Wilder v. United States , 806 F.3d 653 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1815
DARREN F. WILDER,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Michael R. Schneider, with whom Jeffrey G. Harris and Good
Schneider Cormier were on brief, for appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
November 20, 2015
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Darren Wilder was convicted in
March 2006, after a jury trial, of transportation, receipt, and
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and noted that the
evidence against him was very strong. See United States v. Wilder,
526 F.3d 1, 7–12 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1050(2008).
Wilder now appeals the district court's denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in
which he claimed, for the first time, that the jury selection
process for his trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to be
present and his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Because
Wilder cannot overcome his procedural default from not pursuing
either claim at trial or on appeal, we affirm the denial of habeas
relief.
I.
The facts surrounding Wilder's underlying conviction are
set forth in our prior opinion. Wilder, 526 F.3d at 3–5. We
summarize only the facts relevant to this appeal.
On December 1, 2009, Wilder filed a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction on numerous grounds.
On May 14, 2012, Judge O'Toole denied the motion, with the
exception of two constitutional claims regarding jury selection
that he reserved for an evidentiary hearing. The matter was then
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reassigned to Judge Casper so that Judge O'Toole could serve as a
fact witness concerning the conduct of voir dire. On July 22,
2014, after an evidentiary hearing involving testimony and
affidavits from trial participants, including Judge O'Toole, the
district court denied both remaining claims.
The district court (Judge Casper) made the following
findings of fact. Trial began on March 13, 2006. Wilder and
Wilder's girlfriend, parents, stepmother, and mother's friend were
present in the courtroom when the jury venire was brought into the
courtroom. In open court, the trial judge (Judge O'Toole)
explained the nature of the charges against Wilder and then asked
the jury venire a series of questions as a group. After all of
the potential jurors responded affirmatively to the question of
whether he or she was a regular or frequent internet user, the
trial judge indicated that "we're going to end up talking to all
of you in the back."
The trial judge and counsel for both parties then
proceeded to meet with potential jurors one by one in the jury
deliberation room behind the courtroom. That room is not open or
visible to those in the courtroom. However, those in the courtroom
could see potential jurors as they left from and returned to the
courtroom. It took the rest of the morning and most of the
afternoon to go through the individual voir dire of each juror.
In the back room, each individual potential juror was asked follow-
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up questions to those asked in open court as well as a question
about whether child pornography evidence would so emotionally
disturb the potential juror as to make him or her incapable of
remaining impartial. Counsel exercised for-cause challenges as
each juror left the room. The reason for conducting this portion
of voir dire in the jury deliberation room, the trial judge
attested, was to "support[] the juror's interest in privacy and
thus promote[] full and candid answers." While he did not have
any recollection specific to this case, this was his general
practice in "a small number of cases," including child pornography
cases. There was no objection to this procedure from either
counsel.
Neither Wilder nor his family was present for that
portion of the individual voir dire that took place in the jury
deliberation room. Counsel was certainly present. Indeed,
Wilder's counsel instructed Wilder and his family to stay in the
courtroom in case Wilder was needed. Neither Wilder nor any other
person ever made a request to enter and be present in the jury
deliberation room.
After the individual questioning was completed, the jury
selection proceedings resumed in open court. Defense counsel
conferred with Wilder before exercising peremptory challenges.
Both the prosecution and defense counsel then exercised peremptory
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challenges at sidebar. The trial judge then gave some cautionary
instructions to the jury and excused the jury for the day.
In his petition, Wilder does not assert that the exercise
of peremptory challenges at sidebar violated his constitutional
rights. He challenges only those portions of the voir dire that
took place in the jury room.
Wilder's defense counsel made no objection to any
portion of this individual voir dire procedure. He testified that
while he knew that Wilder had a Fifth Amendment right to be present
at jury selection, he generally advises his criminal defendant
clients against participating in individual jury selection
conferences to avoid making potential jurors feel "awkward" by
having to face the defendant in a small space. While he did not
have a specific recollection of having advised Wilder as such, he
testified that it was his general practice to do so. On the other
hand, Wilder testified that he had not been advised of such a right
and that if he had been advised, he would have invoked the right
even against his defense counsel's advice. The prosecutor attested
that defense counsel had in fact informed the trial court that
Wilder did not wish to be present. Defense counsel had no
recollection to the contrary. The district court found Wilder not
credible and credited the testimony of his defense counsel and the
prosecutor.
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Wilder's defense counsel did not advise Wilder about his
Sixth Amendment right to have members of the public present at
jury selection because he "did not know that such a right existed."
Wilder testified that had he been advised, he would have invoked
that right as well.
Upon making these findings, the district court began its
analysis by noting that Wilder did not raise either the Fifth
Amendment or the Sixth Amendment claim at trial or on direct
appeal. Accordingly, the claims were procedurally defaulted
unless Wilder could show cause for having procedurally defaulted
as well as actual prejudice resulting from the alleged errors.
