United States v. Jordan ( 1993 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-2332
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    SHERWOOD K. JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Friedman, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    David G. Webbert with whom Berman & Simmons, P.A. was on brief ________________ _______________________
    for appellant.
    F. Mark Terison, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom ________________
    Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, and Richard W. Murphy, _________________ ___________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

    ____________________
    July 16, 1993
    ____________________

    ________________

    *Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.















    CYR, Circuit Judge. On December 3, 1991, Maine law CYR, Circuit Judge. ______________

    enforcement personnel executed a search warrant at the home of

    appellant Sherwood Jordan, seizing more than a kilogram of

    marijuana, a triple beam scale, $5,880 in cash, six firearms, and

    nearly 1000 rounds of assault-rifle ammunition. A federal grand

    jury subsequently indicted Jordan on six counts of possession of

    firearms or ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924,

    and one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute,

    18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D).

    Jordan moved to suppress all evidence seized during the

    search, contending that the warrant was issued without probable

    cause. Although it expressed "grave reservations as to the

    sufficiency of the probable cause showing," the district court,

    relying on the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,

    see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), denied the motion ___ _____________ ____

    to suppress. Jordan subsequently entered conditional guilty

    pleas to three firearms charges and the drug distribution charge,

    reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. See Fed. ___

    R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).


    A. The Supporting Affidavit. A. The Supporting Affidavit ________________________

    The search warrant was issued by a state court judge on

    the strength of the affidavit of Agent Winston McGill of the

    Maine Bureau of Intergovernmental Drug Enforcement. The affida-

    vit related in great detail two controlled marijuana "buys,"

    within the preceding ten days, from one Donald Moyse, a convicted


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    drug offender, by a confidential informant acting under the

    direct control and surveillance of Agent McGill. McGill attested

    that the confidential informant previously had provided reliable

    tips and had cooperated with local authorities in other con-

    trolled marijuana "buys." The affidavit related that Donald

    Moyse told the confidential informant that the marijuana involved

    in both controlled "buys" had come from Jordan's residence, and

    that both "buys" had been conducted in essentially the same

    manner: the confidential informant would meet with one Cary

    LaFrance at a local rest stop area and turn over the agreed

    purchase price (supplied by Agent McGill). LaFrance would drive

    to Donald Moyse's residence, and the two would proceed to the

    Jordan residence where the marijuana was kept. Moyse and LaFran-

    ce would then meet with the informant at a local school and

    deliver the marijuana.

    On the occasion of each controlled "buy," McGill

    searched the confidential informant for contraband immediately

    prior to providing the purchase money; prior to the second "buy,"

    he searched the informant's vehicle as well. McGill then survei-

    lled the unfolding transaction, observing as the informant

    delivered the "buy" money to LaFrance, following LaFrance to

    Moyse's house, and watching LaFrance and Moyse as they proceeded

    to Jordan's residence, then to the local school. In each in-

    stance, McGill's affidavit attests, the informant told McGill

    that the marijuana had been turned over to him by Moyse and

    LaFrance at the school and that it had been obtained, according


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    to Moyse, at Jordan's residence. Following the second "buy," the

    informant told McGill that Moyse had stated that there was a

    "large quantity" of marijuana at the Jordan residence. Finally,

    the affidavit represented that urinalysis conducted while Moyse

    was on probation occasionally revealed positive results for

    marijuana use.


    B. The District Court Decision. B. The District Court Decision. ___________________________

    Contrary to Jordan's contention on appeal, the district

    court's "grave reservations as to the sufficiency of the probable

    cause showing" did not amount to a finding that the warrant was

    not based on probable cause. "Grave reservations" do not a

    ruling make. Rather, the district court plainly bypassed any

    "probable cause" ruling in favor of its functionally distinct

    reliance on the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.

    In addition, we agree with the government that the McGill affida-

    vit made a sufficient showing of probable cause.1


    C. Probable Cause. C. Probable Cause. ______________

    We must accord the issuing judge's "probable cause"

    determination "great deference," United States v. Scalia, slip _____________ ______

    op. No. 93-1018 at 4 (1st Cir. May 21, 1993) (quoting United ______

    States v. Ciampa, 793 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1986)), with a ______ ______

    ____________________

    1As there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion to
    suppress, we examine the only supporting evidence the McGill
    affidavit to determine the sufficiency of the probable cause
    showing. Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925 (reviewing court may resolve ___ ____
    sufficiency of "probable cause" showing before considering "good
    faith" exception).

