Marino v. United States ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 93-1369

    NICHOLAS R. MARINO,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Respondent.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges,
    ______________

    and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge.
    ____________________


    ____________________

    Cheryl J. Sturm on brief for appellant-petitioner.
    _______________
    James H. Leavey, Assistant United States Attorney and Edwin
    ________________ _____
    J. Gale, United States Attorney on brief for respondent.
    _______

    ____________________

    July 30, 1993
    ____________________






















    PER CURIAM. Petitioner Marino was indicted for
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    conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to

    distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation

    of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii) and 846 (Count I),

    and attempting to possess with intent to distribute one

    hundred kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21

    U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vii) and 846, and 18 U.S.C.

    2 (Count III). Marino entered a plea agreement with the

    government pursuant to which he pled guilty to Count III of

    the indictment which had been amended to delete a reference

    to the specific quantity of marijuana involved. For its

    part, the government agreed to dismiss Count I and recommend

    the minimum sentence under Count III at the sentencing

    hearing. Marino was sentenced to an eighty-two month term of

    incarceration, which sentence was upheld on appeal. United
    ______

    States v. Marino, 936 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991). Subsequently,
    ______ ______

    Marino filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set

    aside or correct his sentence. The district court summarily

    denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

    Marino appeals, and, finding no error, we affirm.

    The background of this case was reported in detail

    by this court in its opinion affirming Marino's sentence.

    Marino, 936 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991). We therefore will pause
    ______

    only long enough to highlight relevant facts in the context

    of Marino's two claims.



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    I
    I

    Lack of an Evidentiary Hearing
    Lack of an Evidentiary Hearing
    ______________________________

    Marino claims that the district court erred in

    denying his motion without the benefit of an evidentiary

    hearing. Specifically, he contends that, because no rational

    explanation was provided to explain his trial counsel's

    "paradoxical" advice, the court should have held an

    evidentiary hearing. The advice to which Marino refers was

    the following: Counsel advised Marino against going to trial

    because the jury would not believe his story that he was only

    interested in purchasing one pound of marijuana.1

    Subsequently, counsel advised Marino to give his one-pound

    purchase claim to the Probation Department in a prepared

    statement, and to repeat it under oath at the presentence

    evidentiary hearing.

    Marino followed counsel's advice. The trial judge

    did not believe Marino's story, and found instead that Marino

    was involved in a transaction which
    involved more than 100 kilograms of a


    ____________________

    1. In a letter to petitioner, counsel stated:
    It is obvious to me that you will not be
    able to testify. In the event you wish
    to do so, however, that option is yours.
    It is my strong feeling that in the event
    you do testify, you would hurt yourself
    more than help, and that the government
    could, quite easily, prove the
    allegations necessary to convict you in
    Count No. III, based on your own prior
    statement and the testimony of the other
    defendants.

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    substance containing a detectable amount
    of marijuana, that is, 500 pounds, that
    the deal was, and as the tape
    demonstrated, it was going to be 500
    pounds at a time or maybe 1000 pounds at
    a time until we got to the ultimate
    amount. So that I'm satisfied with
    respect to the third count that there was
    more than 100 kilos that Mr. Marino was
    involved with.

    That finding was upheld by this court on appeal. Marino, 936
    ______

    F.2d at 27-29. Three consequences flowed from the finding:

    first, Marino's base offense level was set at 26; second,

    Marino was not given credit for acceptance of responsibility

    because he only acknowledged his guilt with respect to one

    pound of marijuana; and third, the court added a two-level

    upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, finding that

    Marino had lied at the presentence evidentiary hearing and in

    his statement of acceptance of responsibility. This court

    affirmed these decisions on appeal. Marino, 936 F.2d at 27-
    ______

    32.

    Marino now claims that had he been advised of the

    possible consequences of his statement to the Probation

    Department and his testimony at the presentence hearing, he

    would have presented his story through third-party witnesses

    rather than testifying on his own behalf. He alleges that he

    presented the district court with a prima facie case of
    _____ _____

    ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the district

    court erred in dismissing his claim without the benefit of an

    evidentiary hearing. We disagree.


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    Section 2255 provides that a petitioner is entitled

    to an evidentiary hearing on his motion "[u]nless the motion

    and the files and records of the case conclusively show that

    the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Rule 4(b) of the

    Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States

    District Courts provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from

    the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior

    proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to

    relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order

    for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be

    notified." This court has summarized the rule as follows:

    [A] petition can be dismissed without a
    hearing if the petitioner's allegations,
    accepted as true, would not entitle the
    petitioner to relief, or if the
    allegations cannot be accepted as true
    because "they are contradicted by the
    record, inherently incredible, or
    conclusions rather than statements of
    fact." Dziurgot v. Luther, 897 F.2d
    ________ ______
    1222, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Myatt
    _____
    v. United States, 875 F.2d 8, 11 (1st
    ______________
    Cir. 1989)).

