National Labor Relations Board v. Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. , 791 F.3d 207 ( 2015 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 14-1917
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LE FORT ENTERPRISES, INC.
    d/b/a MERRY MAIDS OF BOSTON,
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF
    THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
    Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo,
    Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General
    Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Robert
    J. Englehart, Supervisory Attorney, and David A. Seid, Attorney,
    on brief for petitioner.
    Scott Kamins and Offit Kurman, PA on brief for respondent.
    July 1, 2015
    KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.      Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. ("Le
    Fort") does business as a "Merry Maids" franchise, providing
    cleaning services, primarily to homeowners in and around Boston,
    Massachusetts.     Le   Fort   serves    approximately   500   customers,
    generates annual sales in excess of $1,000,000, and employs twenty-
    nine housekeepers.      Some of the housekeepers decided to try to
    unionize.   Over Le Fort's objection, the National Labor Relations
    Board ("the Board") asserted jurisdiction and conducted a secret-
    ballot election among the twenty-nine housekeepers.          By a vote of
    16 to 12 (with one challenged ballot), the employees voted to
    select   the   International   Association    of   Bridge,     Structural,
    Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 7, AFL-CIO ("the
    Union") as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
    Rejecting Le Fort's challenge to the election, the Board certified
    the Union in accord with the employees' vote. Le Fort then refused
    to bargain with the Union, triggering a charge of unfair labor
    practices and a Board order directing Le Fort to bargain.          See Le
    Fort Enters., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (May 22, 2014). The Board
    now petitions this court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(d) and 160(e)
    to enforce the Board's unfair labor practice order.               For the
    following reasons, we reject Le Fort's objections to the Board's
    jurisdiction and the election, and grant the Board's petition.
    - 2 -
    I.    The Board's Jurisdiction
    Congress empowered the Board "to prevent any person from
    engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce."
    29 U.S.C. § 160(a).            "Congress intended to and did vest in the
    Board     the      fullest      jurisdictional          breadth        constitutionally
    permissible under the Commerce Clause."                     NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
    Corp., 
    371 U.S. 224
    , 226 (1963) (per curiam); accord NLRB v. Living
    & Learning Ctrs., Inc., 
    652 F.2d 209
    , 212-13 (1st Cir. 1981).                           Le
    Fort does not claim that it falls outside that broad statutory
    grant of jurisdiction.
    Le   Fort   relies       instead    on    the    Board's     self-imposed
    adoption      of    discretionary        limits        on    the      exercise     of   its
    jurisdiction.        See Siemons Mailing Serv., 
    122 N.L.R.B. 81
    , 82-83
    (1958).    Adopted in order to conserve and efficiently deploy the
    Board's limited resources, see 
    id., these limits
    are expressed as
    minimum levels of business activity, with differing benchmarks for
    retail and non-retail employers.                 See Bussey-Williams Tire Co.,
    Inc.,   
    122 N.L.R.B. 1146
    ,   1147   (1959).           The    Board     exercises
    jurisdiction over a retail enterprise if it has a gross annual
    business volume of at least $500,000.                  NLRB v. Pizza Pizzaz, Inc.,
    
