Cheung Wong v. INS ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    December 8, 1992
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 92-1721

    HING CHEUNG WONG,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

    Respondent.


    ____________________


    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

    OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________
    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
    ______________


    ____________________

    Robert J. Napolitano, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for
    _____________________
    Stay, for petitioner.
    Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Robert Kendall,
    _________________ ________________
    Jr., Assistant Director, and Charles E. Pazar, Office of Immigration
    ___ ________________
    Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, on Memorandum in
    Opposition to Motion for Stay, for respondent.


    ____________________


    ____________________












    Per Curiam. Petitioner Hing Cheung Wong seeks a stay of
    __________

    deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(3) pending our review

    of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying

    his request for discretionary waiver. On August 10, 1992, we

    stayed the order of deportation on a provisional basis and

    directed the parties to file memoranda addressing

    petitioner's challenges to the BIA's decision. Having now

    reviewed the administrative record along with the parties'

    memoranda, we find that the instant petition raises no

    serious legal question. We therefore vacate the provisional

    stay and deny petitioner's application for a stay pending

    review.

    I. Background
    __________

    Petitioner is a 39-year-old native and citizen of Hong

    Kong who has been a legal permanent resident in the United

    States since 1968. The record discloses that he has

    committed three legal offenses since his arrival. In March

    1977, he pled guilty in Maine state court to a charge of

    possessing less than one and one-half ounces of marijuana--a

    civil violation for which he was ordered to perform community

    service. In May 1979, he pled guilty to a charge of

    shoplifting and was fined $100.1 And in August 1984, he

    pled guilty to the charge of acquiring scheduled drugs






    ____________________

    1. This offense, which involved the removal of a pair of
    sneakers from a department store, led to his conviction under
    Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 353, for "theft by
    unauthorized taking." Crimes in Maine are categorized, in
    order of decreasing severity, from Class A to Class E. The
    shoplifting violation was denominated a Class E offense.















    (codeine) by deception, for which he received a one-year

    suspended sentence and two years of probation.2

    Relying on these latter two convictions, the INS in

    December 1985 charged petitioner with being deportable as an

    alien "who at any time after entry [has been] convicted of

    two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a

    single scheme of criminal misconduct ...." 8 U.S.C.

    1251(a)(4) (since recodified at id. 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)).3
    ___

    At a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in March 1987,

    petitioner conceded his deportability under this provision

    and requested a discretionary waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

    1182(c). Following the receipt of testimony from petitioner,

    his wife and his father, the IJ denied such relief as a

    matter of discretion, finding that the adverse factors

    outweighed the equities in petitioner's favor. The BIA

    summarily endorsed the IJ's ruling, and petitioner now seeks

    a stay ofthe order of deportationpending review in thiscourt.



    ____________________

    2. The record reveals that petitioner obtained "Tylenol #4
    with codeine" by use of a forged medical prescription. Such
    action violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 1108, and
    constituted a Class C crime.

    3. The INS later filed an additional charge of
    deportability, contending that petitioner's conviction for
    acquiring scheduled drugs by deception rendered him
    deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) (since recodified at
    id. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i)). This provision applies to
    ___
    convictions for various controlled-substance offenses. The
    immigration judge, however, deemed 1251(a)(11)
    inapplicable. That ruling is not part of the instant
    petition for review.

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    II. Availability of Automatic Stay
    ______________________________

    The filing of a petition for review acts as an automatic

    stay of an order of deportation "unless the alien is

    convicted of an aggravated felony, in which case the [INS]

    shall not stay the deportation ... unless the court otherwise

    directs." 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(3). The INS contends that

    petitioner's 1984 state conviction for acquiring scheduled

    drugs by deception constitutes an "aggravated felony." It

    therefore asserts that petitioner is ineligible for an

    automatic stay, even though the provision eliminating such

    stays in cases of aggravated felons was added in 1990 (six

    years after the conviction involved here). As petitioner has

    not disputed either of these points, we pause only to note

    that both appear supportable.

    The term "aggravated felony" is defined in 8 U.S.C.

    1101(a)(43) as, inter alia, "any drug trafficking crime as
    __________

    defined" in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2). That provision in turn

    defines a "drug trafficking crime" as, inter alia, "any
    __________

    felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21

    U.S.C. 801 et seq.)." Under 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3), it is a

    felony "to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled

    substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or

    subterfuge." This crime is directly analogous to

    petitioner's 1984 state conviction. Moreover, the definition

    of aggravated felony goes on to read: "Such term applies to



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    offenses described in the previous sentence whether in

    violation of Federal or State law." 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43).

