Skidgel v. Maine HHS & Ives ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    June 10, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________

    No. 92-1764

    JENNA SKIDGEL, ET AL.,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Defendant, Appellee.

    v.

    LOUIS W. SULLIVAN,
    Defendant, Appelllant.



    No. 92-1824

    JENNA SKIDGEL, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
    ROLLIN IVES,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    ____________


    ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this court issued on June 3, 1993, is amended

    as follows:

    Page 5, footnote 5, line 5: Change "principle" to
    "principal".

    Page 6, footnote 7, line 2: Change "principle" to
    "principal".






















    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-1764
    JENNA SKIDGEL, ET AL.,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Defendant, Appellee.

    v.

    LOUIS W. SULLIVAN,
    Defendant, Appellant.

    No. 92-1824

    JENNA SKIDGEL, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
    ROLLIN IVES,
    Defendants, Appellants.

    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    ____________________

    [Hon. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________
    ____________________

    Before
    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________
    ____________________

    Marina E. Thibeau, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael E.
    __________________ ___________
    Carpenter, Attorney General, on brief for defendant-appellant Rollin
    _________
    Ives, Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services.
    John F. Daly, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department of
    _____________
    Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, and
    ________________
    Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, and Robert S. Greenspan,
    _________________ ____________________
    were on brief for third-party defendant-appellant Louis W. Sullivan,
    Secretary of Health and Human Services.

















    Frank D'Alessandro, with whom James Crotteau, Patricia Ender, and
    __________________ ______________ ______________
    Pine Tree Legal Assistance, were on brief for plaintiffs-appellees.
    __________________________

    ____________________

    June 3, 1993
    ____________________



























































    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. The Secretary of the
    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
    ____________________

    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Maine

    Department of Human Services (DHS) appeal a decision of the

    district court invalidating and enjoining the enforcement of

    certain regulations and policies regarding Aid to Families

    with Dependent Children (AFDC), upon finding that they

    conflicted with the plain language of the Social Security

    Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    __ ___

    At issue is the application of two distinct

    provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

    602(a)(38), covering the composition of the AFDC filing

    unit,1 and 42 U.S.C. 607 (b)(1)(B)(iv), covering the




    ____________________

    1. 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38) provides, in pertinent part, that,

    in making the determination under paragraph (7)
    with respect to a dependent child and applying
    paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as
    otherwise provided in this part) include--

    (A) any parent of such child, and

    (B) any brother or sister of such child, if
    such brother or sister meets the conditions
    described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a)
    of this title or in section 607(a) of this title,

    if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the
    same home as the dependent child, and any income of
    or available for such parent, brother, or sister
    shall be included in making such determination . .
    . [.]

    We refer to the AFDC filing unit as the family filing unit,
    and to this provision of the statute as the family filing
    rule.

    -2-
    2















    deduction of unemployment compensation from an AFDC

    payment,2 to a particular situation. That situation occurs

    where the principal wage-earner in a two-parent household

    becomes unemployed, and the household includes both at least

    one child common to the two parents and at least one child

    who is the stepchild of the principal earner. The

    stepchild[ren] of the principal earner receive AFDC, pursuant

    to 42 U.S.C. 606(a), because they are deprived of parental

    support due to the continuous absence from the home, death or

    incapacity of a parent.3 Prior to the unemployment of the


    ____________________

    2. 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(1)(B)(iv) provides,

    for the reduction of the aid to families with
    dependent children otherwise payable to any child
    or relative specified in subsection (a) of this
    section by the amount of any unemployment
    compensation that such child's parent described in
    subparagraph (A)(i) receives under an unemployment
    compensation law of a State or of the United States
    . . . [.]

    3. 42 U.S.C. 606(a) provides:

    The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1)
    who has been deprived of parental support or care
    by reason of the death, continued absence from the
    home (other than absence occasioned solely by
    reason of the performance of active duty in the
    uniformed services of the United States), or
    physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who
    is living with his father, mother, grandfather,
    grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather,
    stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt,
    first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of
    residence maintained by one or more of such
    relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is
    (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option
    of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-
    time student in a secondary school (or in the

    -3-
    3















    principal earner, neither the principal earner nor the

    child[ren] common to both parents are included in the family

    filing unit.

    Pursuant to HHS/DHS policy and regulations, once

    the principal earner becomes unemployed, the family filing

    rule requires that the principal earner and the child[ren]

    common to both parents be included in the filing unit, as

    well.4 Such inclusion is required because the child[ren]

    are considered dependent under a separate provision of the

    statute, 42 U.S.C. 607(a), due to the unemployment of the





    ____________________

    equivalent level of vocational or technical
    training), if, before he attains age nineteen, he
    may reasonably be expected to complete the program
    of such secondary school (or such training)[.]

    4. The Secretary's interpretation of the family filing rule
    has been embodied in regulations and official transmissions.
    See 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(1)(vii) which provides, in part,
    ___
    that,

    in order for the family to be eligible, an
    application with respect to a dependent child must
    also include, if living in the same household and
    otherwise eligible for assistance:

    (A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent
    (in the case of States with laws of general
    applicability); and

    (B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or
    sister.
    . . .

