Parra v. State of N.H. ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    November 15, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 94-1204

    HERIBERTO PARRA,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Heriberto Parra on brief pro se. _______________



    ____________________


    ____________________















    Per Curiam. Pro se plaintiff, Heriberto Parra, ___________ ___ __

    appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint

    under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) for failure to state a claim upon

    which relief can be granted. Having thoroughly reviewed the

    record and appellant's submissions on appeal, we affirm the

    dismissal.

    During the pendency of this appeal, the United

    States Supreme Court decided Heck v. Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___, ____ ________

    114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). Heck applies retroactively to this ____

    case. See, e.g., Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 282 n.2 (5th ___ ____ ____ _______

    Cir. 1994). In Heck, the Court held that "a 1983 cause of ____

    action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional

    conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction

    or sentence has been invalidated." 114 S. Ct. at 2374.

    Therefore, if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

    necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

    sentence . . . , the complaint must be dismissed unless the

    plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

    already been invalidated." Id. at 2372. ___

    Notwithstanding the Supreme court's decision in

    Heck, we affirm the dismissal of appellant's claims against ____

    the prosecutors on the ground of absolute immunity. We agree

    with the Fifth Circuit that "[b]ecause absolute immunity is

    properly viewed as 'immunity from suit rather than a mere

    defense to liability,' Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, it is ________

    appropriate for the district courts to resolve the question

    of absolute immunity before reaching the Heck analysis when ____

    feasible." Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. ____
















    Appellant alleges that the prosecutors violated his

    constitutional rights by attending interviews with the

    victims and their parents held after his arrest and

    participating in a conspiracy to influence the victims'

    statements and "brainwash" them to make false accusations and

    commit perjury. Appellant argues that the prosecutors thus

    had an "investigative role" in the case and, therefore, are

    entitled only to qualified immunity.

    We agree with the district court that the

    prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit in this case.

    The Supreme Court recently affirmed the "principle that acts

    undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of

    judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the

    course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled

    to the protections of absolute immunity. Those acts must

    include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled

    by the police and appropriate preparation for its

    presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision

    to seek an indictment has been made." Buckley v. _______

    Fitzsimmons, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615-15 (1993). ___________

    The conduct alleged clearly falls within those parameters.

    The Court has specifically noted that "an out-of-court

    ``effort to control the presentation of [a] witness'

    testimony' is entitled to absolute immunity." Id. (citations ___

    omitted).



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    Parra's remaining 1983 claims are foreclosed by

    Heck and are therefore frivolous under 1915(d). The ____

    complaint alleges that the state actors -- the Sheriff's

    Department, Police Department and its individual officers --

    were "responsible for the false arrest, . . . Malicious

    Prosecutorial Misconduct; Criminal Police Misconduct;

    Perjurious Statements, and Testimony; Falsifying Evidence;

    The Wrongful Conviction; Excessive Sentences; False

    Imprisonment . . . ." It alleges that the State of New

    Hampshire and its Governor are responsible for the

    enforcement of the unconstitutional laws under which

    appellant was prosecuted. The claims, as described by

    appellant, against the non-immune state actors clearly

    challenge the legality of appellant's conviction and

    sentence, neither of which has been invalidated. Therefore,

    the claims are not cognizable under 1983.

    Although it might be argued that a judgment in

    favor of Parra on his false arrest claim would not

    "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

    sentence," Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372, see United States v. ____ ___ _____________

    Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d _____ ______ ________

    1249, 1254 (1st Cir. 1974) ("a false arrest . . . may

    constitute a compensable wrong [under 1983] while not

    undergirding the validity of the criminal conviction to which

    it might be related."), the false arrest claim is in any



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    event time-barred. A civil rights claim pursuant to 1983

    must be brought within the applicable statute of limitations

    period of the state within which the incident occurred. See ___

    Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). In this case, ______ ______

    the arrest occurred in New Hampshire and the statute of

    limitations for claims of false arrest is three years. See ___

    N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 507-B:7 (1993). Under federal law,

    which controls the accrual of 1983 claims, see Guzman- ___ _______

    Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1994), a claim ______ ___________

    for false arrest accrues on the date of the arrest. See, ___

    e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 1989); ____ ____ ______

    McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988); ______ ____________

    Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983); _______ ______

    Singleton v. New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980), _________ _________

    cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981). Parra was arrested in ____________

    January, 1990. He filed this claim in November, 1993, more

    than three years later. Therefore, the district court did

    not err in dismissing Parra's false arrest claim.

    Given that there is no cause of action under 1983

    against the state actors, even proper allegations of

    conspiracy would not suffice to bring the private actors or

    immune parties within the ambit of 1983. Therefore, even

    if appellant's complaint had included more than conclusory

    allegations of collusion and conspiracy between the private

    defendants, the prosecutors and the local officials -- which



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    it did not -- the 1983 claims against those parties would

    still be foreclosed by Heck. ____

    We affirm the dismissal of appellant's claims under

    42 U.S.C. 1985(3) and 1986 for essentially the reasons

    contained in the magistrate judge's order of November 3,

    1993, which was adopted by the district court in an order

    dated December 8, 1993.

    The district court order dated February 11, 1994,

    dismissing the complaint is affirmed. ________



































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