United States v. McDonald , 804 F.3d 497 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1957
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
NICHOLAS MCDONALD,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
George F. Gormley, with whom Stephen Super and George F.
Gormley, P.C., were on brief, for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellee.
October 30, 2015
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Nicholas McDonald was a heroin
dealer in the Bangor area of Maine, obtaining his heroin on trips
to Worcester, Massachusetts. Eventually, when caught with 26.4
grams of heroin, he was charged both for the heroin and a gun in
his possession. McDonald pleaded guilty in February 2014 to one
count of possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(subject to appealing the denial of his motion to suppress). The
district court quite correctly denied his motion to suppress and,
at sentencing, correctly found that he had tried to obstruct
justice by trying to swallow a small bag of heroin.
A separate question on appeal has to do with the increase
in his base offense level from 18 to 20, which was based not on
the drugs he actually possessed but on relevant conduct concerning
drugs he purportedly sold. That relevant conduct was based on
untested accounts by a confidential informant (CI) who purportedly
had accompanied him on his buying trips south and had been with
him on several occasions as he sold drugs. That is, the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) contained information from
the CI, which came in the form of the CI's grand jury testimony
and a statement made to the government. No law enforcement or
other witness saw those sales. The CI did not testify, and so
McDonald never had an opportunity to cross-examine her.
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Still, we cannot say there was clear error in the
district court's finding that this information met the
requirements for relevant conduct and was sufficiently reliable to
attribute to McDonald an additional quantity of drugs. There was
no clear error in the court's finding that between 40 and 60 grams
of heroin were involved, which supported a sentence of 75-months
imprisonment on the drug count.
We point out that McDonald received a concurrent
sentence of 75-months imprisonment on the firearm charge and will
serve 75 months anyway, whatever the merits of the method used by
the government to get an increased sentence on the drug charge.
I.
As to the motion to suppress, we recite the relevant
facts as found by the district court, consistent with record
support. United States v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 2014).
As to the facts relevant to the sentencing appeal, we take the
facts as set forth in the unchallenged portions of the PSR and the
sentencing hearing. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 288
(1st Cir. 2008).
On April 5, 2013, Sergeant Roy Peary of the Penobscot
County Sheriff's Department received an e-mail about suspicious
pawning activity. The e-mail indicated that Kelly Jo Desmond,
Jarod Brown, and another unidentified female were trying to pawn
construction tools and electronics at a Newport, Maine pawnshop,
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but they could not provide a lot of information about the items.
The group had an older, dark-colored Pontiac with a license plate
beginning with "7450" and ending with undetermined letters.
That same day, Sergeant Peary learned of a burglary in
Orrington, Maine. The complainant reported that construction
tools had been stolen and said that he suspected his ex-girlfriend,
Amy White, was involved. The complainant said that White struggled
with drug addiction, knew about his tools, drove a maroon Pontiac
Bonneville, and might be staying at a trailer park in Holden,
Maine. He said that McDonald and Desmond lived in the trailer
where he thought White was staying.
Sergeant Peary learned from the Maine Department of
Motor Vehicles that White was the registered owner of a 1999
Pontiac Bonneville with the plate number "7450 TB" that was listed
as being purple.1 He called Holden Police Officer Chris Greeley
and told him that he was investigating a burglary and suspicious
pawning activity. Greeley knew of existing arrest warrants for
McDonald and Desmond. He suspected that McDonald was staying at
a trailer park in Holden because he had previously driven McDonald
to a trailer there after he picked McDonald up along a roadway in
1 The vehicle identified in the e-mail Peary read was
described as dark-colored, older, and having faded and peeling
paint on the hood, and the burglary complainant described White's
Pontiac Bonneville as maroon. This may explain why the e-mail
described the car as "dark colored," while the Maine Department of
Motor Vehicles listed it as purple.
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February 2013. Additionally, around that time, the park owner
told Greeley that McDonald was living there.
Officer Greeley asked Maine Drug Enforcement Agency Task
Force Agent Amy Nickerson to help him with the investigation.