    646 F.2d 706
    , 707 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (citing Carolina
    Supplies & Cement Co, 
    122 N.L.R.B. 88
    , 89 (1958)).                               The Board
    exercises jurisdiction over a non-retail enterprise if its gross
    outflow or inflow of commerce across state lines is at least
    - 3 -
    $50,000.     NLRB v. Somerville Const. Co., 
    206 F.3d 752
    , 755 (7th
    Cir. 2000); Siemons Mailing 
    Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. at 84-85
    .
    The Board found Le Fort to be a retail enterprise because
    its sales were "sales to a purchaser who desires 'to satisfy his
    own personal wants or those of his family or friends.'" J.S. Latta
    & Son, 
    114 N.L.R.B. 1248
    , 1249 (1955) (quoting Roland Elec. Co. v.
    Walling, 
    326 U.S. 657
    , 674 (1946)).          With annual sales of over
    $1,000,000, Le Fort easily fits within the Board's jurisdiction,
    even as limited by the Board, if it is indeed a retail enterprise.
    Le Fort therefore argues that the Board erred in classifying it as
    a retail business, and that the company does not otherwise satisfy
    the discretionary standard for exercising jurisdiction over non-
    retail businesses.
    Such a challenge to the Board's application of its self-
    imposed jurisdictional reach by a company that falls within the
    Board's broad statutory grant of jurisdiction faces a steep uphill
    climb.      We will enforce against the Board its own self-imposed
    jurisdictional limits only in "extraordinary circumstances" or
    where the Board has abused its discretion.         Pizza Pizzaz, 
    Inc., 646 F.2d at 708
    ("Where statutory jurisdiction exists . . . the
    Board has the administrative discretion to disregard its own self-
    imposed jurisdictional yardstick. . . . When the Board disregards
    its   own    self-imposed   jurisdictional    guidelines   in   asserting
    jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, the courts should not intervene
    - 4 -
    unless compelled to do so by extraordinary circumstances, or unless
    the Board has abused its discretion." (quoting NLRB v. Erlich's
    814, Inc., 
    577 F.2d 68
    , 71 (8th Cir. 1978))).
    Here, there is no plausible basis for arguing that the
    Board disregarded its discretionary jurisdictional standards in
    classifying Le Fort as a retail enterprise, much less that it did
    so in extraordinary circumstances.           As the Board found, and Le
    Fort concedes, Le Fort "provid[es] home cleaning services to
    residential    customers."     Le   Fort's    owner    testified   that   his
    employees "just clean houses" "99 percent of the time."             Le Fort
    is therefore a retail enterprise with annual revenues in excess of
    $500,000, and fits well within the Board's jurisdiction, even as
    limited by the Board.        Le Fort's only argument to the contrary
    relies on cases involving other cleaning companies determined to
    be non-retail businesses.       In each of those cases, though, the
    employer      provided   cleaning     services        to   commercial     and
    institutional clients, and not primarily to homeowners.                 Serv.
    Emp. Int’l Union Local 1877, 
    345 N.L.R.B. 161
    , 162 (2005) (three
    employers provided services to commercial clients); Bergensons
    Prop. Servs., Inc., 
    338 N.L.R.B. 883
    , 884-85 (2003) (employer
    provided services to a university); West Side Carpet Cleaning Co.,
    