    See also SSA Transmittal 86-1 at 9 (Jan. 12, 1986) (on two-
    ___ ____
    step process whereby application of family filing rule must
    precede determination of need).

    -4-
    4















    parent who is the principal earner.5 According to the

    Secretary's interpretation of the family filing rule, the

    common child[ren] now meet "the conditions described in . . .

    607(a)." 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38).

    In the case of the plaintiff class,6 the

    unemployment compensation received by the principal earner is

    then subtracted from the AFDC benefit payable to the newly-

    composed family filing unit. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R.

    233.20(a)(3)(ii) (B), unemployment compensation is not

    considered as income and does not figure into the calculation

    of need, but is deducted from the AFDC payment after the


    ____________________

    5. 42 U.S.C. 607(a) provides:

    The term "dependent child" shall, notwithstanding
    section 606(a) of this title, include a needy child
    who meets the requirements of section 606(a)(2) of
    this title, who has been deprived of parental
    support or care by reason of the unemployment (as
    determined in accordance with standards prescribed
    by the Secretary) of the parent who is the
    principal earner, and who is living with any of the
    relatives specified in section 606(a)(1) of this
    title in a place of residence maintained by one or
    more of such relatives as his (or their) home.

    6. The class was certified as follows:

    All households in the State of Maine who are
    recipients of AFDC benefits as of November 16,
    1990, or who will apply for AFDC benefits on or
    after November 16, 1990, and whose household
    composition includes at least two adults and two
    children where at least one child is the child of
    one but not both of the adults in the household and
    at least one child is the child of both adults in
    the household and where the adult who is not the
    parent of the first child receives unemployment
    benefits.

    -5-
    5















    amount of that payment has been established.7 This special

    treatment of unemployment compensation is the Secretary's

    interpretation and implementation of 42 U.S.C.

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv). The practical result of the HHS/DHS

    policies is a reduction of the AFDC payment going to families

    in the plaintiff class.8


    ____________________

    7. 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(B) provides:

    In determining financial eligibility and the amount
    of the assistance payment all remaining income
    (except unemployment compensation received by an
    unemployed principal earner) and, except for AFDC,
    all resources may be considered in relation to
    either the State's need standard or the State's
    payment standard. Unemployment compensation
    received by an unemployed principal earner shall be
    considered only by subtracting it from the amount
    of the assistance payment after the payment has
    been determined under the State's payment method[.]

    8. The operation of these policies can be illustrated by
    taking the case of one of the plaintiffs, Deborah Blake. Ms.
    Blake and her husband live with their mutual child, Shawn
    Blake, and Ms. Blake's two children, James and Courtney
    Morton. While Mr. Blake was employed, the family received
    AFDC for Ms. Blake's children, James and Courtney Morton, who
    met the definition of dependent children provided in 606(a)
    of the statute. At that time, the family filing rule
    required that the two dependent children, James and
    Courtney, and their parent, Ms. Blake, be included in the
    filing unit. The rule did not require the inclusion of
    either Shawn Blake, because he was not considered a dependent
    child, or Mr. Blake, because he was not the parent of an
    AFDC-eligible child. A portion of Mr. Blake's income was,
    however, deemed available to the filing unit, pursuant to the
    stepparent deeming rule, explained infra Part I, Section A.
    _____
    Before the unemployment of Mr. Blake, the family received
    $453.00 each month in AFDC, and Mr. Blake earned $697.00 a
    month.
    Once Mr. Blake became unemployed, the family filing rule
    required the inclusion of both Shawn (who then met the
    definition of a dependent child in 607(a)) and his parent,
    Mr. Blake. Because unemployment compensation is disregarded

    -6-
    6















    Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant

    Rollin Ives, Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human

    Services, arguing that the State was violating federal

    statutory standards in determining the amount of AFDC

    payments going to members of their class. Ives filed a

    third-party complaint against Louis Sullivan, Secretary of

    the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

    The case went to the district court on a stipulated record.

    In a memorandum decision, the district court ruled

    in favor of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the HHS/DHS

    interpretations of both the family filing rule, 42 U.S.C.

    602(a)(38), and the provision regarding unemployment

    compensation, 42 U.S.C. 607(b)(1)(B)(iv), impermissibly

    conflicted with the plain meaning of the statute. See
    ___

    Skidgel v. Ives, No. 90-0209-B, slip op. (D. Me. Jan. 2,
    _______ ____

    1992) [hereinafter Memorandum Decision]. The district court

    read the family filing rule to require that children defined

    as dependent under 607(a) be determined financially "needy"

    before they could be included in the filing unit. See id. at
    ___ __



    ____________________

    in the determination of need, the new filing unit initially
    met the criteria for the maximum AFDC payment for a family of
    five, $685.00. Pursuant to regulations interpreting
    607(b)(1)(B) (iv), the State then subtracted the amount of
    unemployment compensation received by Mr. Blake, $498.80,
    from the maximum AFDC payment of $685.00, to arrive at an
    AFDC payment of $186.00. Although the total level of
    government income going to the family increased following Mr.
    Blake's unemployment, the AFDC payment decreased
    considerably.

