United States v. Richard L. Rowe ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    August 18, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-1959

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    RICHARD L. ROWE,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    ERRATA SHEET

    The opinion of this Court issued on July 22, 1993, is
    amended as follows:

    On page 2, footnote 1, lines 4-5, replace "29 U.S.C.
    1131;" with "29 U.S.C. 1023, 1024, and 1131;".











































    July 30, 1993
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    _____

    No. 92-1959


    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,

    v.

    RICHARD L. ROWE,
    Defendant, Appellant.


    ___________


    ERRATA SHEET

    The opinion of this Court issued on July 22, 1993, is
    amended as follows:

    On page 4, line 7 from the bottom: strike "Fed. R. Civ. P.
    52(a)."

    On page 4, last line: change "q" in "quideline" to "g"










































    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-1959

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    RICHARD L. ROWE,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    ____________________

    Susan E. Silver with whom Jack F. St. Clair and Joseph, St. Clair
    _______________ __________________ _________________
    & Cava were on brief for appellant.
    ______
    Victor A. Wild, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom A.
    _______________ __
    John Pappalardo was on brief for appellee.
    _______________


    ____________________

    July 22, 1993
    ____________________





















    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
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    Richard Rowe pled guilty to numerous criminal charges

    stemming from his role in a fraudulent health insurance

    scheme whose victims were a number of small businesses and

    their employees.1 Rowe developed and administered a multi-

    employer health insurance plan which offered below-market

    rates for coverage comparable to that provided by other

    insurance companies, and which was falsely represented as

    being a tax-exempt ERISA plan "approved" by the United States

    Department of Labor. Rowe and others involved in the scheme

    mismanaged the operation and converted plan assets and, as a

    result, many subscribers to the plan were left with unpaid

    medical bills.

    Rowe was sentenced to an aggregate six-year term of

    imprisonment, to three years of supervised release, and

    ordered to pay up to $1,903,386 in restitution. He now

    appeals, challenging the following sentencing calculations:

    a two-level increase in his base offense level for victim

    vulnerability, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1; a two-level increase for

    obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1; and a one-level



    ____________________

    1Rowe pled guilty to all counts against him which
    included conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C.
    1341; ERISA theft, 18 U.S.C. 664; ERISA false
    statements, 18 U.S.C. 1027; failure to file certain ERISA
    statements, 29 U.S.C. 1023, 1024, 1131; and ERISA
    kickback, 18 U.S.C. 1954. ERISA is the acronym for the
    Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
    1001 et seq.
    ______

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    upward departure for causing the loss of confidence in an

    important institution, U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, application note

    10(e). We set aside the enhancement for victim vulnerability

    and otherwise affirm.

    Victim Vulnerability. Section 3A1.1 of the Sentencing
    ____________________

    Guidelines directs the sentencing court to increase a

    defendant's base offense level by two levels:

    If the defendant knew or should have known that a
    victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due
    to age, physical or mental condition, or that a
    victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to
    the criminal conduct . . . .

    The commentary to the guideline states that the adjustment

    applies "where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a

    target of criminal activity by the defendant." U.S.S.G.

    3A1.1, application note 1. The commentary further explains

    that an adjustment for victim vulnerability is warranted

    where, for example, a defendant fraudulently markets an

    ineffective cancer cure or targets a handicapped person for

    robbery, but not where a fraud is aimed at the general public

    and "one of the victims happened to be senile." Id.
    __

    The government made two arguments in the district court

    in support of the enhancement. First, it said that small

    businesses such as those solicited by Rowe are unable to

    obtain affordable health insurance for their employees,

    making them particularly susceptible to offers of low-cost

    health insurance. Second, the government argued that



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    individual employees were rendered vulnerable once they

    developed medical problems because they then faced the choice

    of either continuing their payments to Rowe's plan, despite

    its nonpayment or delayed payment of their medical bills, or

    else possibly losing their health insurance. Rowe contends

    that the district court erred in accepting these arguments as

    a basis for imposing an enhancement under section 3A1.1. He

    says that the district court should have required the

    government to produce evidence that the employers and

    employees were in fact unusually vulnerable instead of taking
    _______

    the government's assertions at face value. We agree.

