United States v. Santos-Soto , 799 F.3d 49 ( 2015 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    Nos. 11-2160
    12-1814
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    NORMA SANTOS-SOTO,
    CARLOS PLAZA-SANTIAGO,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
    Gail S. Strassfeld, for appellant Santos-Soto.
    Ramón M. González, for appellant Plaza-Santiago.
    Tiffany V. Monrose, Scott H. Anderson, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States
    Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
    August 24, 2015
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.     After a six-day jury trial,
    Defendants-Appellants      Norma   Santos-Soto   ("Santos")   and   Carlos
    Plaza-Santiago ("Plaza"), former police agents of the Puerto Rico
    Police, were convicted of conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten,
    and intimidate persons in the town of Arecibo in the exercise of
    their constitutional rights in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 241
    (Count 1) and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    controlled substances in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846
    (Count 2).      On appeal, they challenge the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting their convictions on Count 2.1         After careful
    consideration, we reverse Santos's conviction on Count 2 for
    insufficient evidence, but find that there was sufficient evidence
    to convict Plaza on Count 2. We, therefore, affirm his conviction.
    I.   Background
    A.    Factual Background
    We recite the facts as the jury could have found them,
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's
    verdict. See United States v. Beltrán, 
    503 F.3d 1
    , 2 (1st Cir.
    2007).     Santos and Plaza used to work as police agents in the
    Arecibo Drug Division of the Puerto Rico Police.              In 2007, as
    members of the "Confidentiality" section, Defendants worked with
    undercover     agents,     including   Agent     José   Rodríguez-Vázquez
    ("Rodríguez"). Santos was in charge of undercover agent Rodríguez.
    1
    Defendants do not challenge their convictions on Count 1.
    -2-
    On July 5, 2007, the Puerto Rico Police, Arecibo Drug
    Division, executed arrest warrants against some individuals.            Two
    of these individuals -- Juan Carlos Aquino-Méndez ("Aquino") and
    Roberto González-Medina ("González-Medina") -- were arrested based
    on complaints filed for an alleged drug transaction that took place
    on February 7, 2007.    These complaints were predicated on a sworn
    affidavit   prepared   on   February   9,   2007,    by   undercover   agent
    Rodríguez, where he stated that he and a confidential informant,
    Gerald Hernández-Vera ("Hernández"), had purchased two ounces of
    cocaine from Aquino and González-Medina on February 7, 2007.
    However, the information contained in this affidavit detailing the
    transaction was false.
    The February Incident
    On February 7, 2007, Rodríguez and Hernández did not
    purchase any drugs from either Aquino or González-Medina. Instead,
    on February 6, 2007, agent Edgardo Hernández-López (a/k/a "Eggy"),
    a police officer at the Arecibo Illegal Weapons Unit of the Puerto
    Rico Police, gave two ounces of cocaine to Hernández to plant on
    Aquino and González-Medina in order to frame them, because Eggy had
    a personal grudge against Aquino.       On February 7, 2007, Rodríguez
    and Hernández were supposed to do a controlled buy of drugs from
    Aquino's alleged pusher, González-Medina.           They drove together to
    González-Medina's house and Hernández got out of the car and walked
    to the rear side of González-Medina's house to do the controlled
    -3-
    buy while Rodríguez stayed in the car. Hernández talked briefly to
    González-Medina's father, but did not purchase any drugs or talk to
    anyone else.    At the time, Hernández had the drugs that Eggy had
    given him the day before hidden in his boot, but he did not tell
    this to Rodríguez.     Instead, Hernández took out the drugs from his
    boot and, upon returning to the car, told Rodríguez that González-
    Medina   had   just   sold    him   those   drugs   on   behalf    of   Aquino.
    Rodríguez then took Hernández home and left with the drugs.              While
    this was taking place, Santos and Plaza were together in a police
    car in the general vicinity, but they did not see the "transaction"
    take place.    Santos afterwards submitted the drugs for testing to
    the Institute of Forensic Science,2 which concluded that they were
    in fact cocaine.
    Two days later, on February 9, 2007, Rodríguez prepared
    a sworn affidavit, in which he stated that he and the confidential
    informant, Hernández, had purchased two ounces of cocaine from
    Aquino and González-Medina on February 7, 2007.            Rodríguez's sworn
    affidavit of February 9, 2007, was then used to support complaints
    charging   Aquino     and    González-Medina    with     state    drug-related
    offenses, and arrest warrants were issued against them in July
    2007.
    The July Incident
    2
    This was normal procedure.
