United States v. Boudreau ( 2023 )


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  •             United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 21–1973
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JASON D. BOUDREAU,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Barron, Chief Judge,
    Lynch, Circuit Judge,
    and Kelley, District Judge.*
    Jeremy A. Pratt, with whom Jason D. Boudreau, pro se, was on
    supplemental brief, for appellant.
    Lauren S. Zurier, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Zachary A. Cunha, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    January 24, 2023
    *   Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
    KELLEY, District Judge.      Jason D. Boudreau (“Boudreau”)
    was indicted on 34 child pornography possession charges in the
    District of Rhode Island.    Boudreau and the government reached a
    plea agreement under which he pled guilty to Counts 19 and 34 of
    the indictment, and the government dismissed the remaining 32
    charges.   In entering this plea agreement, Boudreau agreed to
    waive his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence.          Despite
    executing this waiver, Boudreau now appeals various aspects of the
    proceedings below, including the calculation of the Sentencing
    Guidelines and the conditions of his life term of supervised
    release.    Because   Boudreau's   waiver   of   appeal   is   valid    and
    enforceable, we dismiss his appeal.
    I.     FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    We begin with a review of Boudreau's criminal history.
    In 2009, Boudreau pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of simple
    assault of an 11-year-old girl in Rhode Island state court.
    Although the charge was “simple assault,” the facts underlying
    this conviction indicate that the crime was sexual in nature:
    Boudreau placed the child on his lap, unbuckled her belt, kissed
    her lips, and tried to place his tongue in her mouth.                  This
    conviction was originally “filed,” with no punishment imposed, but
    was converted to a term of probation in 2010 after Boudreau failed
    to appear in court.
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    In 2012, Boudreau pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of
    second-degree child molestation of a seven-year-old family member
    in Rhode Island state court.             This offense involved kissing and
    feeling the child's intimate parts over her underwear.                    The court
    sentenced Boudreau to eight years, two to be served in prison and
    six to be served on probation as a suspended sentence.
    In 2014, Boudreau pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of
    possession of child pornography in Rhode Island state court.                    The
    court sentenced him to a five-year suspended sentence with five
    years of probation.
    We now turn to the facts of this case. In March 2015, a
    person using an IP address associated with Boudreau's residence
    uploaded     a    video    of   child   pornography      to   a    website   called
    SendVid.com.         The    National    Center    for    Missing    and   Exploited
    Children alerted Rhode Island authorities to the upload of this
    video   in       April     2015.    Rhode       Island    authorities     received
    information from Verizon connecting Boudreau's residential address
    to the video in September 2015.                 In November 2015, authorities
    executed a search warrant at Boudreau's residence and seized
    electronic devices, including cell phones.                Boudreau acknowledged
    ownership of these devices at the time of the search.
    Analysis of Boudreau's cell phone indicated that between
    August and November 2015, the phone had accessed 617 images of
    child pornography.           The phone's cache contained 677 images of
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    child pornography.      The analysis indicated that on September 20,
    2015 (the date which formed the basis for “Count 19,” one of the
    two instant charges here), the phone had accessed 76 images of
    child pornography.
    The District of Rhode Island issued an arrest warrant
    for Boudreau in December 2015.            When Boudreau was arrested in
    Connecticut, authorities seized an additional cell phone from his
    person.    The SD card of this phone contained over 100 additional
    images of child pornography as well as images of young girls in
    Boudreau's family.
    A federal grand jury indicted Boudreau in February 2016
    on 33 counts of access with intent to view child pornography, for
    images found on his devices at his residence.            In June 2016, the
    grand jury returned a superseding indictment adding one count of
    possession of child pornography ("Count 34") to the original 33
    counts, for the images found on his phone during his arrest.
    In May 2018, Boudreau entered into a plea agreement under
    which he was to plead guilty to Counts 19 and 34 and the government
    would dismiss the remaining 32 counts.          The parties agreed that
    the government would recommend a sentence within the Guidelines
    range     and   the   parties   further    agreed   to   four   sentencing
    enhancements that would apply to the calculation of the offense
    level.    The plea agreement expressly contemplated the possibility
    that additional enhancements could apply, and the parties reserved
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    their rights to argue at sentencing as to the proper calculation
    of the guidelines.