Nickerson was familiar with the trailer in question from having
conducted surveillance on it. Nickerson also went to the burglary
scene and spoke with the complainant. The complainant told
Nickerson that White had told him that she had been driving
McDonald to get drugs in Massachusetts.
Greeley, Nickerson, and Peary met at the Holden Police
Department that evening. Agent Nickerson went to the address of
the trailer and saw the Pontiac Bonneville parked there. Soon
after, she saw the Bonneville leaving. She notified Greeley and
Peary of this, and began to follow the car onto Route 1A. She
could see two people in the car and observed that the car was
driving at what she estimated was about ten miles per hour below
the speed limit. Greeley, who was waiting at the Holden Police
Department's exit onto Route 1A, began to drive behind the
Bonneville. The vehicle was driving slowly, a line of cars had
developed behind it, and its brake lights came on three times
without any connection to traffic lights or signs.
When Greeley turned on his cruiser's lights to pull the
car over, the Bonneville pulled to the side, and its passenger,
who was later identified as McDonald, fled into the woods. Greeley
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and Nickerson detained the driver, who turned out to be White, and
they saw construction tools in the back seat. McDonald was tracked
down and apprehended.
Officers found a hypodermic needle, a bag of Pentedrone
Hydrochloride,2 a folding knife, $1,430 of cash, pepper spray, and
two and a half Suboxone strips containing Pentedrone Hydrochloride
on McDonald at the time of his arrest.
A search of the vehicle also revealed a safe. McDonald
denied ownership of the safe, though it turned out to be his.
After being apprehended, McDonald was taken to Eastern
Maine Medical Center because he was displaying signs of agitation,
fear, and confusion. After being at the hospital for approximately
two hours, he went to use the bathroom. After about ten minutes,
he returned to his hospital bed and appeared to fall asleep. The
officer supervising him saw a bag fall from the bed onto the floor.
When the officer picked it up, McDonald got up, fought with the
officer, grabbed the bag, and put it in his mouth. Ten people had
to come to hold him down. The bag was dislodged, which contained
26.4 grams of heroin.
The next day, the police executed a search warrant for
the safe and found a digital scale, packaging materials, and a
loaded 9 millimeter handgun.
2 The PSR described "Pentedrone Hydrochloride [as a drug]
most closely related to Metheathinone."
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Apart from those items seized, a CI provided information
to the government and later testified before a grand jury that
between February 2013 and the time of McDonald's arrest, she helped
McDonald sell heroin on a regular basis and she had gone with
McDonald on trips to Massachusetts where McDonald would buy heroin
and bring it back to Maine.
McDonald was indicted on June 13, 2013, on the two counts
and on August 2, 2013, filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the vehicle stop. The motion was denied on September
30, 2013. On March 4, 2014, McDonald entered a conditional plea
to both counts, in which he reserved the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress.
At sentencing, the government asked for a sentence of
75-months imprisonment, and McDonald suggested a sentence of
imprisonment between 55 and 60 months. McDonald was granted a
two-level reduction (a "Holder reduction") based on the then-
proposed change in the United States Sentencing Guidelines to lower
drug quantity calculations by two levels. The court discussed an
obstruction of justice enhancement, at which point the government
introduced McDonald's medical records. In response to McDonald's
argument that his behavior was not willful, the government said
that the records demonstrated that McDonald was "calm and
cooperative" and in control of his behavior. The court applied
the enhancement.
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The court noted that the probation officer held McDonald
accountable for 97.219 kilograms of marijuana equivalent3 based on
the amounts found and the CI testimony, resulting in a base offense
level of 24. The government, "[o]ut of an abundance of caution,"
proposed a quantity of 62.388 kilograms of marijuana equivalent,
resulting in a base offense level of 22. This amount included the
26.4 grams of heroin seized from McDonald, and, based on the CI's
proffer and grand jury testimony, the additional grams of drugs
involved in other transactions described by the CI. McDonald
argued he could be held responsible for only the 26.4 grams of
heroin seized from him because, he claimed, the remainder of the
drug quantity was based on unreliable CI testimony. The court
"accept[ed] the [CI's] testimony and statements that the defendant
sold heroin in roughly the quantities urged by the government" but
noted that if the CI was "off by as much as 25 percent in terms of
her recollection, the defendant would still be in the offense level
of 20." Accordingly, the court concluded that McDonald "was
involved in a drug quantity somewhere between 40 and 60 grams of
heroin, or kilograms of marijuana equivalent" and applied a base
offense level of 20.