    -7-
    7















    7. The district court also determined that

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv), by its express terms, applies only to

    children eligible under 607(a), and does not reach children

    eligible under 606(a). See id. at 4-5. On March 23, the
    ___ __

    court issued a final judgment enjoining the enforcement of

    the implicated HHS/DHS policies and regulations. See Skidgel
    ___ _______

    v. Ives, No. 90-0209-B-H, slip op. (D. Me. Mar. 23, 1992)
    ____

    (final judgment).

    Plaintiffs/appellees urge us to affirm the district

    court's decision. Defendants/appellants argue that the

    district court's reading of 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38)

    contravenes the very purpose of the rule, and draws an

    artificial distinction between 606(a) children and 607(a)

    children. As a result of the district court's holding,

    non-needy children who meet the definition of a dependent

    child provided in 607(a) are not compulsorily included in

    the family filing unit. By contrast, the weight of federal

    authority requires non-needy children who meet the definition

    of a dependent child provided in 606(a) to be so included.

    See discussion infra Part II, Section A 3. With respect to
    ___ _____

    the district court's reading of 607(b)(1)(B)(iv), it is

    defendants' position that the court failed to consider

    textual ambiguity and ultimately neglected to reconcile its

    reading with the family filing rule, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38).





    -8-
    8















    For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the

    district court.


    I.
    I.
    Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
    Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
    _______________________________

    AFDC is a cooperative federal-state program

    authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42

    U.S.C. 601 et seq. The AFDC program provides cash
    __ ___

    assistance to certain needy families with dependent children.

    The program is administered by the states in accordance with

    the Social Security Act and the regulations and directives of

    the Secretary of HHS. We begin with a brief explanation of

    the implicated statutory provisions and the regulations and

    policies which implement them.

    A. Determination of Financial Need
    A. Determination of Financial Need
    __ _______________________________

    In addition to meeting other eligibility

    requirements, families receiving AFDC must be financially

    needy. The main statutory provision covering need is 42

    U.S.C. 602(a)(7), which provides guidelines to state

    agencies for assessing the resources available to a family

    unit. In the paragraph which follows, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(8),

    Congress sets forth criteria for certain income that may be

    disregarded in the determination of need. The family filing

    rule, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38), establishes the individuals

    whose resources must be considered in determining need in

    accordance with 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(7) and (8).



    -9-
    9















    Financial eligibility is determined by comparing a

    family unit's countable income (i.e., income remaining after

    disregards allowed by law) to the standard of need adopted by

    the State. The standard of need is "the amount deemed

    necessary by the State to maintain a hypothetical family at a

    subsistence level." Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253
    ____ _________

    (1974). States assign a standard according to the size of

    the unit applying for AFDC. In 1990 in Maine the standard of

    need for a family of four was $819.00. An AFDC payment in

    Maine is calculated by subtracting a family unit's countable

    income, other than unemployment compensation received by a

    principal earner, from the standard of need established for

    the relevant family size. States are not, however, required

    to provide families with the full standard of need. In

    Maine, the maximum AFDC payment is a fixed percentage (69.4%)

    of the standard of need. Maine permits families to fill the

    "gap" between the need standard and the maximum payment

    standard without penalty. In other words, families with

    countable income below the need standard, but above the level

    of payment paid by the State, may still receive the maximum

    payment from the State. This gap has practical ramifications

    in the instant case because of the operation of the

    stepparent deeming rule, codified at 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(31).

    In the case of the plaintiff class, prior to the unemployment

    of the principal earner the family filing unit did not



    -10-
    10















    include either the principal earner or the half-siblings who

    were not then dependent children for the purposes of the

    statute. See 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38). A portion of the
    ___

    stepparent's income was, however, "deemed" available to the

    unit, pursuant to the stepparent deeming rule. For many in

    the plaintiff class, the income deemed available fell within

    the gap permitted by the State, so that when the principal

    earners were employed, the AFDC benefit to the unit eligible

    under 606(a) either was not affected or was only marginally

    affected by the deemed income.

    B. Unemployment Compensation and 607
    B. Unemployment Compensation and 607
    __ ___________________________________

    The current AFDC statute provides for two

    categories of "dependent children": those defined in

    606(a), who are deprived due to the continuous absence, death

    or incapacity of a parent, and those defined in 607(a), who

    are deprived due to the unemployment of the parent who is the

    principal earner. As originally enacted, AFDC was limited to

    the category of children defined in 606(a). In the 1960's,

    Congress expanded the program to include children deprived

    because of a parent's unemployment. At that time, the

    so-called AFDC-UP program (unemployed parent, earlier called

    AFDC-UF, for unemployed father) was available only to those

    families who were not receiving unemployment benefits. See
    ___

    Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 711 (1975). In
    _________ ________

    Philbrook, the Supreme Court decided, in essence, that
    _________



    -11-
    11















    parents had the choice of applying either for unemployment

    compensation or for AFDC. See id. at 719. In response to
    ___ __

    the Philbrook decision, Congress amended the statute to
    _________

    assure that unemployed parents would seek and obtain

    unemployment compensation first, and that AFDC payments would

    be used only to "supplement UC benefits up to AFDC-UF

    levels." See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1745, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
    ___

    28 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5997, 6048-49. The
    _________ __

    1976 amendment was the predecessor to the current

    607(b)(1)(B)(iii) and (iv). See Pub. L. No. 94-566,
    ___

    507(a)(2), 90 Stat. 2688 (1976) (originally codified at 42

    U.S.C. 607(b)(2)(C) and (D) (1976)).