    136 N.L.R.B. 1694
    , 1695 (1962) (enterprise provided services to
    commercial and residential customers), enforced, 
    329 F.2d 758
    (6th
    Cir. 1964).
    - 5 -
    II.    Le Fort's Objections to the Election
    A.   Factual Background
    The       facts     relevant      to    the   election    are    largely
    undisputed.      The secret-ballot voting occurred in the kitchen of
    the single building from which Le Fort operated.                    To enter the
    kitchen,   employees         walked   into   the    building's    foyer,    crossed
    fourteen feet through the foyer into a hallway, passed through a
    steel door into a two-bay garage, and then walked another fifteen
    feet across the garage to a door into the kitchen.
    During       the     voting,      approximately       eight     employees
    gathered in the foyer.           Some of these employees made remarks to
    other workers entering or leaving the foyer going to or from the
    kitchen.   The comments included the following:
       Four employees were told (or overheard others saying)
    that whoever did not vote for the Union would be
    dismissed, or that new employees would be dismissed
    if they voted "no."1
       After they voted, one of those same four employees,
    plus two other employees, were told that, if the Union
    won, undocumented employees would be fired.2
    1E.g., "whoever doesn't vote for the Union is going to be
    thrown out, for example, the new ones." One of the four employees
    did not hear the threat until after she had voted.
    2E.g., "the persons who did not have papers within the
    Company, if the Union would win, they were going to be thrown out."
    - 6 -
       Three other employees were told things like "[w]e're
    counting on your vote," "[w]e need you on our side,"
    or "you know how you're going to vote."
    Additionally, an employee listening from another room
    overheard those gathered in the foyer making derogatory remarks
    about managers and employees who opposed the Union.3         None of the
    electioneering occurred in any designated "no electioneering"
    area.       Nor were any officials or agents of the Union involved.
    The hearing officer, and then the Board in affirming the
    hearing officer, found that none of the foregoing conduct required
    setting aside the election results.         Le Fort now challenges that
    conclusion, contending that the Board improperly relied on its
    finding that Union agents did not make the various remarks, and
    that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that the various
    comments, viewed collectively, did not warrant setting aside the
    election results.
    B.   Standard of Review
    "In reviewing the Board's findings and conclusions on
    the conduct of elections, the Board is entitled to a 'wide degree
    of discretion' in establishing what 'safeguards [are] necessary to
    insure [that the outcome reflects a] fair and free choice of
    3   E.g., "pieces of trash," "prostitutes," "crackheads," and
    "hag."
    - 7 -
    bargaining representatives by employees.'"              Hosp. Gen. Menonita v.
    NLRB, 
    393 F.3d 263
    , 266 (1st Cir. 2004) (alterations in original)
    (quoting NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 
    329 U.S. 324
    , 330 (1946)).                      The
    Board's findings of fact will stand if supported by substantial
    evidence.      29 U.S.C. § 160(e).           As the party challenging the
    election, Le Fort bears the burden of proof, and must establish
    that the Board abused its discretion in upholding the election.
    Hosp. Gen. 
    Menonita, 393 F.3d at 266
    .               The Board would abuse its
    discretion if it used the incorrect legal standard.                 NLRB v. Reg'l
    Home Care Servs., Inc., 
    237 F.3d 62
    , 67 (1st Cir. 2001).
    C.   Standard for Non-Party Employee Misconduct
    In assessing the impact of the workers' comments, the
    Board determined that the workers gathered in the foyer were not
    agents   of    the    Union,   nor   were    they     acting   at   its   behest.
    Therefore, the Board evaluated the comments' effect on the election
    under a more lenient standard than it would for conduct by the
    agents of the Union or Le Fort.             Compare Melrose-Wakefield Hosp.
    Ass'n, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    615 F.2d 563
    , 568 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Under
    settled law, non-party statements require the setting aside of the
    election    only     when   they   are   shown   to    have    created    such    an
    atmosphere of fear and coercion that free choice has become
    impossible."); with Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 
    140 F.3d 259
    ,
    264 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Where election misconduct is attributable
    to one of the parties, the Board will overturn the election if the
    - 8 -
    misconduct created such an environment of tension and coercion as
    to have had a probable effect upon the employees' actions at the
    polls and to have materially affected the results of the election."
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Le Fort does not challenge the finding that the employees
    gathered in the foyer were not agents of the Union or acting at
    its behest, and that therefore they were not parties to the
    election.     Rather, Le Fort argues that the Board, allegedly
    contrary to our precedent, placed too much emphasis on this
    finding.    Le Fort claims that "the Board was wrong when it stated
    that   because   co-workers   made   these   threats[,]    this   somehow
    nullified their credibility or their coercive nature."            In this
    manner, argues Le Fort, the Board ran afoul of our precedent
    holding that a finding that remarks are made only by non-parties
    does not preclude a finding of relevant coercion.         See, e.g., NLRB
    v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc., 
    758 F.2d 4
    , 10 (1st Cir. 1985) ("One
    employee's remark to another can be coercive even though the
    speaker is not a union agent."); NLRB v. Int'l Equip. Co., 
    454 F.2d 686
    , 688 (1st Cir. 1972) ("[A]bsence of union culpability
    does not suffice if in fact an atmosphere of fear and coercion
    existed[.]").
    This argument fails to get out of the starting blocks.
    The Board did not find that the non-party status of the hecklers
    "nullified" the credibility or coercive nature of the comments.
    - 9 -
    To the contrary, it examined the circumstances to determine whether
    and to what extent the comments were credible and coercive enough
    to render free choice impossible.        In this manner, the Board
    followed both its precedent and ours. See Westwood Horizons Hotel,
    
