Levy v. Weinhold ( 1993 )


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    United States Court of Appeals
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 92-2135

    LESLIE LEVY, AS TRUSTEE OF 225 COMMONWEALTH TRUST,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    WOLF WEINHOLD, ETC.
    Plaintiff, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________
    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Feinberg,* Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________
    ____________________

    Thomas N. O'Connor with whom Michael G. Bongiorno and Hale and
    ___________________ ____________________ _________
    Dorr were on brief for Wolf Weinhold, etc.
    ____
    Mark P. Szpak with whom William L. Patton, James L. Sigel, Ropes
    _____________ _________________ ______________ _____
    & Gray, Bruce V. O'Donnell, Managing Attorney, Ann S. Duross,
    _______ ____________________ _______________
    Assistant General Counsel, Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior Counsel, and
    _____________________
    Barbara S. Woodall, Counsel, were on brief for FDIC.
    __________________
    ____________________

    October 19, 1993
    ____________________
    ____________________
    *Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.



















    STAHL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Wolf
    ______________

    Weinhold1 commenced suit in state court against a bank and

    its subsidiary for, inter alia, breach of a written warranty
    _____ ____

    agreement. The bank counterclaimed, seeking payment from

    Weinhold of a facially unqualified promissory note and

    personal guarantee. After the bank failed, the FDIC, in its

    capacity as receiver, removed the proceedings to federal

    court, and sought summary enforcement of the note and

    guarantee. The district court granted the FDIC's motion for

    summary judgment on the note, and, in the same order,

    dismissed Weinhold's warranty claims against the bank's

    subsidiary. We affirm.

    I.
    I.
    __

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
    ________________________________________

    The corporate affiliations of the relevant parties

    are complex, so we begin by tracing them in some detail.

    First American Bank for Savings ("First American"), a

    federally insured savings bank, owned several subsidiary

    corporations which were engaged in the development of real

    estate projects in the Boston area. One such wholly-owned

    subsidiary, First American Development Corporation IV ("FADC-





    ____________________

    1. Weinhold brought suit in his individual capacity and in
    his capacity as trustee of 225 Commonwealth Trust (the
    Trust). References to Weinhold will hereinafter apply to him
    in both capacities unless otherwise noted.

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    IV"),2 formed a joint venture with H&P Associates Limited

    Partnership II ("H&P"). The joint venture, known as

    Commonwealth-Marlboro Associates ("CMA"), acquired an

    apartment building at 225 Commonwealth Avenue ("the

    property") in Boston, with the intention of converting the

    property to residential condominiums.3 CMA hired GVW, Inc.

    ("GVW"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of H&P, as general

    contractor for renovation work on the property.

    During April 1986, Weinhold and Leslie Levy4

    became interested in buying the property from CMA. To that

    end, they formed 225 Commonwealth Trust ("the Trust"). On

    June 30, 1986, Weinhold, on behalf of the Trust, bought the

    property from CMA. GVW had not yet completed renovations to

    the property, and under the terms of the purchase and sale

    agreement between CMA and Weinhold, the work of completing

    the renovations was left to GVW. Among other terms, the

    purchase and sale agreement included the following paragraph:

    [CMA] and [GVW] shall enter into a
    supplementary agreement with [Weinhold]
    warranting, in favor of [Weinhold]: (a)
    the construction of the improvements


    ____________________

    2. FADC-I through III, and FADC-V through IX were also
    wholly-owned subsidiaries of First American, and were named
    as defendants. Weinhold does not appeal the rulings below as
    to these parties.

    3. CMA also acquired a second apartment building in Boston,
    which is not at issue in this case.

    4. Levy, a party below in her capacity as trustee, is not a
    party to this appeal.

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    constituting the Project for a period of
    one (1) year after the Project is
    [s]ubstantially [c]ompleted, and (b) the
    structural improvements at the [property]
    related to the Project for a period of
    five (5) years after the Project is
    [s]ubstantially [c]ompleted. The
    warranties set forth in such side
    agreement shall survive the Closing Date.

    On September 3, 1986, in compliance with this contractual

    provision, CMA executed a document in which it warranted

    GVW's work on the property. Because FADC-IV was a joint

    venturer in CMA, both the purchase and sale agreement and the

    September 3, 1986, warranty were executed by officers of

    FADC-IV.

    In addition to purchasing the property from CMA,

    Weinhold also obtained financing for his purchase of the

    property through First American, FADC-IV's parent company,

    borrowing $2.4 million from First American. The loan was

    evidenced by a promissory note signed by Weinhold in the

    amount of $2.4 million, and repayment was secured by

    Weinhold's personal guarantee and by a first mortgage on the

    property.

    Shortly after the sale, disputes arose between

    Weinhold and GVW regarding the completion of the renovations.

    As a result, Weinhold terminated GVW as general contractor.