    United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 929 F. 2d 747, 749-50
    _____________ ___________________

    (1st Cir. 1991).

    Petitioner claims that his counsel's inconsistent

    advice, because it resulted in an increase in petitioner's

    offense level, constituted, ipso facto, ineffective
    ____ _____

    assistance of counsel. The legal standard is clear.

    Petitioner must show both that counsel's performance fell

    below an objective standard of reasonableness and that


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    prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
    __________ __________

    687 (1984). See also Lopez-Nieves v. United States, 917 F.2d
    ___ ____ ____________ _____________

    645, 648 (1st Cir. 1990). Counsel's performance must be

    examined "not in hindsight, but based on what the lawyer

    knew, or should have known, at the time his tactical choices

    were made and implemented." United States v. Natanel, 938
    ______________ _______

    F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 986
    _____ ______

    (1992). The "range of reasonable professional assistance" is

    quite wide. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Therefore, as
    ___ __________

    the Supreme Court has noted, "[j]udicial scrutiny of

    counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id.
    ___

    We cannot say that defense counsel's performance

    was unreasonable. As the court below held,

    [I]n making decisions regarding the
    propriety of having Petitioner testify at
    a trial and at a presentence evidentiary
    hearing, defense counsel had to evaluate
    two very distinct sets of circumstances.
    In deciding that Petitioner should not
    testify at trial, defense counsel had to
    take into account the considerable wealth
    of government evidence. . . . In
    deciding to permit Petitioner to testify
    at his presentence evidentiary hearing,
    however, defense counsel was required to
    view the government's evidence in a much
    different light. Although the government
    possessed an abundance of evidence
    linking Petitioner with the drug
    transaction generally, the government's
    evidence concerning the specific amount
    involved in the transaction was less
    persuasive. See United States v. Marino,
    ___ _____________ ______
    936 F.2d at 28[-29]. Given the strength
    of the government's evidence connecting
    Petitioner with some sort of marijuana
    purchase and the ambiguities in the


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    government's evidence concerning the
    amount of marijuana, it cannot be said
    that defense counsel's advice concerning
    either matter fell below an objective
    standard of reasonableness.

    Marino v. United States, No. 92-0503B, Mem. and Order at 4
    ______ _____________

    (D. R.I. February 23, 1993). Petitioner erroneously assumes

    that giving different advice with respect to an issue at

    different stages of a prosecution is per se unreasonable.
    ___ __

    The district court acted within its discretion in denying

    petitioner's motion without benefit of an evidentiary

    hearing. Nothing would have been added to the court's

    understanding of the issue by holding a hearing, especially

    when the same court that denied the 2255 motion heard the

    relevant evidence at sentencing.

    Even were we to accept petitioner's contention that

    counsel's advice was unreasonable, we fail to see how he was

    prejudiced by that advice. Petitioner claims that

    "[p]rejudice in the case at bar is readily identified in

    mathematical terms. The Guideline Range would have been 51-

    63 months had the defendant been given consistent advice

    about not giving a statement to the Probation Department and

    not taking the witness stand at the Fatico hearing." We
    ______

    disagree. Petitioner had much to gain by testifying. Had

    the court believed him, the sentencing guideline range for

    the base offense level would have dropped from 63-78 months

    to 2-8 months. As the court below held, "[g]iven the



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    tremendous reduction in sentence Petitioner stood to gain by

    successfully challenging the amount of marijuana, the court

    cannot say that ``but for' defense counsel's lack of advice

    Petitioner would have decided not to testify at the

    presentence evidentiary hearing." Marino v. United States,
    ______ _____________

    No. 92-0503B, Mem. and Order at 6.

    In sum, petitioner's allegations, to the extent

    they are factual, "would not entitle petitioner to relief"

    under section 2255, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 929 F.2d at 749;
    ___________________

    and, to the extent they are conclusory, need not be credited.

    See id. at 740-50. Hence, an evidentiary hearing was not
    ___ ___

    required.

    II
    II

    Amendment of the Indictment
    Amendment of the Indictment
    ___________________________

    Count III of Marino's original indictment stated:

    The Grand Jury further charges:
    That on or about December 19, 1989, in
    the District of Rhode Island and
    elsewhere, defendant NICHOLAS R. MARINO
    did attempt to possess with the intent to
    distribute 100 kilograms or more of a
    mixture or substance containing a
    detectable amount of marihuana, a
    Schudule [sic] I Controlled Substance in
    violation of Title 21, United States
    Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(B)(vii).
    All in violation of Title 21, United
    States Code, Section 846 and Title 18,
    United States Code, Section 2.