    270 N.L.R.B. 802
    , 803 (1984) ("[T]he test to be applied is whether
    the misconduct was so aggravated as to create a general atmosphere
    of fear and reprisal rendering a free election impossible."); see
    also Melrose-Wakefield Hosp. Ass'n, 
    Inc., 615 F.2d at 568
    (calling
    the non-party standard "settled law").     In sum, we find no error
    in the standard employed by the Board.
    D.   Applying the Standard to the Employees' Comments
    We turn next to Le Fort's principal argument:    that the
    nature of the comments made by the non-party employees compelled
    the Board to find that free choice was not possible.      To assess
    that argument, we consider first the comments by category, and
    then cumulatively.   As did the hearing officer and the Board, we
    consider the following five factors to determine whether the
    threats created a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal that
    made a free election impossible: (1) "the nature of the threat
    itself"; (2) "whether the threat encompassed the entire bargaining
    unit"; (3) the extent of dissemination; (4) "whether the person
    making the threat was capable of carrying it out, and whether it
    is likely that the employees acted in fear of his capability of
    carrying out the threat"; and (5) whether the threat occurred "at
    - 10 -
    or near the time of the election."                 Westwood Horizons 
    Hotel, 270 N.L.R.B. at 803
    ; accord Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    122 F.3d 582
    , 586 (8th Cir. 1997).
    We begin with the most serious threats made: the threats
    that undocumented employees would be turned in when the Union won
    the election.            While such threats certainly warrant scrutiny, the
    Board       did    not    abuse    its   discretion   in   concluding   that   the
    particular threats made here did not overbear the free choice of
    any voters in a manner that prejudiced Le Fort.                First, all three
    employees who heard these threats had already voted, and there was
    no evidence that these threats were disseminated beyond those three
    original listeners.               Second, even if an employee had heard the
    threat before voting, the threat would have more likely induced an
    undocumented employee to vote against the Union, not for it.                   The
    gist of the threat, after all, was that, if the Union won,
    undocumented employees would be fired, no matter for whom they
    voted.4      We fail to see how such threats could have disadvantaged
    Le Fort.
    4
    Le Fort tries to characterize these threats as threats that
    the undocumented employees would be ousted if they did not support
    the Union, but the transcripts of the hearing do not support this
    reading. The threats as transcribed were as follows: "when the
    Union enters, when they enter into the Company, that they win,
    those of us workers that do not have legal documents would be fired
    from the Company.    The Union was going to remove us from the
    Company"; "the persons who did not have papers within the Company,
    if the Union would win, they were going to be thrown out"; and
    "the persons who did not have documents would be removed . . .
    - 11 -
    The analysis changes when we consider the threats that
    the   Union    would   secure   the    firing   of   those,   especially   new
    employees, who did not vote for it.             Those threats were directed
    to at most five employees.5       Three of these employees had not yet
    voted.    And the threats were aimed at those who voted in a
    particular manner.       Thus, if an employee viewed the threat as
    credible, and believed that the Union might win, she might protect
    herself by voting for the Union.          The problem for Le Fort is that
    nothing about the nature of the threat compelled a finding that it
    was credible. There is no evidence that any of the employees might
    have thought that the Union would know for whom each person voted
    in a secret-ballot election.             Also, as found by the hearing
    examiner, the rank-and-file employees conveying the threats did
    not have the authority to carry out any firings.              Finding threats
    of this nature not credible comports with Board precedent, NLRB v.
    Downtown Bid Servs. Corp., 
    682 F.3d 109
    , 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
    [b]y the Union. In other words, if the Union won the persons who
    did not have documents would be removed."      We agree with the
    hearing officer that the plain import of these threats was that
    undocumented employees would be fired at the Union's behest,
    regardless of whether they had supported the Union.
    5It is unclear how the hearing officer arrived at five, and
    not four, employees. It appears that the hearing officer may have
    double-counted one employee who heard the threats.
    - 12 -
    In Re Accubuilt, Inc., 
    340 N.L.R.B. 1337
    , 1338 (2003), and we see
    no reason not to defer to such a finding here.6
    We consider next the electioneering comments (e.g.,
    "we're      counting    on   your   vote")      and   name-calling   (e.g.,
    "crackheads" and "pieces of trash").          Neither rose to the level of
    compelling a conclusion that the election results were tainted.
    The remarks were made outside any designated "no electioneering
    area," by non-party co-workers, and were not directed at listeners
    standing in line waiting to vote.            See Overnite Transp. 
    Co., 140 F.3d at 269-70
    ; Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 
    259 N.L.R.B. 1118
    , 1119 (1982), enforced, 
    703 F.2d 876
    (5th Cir. 1983).              The
    foyer in which the comments were made was separated from the
    polling room by at least 15 feet of garage bays and a closed steel
    door. An election observer stationed in the polling room testified
    that she heard outside voices, but that the voices were neither
    loud nor distinct.       In short, Le Fort has given us no reason to
    disturb the Board's conclusion that the relatively mild, "rah-rah"
    electioneering comments to workers on their way to the polling
    place       and   the   childish    name-calling      did   not   interfere
    6
    We note too that, as with the threats to undocumented
    employees, some of the threats to new employees were ambiguous as
    to who (the employer or the Union) would be responsible for the
    firing: "[i]f I wanted to get more pay I had to vote 'yes' because
    otherwise all of the new people were going to be fired"; and "if
    you're new you're going to be thrown out". Le Fort makes no claim
    that the hecklers could have been credibly viewed as speaking on
    behalf of the employer.
    - 13 -
    significantly with voters' free choice.    See Deffenbaugh Indus.,
    