    In June of 1987, based on GVW's failure to properly complete

    the required renovations, Weinhold brought suit in

    Massachusetts's Suffolk County Superior Court against FADC-



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    IV, H&P and GVW alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and
    _____ ____

    breach of warranty by all defendants. Foremost among

    Weinhold's claims was his allegation that the renovations did

    not comply with relevant zoning provisions.

    Weinhold subsequently added First American as a

    defendant, arguing that FADC-IV was an alter ego of First

    American. In essence, Weinhold argued that First American

    was liable for FADC-IV's actions, including FADC-IV's

    warranty of GVW's renovation work. First American

    counterclaimed, alleging that Weinhold had failed to make

    mortgage payments. First American sought payment of the note

    and enforcement of Weinhold's guarantee.

    On October 19, 1990, First American was declared

    insolvent and the FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC

    removed the case to federal district court, and sought

    summary judgment on the note and guarantee.

    In granting the FDIC's motion for summary judgment,

    the district court ruled that Weinhold had failed to offer

    proof of any defense to payment on the note and guarantee

    sufficient to satisfy the requisites of D'Oench, Duhme & Co.
    ____________________

    v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). In a second ruling, the court
    ____

    dismissed the breach of warranty claims that had originally

    been brought against FADC-IV. The court reasoned that

    Weinhold's warranty claims against FADC-IV, like his defenses

    to the FDIC's counterclaim, failed to satisfy the demands of



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    the D'Oench doctrine. Upon review, we affirm both rulings.
    _______







    II.
    II.
    ___

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________

    A. Standard of Review
    ______________________

    Our review of summary judgments is plenary.

    Rivera-Ruiz v. Gonzalez-Rivera, 983 F.2d 332, 333-34 (1st
    ___________ _______________

    Cir. 1993). "[W]e read the record and indulge all inferences

    in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at
    ___

    334. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no

    genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

    entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 333.
    ___

    Moreover, we are free to affirm a district court's ruling "on

    any ground supported in the record even if the issue was not

    pleaded, tried or otherwise referred to in the proceeding

    below." De Casenave v. United States, 991 F.2d 11, 12 n.2
    ___________ ______________

    (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

    B. Weinhold's Defenses to Payment of the Note
    _____________________________________________

    In contending that the district court improperly

    granted the FDIC's motion for summary judgment, Weinhold has

    done no more than press his affirmative warranty claims. The

    bulk of Weinhold's appellate brief is dedicated to arguing

    that his warranty claims against First American survive both



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    D'Oench and 12 U.S.C. 1823(e), which has been loosely
    _______

    described as D'Oench's codification.5 Apparently, Weinhold
    _______

    assumes that a viable breach of warranty claim, based on

    CMA's written warranty of GVW's construction work, would

    excuse payment on the promissory note. Because Weinhold's

    assumption in this regard is erroneous, we need not linger

    long over this argument.

    The possibility of valid set-off or recoupment

    claims does not preclude the summary enforcement of debt

    instruments. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 689 F.
    ___ ____ ____ _________________

    Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. Tex. 1987). Weinhold's breach of

    warranty claims are no more than set-off or recoupment

    claims. They involve issues of zoning, workmanship and other

    matters relating to GVW's work on the renovation project,

    rather than issues of liability between Weinhold and First

    American on the note and guarantee. Even were we to

    disregard FADC-IV's corporate form, as we are repeatedly

    urged to do by Weinhold, we would find, at most, that First

    American and Weinhold entered two separate agreements. The

    agreement regarding the loan of $2.4 million, on one hand, is

    evidenced by the note, the mortgage and the personal


    ____________________

    5. Weinhold argues at great length that First American
    actually "approved" both the purchase and sale agreement and
    the September 3 warranty agreement, despite the fact that
    both agreements were signed by officers of FADC-IV. As we
    understand it, this contention is aimed solely at showing
    that Weinhold's affirmative warranty claims survive D'Oench
    _______
    and 1823(e).

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    guarantee. FADC-IV's obligation to convey title to Weinhold

    and to warrant GVW's work, on the other hand, arises out of

    the entirely separate purchase and sale agreement. Simply

    put, GVW's allegedly unacceptable workmanship does not

    relieve Weinhold of his obligations under the note and

    guarantee.6 Cf. Koch v. Koch, 903 F.2d 1333, 1335 (10th
    ___ ____ ____

    Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs

    in real estate transaction notwithstanding defendant's claims

    based on separate stock transaction executed between the same

    parties on the same day); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v.
    _______________________________

    Daniels, 768 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming summary
    _______

    judgment on claim for payment of facially unconditional note

    where defendant's allegations did not constitute a defense to

    payment).