    -4-
    The arrest warrants for Aquino and González-Medina were
    to be executed on July 5, 2007.       Santos assigned the arrest
    warrants related to the February incident to Agent Bernie González-
    Vélez ("González-Vélez"), who had joined the Arecibo Drug Division
    earlier that year. According to González-Vélez's trial testimony,3
    Santos, Plaza, and two other police agents developed a plan whereby
    González-Vélez and Rodríguez were to conduct a buy-bust operation.
    Pursuant to the plan, González-Vélez would go to Aquino's house
    with Rodríguez to buy some drugs from Aquino. After paying for the
    drugs, González-Vélez would execute the arrest warrant issued as a
    result of the February complaint.     However, Hernández again got
    cocaine prior to the planned buy-bust. Earlier that day, Hernández
    obtained fifty baggies of cocaine from Eggy and Agent José González
    (a/k/a "Tuti"), who also worked at the Arecibo Illegal Weapons Unit
    of the Puerto Rico Police.   Both Eggy and Tuti told Hernández to
    plant the cocaine on Aquino.      According to Hernández's trial
    testimony, Plaza called him on July 5, 2007, and told him to
    purchase fifty bags of cocaine from Aquino.
    Hernández consumed three to five of the fifty baggies of
    cocaine that Eggy and Tuti had given him, and then met with
    González-Vélez and Rodríguez.   Hernández gave the remaining forty-
    five to forty-seven baggies of cocaine to Rodríguez, and told him
    that he had purchased the drugs from Aquino earlier that day.
    3
    González-Vélez testified pursuant to a plea agreement.
    -5-
    Hernández told González-Vélez and Rodríguez that they still needed
    to pay Aquino for the drugs.   Because Hernández had already gotten
    the drugs, the original buy-bust plan was changed.     The officers
    then planned to pay Aquino for the cocaine that he had allegedly
    sold Hernández earlier that day, and then arrest him after making
    the payment.    When González-Vélez and Rodríguez suggested that
    Hernández go with them to pay Aquino for the drugs, Hernández
    refused.   Instead, he requested to be taken home because he feared
    that Aquino would label him as a snitch and kill him.      González-
    Vélez then radioed the patrol car where Santos and Plaza were and
    informed them that Hernández did not want to go to Aquino's house
    and wanted to be taken home instead.    Plaza told González-Vélez to
    take Hernández home, which he did.     At no time did González-Vélez
    tell Plaza that Hernández had already "purchased" the drugs from
    Aquino or that they already had the drugs.
    After dropping Hernández at his house, Rodríguez and
    González-Vélez arrived at Aquino's house to execute the arrest
    warrant.   There were no other police officers at Aquino's house,
    but other officers had agreed to be nearby.    Rodríguez exited the
    car and called for Aquino.     When Aquino came out of his house,
    Rodríguez told him that he was there to pay for the drugs he had
    given earlier to Hernández, but Aquino denied any knowledge of the
    drugs. Rodríguez then identified Aquino by taking off his watch --
    a prearranged signal -- and returned to the car while Aquino went
    -6-
    back into his house. González-Vélez then exited the car and called
    Aquino.      When Aquino once again came out of his house, González-
    Vélez arrested him and searched him, but did not find anything
    illegal.     González-Vélez then radioed Santos, Plaza, and two other
    agents who were all together in the same police car and told them
    that "the target had been arrested."         He did not mention anything
    about the drugs.       Santos, Plaza, and the other two agents arrived
    at Aquino's house in less than ten minutes. Other officers arrived
    shortly thereafter.        Immediately upon his arrival Plaza asked
    González-Vélez for the "bundle" of cocaine.           González-Vélez then
    gave Plaza the drugs that Rodríguez had given him.          Plaza took the
    "bundle" and told Aquino, "This is yours."           Aquino denied that it
    was   his.       The   officers   then    searched   Aquino's   house   for
    approximately twenty minutes but did not find anything illegal.
    All they found was over $2,000 in a drawer, which González-Vélez
    seized.      Aquino was taken to the police station in a van, while
    González-Vélez left with Rodríguez.
    Later that day, Plaza arrested Hernández at his house,
    though his arrest was fake.4         He was also taken to the police
    station and left in a holding cell until the next day, when he was
    released on bail, which was paid for by Plaza.
    4
    Other people, including González-Medina, were also arrested on
    July 5, 2007.
    -7-
    After all the arrests were made on July 5, 2007, the
    agents went back to the police station.      There, González-Vélez
    asked Santos and Plaza what would happen because the drugs had not
    been seized from Aquino and the buy-bust had not taken place.
    Santos and Plaza instructed González-Vélez to tell the district
    attorney that he had seized the drugs from Aquino's person.
