United States v. Bushway de Souza ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    August 5, 1993
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 93-1205

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARBARA BUSHWAY DE SOUZA,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


    [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Barbara Bushway De Souza on brief pro se.
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    Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, on Motion for Summary
    _______________
    Disposition, for appellee.


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    Per Curiam. Barbara Bushway Desouza pled guilty in
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    1992 to drug charges and was sentenced. She did not appeal

    her sentence directly. However, Desouza brought a motion

    under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that a Sentencing Guideline

    amendment permitting an additional one-level reduction in

    base offense level for acceptance of responsibility should be

    applied to reduce her sentence. The district court denied

    her motion because the amendment became effective after she

    was sentenced and could not be applied retroactively. We

    affirmed in United States v. Desouza, -- F.2d -- (1st Cir.
    _____________ _______

    1993). Before our decision was rendered, Desouza petitioned

    the district court to have certain transcripts prepared at

    government expense, averring that she needed the transcripts

    to "prepare [a] motion in order to secure my rights under the

    law." The district court denied her request because she had

    not given any reason why the transcripts should be prepared

    at government expense. Desouza has appealed. We now affirm.

    The district court's denial of Desouza's motion was

    proper under our case law. In Ellis v. State of Maine, 448
    _____ ______________

    F.2d 1325, 1327 (1st Cir. 1971), we held that a habeas

    petitioner alleging simply that his rights had been infringed

    had no right to a free transcript without showing more

    specifically that his claim had some merit. We stated:

    As to the request for a transcript, it is
    important to note that we are not here

















    concerned with a direct appeal from a
    conviction, or a state habeas which takes
    the place of such an appeal, where a
    transcript may be a matter of right
    without showing merit in the appeal.
    [Citation omitted.] Appellant's petition
    is wholly for collateral relief. For
    this unusual and exceptional relief there
    should be a burden upon the petitioner to
    come into court with his case, not simply
    to try to make one out. This does not
    mean, of course, with his full case, but
    he must show merit, not just personal
    opinion.

    Id. In her motion to the district court, Desouza stated only
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    that she needed the transcripts to prepare a motion to

    "secure [her] rights." Thus, she has not even alleged that

    her rights have been violated, as the unsuccessful petitioner

    in Ellis did, nor, obviously, has she given any details
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    suggesting that she could make out a case that her rights had

    been infringed. Her brief to this court is no more specific.

    It states only that she is preparing a section 2255 motion

    and that "[i]n order to be able to address the right issues

    and effectively and accurately present [my] case . . . , [I]

    need[] to refer to [the] transcripts . . . ." Because

    Desouza, who is seeking collateral relief, has not even

    described in general terms what the nature of her claim is,

    let alone given any specific facts to show that she has some

    meritorious claim, it is clear that the district court acted

    properly in denying her request for a free transcript.

    We note further that Desouza's motion for free

    transcripts would also have been properly denied under 28


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    U.S.C. 753(f). That statute permits the provision of free

    transcripts to indigents pursuing their section 2255 rights

    under certain circumstances.1 It states:

    Fees for transcripts furnished in
    proceedings brought under section 2255 of
    this title to persons permitted to sue or
    appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by
    the United States out of money
    appropriated for that purpose if the
    trial judge or a circuit judge certifies
    that the suit or appeal is not frivolous
    and that the transcript is needed to
    decide the issue presented by the suit or
    appeal.

    Thus, under section 753(f) Desouza would be entitled to a

    free transcript only if the district court had determined

    (or, presumably, if this court upon appeal were to determine)

    that her section 2255 motion was not frivolous and that the

    requested transcripts were necessary to decide her motion.

    The Supreme Court has held that the requirements imposed on

    indigents seeking transcripts which are contained in this

    provision of section 753(f) are constitutional. See United
    __________

    States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 325 (1976) (plurality
    ______ _________

    decision). Since Desouza has not described the basis for her

    suit or any specific facts which might support a section 2255

    motion, we cannot say that her motion would not be frivolous



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    1. The record does not show whether the district court
    granted Desouza's application to proceed in forma pauperis in
    seeking the transcripts. In light of other information
    contained in the record, however, we may assume either that
    the court granted her IFP application or that it would have
    done so.

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    or that the transcripts would be necessary to decide her

    motion. Thus, we conclude that the district court acted

    properly in denying her motion for free transcripts. See id.
    _______

    at 326 (had the section 2255 petitioner provided the district

    court with some factual allegations respecting his claim of

    ineffective assistance of counsel, and not merely with

    conclusory allegations, and had he stated explicitly what his

    counsel's error was, the court might have concluded that his

    claim was not frivolous and that a free transcript should be

    furnished); Sistrunk v. United States, 992 F.2d 258, 259
    ________ ______________

    (10th Cir. 1993) (a conclusory allegation that a defendant

    was denied effective assistance of counsel does not satisfy

    the requirements of section 753(f)).2


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    2. Because Desouza failed to make any showing that her
    section 2255 motion would not be frivolous or that the
    requested transcripts would be necessary to decide her
    motion, we need not decide whether she should have brought
    her section 2255 motion before seeking to obtain the
    transcripts. See Sistrunk, 992 F.2d at 259 (citing cases
    ____________
    which have held that the actual filing of the habeas petition
    is a necessary prerequisite to seeking free transcripts under
    section 753(f), but not deciding whether to adopt that
    interpretation in light of petitioner's failure to satisfy
    the statutory prerequisites); see also United States v.
    ________________________
    Chambers, 788 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (discussing the
    ________
    conflict on this point among the circuit courts). Similarly,
    because Desouza seeks the preparation of transcripts and not
    simply a copy of transcripts already in existence, there is
    no need to consider whether, not meeting the requirements of
    section 753(f), she could obtain free transcripts under
    section 753(b). See Rush v. United States, 559 F.2d 455, 458
    ________ _____________
    (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing the district court's denial of
    petitioner's motion for free transcripts under section
    753(f); because the transcripts were already in existence,
    the court of appeals held that the petitioners, whose
    conclusory allegations respecting their section 2255 motion

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    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.3
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    ____________________

    did not meet the requirements of section 753(f), had a right
    to the transcripts under section 753(b), which provides that
    "the original records" in the clerk's office must be open to
    inspection "by any person without charge"). The Rush
    ____
    decision has been criticized. See Sistrunk, 992 F.2d at 260;
    ___ ________
    United States v. Losing, 601 F.2d 351, 352-53 (8th Cir.
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    1979).

    3. Because Desouza has not said what grounds she has for
    bringing a second section 2255 motion, we cannot say whether
    her motion would be likely to be dismissed under Rule 9 of
    the Rules Governing 2255 Proceedings, given her previous
    section 2255 motion, as the government argues.

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