    To the extent that Weinhold's appeal raises any

    defenses other than his mistaken reliance on his affirmative

    warranty claims, it does so in an ineffective manner. This

    court has often warned litigants that issues raised


    ____________________

    6. To the extent that the issue of GVW's workmanship could
    ever provide a defense to payment of the note, it could only
    constitute a defense of fraud in the inducement, a defense
    which Weinhold raised in state court. However, the Supreme
    Court has made clear that 1823(e) precludes the defense of
    fraud in the inducement where the FDIC is suing on a facially
    unqualified promissory note. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S.
    ___ _______ ____
    86, 94 (1987). See also In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty
    ___ ____ _________________________________
    Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1346 (1st Cir. 1992). Moreover, to the
    _____
    extent that Weinhold attempts to resurrect on appeal his
    claims of deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and violations
    of Massachusetts consumer protection laws, such claims are
    similarly barred by Langley.
    _______

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    ineffectively are deemed waived. E.g., In re: Nelson, No.
    ____ ______________

    92-2408, slip op. at 8 n.6 (1st Cir. June 3, 1993).

    In sum, even if Weinhold's warranty claims are

    valid, they are nonetheless based solely on FADC-IV's written

    warranty of GVW's work. As such, they amount to set-off or

    recoupment claims, rather than defenses to his obligations on

    the note and guarantee. Thus, they do not preclude the entry

    of summary judgment in favor of the FDIC for enforcement of

    the note and guarantee.

    C. Weinhold's Warranty Claims Against FADC-IV
    ______________________________________________

    Relying on Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655
    ______ ________________________

    F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1981) and its progeny, Weinhold

    argues that his breach of warranty claims survive D'Oench due
    _______

    to the fact that they are based on documents which evidence

    bilateral obligations. See, e.g., id. (holding that neither
    ___ ____ ___

    D'Oench nor 1823(e) apply "where the document the FDIC
    _______

    seeks to enforce is one . . . which facially manifests

    bilateral obligations and serves as the basis of the lessee's
    _________

    defense").

    Weinhold's reliance on Howell is misplaced. In the
    ______

    various cases employing the Howell exception, or similar
    ______

    reasoning, the claims or defenses which the non-governmental

    party seeks to enforce are contained either in the very
    ______

    instrument which the governmental party seeks to enforce,

    see, e.g., Howell, 655 F.2d at 747 (holding that when "the
    ___ ____ ______



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    asset upon which the FDIC is attempting to recover is the
    ___

    very same agreement that the makers allege has been breached
    ___________________

    by the FDIC's assignors, 1823(e) does not apply"); FDIC v.
    ____

    Panelfab Puerto Rico, Inc., 739 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1984)
    ___________________________

    (holding that the FDIC may not invoke 1823(e) to invalidate

    claims which arise from "the same agreement on which the FDIC

    brought the action in the first place"); FDIC v. Aetna
    ____ _____

    Casualty and Sur. Co., 947 F.2d 196, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1991)
    ______________________

    (applying Howell's reasoning to defenses contained in
    ______

    bilateral bond agreement which FDIC sought to enforce); or
    __

    they are contained in closely related, or "integral" loan

    documents. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Oaks Apartments
    ___ _______________________ ________________

    Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1992)
    _______________

    (applying Howell exception to a liability limitation clause
    ______

    contained in loan guarantee); FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d
    ____ ________

    1231, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Howell-type rationale
    ______

    to a loan agreement and modification agreement that were

    "integral to the loan transaction"); Baumann v. Savers Fed.
    _______ ___________

    Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1991)
    __________________

    (applying Howell exception to claims based on a "schedule
    ______

    dictated in the loan documents"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
    _____ ______

    1936 (1992).

    To the extent that Weinhold argues that the

    purchase and sale agreement in this case is an integral part

    of Weinhold's financing arrangements, we disagree. Thus,



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    even were we to disregard FADC-IV's status as a corporation

    separate from its parent, First American, we are still left

    with two distinct agreements, one which governs the purchase

    and renovation of the property, and the other which governs

    the financing thereof. Cf. Cardente v. Fleet Bank of Maine,
    ___ ________ ____________________

    Inc., 796 F. Supp. 603, 612-13 (D. Me. 1992) (declining to
    ____

    apply Howell exception to plaintiff's claims arising from a
    ______

    lease between plaintiffs and failed bank where FDIC sought

    enforcement of a promissory note and mortgage on the leased

    property which were facially unrelated to the lease).

    Accordingly, the Howell exception to D'Oench does not apply
    ______ _______

    to Weinhold's claims. Given that Weinhold offers no other

    basis for challenging the district court's dismissal of his

    warranty claims, we affirm that dismissal.

    III.
    III.
    ____

    CONCLUSION
    CONCLUSION
    __________

    For the foregoing reasons, the order of the

    district court granting summary judgment in favor of the FDIC

    and dismissing Weinhold's breach of warranty claims is

    Affirmed. No costs.
    Affirmed No costs
    ________ ________













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