Kelly v. Weld ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    December 11, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 92-1967

    DANNY M. KELLY,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    WILLIAM F. WELD,

    Defendant, Appellee.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. David S. Nelson, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Torruella and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    Danny M. Kelly on brief pro se.
    ______________
    Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Eleanor Coe Sinnott,
    __________________ ____________________
    Assistant Attorney General, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for
    Summary Disposition, for appellee.


    ____________________


    ____________________





















    Per Curiam. Danny M. Kelly appeals from a district
    __________

    court order dismissing his complaint. Appellant filed his

    complaint in July, 1991 against Governor William F. Weld, "in

    his role as governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

    The complaint alleged that appellant was denied his

    constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the

    failure of a Massachusetts inspection station to grant him an

    inspection sticker for his 1970 Oldsmobile. More

    specifically, he claimed that he had been denied his rights

    of free expression, enjoyment of his property, equal

    protection and due process. Appellant sought injunctive,

    declaratory and compensatory relief and costs.

    Appellee moved to dismiss. The district court

    referred the motion to a United States Magistrate who issued

    two reports recommending that appellant's claims for

    compensatory relief be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh

    Amendment and that the remainder of the complaint be

    dismissed for failure to state a claim. Appellant filed

    objections to both reports. The district court, in an

    opinion dated August 5, 1992 dismissed appellant's complaint

    for the same reasons expressed in the magistrate's reports

    and denied appellant's motion for injunctive relief to allow

    appellant to operate his car without a current inspection

    sticker. For the reasons set forth in the district court

    opinion, we affirm. We add only the following comments.



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    Appellant, in his brief, describes his case as
    follows:

    [t]he case is based upon the
    Commonwealth's refusal to provide a
    Certificate of Inspection for Appellant's
    1970 Oldsmobile during its yearly
    required auto inspection even though the
    car meets all specifications required
    under state and Federal law to be granted
    a Certificate of Inspection.

    Appellant admits later in his brief, however, that after he

    filed his complaint in this case he obtained a certificate of

    inspection for his car from another inspection station.

    Therefore, appellant's request for injunctive relief is moot.

    Moreover, the fact that appellant was able to

    obtain a certificate of inspection belies his claims that the

    Commonwealth has denied him any rights whatsoever, much less

    any federal rights. The essence of his complaint is that a

    specific inspection station erred in denying his car a

    certificate of inspection when it allegedly met all of the

    inspection requirements. Appellant complains in his brief

    that the district court failed to resolve the "main point" of

    whether or not the initial inspection station erroneously

    denied his car an inspection certificate. That question,

    however, is not one over which the federal courts have

    jurisdiction.

    Finally, appellant's claims of judicial bias and

    judicial error in the denial of his request for a jury trial

    are entirely without basis in the law. The alleged source of



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    judicial bias, appellant's pro se status, is not extra-

    judicial. Therefore, recusal is required only if the source

    of bias and alleged indications of bias -- ignoring

    appellant's allegations that his car met all inspection

    requirements -- "would create a reasonable doubt concerning

    the judge's impartiality." United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d
    _____________ _____

    33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991). The judge focused on the appropriate

    issues in dismissing this case and his actions do not provide

    any basis for recusal. Even if there had been a showing of

    judicial bias, the requested remedy -- replacing the judge

    with a jury -- would not have been appropriate. Whether or

    not to grant a motion to dismiss is a legal rather than a

    factual question. Therefore, only if a case survives a

    motion to dismiss can it be heard by a jury. The district

    court judgment is affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 92-1967

Filed Date: 12/11/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015