asserted against defendant Virginia Brierly is

    infirm because it does not charge any conduct fairly

    attributable to the State. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
    _____ __________________



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    U.S. 922, 937, 940 (1982). Likewise, the damages claim

    asserted against the defendant Fallon may well be barred by

    the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes suits against State

    officials which must be paid from State funds. Hafer v.
    _____

    Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of
    ____ ____ __________________

    State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). But we think it
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    unnecessary here to reach these issues because both claims

    are infirm for another reason: there are no facts indicating

    that the remedies available from the State were inadequate.

    It is well established that unauthorized conduct

    which cannot be foreseen and controlled in advance does not

    constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the

    Due Process Clause "until and unless [the State] refuses to

    provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy." Hudson v.
    ______

    Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Parratt v. Taylor,
    ______ ________ _______ ______

    451 U.S. 527 (1981); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
    ________ _____

    (1990); Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323 (1st Cir. 1992). Since
    ____ _____

    inadequacy of the state's remedy is a material element of the

    claim, plaintiff had the burden to set forth supporting

    factual allegations, either direct or inferential, to sustain

    an actionable legal theory. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 515.
    ______

    Plaintiff's vague allegations reflect, instead, that

    there was a state process for challenging both of the alleged

    due process deprivations. Plaintiff even states that he used

    the process, appealing at least one of his objections as far



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    as the Rhode Island Supreme Court. That plaintiff disagreed

    with the result does not show that the process itself is

    inadequate. To the extent that plaintiff is attempting by

    this suit to overturn those state court judgments, he is not

    entitled to any relief in the district court or here. Lower

    federal courts have no power to sit in review of state court

    orders. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
    _______________________________________ _______

    460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
    ______ ___________________

    U.S. 413 (1923); Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 17 (1st
    ___________ ___

    Cir. 1990).

    We also see no reason to disagree with the trial

    court's decisions to grant Virginia Brierly's motion for

    attorney's fees and costs, and to deny plaintiff's second

    motion to amend the complaint. Both decisions are entrusted

    to the sound discretion of the district court, whose rulings

    will not be disturbed except on a clear showing of abuse.

    See Coyne v. Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 1992)
    ___ _____ __________

    (denial of motion to amend); Finnern, 984 F.2d at 537 (same);
    _______

    Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (fee
    __________________________ ____

    awards under 42 U.S.C. 1988); Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 15
    ___________

    (sanctions under Rule 11).

    The district court awarded costs and fees to

    Virginia Brierly when it dismissed the claim asserted against

    her in plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The order ran

    jointly against plaintiff and his attorney under Rule 11, and



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    against plaintiff alone under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The court

    pointedly found that plaintiff's purpose in bringing the suit

    included an effort to harass Virginia Brierly and to

    retaliate against her for the losses plaintiff had suffered

    in the state courts. Moreover, the court reasoned that the

    claim as pleaded was so frivolous and lacking in foundation

    that neither a competent attorney nor a party could believe,

    after a reasonable inquiry, that it was well-grounded in fact

    or in law.

    These findings more than satisfied the requirements

    of Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. 1988, which, though not identical

    to one another, permit fee awards either where the pleading

    falls below an objective standard of reasonableness or where
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    there is a showing of subjective bad faith. Here both

    standards were violated. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14
    ___ ______ ____

    (1980) (applying the criteria announced in Christiansburg
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    Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978) to awards of
    ___________ ____

    fees to prevailing defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1988);

    Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 19 (observing the alternative
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    standards for Rule 11 awards); Foster v. Mydas Assoc., Inc.,
    ______ _____ ____________

    943 F.2d 139 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing criteria and

    findings necessary under each authority).

    In light of these detailed findings, and

    plaintiff's first two futile attempts to plead a legally

    cognizable claim, we see no abuse of discretion in the



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    district court's denial of leave to file yet a third

    complaint "for reasons cited in connection with dismissal of

    the First Amended Complaint." See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
    ___ _____ _____

    178, 182 (1962) (while leave to amend is usually "freely

    given," denial will be upheld where there is stated a

    "justifying reason," such as "bad faith or dilatory motive

    ... repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments ...

    undue prejudice to the opposing party [or] futility of the

    amendment").

    Accordingly, the district court's judgment is

    affirmed.
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