    The fact that petitioner's conviction occurred in state

    court, therefore, does not preclude a finding of aggravated

    felony under federal law.

    The aggravated-felony provisions were introduced in

    1988. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), Pub. L. No.
    ___

    100-690, 102 Stat. 4181. The elimination of the automatic

    stay for aggravated felons (along with the inclusion of state

    crimes in the aggravated-felony definition) was effected by

    the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649,

    104 Stat. 4978. Some initial uncertainty arose as to the

    degree to which the amendment eliminating the automatic stay,

    see id. 513(a), 104 Stat. 5052, was retroactive. IMMACT
    ___ ___

    provided that such change was applicable to petitions for

    review "filed more than 60 days after the date of the

    enactment of this Act." Id. 513(b). Yet this directive
    ___

    failed to specify when the conviction must have occurred.
    __________

    Noting this fact, one court held that the 1990 amendment

    eliminating the automatic stay for aggravated felons did not

    apply to persons whose convictions predated the ADAA's

    effective date of November 18, 1988. See Ayala-Chavez v.
    ___ ____________

    INS, 945 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1991)
    ___

    In December 1991, however, new legislation amended this

    provision so that it would apply "to convictions entered



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    before, on, or after" IMMACT's effective date. Miscellaneous

    and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of

    1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 306(a)(11), 105 Stat. 1751.

    This amendment "take[s] effect as if included in the

    enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990." Id. 310(1), 105
    ___

    Stat. 1759. Arguably, some question still remains as to

    whether the automatic stay is inapplicable (1) to all
    ___

    aggravated felony convictions, whenever they occurred, or (2)

    only to those occurring after November 18, 1988. See Ayala-
    ___ ______

    Chavez, 945 F.2d at 293-94 (discussing two other provisions
    ______

    of IMMACT having similar "before, on, or after" effective

    dates). However, the Ninth Circuit has since held that the

    Technical Amendments effectively overruled its Ayala-Chavez
    ____________

    decision, and that "a party convicted of an aggravated felony

    is precluded from obtaining an automatic stay of deportation,

    regardless of the date of conviction." Arthurs v. INS, 959
    _______ ___

    F.2d 142, 143 (9th Cir. 1992) (6/88 conviction). Other

    courts have agreed. See Zegarski v. INS, 965 F.2d 426, 427
    ___ ________ ___

    (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (8/86 convictions); Ignacio v.
    _______

    INS, 955 F.2d 295, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (9/83
    ___

    convictions). Cf. Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 659-60 (5th
    ___ _______ ___

    Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (because of 4/86 conviction,

    petitioner was an aggravated felon ineligible to apply for

    asylum). Moreover, the Arthurs case involved a state drug
    _______

    conviction and so held, by implication, that the 1990



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    amendment including state crimes within the definition of

    aggravated felony was also fully retroactive.4 Cf. United
    ___ ______

    States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1991) (statutes
    ______ _____

    retroactively making past criminal activity a new basis for

    deportation have been upheld), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1487
    _____________

    (1992). Given this caselaw, and given his failure to raise

    the issue, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to an

    automatic stay.

    III. Propriety of Discretionary Stay
    _______________________________

    We have stated in a different context that, where denial

    of a stay "will utterly destroy the status quo, irreparably

    harming" appellant, but granting a stay "will cause

    relatively slight harm" to appellee, the appellant "need not

    show an absolute probability of success" on the merits; it is

    enough if "there are serious legal questions presented."

    Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir.
    _______________________ ___

    1979); accord Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 4
    ______ ______________ ______________

    n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) (probability of success need not be shown

    "where the harm to plaintiffs is particularly severe and

    disproportionate"). The Fifth Circuit has suggested such a

    lower standard might apply in the 1105a context, see
    ___

    Ignacio, 955 F.2d at 299 & n.5, and the INS here has adverted
    _______

    to the Providence Journal standard in its memorandum (albeit
    __________________


    ____________________

    4. That amendment (unlike the one eliminating the automatic
    stay) was made effective "as if included in the enactment of"
    the ADAA. IMMACT, 501(b), 104 Stat. 5048.

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    without addressing its applicability). Yet we need not

    decide which standard should govern, inasmuch as petitioner

    has failed to present a "serious legal question," let alone

    establish a probability of success.