    C. The Family Filing Rule
    C. The Family Filing Rule
    __ ______________________

    Prior to 1984, families applying for AFDC lawfully

    could choose to exclude household members from the filing

    unit if those members had resources that would reduce the

    family's benefit or make the family ineligible for AFDC. In

    1983, the Secretary of HHS proposed an amendment "``to

    establish uniform rules on the family members who must file

    together for AFDC, and the situations in which income must be

    counted.'" Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 592 (1986)
    _____ _______

    (citing Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Honorable George Bush,

    President of the Senate). As part of the Deficit Reduction

    Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, (DEFRA), Congress amended

    the AFDC program by adopting the family filing rule. See 98
    ___



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    Stat. 1145 (1984)(codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C.

    602(a)(38)). The legislative purpose behind the enactment of

    the rule, as reported by the Senate Finance Committee, was as

    follows:

    "``Present Law

    "``There is no requirement in the present law that
    parents and all siblings be included in the AFDC
    filing unit. Families applying for assistance may
    exclude from the filing unit certain family members
    who have income which might reduce the family
    benefit. For example, a family might choose to
    exclude a child who is receiving social security or
    child support payments, if the payments would
    reduce the family's benefits by an amount greater
    than the amount payable on behalf of the child.
    . . .

    "``Explanation of Provision

    "``The provision approved by the Committee would
    require States to include in the filing unit the
    parents and all dependent minor siblings (except SSI
    recipients and any stepbrothers and stepsisters)
    living with a child who applies for or receives AFDC
    . . . .

    "``This change will end the present practice whereby
    families exclude members with income in order to
    maximize family benefits, and will ensure that the
    income of the family members who live together and
    share expenses is recognized and counted as
    available to the family as a whole.'"

    Bowen, 483 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting from S. Print No. 98-169,
    _____

    980 (1984)). Thus, the amendment sought to compel the

    inclusion in the family filing unit of dependent children

    living in the same home as the child receiving AFDC. When it

    was enacted, the family filing rule required only the

    inclusion of 606(a) children, children who were deprived



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    due to the continuous absence, incapacity or death of a

    parent. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress

    amended 602(a)(38) to include children who meet the

    conditions described in 607(a). See 100 Stat. 2085, 2917
    ___

    (1986) ( 1883(b)(2)(A) of the Act). Under a subsection

    entitled, "Technical Corrections to AFDC and Child Support

    Programs," the Senate Report accompanying the amendment

    explained that no distinction between children deprived due

    to the absence, incapacity or death of a parent, and those

    deprived due to the unemployment of a parent, was intended.

    S. REP. NO. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1074 (1986).9


    II.
    II.
    Analysis
    Analysis
    ________

    The issues involved in this case are purely ones of

    statutory construction. Our review is, therefore, de novo.

    United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016, 1019 (1st Cir. 1991).
    _____________ ______

    See generally Commonwealth of Mass. v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424,
    ___ _________ ______________________ ____

    428 (1st Cir. 1990) (questions of law decided by a trial

    court are not binding on the reviewing court).

    A. The Family Filing Rule
    A. The Family Filing Rule
    __ ______________________


    ____________________

    9. The Senate Report provides, in part, that,

    no such distinction between these two categories
    was intended, and this provision will clarify that,
    in a State that provides AFDC on the basis of the
    unemployment of a parent, siblings who are
    dependent for that reason must be included in the
    AFDC unit.
    Id.
    ___

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    1. Background
    1. Background
    __ __________

    We begin by addressing the application of the

    family filing rule, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38), to the plaintiff

    class. The rule provides that in making the determinations

    of need with respect to a dependent child, states must

    include any parent of a dependent child and any brother or

    sister if such brother or sister "meets the conditions

    described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) or in

    section 607(a)." Id. Plaintiffs challenge the State's
    __

    practice of including the child common to both parents in the

    family filing unit because, under the Secretary's

    interpretation, the child meets the conditions described in

    607(a). We must determine what Congress meant when it

    referred to the "conditions described" in 607(a); in

    particular, whether Congress intended to incorporate need as

    a condition that must be met before a child may be included

    in the filing unit. Although several courts have interpreted

    the family filing rule with respect to children defined as

    dependent under 606(a), the rule as originally enacted,

    none has specifically interpreted the rule with respect to

    607(a) children. See discussion infra Part II, Section A 3.
    ___ _____

    The district court held that the family filing rule

    requires the inclusion of children who meet the definition of

    dependent found in 607(a) only if such children are first

    determined to be needy. In so holding, the district court



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    recognized the abundance of federal authority requiring the