    González-Vélez told Santos and Plaza that "the facts didn't occur
    like that," to which they responded that "it was Aquino's drugs,
    submit the case like that."    González-Vélez did exactly as Santos
    and Plaza had instructed.     He told the district attorney that he
    had a search warrant for Aquino and that when he arrested and
    searched him, he seized drugs and money from Aquino.5
    In September 2007, in collaboration with the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"),6 González-Vélez had three recorded
    conversations with Santos about the July 5 incident.       In these
    conversations, Santos -- unaware that she was being recorded --
    told González-Vélez that he should stick to "the same story" he
    previously told the district attorney back in July 2007. González-
    Vélez was unable to record any conversations with Plaza.    Also in
    September 2007, Santos talked to FBI agent Julio Tobar.    She told
    5
    Based on this information, Aquino was charged in state court
    with drug-related offenses. González-Vélez testified against him
    in the state proceedings, where he maintained the false version of
    the events that he had previously told the district attorney.
    6
    It is unclear from the record how the FBI first became involved
    in this case.
    -8-
    Tobar that on July 5, 2007, she learned from Hernández that he had
    received baggies of cocaine from Aquino, and admitted to Tobar that
    she instructed González-Vélez to "charge Aquino as if the drugs had
    been found in his possession," despite knowing that the drugs had
    not been found on Aquino or in his house.
    Subpoenaed phone records of Eggy, Tuti, and Plaza for the
    months of February, June, July, and September 2007, showed that the
    telephone   calls   between   Plaza,    Eggy,   and   Tuti    significantly
    increased in frequency on the days before, of, and following the
    February and July incidents.7    Specifically, on February 6, 2007 --
    the day when Eggy gave Hernández two ounces of cocaine to plant on
    Aquino and González-Medina -- the records showed three telephone
    calls between Eggy, Tuti, and Plaza. First, Eggy called Tuti, then
    Plaza called Tuti, and afterwards Eggy and Tuti had another
    telephone conversation.       On the following day, the day of the
    February incident, there were nine telephone calls between Eggy,
    Tuti, and Plaza, and Plaza participated in four of them.             In the
    morning, Tuti called Eggy, and then called Plaza.            Between 4:18 pm
    and 4:40 pm, the three agents had four telephone conversations.
    First, Eggy and Tuti talked, then Plaza called Tuti, and after
    speaking with Plaza, Tuti called Eggy.           The three of them had
    additional telephone conversations during the evening.            A similar
    7
    Santos's telephone records were not subpoenaed.
    -9-
    pattern was reflected in the records for February 8, the day after
    the February incident.
    The records also showed that from July 2 to July 6, 2007,
    Plaza had seventeen telephone calls with Tuti and Eggy,8 and Plaza
    initiated more than forty percent of these calls.9                    Six of the
    seventeen telephone calls were prior to the buy-bust, while the
    remaining eleven were either during or after the planned buy-bust.
    In addition, during this same period, Tuti and Eggy called each
    other on thirty-one occasions.           The evidence showed not only that
    Plaza, Tuti, and Eggy were in constant communication during these
    days,   but     also    that   their    telephone    calls     were   relatively
    contemporaneous.         Many times two of the agents would talk and
    immediately      upon    hanging   up    the    phone,   one   of     them   would
    communicate with the third agent.              For example, on July 5, 2007,
    one hour before the buy-bust operation was scheduled to begin, Tuti
    and Plaza had a telephone conversation at 3:01 pm that lasted for
    two minutes.     Immediately after hanging up with Plaza, Tuti called
    Eggy at 3:03 pm.        Similarly, later that same day, and close in time
    to the planned buy-bust operation, Plaza called Tuti at 6:58 pm and
    talked to him for two minutes.            Immediately after finishing his
    8
    Ten of these telephone calls were with Tuti, and the remaining
    seven were with Eggy.
    9
    Fourteen out of the seventeen telephone calls were made on the
    days before, of, and following the July incident. Eight of these
    calls were made on July 5, 2007.
    -10-
    conversation with Plaza, Tuti called Eggy at 7:01 pm. The evidence
    reflects the same pattern of contemporaneous calls between the
    three of them on the day following the arrest of Aquino, when six
    telephone calls were made between Eggy, Tuti, and Plaza within a
    time frame of barely eight minutes.10
    The telephone records admitted into evidence showed that
    the telephone calls between Plaza, Eggy, and Tuti around the
    February and July incidents constituted a spike in relation to the
    telephone records for the rest of the period examined, which showed
    that Plaza barely communicated with Eggy or Tuti by phone.11
    10
    For example, on July 6, 2007, Eggy called Tuti at 3:25 pm and
    talked to him for four minutes, until 3:29 pm. At 3:29 pm Eggy
    received an incoming call from Plaza. He talked to Plaza for two
    minutes, until 3:31 pm, when he then received a call from Tuti at
    3:31 pm.    At 3:32 pm, one minute after Plaza finished his
    conversation with Eggy, Plaza called Tuti on his phone. Then, right
    after finishing his conversation with Plaza, Tuti called Eggy at
    3:33 pm.
