Tucker v. Winterport, Town of ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    July 29, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




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    No. 93-1234




    WENDELL E. TUCKER, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    TOWN OF WINTERPORT,

    Defendant, Appellee.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
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    Charles W. Hodsdon, II, on brief for appellants.
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    Richard D. Violette, Jr., on brief for appellee.
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    Per Curiam. The appellants are residents of
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    Winterport, Maine. All own property near a site on which the

    Town of Winterport stored salt and sand to be used for

    highway snow removal. According to the appellants, salt and

    other contaminants from the pile polluted their properties,

    damaging their plumbing and making their well water unfit for

    consumption by people or animals.

    The appellants sued the Town and the contractor who

    maintained the pile of salt and sand. They filed this

    lawsuit in a state court, alleging violations of the Maine

    Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S.A. 8101 et seq. The appellants

    later amended their complaint to include a claim under 42

    U.S.C. 1983, on the basis of which the defendants removed

    the lawsuit to federal court. The defendants then moved for

    summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim. A magistrate-

    judge recommended giving summary judgment to the defendants

    and the district court accepted the recommendation. It

    granted judgment to the defendants on the Section 1983 claim,

    and remanded the outstanding state law claims to the state

    court. This appeal followed. Finding no "substantial

    question" about the correctness of the district court's

    decision, we summarily affirm. See First Circuit Local Rule
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    27.1.

    The magistrate-judge's recommended decision was based on

    his understanding that the appellants' Section 1983 claim



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    alleged a "taking of their property without compensation in

    violation of the Fifth Amendment." The magistrate-judge

    reasoned that the salt pollution at issue here was not a

    "taking" because it only diminished, but did not totally

    destroy, the value of the appellants' land. See Ortega
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    Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91, 101 (1st
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    Cir. 1977). The district judge apparently accepted this

    reasoning.

    We affirm the grant of summary judgment without reaching

    this issue because we find that, whether or not a "taking"

    has occurred, the appellants' Section 1983 claim is not ripe

    for adjudication. "The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe

    the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just

    compensation." Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
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    Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). If state law makes
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    "reasonable, certain and adequate" provision for relief, a

    "property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just

    Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been

    denied just compensation." Id. at 194-95.
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    Nothing in the record here gives us reason to believe

    that the appellants have yet resorted to state process and

    failed to obtain just compensation. Nor have the appellants

    shown us that the state's procedures are inadequate. See
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    Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 65 (1st Cir. 1991)
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    (property owner who claims a taking in federal court without



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    first exhausting state remedies has the burden of proving the

    inadequacy of those remedies). The appellants' own amended

    complaint suggests that they hold out hope of recovery under

    the Maine Tort Claims Act. We note, too, that although Maine

    does not have a statutory inverse condemnation remedy, see
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    Lerman v. City of Portland, 675 F.Supp. 11, 15-16 (D.Me.
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    1987), the Maine Supreme Judicial Court -- in a case that

    also involved pollution caused by salt used for highway snow

    removal -- has created a nonstatutory right of action on

    behalf of property owners subjected to a taking. Foss v.
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    Maine Turnpike Authority, 309 A.2d 339, 343-45 (Me. 1973).
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    We have held that a property owner must pursue such a

    nonstatutory remedy before he can maintain a federal damages

    claim under the Fifth Amendment. Culebras Enterprises Corp.
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    v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 515 (1st Cir. 1987).
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    To sum up, because the plaintiffs have neither availed

    themselves of state procedures for obtaining just

    compensation, nor demonstrated the inadequacy of such

    procedures, their takings claim is unripe and was properly

    dismissed.

    Affirmed.
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