    The plea agreement also contained the following waiver
    of appeal clause:
    Defendant hereby waives Defendant's right to
    appeal the convictions and sentences imposed
    by the Court, if the sentences imposed by the
    Court are within or below the sentencing
    guideline[s] range determined by the Court.
    This agreement does not affect the rights or
    obligations of the United States as set forth
    in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (b), and the government
    retains its right to appeal any of the Court's
    sentencing determinations.
    The district court conducted a change of plea hearing at
    which Boudreau was questioned about his understanding of the plea
    agreement and waiver of appeal.    Under oath, Boudreau testified
    that he understood the terms of the agreement, including the waiver
    of appeal, that he had discussed the agreement with his attorney,
    and that he was fully satisfied with his attorney's performance.
    The district court did not, however, state as a part of the
    colloquy that Boudreau could not withdraw his plea of guilty if he
    was dissatisfied with the sentence he received, as required by
    Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(c)(3)(B).
    The   Probation   Department   prepared   a   Presentence
    Investigation Report ("PSR") that contained a detailed statement
    of facts supporting each application of a sentencing enhancement.
    The PSR further recommended that the four sentencing enhancements
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    that the parties had agreed to in the plea agreement should apply.
    The   PSR   also   recommended   the     application      of     a    five-point
    enhancement for a "pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse
    or exploitation of a minor" should apply to Boudreau's offense
    level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5).
    At   sentencing,   the     district   judge        calculated    the
    Sentencing Guidelines as the PSR had recommended.                The district
    judge determined that the base offense level was 18 and added each
    of the four enhancements the parties had agreed upon in the plea
    agreement: two-level increase for material depicting prepubescent
    minors;     four-level   increase    for    depiction     of     sadistic     or
    masochistic conduct; two-level increase for use of a computer; and
    five-level increase for access to 600 or more images.                The district
    court also applied the PSR's suggested five-level increase for a
    "pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of
    a minor" and a three-level decrease for Boudreau's acceptance of
    responsibility.     This brought the offense level to 33.                Neither
    party objected to the calculation of the offense level, including
    the application of the enhancements.         The district court further
    determined that the criminal history score was 9 and the criminal
    history category was IV, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range
    of 188 to 235 months.
    When imposing the sentence, the district court again
    asked Boudreau if he had assented to the appeal waiver in his plea
    - 6 -
    agreement, and Boudreau again indicated that he had.                    The district
    court imposed a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range of 235
    months.      Because this sentence fell within the Guidelines range,
    the appeal waiver Boudreau agreed to in his plea agreement applied.
    In explaining its sentence, the district court expressed concern
    that Boudreau's risk of recidivism was nearly 100 percent and cited
    his past instances of child abuse and child pornography possession
    in reaching this conclusion.             The district court indicated that
    it   would    have   imposed    a    harsher   sentence        if    the   Sentencing
    Guidelines range had been higher and stated that it needed to keep
    Boudreau "locked up as long as [it] can in order to protect the
    public from [Boudreau] based on [his] history."
    The district court further imposed a sentence of a
    lifetime      term   of   supervised      release       with        several    special
    conditions including a "suspicionless search" provision that would
    permit    the   Probation      Officer    to   search    Boudreau's           property,
    including electronic devices, at any time, without a requirement
    of reasonable suspicion of a violation.             Additionally, the court
    imposed a special condition restricting Boudreau's abilities to
    access devices capable of connecting to the internet and to
    interact with persons under the age of 18.
    II.     DISCUSSION
    Boudreau appeals his sentence on various procedural and
    substantive grounds.        However, because Boudreau executed a waiver
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    of appeal in his plea agreement, we first assess whether Boudreau's
    waiver is valid and enforceable.        If an appeal is subject to a
    waiver that is valid and enforceable, we will dismiss the appeal.
    See United States v. Morales-Arroyo, 
    854 F.3d 118
    , 121–22 (1st
    Cir. 2017).
    We thus begin with Boudreau's challenge to the validity
    of his waiver of appeal.     We identified a three-factor standard
    for validity in United States v. Teeter, 
    257 F.3d 14
    , 24–25 (1st
    Cir. 2001).    First, the waiver must "comprise 'a clear statement'
    describing the waiver and specifying its scope."       United States
    v. Morillo, 
    910 F.3d 1
    , 2 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Teeter, 
    257 F.3d at 24
    ).     Second, the "record must show that the judge’s
    interrogation 'suffice[d] to ensure that the defendant freely and
    intelligently agreed to waive [his or] her right to appeal [his
    or] her forthcoming sentence.'"     
