Porter v. Pelino ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    December 9, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ___________________


    No. 92-1403




    FRANK PORTER, JR.

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    LT. PELINO, ET. AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ___________________

    Frank Porter, Jr. on brief pro se.
    ________________
    A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Victor A.
    ___________________ _________
    Wild, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    ____



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    Per Curiam. The issue before us is whether the district
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    court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for

    relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Appellant

    sought through this motion to obtain reconsideration of the

    dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. We affirm the district
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    court's decision.

    Appellant was convicted by a jury on March 15, 1989 of

    robbing five banks. After considering and rejecting several

    post-trial motions, the district court sentenced appellant to a

    264 month prison term. An appeal was taken to this court. We

    affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. United States v.
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    Porter, 924 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1991).
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    While he was awaiting trial, appellant filed a petition

    for habeas corpus challenging the conditions of his pretrial
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    confinement in a state facility (where he was awaiting

    disposition of state charges), and alleging various

    constitutional errors in the investigation, prosecution, and

    defense of his case. The petition was originally assigned a

    separate case number and routed to another judge. It was

    reassigned to the trial judge at the conclusion of petitioner's

    trial. The trial judge denied the petition on February 21,

    1991, shortly after this court affirmed appellant's conviction,

    because "all issues of any significance" had been reviewed on

    direct appeal, or "rendered moot" by petitioner's conviction and

    incarceration in a federal facility.



















    Almost a full year later, on February 18, 1992, appellant

    filed the instant motion, urging reconsideration of the denial of

    his habeas petition for three reasons. First, he said that the
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    district court had inadvertently failed to allow him to amend the

    petition. Second, he argued that he was entitled to

    reconsideration because of his counsel's "excusable neglect": a

    delay in transmitting to the court appellant's request to amend

    the habeas petition. And third, he argued that the district
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    court should reconsider because it had mistakenly treated the

    petition as one challenging a state court judgment under 28

    U.S.C. 2254.

    A motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),

    is committed to the district court's discretion and may be

    granted only under exceptional circumstances. We review a denial

    of postjudgment relief under this rule only for "abuse of

    discretion." See United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at
    ___ _____________ _____________________________

    18 Oakwood St., 958 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing cases);
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    United States v. Ayer, 857 F.2d 881, 886 (1st Cir. 1988). We
    _____________ ____

    find no abuse here.

    First, the record does not support appellant's contention

    that the district court failed to consider his motion to amend

    his habeas petition. As originally drafted, appellant's motion
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    was contained in a letter dated December 18, 1989, addressed to

    appellant's attorney and forwarded by the attorney to the court

    on January 18, 1990. Appellant had also sent an almost identical



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    letter directly to the court, dated December 22, 1989. The

    letters recite what seem to be clarifications or explanations of

    the grounds raised in appellant's original habeas petition.
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    These letters were before the trial judge, and their contents

    were presumably considered by him, when he denied appellant's

    habeas petition in February, 1991.
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    Appellant now contends that the letters actually sought

    the court's permission for the filing of yet another, separately

    labelled, "amendment" to the habeas corpus petition. Appellant

    first filed such a document on February 18, 1992, along with the

    instant Rule 60(b) motion. Even if we were to read appellant's

    original letter motion as seeking permission to file this

    separate document, however, it is clear that the district court

    did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for

    reconsideration under Rule 60(b). As we read the separate

    "amendment" appellant has now filed, it, too, does no more than

    restate or attempt to clarify, the arguments asserted in the

    original habeas petition. Although appellant argues that "new
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    evidence" is presented in the amendment, we find none.

    Appellant's second argument, that he is entitled to

    reconsideration of his habeas petition because of his attorney's
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    "inadvertence" is frivolous. The attorney's one month delay in

    transmitting appellant's letter motion to the court did not

    affect the outcome of appellant's habeas petition, which was
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    denied on the merits, well after the letter motion was received.



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    Finally, appellant argues that the district court

    incorrectly treated his habeas petition as a motion for relief
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    from a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2254. He claims

    that the district court should have treated some of the

    petition's allegations, presumably those dealing with the

    conditions of his pretrial detention, as having been brought

    under 28 U.S.C. 2241, others as asserting a civil rights

    action, presumably under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and still others as a

    petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255.

    When the district court ruled on the habeas petition,
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    petitioner was already serving his sentence in federal prison.

    He had not been subject to any of the challenged conditions of

    his pre-trial confinement for more than a year. The district

    court's dismissal of these grounds as moot was thus correct.

    Moreover, no matter how liberally one reads petitioner's habeas
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    petition, the only relief it demands is release from confinement.

    The district court could not be expected to reinterpret this

    petition as one asserting a civil rights claim for damages. Even

    petitioner took more than two years to conceive of this gloss

    upon his own petition.

    Finally, the district court did not misconstrue its own

    statutory authority in deciding the remainder of appellant's

    arguments. These arguments were properly construed as a

    challenge to appellant's federal conviction. They were handled





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    appropriately, and correctly dismissed, in light of the policy

    and procedures under 28 U.S.C. 2255.

    Affirmed.
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    So ordered.
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