    In our view, it may be fair to assume as a matter of

    reasonable inference that a number of the small businesses to

    whom the insurance was sold were motivated by need as well as

    by the prospect of savings. It is even more likely that

    those subscribers who were already ill when the plan faltered

    would be inclined to remain longer with the plan for lack of

    alternatives. The district court in sentencing matters is

    not restricted to formal evidence, and the court's factual

    inferences, as well as direct findings, are normally set

    aside only if "clearly erroneous." See 9 Wright & Miller,
    ___

    Federal Practice and Procedure 2573, at 689, 2587 (1971 &
    ______________________________

    1993 Supp.).

    Nevertheless, we think as a matter of interpretation of

    the guideline, cf. United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94,
    __ _____________ ________



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    102 (1st Cir. 1991), that the enhancement does not apply in

    this case. In construing this guideline, the circuit courts

    have been rather quick to reverse enhancements based on the

    victims' class membership, without a showing of individual

    circumstances; and, in addition, the case law has emphasized

    the need for "unusual[]" vulnerability and "particular[]"

    susceptibility. U.S.S.G. 3A1.1.2 In Wilson, the court
    ______

    reversed the enhancement for one who fraudulently solicited

    for "relief" funds in a town stricken by a tornado, saying:

    [I]f we were to adopt the government's position,
    virtually every defendant convicted of a crime
    involving fraudulent solicitation would be subject
    to an upward adjustment under 3A1.1. Those who
    engage in this criminal activity usually target
    their solicitations at those they think most likely
    to respond to the requests for money. We do not
    think, however, that the Sentencing Commission
    intended on that account to impose an upward
    adjustment on virtually all defendants convicted of
    fraudulent solicitation.

    913 F.2d at 138.

    We think that even if we accept the government's

    assumption that small businesses are often limited in their

    sources for securing insurance, this does not itself show

    that measure of "unusual" or "peculiar" vulnerability or

    susceptibility of victims needed to invoke the guideline.


    ____________________

    2See, e.g., Sabatino, 943 F.2d at 103; United States v.
    _________ ________ _____________
    Paige, 923 F.2d 112, 113-114 (8th Cir. 1991); United States
    _____ ______________
    v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1990); United
    ______ ______
    States v. Wilson, 913 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1990). Compare
    ______ ______ _______
    United States v. Pavao, 948 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991)
    ______________ _____
    (enhancement upheld where district court heard evidence of
    drug user's actual vulnerability to crime).

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    Apart from directing his offers to the group "most likely to

    respond," Wilson, 913 F.2d at 138, there is nothing in the
    ______

    record to suggest that Rowe focused special attention on

    precariously placed victims--conduct evincing the "extra

    measure of criminal depravity which 3A1.1 intends to more

    severely punish." United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329,
    _____________ _____

    1335 (5th Cir. 1990).

    We do not say that under the guideline special

    vulnerability may never be derived from class membership; as

    the commentary states, "market[ing] an ineffective cancer

    cure" would qualify for enhancement. U.S.S.G. 3A1.1,

    application note 1. But where there is only an ordinary

    measure of increased likeliness to respond in the solicited

    group, and no evidence that the defendant selected individual

    victims based on special susceptibility, we think the

    enhancement does not apply. It is hard to articulate a more

    precise standard where so much turns on degree. The emerging

    case law will pick out the pattern.

    As for the individual employees who later developed

    medical conditions, we agree with the government that it is

    probably safe to assume that these individuals had more than

    the usual incentive to continue paying their premiums. There

    may well be among this group some who were especially

    stricken and unusually vulnerable, just as there may have

    been some small businesses truly desperate to obtain



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    insurance. Although individuals who became ill after the

    insurance was sold were hardly a special target of Rowe's

    initial solicitations, it may be that their subsequent

    inability to switch plans contributed in some manner to his

    profits.

    But in this case the thrust of the wrongdoing with which

    Rowe was charged was the initial fraudulent solicitations and

    the mismanagement or looting of the plan's assets. The near

    certainty that some of the subscribers would be more enmeshed

    than others appears to have been a collateral aspect of the

    wrongdoing. Indeed, the situation is rather close to the

    case in which a fraud is aimed at the general public and some

    of the victims are senile or otherwise unusually susceptible.

    Yet in that instance the guideline commentary expressly

    precludes an enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1, application note 1,

    presumably because there is no special targeting of such

    victims and the added impact is incidental. We think the

    same result follows in this case.3

    Obstruction of Justice. Rowe's guilty plea encompassed
    ______________________

    related charges that were brought in Atlanta and Boston and

    that were later consolidated. After Rowe's arrest in Boston



    ____________________

    3At oral argument before this court, the government
    implied that Rowe's company told individual subscribers with
    medical problems that they had no choice, given their
    existing conditions, other than to stay with its plan despite
    late payment of their claims. However, no evidence to this
    effect was presented to the district court.

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    on January 23, 1990, he was released on bond on the

    condition, among others, that he appear for all judicial

    proceedings as required. Two days later Rowe was arraigned

    in the Atlanta case in the Northern District of Georgia.