    Inc., 122 F.3d at 586
    ("[A] certain measure of bad feeling and
    even hostile behavior is probably inevitable in any hotly contested
    election[.]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Finally, given how non-existent or minimal the impact of
    any of these comments was, the Board was not compelled to find
    that, cumulatively, they precluded the holding of a fair election.
    Le Fort complains that the Board did not "analyze[] and develop[]
    . . . in the underlying proceedings" whether the cumulative impact
    of the conduct justified setting aside the election.   The hearing
    officer did not separately and explicitly discuss the cumulative
    effect of the comments.    However, Le Fort did not ask that the
    hearing officer undertake such a discussion.    Rather, it was not
    until Le Fort filed its exceptions to the hearing officer's report
    and recommendation that Le Fort raised the issue of cumulative
    effect.   The Board, after adopting the hearing officer's findings
    and recommendations, responded that it "f[ou]nd no merit to [Le
    Fort's] contention on exception that the cumulative impact of the
    conduct warrants setting aside the election."     Le Fort Enters.,
    Inc., Case No. 01-RC-097257, 
    2013 WL 6252456
    , at *1 n.2 (Dec. 3,
    2013).
    After putting aside Le Fort's bluster, and viewing its
    challenge in its totality, we are left with little more than brief,
    ambiguous, rumored threats to three employees who had not yet
    - 14 -
    voted, made by co-workers without authority to carry out the
    threats, and in the context of taunting and cajoling during a hotly
    contested election.   Though the voting atmosphere may have been
    somewhat boisterous, Le Fort fails to satisfy its burden to show
    that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that the
    election was not so pervaded with fear and coercion as to render
    a free choice impossible.    Melrose-Wakefield Hosp. Ass'n, 
    Inc., 615 F.2d at 570
    .
    III.   Conclusion
    The Board's petition for enforcement is granted.
    - 15 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1917

Citation Numbers: 791 F.3d 207, 203 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3409, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11365

Judges: Howard, Selya, Kayatta

Filed Date: 7/1/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (16)

National Labor Relations Board v. West Side Carpet Cleaning ... , 329 F.2d 758 ( 1964 )

National Labor Relations Board v. A. J. Tower Co. , 329 U.S. 324 ( 1946 )

Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling , 66 S. Ct. 413 ( 1946 )

Overnite Transportation Company v. National Labor Relations ... , 140 F.3d 259 ( 1998 )

Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Systems, Inc., Petitioner-... , 703 F.2d 876 ( 1983 )

deffenbaugh-industries-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board-general , 122 F.3d 582 ( 1997 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Pizza Pizzaz, Inc., D/b/a/... , 646 F.2d 706 ( 1981 )

National Labor Relations Board v. International Equipment ... , 454 F.2d 686 ( 1972 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc. , 85 A.L.R. Fed. 173 ( 1985 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Erlich's 814, Inc., ... , 577 F.2d 68 ( 1978 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Regional Home Care ... , 237 F.3d 62 ( 2001 )

Melrose-Wakefield Hospital Association, Inc. v. National ... , 615 F.2d 563 ( 1980 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Living and Learning ... , 652 F.2d 209 ( 1981 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp. , 83 S. Ct. 312 ( 1963 )

Hospital General Menonita v. National Labor Relations Board , 393 F.3d 263 ( 2004 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Somerville 1 Construction ... , 206 F.3d 752 ( 2000 )

View All Authorities »