3 Because two drugs were involved, the heroin was
calculated as a marijuana equivalent: 1 gram of heroin is
equivalent to 1 kilogram of marijuana.
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The court added a two-level enhancement for possession
of a firearm, the two-level increase for obstruction of justice,
and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
resulting in a total offense level of 21. McDonald's criminal
history, which included sixteen prior convictions -- thirteen of
which were scored and many of which were associated with drugs --
placed him at a criminal history category of VI. With the two-
level "Holder reduction" the guideline range was 63 to 78 months.
The court sentenced him to 75-months imprisonment for each count,
to be served concurrently, which accounted for the three months
McDonald had already spent in state custody. This appeal followed.
II.
McDonald first challenges the denial of the motion to
suppress. He argues that because he did not break any law by
traveling below the speed limit or slowing down at different
points, the information the officers had did not amount to
reasonable suspicion. This argument fails.
Police may stop and briefly detain an individual for
investigative purposes if they have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 147
(1st Cir. 2013). Because reasonable suspicion requires a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual of
criminal activity, courts "view the circumstances through the lens
of a reasonable police officer," looking to the totality of the
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circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed.
Id. at 148. When reviewing a district court's decision on a
suppression motion, we review its factual findings and credibility
determinations for clear error, while we review its legal
conclusions de novo. Id. at 147. "Absent an error of law, we
will uphold a refusal to suppress evidence as long as the refusal
is supported by some reasonable view of the record." United States
v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2003).
The district court had a reasonable basis to deny the
motion to suppress. Ample evidence supported a suspicion of legal
wrongdoing when the police pulled over White's car. Specifically,
the officers had knowledge that the burglary complainant
associated White with the burglary; that White struggled with drug-
dependency, and "drug seekers often resort to property crime to
support their habits"; that White was associated with Desmond, who
was associated with the suspicious pawning activity and had tried
to pawn goods that were similar to those taken in the burglary;
that White's car was likely used in connection with the pawning
activity; that because the pawn dealer did not accept all of the
goods, some of them may have remained in White's car; that White's
car was at a trailer that was associated with Desmond; and that
the car was driving in an overly cautious manner with a "suspicious
application of [its] brakes." Further, Officer Greeley testified
that he believed the car was driving in this manner in preparation
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to stop so that someone could flee. Altogether, that suffices.
Cf. United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2014) ("We
think it virtually unarguable that a reasonably prudent police
officer, standing in [the officer's] shoes and knowing what [he]
knew, would have harbored such a suspicion."); see also United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that factors
that seem to be "innocent" by themselves can together amount to
reasonable suspicion).
III.
Next, McDonald argues that the district court erred in
the amount of drugs it attributed to McDonald at sentencing. His
argument appears to have two components: first, that the drug
transactions the CI described do not constitute relevant conduct,
which he argues for the first time on appeal; and second, that the
CI's testimony was unreliable.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, "a defendant may be
held responsible for drug quantities involved in his 'relevant
conduct,'" even if the quantities were not involved in the offense
of conviction. United States v. Laboy, 351 F.3d 578, 582 (1st
Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). If the sentencing court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v.
Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1999), that a defendant
engaged in the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan"
involving additional drugs, it can attribute the amount of those
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drugs involved to the defendant. See United States v. Blanco, 888
F.2d 907, 909 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2))
(emphasis in original omitted). A "sentencing court's finding
that drugs other than those specified in the indictment were part
of the same common scheme or course of conduct is entitled to
considerable deference," and "[a]bsent mistake of law, we review
such conclusions only for clear error." United States v. Wood,
924 F.2d 399, 403 (1st Cir. 1991). Because McDonald raises the
argument that the transactions described do not constitute
relevant conduct for the first time on appeal, we review this part
of his argument for plain error. See United States v. Correa-
Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining that the plain
error standard requires the appellant to prove "(1) an error, (2)
that is clear or obvious, (3) which affects his substantial rights
(i.e., the error made him worse off), and which (4) seriously
impugns the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
proceeding," id. at 18).