    inclusion of children defined as dependent in 606(a)

    without such a prior determination of need. See Memorandum
    ___

    Decision at 7 n.11. The district court's reason for

    distinguishing between these categories of children centered

    on the placement of the word "needy" in the respective

    sections of 606(a) and 607(a). Both sections begin by

    stating that "the term ``dependent child' means a needy child"

    who meets certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. 606(a) and

    607(a). The essence of the district court's distinction was

    that, because the word "needy" appears before clauses (1) and

    (2) in 606(a),10 it is not to be considered in making the

    determination under 606 (a) for the reason that the family

    filing unit rule refers only to the conditions specified in

    those clauses. In 607 (a), by contrast, the word needy

    appears within the section which is not broken into numbered

    clauses, and the family filing rule simply references

    607(a).11 The placement of the word "needy" was the sole

    basis for what the district court found to be the plain

    meaning of the rule.


    ____________________

    10. See supra note 3. The statute begins, "[t]he term
    ___ _____
    ``dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been
    deprived of parental support . . . [.]"

    11. See supra note 5. Section 607(a) has no demarcated
    ___ _____
    clauses, and simply begins, "[t]he term ``dependent child'
    shall, notwithstanding section 606(a) of this title, include
    a needy child who has been deprived of parental support . . .
    ."

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    16















    Our inquiry does not end with the placement of the

    word "needy" in 607(a) of the statute. We examine the

    family filing rule in the context of its place in the

    statutory scheme and in light of its statutory purpose. See
    ___

    Conroy v. Aniskoff, 61 U.S.L.W. 4301, 4302 (U.S. March 31,
    ______ ________

    1993) (No. 91-1353) (noting the "``cardinal rule that a

    statute is to be read as a whole'" and that "the meaning of

    statutory language, plain or not, depends upon context."

    (citations omitted)); Evans v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't. of
    ______________________________________

    Human Servs., 933 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (concluding on
    _____________

    the basis of the language of the statute as read in the

    context of its structure and in the light of its purposes).

    Cf. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
    __ ________________ ____________________________________

    810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying a detailed

    analysis after an initial, literal reading of the statute).

    A thorough analysis is especially warranted where, as here,

    we are charged with interpreting a complex and technical

    statute which has been amended over time and which contains

    elaborate, internal cross-references.

    As we explain below, we think that the term

    "conditions described" in the family filing rule is ambiguous

    with respect to children defined as dependent under 607(a).

    When we find such ambiguity in a statute, we give

    considerable weight to the interpretation rendered by the

    agency charged with administering that statute. See Evans,
    ___ _____



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    17















    933 F.2d at 7. Our examination of the language in the

    context of its place in the statutory scheme and in light of

    its statutory purpose convinces us that the Secretary's

    interpretation of 602(a) (38)(B) is not only permissible,

    but fully consonant with the will of Congress. See Chevron
    ___ _______

    U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
    ____________ __________________________________

    837, 843 (1984) (explaining that if a statute is silent or

    ambiguous with respect to the issue presented, the question

    for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a

    permissible construction of the statute).





    2. Ambiguity
    2. Ambiguity
    __ _________

    The district court assumed that Congress meant the

    term "conditions described" to incorporate all of the terms

    listed in the cross-referenced section, 607(a), and thus to

    include the term "needy." Although the term "needy" plainly

    appears in 607(a), it does not necessarily follow that

    Congress intended for that term to be a "condition described"

    for the purpose of 602(a)(38). Section 607(a) and 606(a)

    function in the statutory scheme to define the two categories

    of "dependent children" who may be eligible for AFDC.

    Regardless of which categorical definition is used, no child

    or family may receive AFDC unless that child or family is

    financially needy. The family filing rule has a different



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    function in the statutory scheme; that of defining the unit

    pursuant to which need is be determined under 602(a)(7).

    This function is apparent from the plain terms of the rule,

    itself, which begins: "in making the determination under

    paragraph (7) . . . a State agency shall include . . . ." As

    discussed supra in Part I Section A, need for AFDC purposes
    _____

    is not a fixed condition; its assessment depends on a variety

    of factors. To assume that Congress intended to include need

    among the "conditions described" for the purpose of the

    family filing rule--which, by its plain terms, exists prior

    to the assessment of need and as a basis for the definition

    of need--is not the most sensible reading of the rule.

    We find that it is not clear from the face of the

    rule which conditions Congress intended to include when it

    referred to the "conditions described" in 607(a). While in

    the abstract, it might be reasonable to presume that a

    reference to the "conditions described" in a cross-referenced

    section refers to all descriptive terms contained in that

    section, such a reading is problematic in this context. By

    including "needy" as a "condition[] described," the district

    court's interpretation does not properly account for, and

    reads circularity into, the facially-evident function of the

    family filing rule.

    3. Case Law and Legislative History
    3. Case Law and Legislative History
    __ ________________________________





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    Our examination of the case law interpreting the

    family filing rule as originally enacted, and the legislative

    history behind Congress' amendment of the rule to add

    607(a), leads us to conclude that the district court's

    interpretation is erroneous and to uphold the Secretary's

    policy.