    In exercising its discretion whether to grant relief

    from deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), the BIA

    "balance[s] the adverse factors evidencing an alien's

    undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and

    humane considerations presented in his behalf." Matter of
    _________

    Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) (quoted in Hazzard
    _____ _______

    v. INS, 951 F.2d 435, 438 (1st Cir. 1991)). The IJ found
    ___

    that a number of factors strongly militated in petitioner's

    favor. He has resided in this country since age 15, for a

    total of 24 years. His parents, grandparents, and four

    siblings all reside here as well; he has no relatives in Hong

    Kong. He served in the Navy from September 1971 to January

    1973. Petitioner married a native-born United States citizen

    in 1985, and the two have lived together ever since. At the

    time of the 1987 hearing, they had had one child together,

    his wife had a second child from a previous relationship who

    lived with them, and she was pregnant with a third. After

    earlier bouts of underemployment, petitioner resumed working

    full-time at a family restaurant in 1986 (as a food

    preparer); he has been the sole support for his family since

    that time.



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    Arrayed against these equities were the following

    adverse factors. As mentioned, petitioner was convicted of a

    serious drug-related crime in 1984 and two less significant

    offenses earlier.5 While he received an honorable discharge

    from the Navy, that discharge was prompted by petitioner's

    use of marijuana. Although petitioner claimed to have been

    rehabilitated from such drug use, the IJ found otherwise. In

    a July 1986 report, his probation officer reported a

    "reluctance [on petitioner's part] to deal with substance

    abuse issues," elaborating as follows:

    I have contacted Mr. Wong's [substance abuse]
    counselor, who states that Mr. Wong has made
    virtually no progress. Their assessment is that he
    is still in the denial stage, that he admits
    continued regular use of marihuana and that he
    justifies his use by insisting that it is a way of
    life in his culture. Of even greater concern is
    that Mr. Wong's reluctance to deal with substance
    abuse issues is apparently longstanding.... Given
    the problems that drug use has caused this
    individual to date, it is truly unfortunate that he
    shows no insight or willingness to change.


    ____________________

    5. Petitioner, conceding deportability, has not challenged
    the denomination of his shoplifting offense as a "crime of
    moral turpitude." We note that such a characterization,
    while not unanimously endorsed, finds support in the caselaw
    of this circuit, see Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st
    ___ ____ _______
    Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 901 (1955)
    ________________________
    (petty larceny of twelve golf balls); Tillinghast v. Edmead,
    ___________ ______
    31 F.2d 81, 83-84 (theft of fifteen dollars), and that of
    other courts, see, e.g., Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967
    ___ ____ ______ ___
    (9th Cir. 1985) (shoplifting); Morasch v. INS, 363 F.2d 30,
    _______ ___
    31 (9th Cir. 1966) (petty larceny); Ablett v. Brownell, 240
    ______ ________
    F.2d 625, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (petty theft). See also 3 C.
    ________
    Gordon & S. Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure
    ________________________________
    71.07[3][d], at 71-161 & n.306 (1992) (describing petty
    larceny as crime of moral turpitude, while noting criticisms
    of that view).

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    And at the hearing, petitioner acknowledged that he continued

    to use marijuana (albeit on an occasional basis). The IJ

    determined that, on balance, these adverse factors outweighed

    the equities. The BIA agreed, concluding that petitioner's

    "criminal record, his history of drug abuse, and his

    continuing disregard of the controlled substance laws of this

    country warrant a denial of relief as a matter of

    discretion."

    Petitioner advances several specific challenges to this

    decision, none of which proves persuasive. First, he

    contends that the IJ accorded excessive weight to his 1977

    marijuana offense, improperly regarding it as equivalent in

    severity to his 1984 drug conviction. Petitioner apparently

    draws such an inference from the simple fact that the IJ

    listed both of these offenses as separate adverse factors.

    Yet such an inference is misplaced: the IJ took full note of

    the suggestion that the marijuana offense involved a

    noncriminal violation,6 and the record reveals no lack of


    ____________________

    6. It is clear that petitioner's offense was not criminal in
    nature. Maine decriminalized the possession of up to one and
    one-half ounces of marijuana as of May 1, 1976. See 1975 Me.
    ___
    Laws c. 499, 2383 (amending Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
    2383). See also 1989 Me. Laws c. 344, 2 (lowering the
    ________
    threshold to one and one-quarter ounces). Compare Me. Rev.
    _______
    Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 1106(3) (any person in possession of
    more than the threshold amount is presumed to be unlawfully
    "furnishing" a scheduled drug). The offense to which
    petitioner pled guilty occurred on June 28, 1976, some two
    months after decriminalization took effect.
    Some confusion has occurred on this point. At the
    agency hearing, petitioner's counsel suggested, first, that

