United States v. Cirilo , 803 F.3d 73 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LUIS CIRILO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Kayatta, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Robert Herrick on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, with
whom Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and Susan Jorgensen, Assistant United States
Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
September 24, 2015
BARRON, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, defendant Luis
Cirilo challenges the sentence he received for one count of
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8). Cirilo contends that the District Court erred by
imposing a sentence based on disputed facts in the presentence
report. He also argues that the District Court's factual
determinations were clearly erroneous. Because we find no error,
we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Cirilo entered into a plea agreement with the government
on one count of unlawful firearm possession. The plea agreement
set forth sentencing recommendations but stipulated that the judge
was not bound by them. The agreement stipulated that the firearm
offense carried a base offense level of 20, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4), and that the defendant was eligible for a three-
level deduction based upon his acceptance of responsibility, see
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The government agreed to recommend a sentence
at the lower end of the "applicable guidelines range." A section
of the plea agreement titled "Applicability of United States
Sentencing Guidelines" included a table of potential sentencing
ranges based on various criminal history categories and a total
offense level of 17. With a criminal history category of I, as
Cirilo ultimately had, and a total offense level of 17, the
- 2 -
applicable sentencing range specified in the plea agreement was 24
to 30 months.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted
the presentence report's recommendation, which was based on a
different guidelines calculation than that in the plea agreement.
The presentence report recounted, as part of the description of
the offense conduct, that Cirilo was arrested after police
witnessed him fleeing the scene of an attempted burglary with four
other individuals, all of whom were dressed in bullet proof jackets
with "POLICE" patches. Based on that conduct, the presentence
report stated that Cirilo qualified for a four-level enhancement,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for possessing the firearm
during the commission of an attempted burglary. The presentence
report also stated that Cirilo qualified for an upward departure
under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.24 because the defendant wore or displayed an
official insignia or uniform during the commission of the offense.
The presentence report ultimately recommended a guidelines
sentencing range of 37 to 46 months. The government nonetheless
recommended a sentence at the lower end of the applicable
guidelines range set out in the plea agreement (i.e., 24 months).
The District Court imposed a 60-month term of
imprisonment. Cirilo now appeals.
- 3 -
II.
Cirilo first argues that the District Court erred by
relying on disputed facts in the presentence report to calculate
the advisory sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Cirilo's claim rests on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32,
which provides that a court, at sentencing, "must -- for any
disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted
matter -- rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is
unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing,
or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
But, under Rule 32, facts must be "sufficiently
'controverted' to trigger the sentencing court's fact-finding
duty." United States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 700 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir.
2000)); see also United States v. González, 736 F.3d 40, 42-43
(1st Cir. 2013). Where "a defendant's objections to a presentence
investigation report are wholly conclusory and unsupported by
countervailing evidence, the sentencing court is entitled to rely
on the facts set forth in the presentence investigation report."
United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 386 n.4 (1st Cir. 2015)
(citing United States v. Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2003)).
Here, Cirilo's objections did not controvert the facts
in the presentence report. In a written objection to the
- 4 -
presentence report, defense counsel did object to the inclusion of
particular paragraphs recounting the attempted burglary on the
ground that "this is not what Mr. Cirilo pled guilty to." The
defense counsel's written objection to the report also challenged
the corresponding guideline calculations on the ground that they
"do not reflect the conduct Mr. Cirilo accepted responsibility
for." Those paragraphs provided the factual basis for the four-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and the grounds
for a departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.24. In pressing that
objection, however, defense counsel seemed to object to the use of
facts outside of the plea agreement for sentencing purposes, and
the probation office responded to this objection by clarifying
that "the [o]ffense [c]onduct in the presentence investigation
report is not necessarily limited to the facts agreed to by the
parties in a plea agreement or stipulation." At no point did
defense counsel directly or specifically challenge any of the facts
about the burglary that the report recounted.
The limited nature of Cirilo's objections to the report
became even more apparent at the sentencing hearing. There,
defense counsel again objected that "in the plea agreement,
[Cirilo] signed a stipulation of fact that does not include any
relationship to any other commission of any other crime." And
when the court started to respond to the objection, the defense
counsel conceded that the probation officer could gather other
- 5 -
information from beyond the plea agreement. At no point in this
exchange did the defense counsel say anything to challenge the
substance of the factual allegations contained in the report.
Soon thereafter, moreover, the probation officer offered
an account of the burglary. But in response, defense counsel
stated only -- in an implicit admission -- that "[w]e just want to
clarify for the record that he was not found wearing a police vest.
He was in a car that had a police vest inside the car. He was not
found wearing it." In other words, the one comment on the
substance of the allegations in the report that the defense counsel
did make did not contradict the facts in the report on which the
District Court based the sentence.1
Thus, although Cirilo contends that he raised a factual
dispute about the presentence report's account of the attempted
1 Cirilo's reply brief suggests that the government
understated his sentencing exposure in negotiating the plea
agreement. But at his change-of-plea hearing, Cirilo was asked,
and indicated he understood, that the plea agreement's sentencing
recommendation was not binding on the District Court. A district
court is not required to follow the United States Attorney's
sentencing recommendation in a non-binding plea agreement. See
United States v. Jiménez-Otero, 898 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1990)
("[T]he law is clear that, where a non-binding plea agreement is
struck, the district court is constrained neither by the United
States Attorney's sentencing recommendation nor by stipulations of
fact accompanying the plea contract." (citations omitted)). To
the extent that Cirilo suggests that the government was employing
a "negotiating tactic" that so impaired the fairness of the plea
process as to warrant re-sentencing, we deem the argument waived
for lack of development. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 6 -
burglary, the record shows that he did not. The District Court
therefore committed no error in relying on the presentence report's
facts about the attempted burglary. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(3)(A) ("At sentencing, the court . . . may accept any
undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of
fact."); see also, e.g., United States v. Meléndez, 279 F.3d 16,
18 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[Defendant's] objection . . . was not an
objection to the factual accuracy of the information contained
therein but to its inclusion in the report."); United States v.
García, 954 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) ("By couching his
objections to the [presentence report] exclusively as
interpretations of the facts, not as challenges to the underlying
facts themselves, the [defendant] effectively obviated any need
for an evidentiary hearing.").
In a related challenge, Cirilo also argues that the
District Court clearly erred in finding that he had committed the
possession offense during the commission of another felony, see
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), and that he had committed those offenses
while wearing an official uniform, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.24. But
Cirilo's argument is in fact just a reprise of the Rule 32 argument
we have just rejected.
Cirilo's sole ground for asserting that the District
Court's factual findings were clearly erroneous is that the
presentence report's allegations could not supply the factual
- 7 -
basis for the findings. But, as we have just explained, Cirilo
did not actually contest the substance of the factual allegations.
And because in such circumstance, "a sentencing court may consider
facts contained in the [presentence report] as reliable evidence,"
the District Court was entitled to rely on the report's account.
United States v. López, 299 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997)). Thus, the
record supports these findings, as Cirilo provides no reason for
us to conclude otherwise.
III.
The judgment of the District Court is thus affirmed.
- 8 -