    Shortly thereafter Rowe fled the country, and a warrant

    for his arrest was issued on April 13, 1990. Rowe was

    arrested in Denmark by Danish authorities on June 16, 1990,

    and returned the next month to Atlanta where he remained in

    federal custody without bail. While Rowe was out of the

    country, the district court in Georgia heard motions in the

    case in Rowe's absence. Rowe's action in fleeing the country

    resulted in a two-level enhancement for obstruction of

    justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, which Rowe now appeals.

    The government argues that Rowe has waived any objection

    to the enhancement for obstruction of justice because his

    written objection to the enhancement as proposed in the

    presentence report was not repeated at the sentencing

    hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the district judge

    asked Rowe's counsel whether he had any "additions or

    corrections" to make to the presentence report, which

    incorporated an enhancement for obstruction of justice.

    Rowe's lawyer replied that the only correction concerned

    Rowe's assets and liabilities, and the discussion then turned

    to the defendant's assets and to other issues.





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    Notably, the government, when asked the same question,

    said that it had no additions or corrections to make, even

    though it had filed its own written objections to the

    presentence report. When the district court then inquired

    into one of those objections, the prosecutor told the judge

    that he had "understood the Court to be asking whether there

    were any additional matters the government wanted to submit
    __________

    to the Court as opposed to argue to the Court." Rowe's

    lawyer might have reached the same conclusion since the

    matter of Rowe's assets was a newly-raised issue. We need

    not pursue the matter because the enhancement was

    appropriate.

    Rowe argues that the obstruction enhancement does not

    apply to flights from arrest that do not endanger others.

    U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, application note 4(d), and 3C1.2. This

    is a generally correct statement of the law but an erroneous

    description of the reason for Rowe's enhancement. Rowe

    received the enhancement for his failure to appear for

    judicial proceedings. This was made clear in the presentence

    report. The commentary to the obstruction guideline in

    effect at the time of Rowe's sentencing provides for a two-

    point increase for a defendant's "willfully failing to

    appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding." U.S.S.G.

    3C1.1, application note 3(e) (1990).





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    Although this commentary was not in effect when Rowe

    fled to Denmark, no ex post facto problem is presented. The
    _____________

    1989 version of the guidelines were in effect when Rowe

    disappeared in early 1990. The courts have uniformly held

    that flight from judicial proceedings constitutes an

    obstruction of justice under the 1989 version of the

    Guidelines. United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370, 1375
    _____________ ______

    (D.C. Cir. 1993) (canvassing cases); United States v.
    ______________

    McCarthy, 961 F.2d 972, 979-80 (1st Cir. 1992).
    ________

    Rowe's only response to the actual basis for the

    enhancement is that he was unaware of probation proceedings

    to obtain his passport. It was during these proceedings that

    authorities learned of Rowe's absence from the country. In

    his response to the presentence report, Rowe explained that

    he had already left for Denmark when the probation office

    began its efforts to secure his passport. However, as Rowe's

    counsel conceded at oral argument in this court, one of the

    conditions of Rowe's release was that he turn over his

    passport. The obvious purpose of the requirement was to

    prevent Rowe from avoiding prosecution by leaving the

    country. We find no error in the district court's decision

    to enhance Rowe's sentence for obstruction of justice.

    Loss of Confidence in an Important Institution. We also
    ______________________________________________

    affirm the district court's decision to depart upward one

    level for loss of confidence in an important institution.



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    The commentary to the fraud guideline says that an upward

    departure may be warranted if the amount of the loss involved

    does not fully capture the harm or seriousness of the

    conduct, and then gives several examples of when a departure

    may be appropriate. U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, application note 10.

    One of the examples is where "the offense caused a loss of

    confidence in an important institution." Id., application
    ___

    note 10(e).

    In its presentence memorandum, the government cited

    articles and congressional testimony describing the growing

    threat to the health insurance industry, and in particular to

    multi-employer arrangements for small businesses, caused by

    fraudulent operators posing as legitimate insurers. Rowe

    argues that there was no evidence that his own conduct

    occasioned a loss of confidence in the health industry. In

    our view no such evidence was required.

    We think it obvious that the many businesses and

    employees defrauded by Rowe must have had their confidence in

    health insurers shaken as a result of their experience. It

    cannot be seriously doubted that they and others made aware

    of the scheme are now likely to be more wary of insurers, and

    especially of legitimate but relatively unknown insurers who

    cater to small businesses. The district court did not need

    to hear evidence to reach this conclusion. See United States
    ___ _____________

    v. Fousek, 912 F.2d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1990) (evidence not
    ______



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    necessary to show that bankruptcy trustee's embezzlement of

    funds caused a loss of confidence in the institution of

    bankruptcy trustees).

    We conclude that the vulnerability enhancement cannot

    stand but that the other challenges to the sentence fail.

    The sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for re-
    _______ ________

    sentencing consistent with this opinion.

    It is so ordered.
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