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    understanding as to the nature of each offense. To the

    extent petitioner contends that the IJ abused his discretion

    by regarding the marijuana offense as an adverse factor at

    all, we likewise disagree. Notwithstanding its

    decriminalization in Maine, the fact remains that marijuana

    possession continued to be against the law--both as a civil

    violation under state law, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
    ___

    2383(1), and as a criminal violation under federal law, see
    ___

    21 U.S.C. 844.7 Accordingly, for the purpose of deciding


    ____________________

    the marijuana offense was criminal in nature, then that it
    was a civil violation. And the government, while not
    addressing the issue below, erroneously asserts on appeal
    that decriminalization occurred subsequent to petitioner's
    offense. Although the IJ apparently did not confirm the date
    of this change in state law, he did assume arguendo that the
    ________
    1976 offense was civil in nature. Any confusion on this
    point was thus without prejudice.

    7. We note that, in the interval between the IJ's decision
    and that of the BIA, an increased tolerance for possession of
    small amounts of marijuana was likewise introduced into
    federal law. While such possession remains a criminal
    violation, the ADAA in 1988 added a provision permitting the
    Attorney General to seek civil rather than criminal penalties
    in such cases. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4384
    ___
    (codified at 21 U.S.C. 844a). And while possession of
    marijuana in whatever amount formerly provided a basis for
    deportability, see 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) (Supp. 1989), the
    ___
    1990 IMMACT exempted from that provision "a single offense
    involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams
    [approximately 1.06 ounces] or less of marijuana." Pub. L.
    No. 101-649, 602(a), 104 Stat. 5080 (recodified at 8 U.S.C.
    1251(a)(2)((B)(i)).
    These developments (to which petitioner has not
    referred) do not undermine the agency's decision here. As
    mentioned, his deportability was not predicated on his
    marijuana offense, but rather on his two other convictions.
    And this more lenient approach does not render marijuana
    possession (or use) irrelevant in the context of deciding
    whether discretionary relief from deportation should be

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    whether discretionary relief from deportation should be

    granted, we think the IJ was warranted in regarding

    petitioner's marijuana offense as a relevant adverse factor.

    In a similar vein, petitioner argues that the IJ

    accorded exaggerated weight to his ongoing use of marijuana.

    For much the same reasons just discussed, this argument

    likewise fails. The IJ found that, despite its

    decriminalized status, petitioner's use of marijuana for at

    least fifteen years reflected a lack of genuine

    rehabilitation. Given the continued illegality of marijuana

    possession, we find no abuse of discretion in the IJ's

    consideration of such evidence. To the extent petitioner

    questions the IJ's conclusion as to lack of rehabilitation,

    we note that the probation officer's statement strongly

    supports that finding. Moreover, petitioner's acknowledged

    use of marijuana shortly before the agency hearing--some

    months after having been ordered to show cause why he should
    _____

    not be deported--reflects a certain brazenness which further

    reinforces the IJ's conclusion.

    Finally, petitioner complains that the BIA failed to

    consider the absence of negative information (and the

    resulting inference of rehabilitation) during the five years

    this case was pending before the BIA. Yet, as far as the

    instant record reveals, petitioner filed no motion to


    ____________________

    awarded.

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    reconsider or reopen based on any such new evidence. As

    such, the BIA was obviously justified in deciding the case on

    the basis of the original record.

    In reviewing the BIA's discretionary decision to deny a

    waiver under 1182(c), we consider only whether that

    decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

    discretion. See, e.g., Martinez v. INS, 970 F.2d 973, 974
    ___ ____ ________ ___

    (1st Cir. 1992); Hazzard, 951 F.2d at 438. The denial will
    _______

    be upheld "unless it was made without a rational explanation,

    inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on

    an impermissible basis." Williams v. INS, 773 F.2d 8, 9 (1st
    ________ ___

    Cir. 1985) (quoted in Martinez, 970 F.2d at 974). For the
    ________

    foregoing reasons, we find that the decision here suffers

    from none of these defects. The agency considered all

    relevant factors and articulated a supportable rationale for

    its decision. As we find that petitioner has failed to

    present a serious legal question, the motion for a stay

    pending review is denied.

    The provisional stay of deportation entered on August
    ________________________________________________________

    10, 1992 is vacated, and petitioner's motion for a stay
    _____________________________________________________________

    pending review is denied. Petitioner's motions to stay the
    _____________________________________________________________

    appellate process and to continue the stay of deportation are
    _____________________________________________________________

    likewise denied. Petitioner shall show cause within three
    _____________________________________________________________

    weeks from the date of this decision why the instant petition
    _____________________________________________________________

    should not be dismissed.
    ________________________



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