There was no plain error with the district court's
finding that the transactions described by the CI were relevant.
McDonald pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
heroin, and he expressly said that he "does not dispute his guilt."
The district court did not plainly err in finding that multiple
drug transactions between February 2013 and McDonald's arrest in
April 2013 were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme
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or plan, and so qualified as relevant conduct. As the CI
explained, over this two-to-three month period that covered the
lead up to the offense of conviction, McDonald's activity as a
drug dealer took him to Worcester by car to pick up heroin on
multiple occasions, returning to Maine to sell it, and then
returning to Worcester to restock, all with the assistance of the
same person.4 In Wood, we found no clear error in the district
court's conclusion that three transactions were part of the same
scheme notwithstanding the defendant's argument that "the sources
[of the drugs] varied, his involvement varied and the methods for
transporting the cocaine from New York to Maine varied." 924 F.2d
at 403–04;5 see also David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 477 (1st
4 The district court did not identify whether it
considered the transactions described by the CI as part of the
same "course of conduct" or part of a "common scheme or plan."
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(B) ("Offenses that do not qualify as
part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of
the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or
related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are
part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.");
United States v. St. Hill, 768 F.3d 33, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2014)
(distinguishing between the two but acknowledging that "the
phrases are sometimes used interchangeably," id. at 37). At the
very least, it was not plain error for the district court to find
the drug transactions were part of the same course of conduct given
both the conviction and transactions involved heroin dealing
employing a common source, a common re-supply routine, and the
same source of transportation. "[I]f the conduct was relevant
conduct as part of the 'same course of conduct,' it matters not
whether it was also part of a common scheme or plan." Id. at 37.
5 In Wood, the court found that a fourth transaction
involving the defendant's wife about which the defendant was
unaware was not part of a common scheme or plan. 924 F.3d at 404.
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Cir. 1998) (finding that "[a]lthough the petitioner's drug
trafficking resulted in two separate charged conspiracies, the
framing of the charges cannot obscure the fact that, throughout
the cocaine trafficking described in the indictment, the
petitioner and his principal accomplices remained at the center of
an ongoing enterprise devoted to a single purpose . . . [because]
the petitioner never deviated from his main business: the
acquisition, distribution, and sale of cocaine in a specific
region").
McDonald's claim that the CI was unreliable because of
inconsistencies between her proffer and grand jury testimony and
because she wanted to save herself from incarceration time also
fails. The PSR and district court identified at least four ways
in which the CI's testimony was corroborated by external evidence.
First, the CI said that McDonald had a safe and a gun, and the
officers indeed found a safe and a gun, which are both tools of
drug trafficking. Second, McDonald engaged in recorded jailhouse
calls, where he made a statement that he was "coming off . . .
five, six grams a day," and tried to get someone to lie if asked
about the contents of the safe. Third, McDonald's criminal record
included sixteen prior convictions, several of which were drug
related. These convictions provided a reason to believe that
McDonald was involved in drug trafficking on a regular basis.
Fourth, McDonald was unemployed and receiving $678 a month in
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disability payments, yet he admitted that his drug addiction cost
him approximately $1,000 per week. The district court noted that
McDonald "had $1,430 in currency on his person at the time of his
arrest with no sign of legitimate gainful employment." The
district court did not clearly err in concluding that McDonald's
"need to fund [his] own drug habit and the apparent inability of
[McDonald] to obtain that kind of money through legitimate means"
was consistent with McDonald's dealing drugs, and thereby
corroborated the CI's testimony.
Further, the district court accounted for the
possibility that "the [CI's] memory is not perfect" by reducing
the amount of drugs it attributed to McDonald based on the CI's
testimony. And this conservative estimate was even lower than the
already conservative estimate in the PSR: when there was a
divergence between the proffer and grand jury testimony, the PSR
considered the smaller amount. Cf. United States v. Ramírez-
Negrón, 751 F.3d 42, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding no clear error
in the district court's drug quantity calculation when it "was
based on the most lenient assumptions toward [the defendant] that
the record allowed," id. at 53). We cannot say the district court
clearly erred in the drug quantity it attributed to McDonald.