    Part of examining the language in context entails

    reviewing the case law which has interpreted the family

    filing rule to compel the inclusion of non-needy children

    defined as dependent under 606(a). Overwhelmingly, courts

    have rejected the argument that a child must be needy before

    that child is to be included in the family filing unit. See
    ___

    Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 513-16 (8th Cir. 1987). See
    ______ _____ ___

    also Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d 1288, 1294 (6th Cir. 1988);
    ____ _______ ______

    Creaton v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1987); Oliver v.
    _______ _____ ______

    Ledbetter, 821 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme
    _________

    Court, in a case upholding the constitutionality of the

    family filing rule, dismissed the argument in a footnote,

    citing to clear legislative intent to include non-needy

    children in the family filing unit. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at
    ___ _____

    593 n.5. The Court commented that construing the rule to

    require the inclusion of only needy children was "completely

    inconsistent with the intent of Congress as explained in the

    Secretary's request for legislation, in the Senate Print, and

    in the Conference Report as well." Id. Rather than pursuing
    __



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    its own analysis, the Court noted its satisfaction with that

    performed by the district court in Gillard v. Kirk, 633 F.
    _______ ____

    Supp. 1529, 1548 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), and made favorable

    reference to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gorrie, 809
    ______

    F.2d at 513-516. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 587 n.5.
    ___ _____

    The express purpose behind the enactment of the

    family filing rule, as apparent in the Senate Print

    referenced by the Supreme Court and cited and discussed supra
    _____

    in Part I, Section C, was to change the practice whereby

    families could exclude children who had other resources,

    i.e., children who were not independently needy, from the

    family filing unit. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 599 (noting that
    ___ _____

    the purpose of the rule is to "deny [] a family the right to

    exclude a supported child from the filing unit"). This

    legislative history formed the cornerstone of the district

    court's reading of the family filing rule to require the

    inclusion of non-needy children in Gillard, 633 F. Supp. at
    _______

    1546.

    It is true that in Gorrie, the other case cited by
    ______

    the Supreme Court, the court began with the language of

    606(a) and was initially persuaded by the placement of the

    word "needy" outside the numbered clauses. The court did not

    rest its conclusion solely on this reading, however, but went

    on to do a detailed, contextual analysis of the family filing

    rule. The detailed analysis corroborated that court's



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    initial reading of the rule to require the inclusion of non-

    needy children in the family filing unit. See Gorrie, 809
    ___ ______

    F.2d at 513-16.

    Unlike the court in Gorrie, the district court in
    ______

    the instant case stopped with its reading of 607(a). The

    court did not go on to consider the particular meaning that

    term might have in the context of the family filing rule.

    Had the district court continued to perform a detailed

    analysis, it would have discovered that the legislative

    purpose of the rule, and its function in the statutory

    scheme, were not served by its reading. Like the Supreme

    Court, we conclude that the real problem with construing the

    rule to require the exclusion of non-needy children is that

    such a construction flies in the face of Congressional intent

    to end the practice of excluding non-needy children from the

    filing unit. We are not persuaded by the truncated reading

    of the district court, but proceed to address the district

    court's correct concern that 607(a) is drafted differently

    from 606(a).

    The word "needy" appears in 607(a), and the

    family filing rule references the entire section, whereas the

    "needy" is offset in 606(a) and the family filing rule

    refers to clauses that do not contain that term. The

    question is what effect to give to that difference, given the

    function of the rule in the statutory scheme, its purpose,



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    and the manner in which the rule has been interpreted. In

    other words, was Congress' cross-reference to a previously-

    drafted section of the statute in which the criterion of need

    is not set off in a separate clause but appears within the

    referenced section, a clear signal of its intent to include

    need as one of the "conditions described" as applied to

    607(a) children? We do not think so.

    First, to the extent that the issue is the

    exclusion of non-needy children from the family filing unit,

    the same analysis of legislative purpose used with respect to

    606(a) children applies to this case. Moreover, in the

    previously- cited Senate Print accompanying the DEFRA

    amendment, the Congress made clear who the exceptions to the

    family filing rule were to be. Namely, the provision would

    require the inclusion of all dependent minor children except

    SSI recipients and stepchildren. See Bowen, supra Part I,
    ___ _____ _____

    Section C (citing S. Print No. 98-169 at 980). Otherwise,

    the family filing unit rule was intended to be an inclusive

    rule, inclusive especially of non-needy siblings.

    Second, the Congressional history behind the

    amendment of 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(38), to include children

    eligible under 607(a), unambiguously expresses Congress'

    intention not to distinguish between children eligible under

    the two sections. See S. REP. NO. 313 at 1074, supra note 9
    ___ _____

    and accompanying text. Congress, having omitted a reference



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    to 607(a) children in the original rule, stated that it

    intended to create no such distinction between children

    eligible under 606(a) and children eligible under 607(a).