    Id.
     (alterations in original)
    (quoting Teeter, 
    257 F.3d at 24
    ).       And third, denying a right to
    appeal must not "work a miscarriage of justice."        
    Id.
     (quoting
    Teeter, 
    257 F.3d at 25
    ).
    Here, there is no argument on the first Teeter factor,
    as Boudreau does not dispute that the plea agreement plainly states
    the terms and scope of the waiver.       On the second factor -- the
    sufficiency of the district court's plea colloquy -- Boudreau
    contends that the court should not give effect to the appeal waiver
    based on this factor in part because the district court failed to
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    inform him that he did not have a right to withdraw his plea, in
    violation of Rule 11(c)(3)(B), and failed to inform him about the
    nature of each charge to which he was pleading, in violation of
    Rule 11(b)(1)(G).           Regarding the district court's failure to
    inform Boudreau about his right to withdraw his plea, we do not
    see how this error, even if true, has any bearing on whether
    Boudreau was adequately informed about his right to appeal his
    conviction and sentence, and we therefore do not see how this error
    is relevant to the second Teeter factor.
    As to Boudreau's claim that the district court failed to
    inform him about the nature of each charge to which he was
    pleading,    a    court's    failure    in     this   regard   could    affect   a
    defendant's ability to "intelligently" waive his right to appeal
    his conviction and sentence on those charges and is thus relevant
    to the Teeter analysis.          See Morillo, 
    910 F.3d at 2
    .             However,
    Boudreau does not sufficiently develop his argument regarding this
    error; although he argues that the prosecutor "provided the court
    with an incorrect explanation" regarding the charges against him,
    Boudreau    does    not   provide     any    argument   for    how   exactly   the
    prosecutor       erred    and   how    that     error    affected      Boudreau's
    intelligent waiver of his right to appeal.                 We therefore treat
    this argument as insufficiently developed and, thus, waived.                   See
    United States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 1990).                   Thus,
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    the two errors Boudreau asserts, which he casts as Rule 11 errors,1
    provide no support for the argument that the district court's
    interrogation was insufficient to show that Boudreau waived his
    right to appeal "freely and intelligently."     See Morillo, 
    910 F.3d at 2
    .
    Having   dispensed    with     Boudreau's   Rule   11-based
    challenges to the validity of his appeal waiver, we turn to the
    other arguments he makes regarding the second Teeter factor.      We
    do not find them persuasive.     Boudreau's principal argument is
    that the plea agreement's language is complex, and his answers at
    the plea colloquy were brief and thus insufficient to establish
    full understanding of the plea.        These concerns, which we have
    never identified as factors that can support relief on this claim,
    are minimal, given that Boudreau was represented by counsel --
    whose duties included explaining any complexities in the plea
    agreement to Boudreau -- throughout plea negotiations and at his
    change of plea hearing.    Further, Boudreau stated at his plea
    hearing that he was fully satisfied with the performance of his
    1 Insofar as Boudreau argues that Rule 11 errors not only
    affected his ability to intelligently waive his right to appeal
    but invalidated the plea agreement itself, with the effect of
    freeing him not only from the appeal waiver but from all other
    aspects of the agreement reached as part of his plea, this
    challenge fails under plain error review, as Boudreau has not shown
    "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
    have entered the plea." United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004); see United States v. Rivera-Clemente, 
    813 F.3d 43
    , 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (same).
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    counsel,     and     he   has   not    contested       the     quality   of      his
    representation.       See United States v. Rivera-Clemente, 
    813 F.3d 43
    , 48–49 (1st Cir. 2016);        United States v. Hernandez-Maldonado,
    
    793 F.3d 223
    , 226 (1st Cir. 2015).                   Additionally, during the
    colloquy, Boudreau was again afforded the opportunity to consult
    with counsel and to ask the court to further explain anything that
    he did not understand. Consequently, Boudreau has failed to carry
    his burden to establish that his appeal waiver was not entered
    "freely and intelligently." Morillo, 
    910 F.3d at 2
    .2
    Our final task is to determine whether, per the third
    Teeter     factor,    denying   Boudreau       his    appeal    would    "work     a
    miscarriage of justice."         