    11
    The evidence does not reflect a single telephone call between
    Plaza and Eggy from late January to February 28, 2007, other than
    the ones he had on the days of and after the February incident. In
    addition, the telephone records reflect that during the entire
    months of June and July 2007, Plaza and Eggy communicated by phone
    on only three days, aside from the days of and after the July
    incident.    As to his telephone conversations with Tuti, the
    evidence showed that during the entire month of February 2007,
    aside from the days of and after the February incident, Plaza
    communicated with Tuti by phone only on February 14, 2007, which
    was the day before the Institute of Forensic Science received the
    drugs from the February incident for testing.        The telephone
    records also reflect that from June 1 to July 31, 2007, Plaza and
    Tuti communicated by phone on only one day aside from the days
    around the July incident. We note several telephone calls between
    Plaza and Tuti in September 2007. Although the parties do not make
    anything of it, we acknowledge that these calls were made around
    the time that the FBI initiated its investigation in this case.
    -11-
    B. Procedural Background
    On October 1, 2007, a grand jury returned a two-count
    indictment charging Santos and Plaza, along with others,12 with
    (1) conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate persons
    in the town of Arecibo in the exercise of their constitutional
    rights    in   violation   of   
    18 U.S.C. § 241
       (Count   1),   and
    (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled
    substances in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846 (Count 2).13
    Santos and Plaza were tried jointly. At the close of the
    government's case, both Defendants moved for judgments of acquittal
    under Rule 29 of Federal Criminal Procedure, which the district
    court denied. After presenting their witnesses, Defendants renewed
    their    motions   for   acquittal,    which   were   again   denied.    On
    October 28, 2010, after a six-day trial, the jury found Santos and
    Plaza guilty of both counts.         Santos was sentenced to concurrent
    terms of fifty-one months of imprisonment on each count, to be
    followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release on
    each count, and a $200 special monetary assessment.           The district
    12
    The confidential informant, Hernández, and agents González-Vélez
    and Rodríguez were also indicted. Hernández pled guilty to the two
    conspiracy charges, González-Vélez pled guilty to conspiracy to
    violate constitutional rights, and Rodríguez pled guilty to a
    charge of withholding information of a felony.
    13
    In United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 
    691 F.3d 1
    , 16 (1st Cir.
    2012), we held that a conspiracy by law enforcement officers to
    plant controlled substances on victims in order to fabricate
    criminal cases entails the specific intent to distribute within the
    meaning of § 841(a)(1).
    -12-
    court sentenced Plaza to concurrent terms of forty-one months of
    imprisonment on each count, to be followed by concurrent three-year
    terms of supervised release on each count, and a $200 special
    monetary assessment.           Santos and Plaza appeal their Count 2
    convictions only.
    On appeal, Santos and Plaza challenge the sufficiency of
    the evidence supporting their convictions on Count 2, and claim
    that the district court erred in denying their respective motions
    for acquittal.       Santos argues that the government did not present
    any evidence that she knew the drugs involved in the February or
    July incidents did not come from González-Medina or Aquino and,
    thus,   there    was   no   evidence    that    she   had   knowledge   of   the
    conspiracy      to   possess   with    intent    to   distribute   controlled
    substances. Santos also claims that the government failed to prove
    that she possessed the intent to distribute controlled substances;
    that is, that "the cocaine be transferred between police officers
    in order to be planted on any victim."
    Plaza alleges that, as to the February incident, there
    was no evidence that he had anything to do with the drugs received
    from Eggy and Tuti for the purpose of fabricating a case against
    Aquino.   In relation to the July incident, Plaza claims that the
    government failed to produce evidence showing beyond a reasonable
    doubt that he knew of the existence of the conspiracy to possess
    -13-
    with   intent   to   distribute   controlled    substances   and   that   he
    knowingly and intentionally joined said conspiracy.
    II.    Discussion
    We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion
    made under Rule 29 for judgment of acquittal.          United States v.
    Ulloa, 
    760 F.3d 113
    , 118 (1st Cir. 2014).       In so doing, "we examine
    the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most
    favorable to the jury's verdict."         United States v. Trinidad-
    Acosta, 
    773 F.3d 298
    , 310 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted).     We do not focus on each piece of evidence
    separately.     Rather, we evaluate the sum of all the evidence and
    inferences drawn therefrom, and determine whether that sum is
    enough for any reasonable jury to find all the elements of the
    crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the individual
    pieces of evidence are not enough when viewed in isolation. United
    States v. Shaw, 
    670 F.3d 360
    , 362 (1st Cir. 2012) ("Individual
    pieces of evidence viewed in isolation may be insufficient in
    themselves to prove a point, but in cumulation may indeed meet the
    mark."); United States v. Mena-Robles, 
    4 F.3d 1026
    , 1031 (1st Cir.