    As part of his plea agreement with the government, the words

    "100 kilograms or more of" were deleted from the indictment,



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    by order of the court, prior to his entry of a plea of guilty

    to Count III. The petitioner, the government and the court

    all agreed that the amount of marijuana which Marino had

    attempted to purchase was not an element of the crime with

    which he had been charged, but rather that it was a

    sentencing issue to be determined by the court in a

    presentence evidentiary hearing prior to sentencing. See
    ___

    United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 551 n.6 (1st Cir.
    ______________ ______

    1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
    _____ ______

    After the modification, Count III of the indictment

    stated that Marino "did attempt to possess with the intent to

    distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable

    amount of marihuana, a Schudule [sic] I Controlled Substance

    in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections

    841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii)." It is unclear why the
    ___________________

    reference to a violation of 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) was not also

    deleted. That provision provides for a mandatory five-year

    minimum sentence for violations of 841(a) involving "100

    kilos or more of a mixture or substance containing a

    detectable amount of marijuana." 21 U.S.C.

    841(b)(1)(B)(vii).

    Although a hypertechnical reading of the amended

    indictment could therefore lead to the conclusion that Marino

    did, despite his best efforts, plead guilty to attempting to

    possess more than one hundred kilos of marijuana, we decline



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    to so read the record. It is clear from the transcript of

    the plea hearing that Marino did not intend to plead guilty

    to an attempt to possess with intent to distribute more than

    one pound of marijuana. It is likewise clear that the

    government was amenable to his plea of guilty to an

    undetermined quantity of marijuana, and that the issue of

    quantity would be determined by the court at a presentencing

    hearing. In the course of the plea colloquy, the court

    determined that Marino understood: (1) the maximum penalty

    for the crime with which he was charged; (2) that the penalty

    would depend upon the amount of marijuana that he had sought

    to purchase; and, (3) that the court would determine that

    amount.

    Marino now claims that the court order deleting the

    phrase "100 kilograms or more of" from Count III of the

    indictment was an improper amendment of the indictment, and

    that, as a result, the court was divested of jurisdiction in

    the case. Marino concedes that the quantity of drugs

    involved is not an element of an offense charged under 21

    U.S.C. 841(a). He claims, however, that the quantity did

    not constitute mere surplusage in the indictment because it

    "notifies the accused of the exact nature of the charge," and

    because "it alerts the defendant to the applicability of the

    penalty enhancement provision."





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    Petitioner's claims are without merit. As this

    court recapitulated in United States v. Angiulo,
    _____________ _______

    "An indictment may not be amended
    except by resubmission to the grand jury,
    unless the change is merely a matter of
    form," but withdrawal of a portion of the
    indictment that the evidence does not
    support is not an impermissible
    amendment, "provided nothing is thereby
    added to the indictment, and that the
    remaining allegations charge an offense."

    847 F.2d 956, 964 (1st Cir.) (quoting United States v.
    _____________

    Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1139-40 (1st Cir. 1981)), cert.
    ______ _____

    denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988). In this case, nothing was added
    ______

    to the indictment by the removal of the reference to "100

    kilos or more of" marijuana, and the remaining allegations

    charged an offense. Indeed, they charged the offense with

    which Marino had originally been charged: possession with

    intent to distribute marijuana. Section 841(a) criminalizes

    the possession with the intent to distribute any quantity of
    ___

    marijuana. The quantity of drugs involved is not an element

    of the crime; rather it is an issue to be determined by the

    judge at the time of sentencing. See Barnes, 890 F.2d at 551
    ___ ______

    n.6.

    Marino's contention that vital information was

    deleted from the indictment is rebutted by the fact that

    Count III of the indictment, as amended, retained a reference

    to 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(vii), thereby putting Marino on

    notice as to the potential applicability of the enhanced



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    penalty provision. Furthermore, the fact that the government

    had included the "100 kilograms or more" language in the

    original indictment, along with the plea colloquy, made it

    clear to defendant that the government would contest Marino's

    "one pound" story at the time of sentencing. It cannot be

    said that the amendment to the indictment resulted in unfair

    prejudice or surprise to Marino. He requested the amendment,

    and demonstrated an understanding of the implications that

    amendment would have for the sentencing process. The

    amendment to the indictment was proper and did not divest the

    district court of jurisdiction.

    III
    III

    Conclusion
    __________

    Finding no error in the judgment of the district

    court, the judgment is therefore summarily affirmed. See 1st
    ___

    Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.





















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