    257 F.3d at 25
    .             Whether a district
    court's error constitutes a miscarriage of justice is "more a
    concept than a constant," and the factors that we may weigh include
    "the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g.,
    whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a
    statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the
    impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent
    2 Boudreau separately contends in his counseled brief to us
    that he did not "freely and intelligently" waive his right to
    appeal the suspicionless search condition imposed on him as part
    of his supervised release because he could not have reasonably
    foreseen that it would be imposed and that it was, in any event,
    outside the scope of his appeal waiver. But, given the terms of
    his plea agreement and colloquy, these contentions are meritless
    under our precedent. See United States v. Santiago, 
    769 F.3d 1
    , 7-
    8 (1st Cir. 2014).
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    to which the defendant acquiesced in the result."                       
    Id. at 26
    .   We
    will reverse on this factor "only in 'egregious cases,'" not in
    "garden-variety" sentencing disputes.              Morillo, 
    910 F.3d at 4
    (quoting Teeter, 
    257 F.3d at
    25–26).             As we have explained, for
    the imposition of a condition of supervised release to result in
    a "miscarriage of justice," the condition must be "so lacking in
    rationality    or    so   wholly    unrelated    to    legitimate          sentencing
    purposes as to necessitate invalidating [the] waiver of appeal."
    United States v. Rivera-López, 
    736 F.3d 633
    , 636 (1st Cir. 2015).
    Here,      Boudreau     has   alleged      no        error    sufficiently
    egregious for us to consider piercing his waiver of appeal.                          We
    will   comment      briefly   on   Boudreau's      assertions           that   certain
    conditions    of    supervised     release    amount       to    a   miscarriage     of
    justice.     Specifically, Boudreau challenges Special Condition 6,
    which permits the Probation Officer to search his residence and
    property without reasonable suspicion of a violation; Special
    Condition 7, which restricts him from accessing devices that are
    capable of connecting to the internet; and Special Condition 8,
    which restricts his ability to contact children, either male or
    female, under the age of 18.
    Each of these challenges fails on plain error review, as
    Boudreau does not identify precedent that would provide a basis
    for concluding that it would be clear or obvious error to impose
    any of these conditions.            See Rivera-López, 736 F.3d at 63.
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    Indeed, we have permitted the imposition of a suspicionless search
    condition in another context as reasonably related to the goals of
    supervised release, see United States v. Windle, 
    35 F.4th 62
    , 67-
    68 (1st Cir. 2022), and three of our sister circuits have upheld
    the   imposition   of   similar    conditions    on   child   pornography
    offenders, see United States v. Sulik, 
    807 F. App'x. 489
    , 492–93
    (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Rosenthal, 
    295 F. App'x 985
    , 986
    (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. White, 
    244 F.3d 1199
    , 1208 (10th
    Cir. 2001).   In addition, we have upheld on plain error review
    both a supervised release condition barring a child sex offender's
    ability to have contact with minors, see United States v. Pabon,
    
    819 F.3d 26
    , 29, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2016), and a restriction on a
    child pornography offender's ability to access the internet, see
    United States v. Velez-Luciano, 
    814 F.3d 553
    , 560 (1st Cir. 2016).
    Thus, Boudreau has not met his burden to show that the imposition
    of the conditions that he challenges resulted in a miscarriage of
    justice in his case.
    We need not go further.3         The district court's sentence
    was supported by meticulous factfinding and a clear consideration
    3Boudreau contests the validity of the plea agreement on a
    number of additional grounds in his pro se supplemental brief. To
    the extent these arguments were not waived, they are meritless.
    The record does not suggest that the plea agreement was
    procedurally invalid or lacked consideration, that any of the
    prosecutor’s actions were taken in bad faith or in breach of the
    agreement, or that any of the supervised release conditions imposed
    on Boudreau were outside the scope of the appeal waiver. Because
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    of the statutorily required factors, and falls squarely within the
    scope   of   what   courts   within   and   outside    this   circuit   have
    permitted.    There has been no miscarriage of justice.            We find
    that Boudreau's waiver of appeal is valid, enforceable, and bars
    our further consideration of his arguments.           We thus dismiss and,
    as to the arguments addressed in Footnote 1, affirm as there was
    no plain error.
    counsel declined to make these arguments, we need not address their
    deficiencies in any further detail.
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