IV.
Finally, McDonald challenges the district court's
imposition of an obstruction of justice enhancement. He primarily
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argues that because he was "seriously impaired" at the time, he
could not have willfully obstructed justice. He also argues that
the enhancement should not apply because he did not materially
hinder the investigation. These arguments too fail.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide, in relevant part, for
a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice "[i]f . . . the
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1(1). A sentencing court's
"factbound determination that an obstruction of justice occurred"
can be based on "any evidence that it reasonably deems reliable."
United States v. Quirion, 714 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 2013). We
review the district court's imposition of an obstruction of justice
enhancement for clear error and set aside the district court's
determination "only if a review of the record leaves us 'with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"
Id. at 79–80 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948)).
We find no clear error in the district court's
determination that an obstruction of justice occurred. McDonald
concealed drugs for two hours at the hospital, and when the drugs
fell onto the floor, he attempted to swallow them and became
physically combative with the people trying to restrain him. His
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argument that he did not willfully obstruct justice fails. The
district court noted that at 10 p.m., two hours prior to the time
the heroin fell from McDonald's hospital bed, the nurse's note
described him as "calm and cooperative." As the district court
explained, "it was two hours after the arrest. The defendant knew
all along that he had drugs . . . . The defendant may have acted
irrationally when the drugs fell on the floor, but he had plenty
of time, namely, two hours, to consider what he was going to do
with the drugs that were near his body."6 Cf. United States v.
Bedford, 446 F.3d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The conduct
demonstrates his determination to conceal the evidence from the
police. It reflects a deliberate action rather than . . .
spontaneous or reflexive conduct . . . ."); United States v.
Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no clear error
in the district court's obstruction of justice enhancement when
the defendant "entered the hospital with three objects [containing
heroin] inside her body[,] . . . [w]hile at the hospital, she hid
two of the objects in her pillow[, and] . . . [w]ith the exception
of a few violent outbursts early in her hospital stay, [the
defendant] appeared lucid and deliberate").
6 McDonald's assertion that he was concealing the drugs
for later use rather than to obstruct justice does not help his
argument. Even if this were true, by concealing drugs for later
use, McDonald ipso facto willfully obstructed justice given his
awareness that the drugs he was hiding were pertinent to the
government's investigation.
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Finally, McDonald's argument that his conduct did not
hinder the investigation or prosecution is misplaced. As the
district court explained, the provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines that refers to a "material hindrance" does not apply in
McDonald's case. Application Note 4(D) of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
provides that, if the destruction or attempt to conceal evidence
"that is material to an official investigation . . . occurred
contemporaneously with arrest . . . it shall not, standing alone,
be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it
results in a material hindrance to the official investigation or
prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of the
offender." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(D) (emphasis added). Because
McDonald's actions at the hospital took place at least two hours
after his arrest, this note does not apply, and whether his actions
resulted in a material hindrance to the investigation does not
affect the analysis. The district court rejected McDonald's
argument that his attempt to swallow the heroin was contemporaneous
with his arrest. McDonald does not dispute this finding, so any
challenge to it is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
V.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm McDonald's
conviction and sentence.
- Concurring Opinion Follows -
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the
court's opinion because our precedent establishes that a
sentencing court may attribute additional drug amounts to a
defendant, to which the criminal defendant has not pled and in
addition to the drug amounts specified in the indictment, if the
narcotics are part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme
or plan as the charged conduct. See United States v. Blanco, 888
F.2d 907, 909 (1st Cir. 1989). "For two or more offenses to
constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be
substantially connected to each other by at least one common
factor, such as victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or
similar modus operandi." United States v. Santos Batista, 239
F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.9).
Despite our precedent, I find this general practice troubling as
it routinely results in significant sentence increases based on
uncharged, untried, and unpled to behavior. I fear that our
continued acceptance of this practice improperly prejudices
criminal defendants and downgrades the quality of our judicial
system.
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