    That Congress labeled the amendment a "[t]echnical

    [c]orrection[]" further underscores its intention against

    substantively different treatment of these categories of

    children. In sum, we ascertain no basis for a finding that

    Congress intended to treat these categories of children in a

    substantively different manner, permitting the exclusion of

    non-needy children eligible under 607(a), but compelling

    the inclusion of such children eligible under 606(a).12

    In overturning the finding of the district court,

    we note that this matter of statutory construction is made

    difficult by the patchwork manner in which the AFDC statute

    has been enacted. We deal with a statute, and a section

    within a statute, which has been amended frequently, and

    which is not rewritten in its entirety with each amendment.



    ____________________

    12. Plaintiffs note that the legislative history of the Tax
    Reform Act, which amended the family filing rule to include
    607(a) children, refers to the required inclusion of
    dependent children. From Congress' use of the word
    dependent, plaintiffs conclude that Congress meant to require
    the inclusion of only needy 607(a) children. The
    legislative history of the DEFRA amendment which created the
    original family filing rule covering 606(a) children,
    however, similarly refers to the compelled inclusion of
    dependent children. As we have explained, the compelled
    inclusion of 606(a) children has been upheld by other
    federal courts. Plaintiffs' argument, without more, does
    nothing to advance a reasonable basis for treating 607(a)
    children differently from 606(a) children.

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    As we observed in Sweeney v. Murray, 732 F.2d 1022, 1024-25,
    _______ ______

    1027(1st Cir. 1984), with regard to a different subsection of

    the AFDC statute, the provision at issue in this case is

    anything but elegantly drafted, but its legislative directive

    is comparatively clear. We hold that the Secretary's policy

    of requiring the inclusion of non-needy 607(a) children in

    the filing unit resonates with the legislative purpose of the

    rule and upholds its integrity in the statutory scheme.

    B. The Reduction of AFDC by Unemployment Compensation
    B. The Reduction of AFDC by Unemployment Compensation
    __ __________________________________________________

    The final issue is more difficult. The district

    court held that the HHS/DHS practice of reducing AFDC

    payments by the amount of the stepparents' unemployment

    conflicted with the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C.

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv). Once again, the district court anchored

    its conclusion in what it characterized as plain meaning, and

    ended its inquiry there. The court determined that

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv) authorized the reduction only of the income

    "``payable to [a] child . . . specified in [ 607(a)].'"

    Memorandum Decision at 5. Thus, only the AFDC payments going

    to children eligible under 607(a) would be reduced by the

    unemployment compensation received by the principal earner.

    Defendants point to two problems with the district

    court's interpretation. First, the court ignored that

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv) of the statute actually compels the

    reduction of the AFDC payment otherwise payable to "a child



    -25-
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    or relative specified" in 607(a). The word "relative"
    __ ________

    creates an ambiguity in the statute which the court failed to

    apprehend. Second, once this language is placed in the

    context of the larger statutory scheme, the district court's

    reading cannot be reconciled with the family filing rule.

    For the reasons that follow, we conclude that deference to

    the Secretary is proper in this instance.

    We first examine the meaning of the word "relative"

    in 607(b)(1)(B)(iv). That section directs attention to a

    child or relative specified in 607(a). Turning to

    607(a), one sees that the reference encompasses relatives

    specified in 606(a)(1) -- a "father, mother, grandfather,

    grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother,

    stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew,

    or niece." 42 U.S.C. 606(a). Defendants argue that a

    plausible interpretation of 607(b)(1)(B)(iv) is that it

    directs the deduction of unemployment compensation from AFDC

    payable to any 607(a) child, or to any listed, co-resident

    relative of that child. Plaintiffs offer a strong contrary

    argument that the relatives listed in 606(a)(1) are

    intended to represent only the caretaker relatives of the

    dependent child. Whether for the purposes of

    607(b)(1)(B)(iv), Congress meant to provide a list of

    co-resident relatives or to limit its reference to caretaker

    relatives is, arguably, ambiguous. As we explained supra,
    _____



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    when we find ambiguity we give deference to the considered

    interpretation of the Secretary. See Evans, 933 F.2d at 7.
    ___ _____

    Even were we to agree with plaintiffs' argument as

    to the meaning of the word "relative," we would still

    encounter the problem of conflict with the later-enacted

    family filing rule when we place 607(B)(1)(B)(iv) into the

    context of the statutory scheme. As we have held, the family

    filing rule applies to 607(a) children. The rule

    establishes a uniform system whereby need is calculated on

    the basis of the collective needs of the household. Adopting

    the plaintiffs' reading of 607(b)(1)(B)(iv) would lead to

    the anomalous practice of assessing need collectively, and

    then splintering the family unit at the point of determining

    the proper AFDC payment. To assess need based on one

    picture, and arrive at benefits based on another, is

    unworkable and undercuts the policy behind the family filing

    rule. See Bowen, supra Part I Section C (citing S. Print No.
    ___ _____ _____

    98-169 at 980) (noting that one purpose of the rule is to

    "ensure that the income of family members that live together

    and share expenses is recognized and counted available to the

    family as a whole").