    1993) ("[J]uries are not required to examine the evidence in
    isolation, for individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in
    themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it.           The sum
    of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its
    constituent parts." (internal quotation marks omitted)).           Also, in
    -14-
    reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e do not assess the
    credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury.
    Nor   need   we   be   convinced    that     the   government    succeeded   in
    eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant's
    innocence." Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d at 310-11 (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted). "Rather, we must decide whether that
    evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would
    allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the defendant committed the charged crime," id.                   at 311
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), even if that
    conclusion is not inevitable. United States v. Floyd, 
    740 F.3d 22
    ,
    30 (1st Cir. 2014) (The evidence "suffices if the conclusions that
    the   jury   draws     from   [it],     although      not   inevitable,      are
    reasonable.").     "The verdict must stand unless the evidence is so
    scant that a rational factfinder could not conclude that the
    government proved all the essential elements of the charged crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt."        United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 
    597 F.3d 32
    , 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted); United States v.
    Azubike, 
    564 F.3d 59
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that so long as
    "any reasonable jury could find all the elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the conviction" (internal
    quotation    marks     omitted)).       Thus,      "defendants    challenging
    convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle on
    -15-
    appeal."   United States v. Lipscomb, 
    539 F.3d 32
    , 40 (1st Cir.
    2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Nevertheless,   "we   must   'reject   those   evidentiary
    interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable,
    or overly speculative.'"   United States v. Rodríguez-Martínez, 
    778 F.3d 367
    , 371 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Spinney, 
    65 F.3d 231
    , 234 (1st Cir. 1995)). "Where the evidence presented does
    not support the inference that a defendant had knowledge of the
    crime, we have consistently found the evidence insufficient."    
    Id.
    (citing United States v. Pérez-Meléndez, 
    599 F.3d 31
    , 42 (1st Cir.
    2010)).
    To sustain a drug-conspiracy conviction, the government
    must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "knew about
    and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy, 'intending to
    commit the underlying substantive offense.'"       United States v.
    Acosta-Colón, 
    741 F.3d 179
    , 190 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United
    States v. Ortiz de Jesús, 
    230 F.3d 1
    , 5 (1st Cir. 2000)).         "An
    agreement to join a conspiracy may be express or tacit, and may be
    proved by direct or circumstantial evidence," Trinidad-Acosta, 773
    F.3d at 311 (quoting United States v. Liriano, 
    761 F.3d 131
    , 135
    (1st Cir. 2014)), such as inferences "drawn from members' words and
    actions and from the interdependence of activities and persons
    involved." Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also United States v. Martínez-Medina, 
    279 F.3d 105
    ,
    -16-
    113-14   (1st      Cir.    2002)    ("The    jury    may   infer    an   agreement
    circumstantially by evidence of, inter alia, a common purpose
    . . . , overlap of participants, and interdependence of various
    elements in the overall plan.").
    A   defendant    need    not   know    the   full    extent    of   the
    drug-trafficking          conspiracy    or     the   identities     of      all   the
    co-conspirators to be convicted.               See Ortiz de Jesús, 
    230 F.3d at 5
    .    Further, a defendant may be found to be a part of the
    drug-trafficking conspiracy -- despite a lack of participation in
    the drug collection, handling, or sales -- based upon performance
    of ancillary functions (e.g., accounting, communications, and
    strong-arm enforcement).           See United States v. García-Torres, 
    280 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d at
    311 ("[E]ach coconspirator need not know of or have contact with
    all other members, nor must they know all of the details of the
    conspiracy or participate in every act in furtherance of it."
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).                 However, "it is hard to
    imagine how someone furnishing a peripheral service to a drug
    conspiracy could be deemed to 'join' that conspiracy unless he knew
    both that the drug conspiracy existed and that the peripheral
    service being furnished was designed to foster the conspiracy."
    García-Torres, 280 F.3d at 4 (emphasis omitted).                         With that
    background in place, we turn to the individual Defendants.
    A.   Santos
    -17-
    As noted above, the evidence showed that Santos was in
    charge of undercover agent Rodríguez, who was told by Hernández
    that the two ounces of cocaine from the February incident were
    purchased from Aquino.   Although Santos was with Plaza and other
    agents in the general vicinity during the February incident, she
    did not see the alleged "transaction" take place.       Santos did
    submit the drugs related to the February incident to the laboratory
    for testing.   She also assigned the arrest warrants related to the
    February incident to González-Vélez and, in conjunction with other
    officers, developed the plan for the buy-bust operation of July 5.