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    common-sense view to whether the "totality of the circumstances"

    related in the supporting affidavit, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. ________ _____

    213, 238 (1983), gave rise to a fair probability that a search of

    the target premises would uncover contraband or evidence of a

    crime. See United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 102 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ ________

    1990) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). The "fair probability" _____

    threshold does not require a prima facie showing of criminal

    activity. Ciampa, 793 F.2d at 22 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at ______ _____

    235).

    Jordan makes a spirited attack on the McGill affidavit:

    neither McGill nor the informant had any direct contact with

    Jordan, nor directly observed any drug buy or transfer at the

    Jordan residence; Moyse's representations that the marijuana came

    from Jordan's home are "double hearsay"; Moyse, a marijuana user

    and convicted drug offender, was not a reliable hearsay declarant

    and, finally, the affidavit did not demonstrate a "fair prob-

    ability" that marijuana or related contraband would be found at

    the Jordan residence since the marijuana Moyse sold to the

    informant could have come from LaFrance, Moyse, the school, or

    Jordan's residence.

    We agree that nothing in the McGill affidavit excluded

    the possibility that the marijuana may have come from some place

    other than the Jordan residence. Nevertheless, viewing the

    totality of the circumstances related in the affidavit, rather

    than judging "bits and pieces of information in isolation,"

    United States v. Cochrane, 896 F.2d 635, 637 (1st Cir.) (citing _____________ ________


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    Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984)), cert. denied, _____________ _____ ____ ______

    496 U.S. 929 (1990), the affidavit was sufficient to support the

    issuing judge's "common-sense" determination of probable cause.

    Hearsay statements, like those of Moyse and the infor-

    mant, often are the stuff of search warrant affidavits. See, ___

    e.g., Scalia, slip op. at 2, 3; Ciampa, 793 F.2d at 24. Their ____ ______ ______

    reliability may be corroborated by various means, including

    direct surveillance or circumstantial evidence, or vouchsafed by

    the affiant in this case a highly experienced law enforcement

    officer. See, e.g., Scalia, slip op. at 6-8. McGill attested ___ ____ ______

    that the confidential informant had provided reliable information

    and investigative assistance to the police in the past, which may

    have been sufficient in itself to establish the reliability of

    the informant's hearsay statements. See, e.g., Ciampa, 793 F.2d ___ ____ ______

    at 24 (hearsay conveyed by "proven reliable informant"); cf. ___

    United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1984) _____________ ________

    (double hearsay unacceptable basis for probable cause where

    neither informant nor confidential contact had dealt with police _______ ___

    in the past). Moreover, McGill also attested that (i) Moyse was

    an unwitting participant in the controlled "buy," and (ii)

    unbeknownst to Moyse, McGill observed Moyse's entrance to Jordan-

    's residence on both occasions, thereby establishing that Moyse

    was in a position to know whether Jordan kept marijuana at his

    residence. See Ciampa, 793 F.2d at 24. ___ ______

    Finally, McGill contemporaneously surveilled all

    conspicuous steps taken in the course of both controlled "buys,"


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    which proceeded exactly as foretold by the confidential infor-

    mant, and included stops at Jordan's home, the site of the

    search. Thus, independent corroboration lent further credence to

    the confidential informant's statements (i.e., the location of ____

    the marijuana). See United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 9 (1st ___ _____________ _____

    Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1027 (1989); see also Gates, ____ ______ ___ ____ _____

    462 U.S. at 244 (White, J., concurring) ("Because an informant is

    right about some things, he is more probably right about other

    facts . . . .").

    Appellant nevertheless correctly observes that these

    factors in combination do not exclude the possibility that Moyse

    might have obtained the marijuana at some place along the drug

    "buy" route other than Jordan's residence. But given the exper-

    ience and training of the affiant, the confidential informant's

    proven reliability, and the corroboration of the informant's and

    Moyse's hearsay reports by means of direct police surveillance,

    the issuing judge was not required to credit the speculative

    possibility that the marijuana might have been obtained elsewhere

    along the drug route than Jordan's residence. Nor may we do so.

    See Scalia, slip op. at 4 (issuing judge's "probable cause" ___ ______

    determination entitled to "great deference"). Viewed in their

    totality, therefore, the circumstances related in the supporting

    affidavit, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, provid-

    ed a "substantial basis" for the issuing judge's common-sense

    determination that there was a fair probability that Jordan's




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    home contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Caggiano, 899 ________

    F.2d at 102 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). _____

    Affirmed. ________
















































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