    Where different provisions of the same statutory

    scheme are in tension, a court should make every effort to

    construe such provisions so as to achieve consistency and

    harmony. See Atwell v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 670
    ___ ______ _____________________________



    -27-
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    F.2d 272, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (provisions should, wherever

    possible, be construed to achieve consistency); Citizens to
    ___________

    Save Spenser County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 871 (D.C. Cir.
    ____________________ ___

    1979) (duty to achieve harmonization of conflicting

    provisions). To the extent that the issue is one that has

    the potential for undermining the policy behind the family

    filing rule, we believe that the Secretary is in the best

    position to resolve the conflict. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
    ___ _______

    844 (1984) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
    _____________ ______

    382, 383 (1961), for the proposition that the principle of

    deference to administrative interpretations is followed

    whenever a decision as to the meaning of a statute involves

    reconciling conflicting policies). Our conclusion is

    buttressed by the fact that the Secretary was involved in

    proposing and drafting the family filing rule. See Gorrie,
    ___ ______

    809 F.2d at 514 (noting the Secretary's involvement in

    proposing the legislation for the purpose of establishing

    rules about who must file together for AFDC); Bowen, 483 U.S.
    _____

    at 592, 593 n.5 (same); St. Luke's Hosp., 810 F.2d at 331
    ________________

    (counseling deference where the Secretary was present at the

    statute's creation and thus is likely to be in a better

    position to know the intent of the enacting Congress).

    Finally, we observe, as did the district court,

    that it is not at all clear that Congress has addressed the

    precise issue presented; namely, the application of these



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    distinct statutory provisions to the particular situation of

    families composed of both 606(a) and 607(a) children. In

    Chevron, the Supreme Court explained that in construing a
    _______

    statute courts should first seek to ascertain "whether

    Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at

    issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Although we do not take
    _______

    the command to mean that Congress must anticipate all of the

    possible scenarios that might arise under a statute, we

    believe that this is a case in which deference to the

    interpretation of the Secretary is especially warranted. As

    we explained in St. Luke's Hosp., 810 F.2d at 331, "[a]n
    _________________

    implied delegation of a law-declaring function is especially

    likely where, as here, the question is interstitial, involves

    the everyday administration of the statute, implicates no

    special judicial expertise, and is unlikely to affect broad

    areas of the law." Cf. Drysdale v. Spirito, 689 F.2d 252,
    __ ________ _______

    261 (1st Cir. 1982) (counseling deference where the issue is

    interstitial, and "imbued with administrative history and

    complexity").

    The factors of ambiguity in a statute, conflicting

    statutory provisions, and a complex, interstitial question

    arising in the daily administration of the statute--all

    counsel deference to the Secretary. We must only assess

    whether the Secretary's interpretation is permissible. We

    find that the Secretary's policy harmonizes the two statutory



    -29-
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    provisions, while doing violence to neither individually.

    The Secretary sensibly applies the family filing rule. In

    reading 607(b)(1)(B)(iv) to require the deduction of

    unemployment compensation from the AFDC payment, the

    Secretary reasonably effectuates the will of Congress to

    treat AFDC as a supplement to unemployment compensation,

    rather than treating the two as alternative forms of

    assistance.

    At oral argument, both parties highlighted

    inequities resulting from the respective interpretations of

    the district court and the Secretary. Under the district

    court's reading, families which contain both 607(a)

    children and 606(a) children receive a greater AFDC benefit

    than that received by families who are composed entirely of

    606(a) children or entirely of 607(a) children. Defendants

    pointed out that, by carving out two units, the district

    court effectively permits one unit to receive the maximum

    payment of AFDC, while the other one receives the maximum

    payment of unemployment compensation. Plaintiffs emphasized

    that under the Secretary's reading, families composed of both

    606(a) and 607(a) children receive less AFDC than

    families composed only of 606(a) children. Once AFDC is

    characterized in the light of its statutory purpose as a

    supplement to unemployment income, however, it is apparent

    that the total income going to families with both categories



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    of children is no less than that going to a 606(a) family

    composed of the same number of persons.

    We recognize the hardship visited on families in

    the plaintiff class, whose life circumstances changed

    dramatically following the unemployment of the principal

    earner. The income going to the family unit was reduced by

    the onset of unemployment, and then was further diminished by

    reduction of the AFDC payment in the amount of unemployment

    compensation received. The impact on the families in the

    plaintiff class of the HHS/DHS policies is exacerbated by the

    way in which Maine treats the gap between the standard of

    need and the maximum AFDC payment. See discussion supra Part
    ___ _____

    I, Section A. Maine's policy permitted many families prior

    to the unemployment of the principal earner to attain the

    maximum AFDC payment because the amount of countable income

    earned by the principal earner fell within the gap. See id.
    ___ __

    Maine's treatment of the gap, however, generally permits more

    families to live at a higher level of subsistence, and has

    not been challenged by the plaintiff class.

    In the end, we must acknowledge that the Congress,

    HHS and DHS are charged with the difficult task of allocating

    limited funds across a range of needy families. Overall, we

    believe that the practical implications of the Secretary's

    reading of the statute, when viewed allocationally, are more

    equitable than those flowing from the construction given by



    -31-
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    the district court. The decision of the district court is

    Reversed. No costs.
    Reversed. No costs.
    ________ ________

















































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