    In relation to the July incident, the evidence showed
    that Hernández once again told Rodríguez that he had purchased
    fifty baggies of cocaine from Aquino, and that at the time of the
    alleged transaction Santos was in the same police car as Plaza and
    other agents, and they were in the general vicinity.
    While at some point Santos learned that the drugs had not
    been seized from Aquino's person, she still instructed González-
    Vélez to lie to the district attorney and tell him that they had in
    fact been seized from Aquino at the time of his arrest.     She also
    encouraged González-Vélez several times to stick to this lie.
    Santos alleges that this evidence is insufficient for a
    reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she had
    knowledge of the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and
    knowingly and voluntarily participated in it.   We agree.
    -18-
    The    trial     testimony   revealed      that   Hernández     never
    disclosed that he had gotten the drugs from someone other than
    Aquino or González-Medina, and the government offered no evidence
    from which to infer that Santos knew that the drugs involved in the
    February or July incidents came from someone other than Aquino. In
    fact, at oral argument the government stated that it could not
    point to any evidence demonstrating that Santos did not believe
    that Aquino was the real source of the drugs.
    As evidence supporting Santos's Count 2 conviction, the
    government   points    most   strongly     to   Santos's    encouragement   of
    González-Vélez to lie to the district attorney by telling him that
    he had seized the drugs from Aquino.            In fact, when asked at oral
    argument about the scant evidence against Santos supporting her
    Count 2 conviction, the government stated that "Santos joined the
    conspiracy     late,   when   she   asked       [González-Vélez]    to    lie."
    According to the government, by so doing Santos "tacitly agreed to
    join the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled
    substances."    In fact, the government stated at oral argument that
    Santos's encouragement of González-Vélez to lie to the district
    attorney was the "only evidence" of Santos's knowledge about the
    distribution of controlled substances.
    It is well-established that a defendant need not know the
    full   extent    of    a   conspiracy,      the    identity    of   all     the
    co-conspirators, may join the conspiracy late, and participate in
    -19-
    only ancillary functions.         See United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 
    356 F.3d 1
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2003); García-Torres, 280 F.3d at 4; Ortiz de
    Jesús, 
    230 F.3d at 5
    .           However, a defendant must know that a
    conspiracy exists and that his participation, even if limited to a
    peripheral      service,   is   designed     to   foster    that    conspiracy.
    García-Torres, 280 F.3d at 4. Here, the evidence shows that Santos
    encouraged González-Vélez to lie to the district attorney regarding
    the seizure of the drugs.         Although this and other evidence could
    be sufficient to find "a conspiracy to violate the civil rights of
    the   victims    by   providing    false    evidence   to   the    Commonwealth
    Courts," (Count 1) this evidence is insufficient to prove that
    Santos knew of the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances
    and elected to join it intending that the underlying offense be
    committed (Count 2). Santos's knowledge of a conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute controlled substances cannot be based
    only on her knowledge of a different conspiracy -- the conspiracy
    to violate the civil rights of victims.
    By the same token, although Santos submitted the drugs to
    the Institute of Forensic Science for testing, this does not lead
    to a reasonable conclusion that she was distributing the drugs in
    furtherance of the conspiracy.             "[I]t is hard to imagine how
    someone furnishing a peripheral service to a drug conspiracy could
    be deemed to 'join' that conspiracy unless he knew both that the
    -20-
    drug conspiracy existed and that the peripheral service being
    furnished was designed to foster the conspiracy."             Id.
    Without evidence from which the jury could infer beyond
    a reasonable doubt that Santos knew of the conspiracy to possess
    with    intent       to   distribute    controlled    substances,     Santos's
    conviction on Count 2 cannot stand.
    B.    Plaza
    The record shows that on July 5, 2007, Eggy and Tuti gave
    Hernández fifty baggies of cocaine to plant on Aquino.                On that
    same date, Plaza called Hernández and instructed him to buy fifty
    baggies of cocaine from Aquino. Upon his arrival at Aquino's house
    after González-Vélez had arrested Aquino, Plaza asked González-
    Vélez for the "bundle" of drugs and, once González-Vélez gave him
    the drugs, Plaza confronted Aquino stating, "This is yours."             Some
    time later at the police station, when González-Vélez asked Plaza
    how to submit the case to the district attorney because the drugs
    had    not    been   seized   from     Aquino's   person,   Plaza   instructed
    González-Vélez to lie to the district attorney and claim that the
    drugs had in fact been seized from Aquino's person.                 The trial
    evidence also showed that there was a spike in telephone calls
    between Plaza, Eggy, and Tuti on the days before, of, and following
    both the February and July incidents, when the three agents were in
    constant communication and had numerous relatively contemporaneous
    telephone calls.
    -21-
    Plaza contends that this evidence is insufficient for a
    rational jury to conclude that he is guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt of having participated in the drug conspiracy.                  He alleges
    that the fact that he instructed Hernández to buy from Aquino the
    exact amount of cocaine provided by Eggy and Tuti is not indicative
    that he was part of the drug conspiracy.                 Plaza also claims that
    the telephone calls between him, Eggy, and Tuti were unrelated to
    the alleged conspiracy, as they all worked together, knew each
    other for years and communicated frequently for business and
    personal reasons. Plaza further argues that the testimony from his
    two witnesses contradicts the testimony of one of the government's
    main witnesses.       Finally, he claims that the government failed to
    call Aquino and González-Medina -- the victims -- to testify in
    this case, and to bring charges against Eggy and Tuti, the drug
    suppliers.    His contentions lack merit.
    Viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the
    light most favorable to the guilty verdict, a reasonable jury could
    conclude that Plaza knowingly and voluntarily participated in the
    conspiracy    and    intended   to       commit   the    underlying   substantive
    offense.   See      Mena-Robles,     
    4 F.3d at 1031
       (articulating   the
    requirements to convict a defendant of conspiracy as the intent "to
    agree and to commit the substantive offense that was the object of
    the agreement").        Such knowing and voluntary participation and
    intent are demonstrated by Plaza's actions and words during both
    -22-
    incidents.        See 
    id.
     ("[J]uries are not required to examine the
    evidence     in    isolation,   for    individual   pieces   of   evidence,
    insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation
    prove it.     The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be
    greater than its constituent parts." (quoting United States v.
    Ortiz, 
    966 F.2d 707
    , 711 (1st Cir. 1992))).           There was evidence
    that on the days before, of, and after the two incidents, Plaza was
    in constant communication with Eggy and Tuti via their personal
    telephones, and that Plaza initiated a significant amount of these
    calls.   This, even though Tuti and Eggy worked in a different area
    within the Puerto Rico Police -- the Arecibo Illegal Weapons Unit
    -- and they were not involved in the planned buy-bust operation
    that was being conducted by the Arecibo Drug Division.            Not only
    were Plaza's telephone calls with Eggy and Tuti constant during
    those days, but the telephone calls between the three of them were
    also relatively contemporaneous, with many times two of the agents
    finishing a conversation and immediately calling the third agent.
    The evidence also showed that Plaza otherwise rarely had telephone
    conversations with either Tuti or Eggy, and that the records only
    showed a spike in calls between them around the two incidents.
    Furthermore, there was evidence that on the day of the planned buy-
    bust operation, all communications related to the operation were
    made over a dedicated police radio frequency and not over the
    agents' personal telephones. In addition, the evidence showed that
    -23-
    Plaza instructed González-Vélez to lie to the district attorney and
    claim that the drugs had in fact been seized from Aquino, despite
    being repeatedly told by González-Vélez that this was not true.
    When viewed as a sum of the evidentiary presentation, a reasonable
    inference could be drawn that Plaza had no legitimate, work-related
    reason to be in constant communication with Eggy and Tuti around
    the days of the two incidents -- much less using their personal
    telephones -- and that his unusually frequent and relatively
    contemporaneous telephone calls with Tuti and Eggy show that he was
    aware of the "essential nature" of the conspiracy and intended to
    commit the substantive offense in that he planned to plant those
    drugs on Aquino.14    See United States v. Geer, 
    923 F.2d 892
    , 894
    (1st Cir. 1991).
    Plaza points out that the government did not provide
    evidence as to the content of the telephone conversations, and that
    it did not prove that there was a substantial number of calls made
    around the time of the two incidents, compared with the calls made
    during other months prior to or subsequent to the dates of the
    incidents.     Plaza further claims that he knew Tuti and Eggy for
    14
    In reaching our conclusion, we do not rely on the fifty-baggies
    congruence or on Plaza's "this is yours" comment, since we do not
    find that they have any inculpatory weight under the circumstances
    of this case.
    -24-
    years   as   coworkers       and   thus   the   three   of    them    frequently
    communicated for both personal and business reasons.15
    Contrary   to    Plaza's     assertions,   the    government    did
    introduce telephone records that extended beyond the dates of the
    two incidents.    The telephone records of Eggy and Tuti encompassed
    all telephone calls to and from their telephones for the entire
    months of February, June, July, and September 2007.                  A review of
    these telephone records clearly revealed an unusual spike in
    telephone calls between Plaza and the drug suppliers on the days
    before, of, and following both incidents.           In any event, the issue
    on review is not whether there exists an innocent explanation; the
    issue is whether when examining the evidence as a whole the jury
    could reasonably reject that explanation.           United States v. Floyd,
    
    740 F.3d 22
    , 30 (1st Cir. 2014).
    Plaza further argues that the testimonies of his two
    witnesses -- Feliciano and Centeno -- contradict the testimony of
    one of the government's main witnesses.            However, the jury heard
    the testimony of all the witnesses and made its credibility
    determinations.     On appeal, we cannot re-weigh the evidence or
    second-guess the jury's credibility determinations.16 See Trinidad-
    15
    In its brief, the government pointed out that "absolutely no
    evidence was produced regarding the length of time [Eggy, Tuti, and
    Plaza] knew each other, where they lived, or whether they had
    frequent personal or business communications."
    16
    Furthermore, after a careful review of the record we disagree
    that any such contradictions exist.
    -25-
    Acosta, 773 F.3d at 310-11 ("We do not assess the credibility of a
    witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury." (quoting Troy,
    583 F.3d at 24)); Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d at 191 ("[T]hough we
    exercise de novo review, we can neither re-weigh the evidence nor
    second-guess the jury's credibility calls."); United States v.
    Ayala-García, 
    574 F.3d 5
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he jury [is] free
    to choose which of the two conflicting accounts of the events to
    believe, so long as the evidence viewed in the government's favor
    is adequate to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
    Finally,     we    decline    Plaza's      invitation      to    find    the
    evidence   insufficient       to   support      his    conviction     because       the
    government did not call all possible witnesses to testify, or
    include in the indictment other co-conspirators.                 When we assess
    the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we must
    focus on the evidence actually submitted at trial.                  See Trinidad-
    Acosta,    773   F.3d    at    310-11;         see    also   United        States    v.
    Guzmán-Montañez, 
    756 F.3d 1
    , 12 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that
    what matters is the evidence introduced at trial); United States v.
    García, 
    758 F.3d 714
    , 721-22 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that in
    evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge "we may not
    consider the potential magnitude of the evidence not presented,"
    because doing so would be "an invitation to examine whether the
    Government might have presented a more convincing case, not whether
    -26-
    it in fact presented a sufficient one").17              Because the basis for
    the jury verdict is the evidence that was submitted for its
    consideration, we do not consider the magnitude of additional
    evidence that could have been presented in determining whether the
    evidence that was actually submitted was sufficient to convict the
    defendant.    Nor   do   we     take    into    consideration     that   certain
    individuals were not indicted, as that is a matter within the sole
    discretion of the prosecution.           See United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 693 (1974) (noting that "Executive Branch has exclusive
    authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
    case").   And, here, we conclude that the sum of all the evidence
    and the inferences drawn therefrom, especially the evidence of
    Plaza's telephone communications with Eggy and Tuti, the drug
    suppliers, and the evidence that he instructed González-Vélez to
    falsely   submit   the   case    to    the     local   district   attorney,   is
    sufficient circumstantial evidence that Plaza was aware of, and
    knowingly participated in the conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute controlled substances.             See Floyd, 740 F.3d at 30 (The
    court's "focus must be on the evidence as a whole. . . . [and] [i]t
    suffices if the conclusions that the jury draws from the evidence,
    although not inevitable, are reasonable.").              While the conclusion
    17
    Moreover, we have repeatedly stated that "[t]estimony from even
    just 'one witness can support a conviction.'" United States v.
    Alejandro-Montañez, 
    778 F.3d 352
    , 357 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting
    United States v. De La Paz-Rentas, 
    613 F.3d 18
    , 25 (1st Cir.
    2010)).
    -27-
    that Plaza knew of the drug conspiracy and participated in it
    intending that the underlying substantive offense be committed may
    not be inevitable based on the evidence, it soundly rests on
    sufficient evidence.      Thus, Plaza's conviction on Count 2 is
    affirmed.
    III.   Conclusion
    The evidence submitted at trial to support Santos's
    conviction on Count 2 was insufficient for a reasonable jury to
    conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge of the
    drug conspiracy and voluntarily participated in it, intending that
    the underlying substantive offense be committed.       Thus, Santos's
    conviction on Count 2 is reversed.       In contrast, this evidence,
    which   included   acts   specifically   attributed   to   Plaza,   was
    sufficient to sustain Plaza's conviction as to the same Count 2.
    Therefore, Plaza's conviction on Count 2 is affirmed.
    -28-