The district court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim
on the basis of Wilder's failure to excuse procedural default. It
found that Wilder's counsel had made a reasonable strategic choice
to waive the right, and it did not credit Wilder's claim that he
was never advised of the right. As a result, Wilder could not
show cause sufficient to excuse the procedural default. The
district court also concluded that Wilder could not establish
actual prejudice because his presence would not have necessarily
resulted in a different jury composition or verdict, particularly
given the weight of the evidence against him.
The district court also dismissed the Sixth Amendment
claim on the basis of procedural default. It distinguished this
case from the complete closure in Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d
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48, 61–66 (1st Cir. 2007), which was decided a year after the
trial. Unlike in Owens, the district court found, the first phase
of jury selection took place in open court and Wilder and his
family remained in the courtroom throughout the day. In fact,
conducting the individual voir dire in the jury deliberation room
was essentially "the functional equivalent" of a sidebar
conference. The district court decided that defense counsel's
failure to object to what was at most a partial closure did not
justify an assumption of ineffective assistance of counsel that
would excuse procedural default. That was because competent
defense counsel could have chosen not to object as a strategic
matter. The district court also declined to find a structural
error that would justify a presumption of prejudice and found that
no actual prejudice had been shown.
Finding the issue of procedural default of the Sixth
Amendment claim "a closer call," the district court then proceeded
to also reject the claim on the merits. Noting that a less
stringent standard applied to partial closures than to complete
closures, it found that the partial closure was justified by the
"substantial interest" in eliciting candid answers from potential
jurors. The district court, based on these findings, denied the
habeas claims.
On September 5, 2014, the district court granted
Wilder's application for a certificate of appealability from the
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dismissal of his petition, but only as to the two jury selection
claims. This appeal followed.
II.
A. Standard of Review and § 2255 Framework
A petitioner in federal custody may seek post-conviction
relief if, inter alia, his sentence "was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States" or "is otherwise
subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The burden
of proof is on the petitioner. David v. United States, 134 F.3d
470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998). In reviewing a district court's denial
of a § 2255 motion, we review the district court's legal
determinations de novo and any findings of fact from an evidentiary
hearing for clear error. Owens, 483 F.3d at 57.
Because Wilder is raising his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims for the first time on habeas, he must show both "cause"
that excuses the procedural default and "actual prejudice"
resulting from the alleged error. Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 622 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–
68 (1982). One way to meet the cause requirement is to show
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991). To meet the actual
prejudice requirement, Wilder must show that "there is a reasonable
probability" that the outcome of the trial would have been
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different but for the alleged error. Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 289 (1999). A structural error is considered per se
prejudicial. Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. A structural error is one
"affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather
than simply an error in the trial process itself." Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). "Such errors 'infect the entire trial
process,'" id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630
(1993)), and "necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair,"
id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
B. Fifth Amendment Claim
A criminal defendant has a due process right to be
present at all stages of his trial for which his absence might
frustrate the fairness of the proceedings -- a category that
includes jury empanelment. United States v. Ramírez-Rivera, 800
F.3d 1, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam). Wilder argues that this
right was violated by his exclusion from the individual voir dire
in the jury room. However, his claim cannot survive procedural
default.
Because Wilder did not raise a contemporaneous objection
and did not raise the issue on direct appeal, we do not reach the
merits unless he shows cause for the procedural default, as well
as actual prejudice. The district court's factual findings, which
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were not clearly erroneous, prevent Wilder from showing
ineffective assistance of counsel that would meet the cause
requirement. Defense counsel testified that even though he had no
specific recollection of this case, it was his general practice to
advise clients to waive this right because potential jurors may be
more likely to be candid as to sensitive matters when they are not
made to feel "awkward" by close proximity to the defendant. The
district court credited that testimony, as well as the testimony
of the prosecutor that defense counsel had advised the trial judge
that Wilder did not wish to be present. Meanwhile, the district
court refused to credit Wilder's testimony denying that defense
counsel mentioned to him the reason for not attending individual
voir dire (i.e., to get more candid answers from jurors).
Defense counsel's waiver of the right on behalf of Wilder
was part of a "sound trial strategy" and so was not ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). As the Supreme
Court has recognized, defendants have an interest in eliciting
candid statements by jurors on their potential biases:
Voir dire examination serves to protect [the
right to an impartial trier of fact] by
exposing possible biases, both known and
unknown, on the part of potential jurors.
Demonstrated bias in the responses to
questions on voir dire may result in a juror
being excused for cause; hints of bias not
sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may
assist parties in exercising their peremptory
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challenges. The necessity of truthful
answers by prospective jurors if this process
is to serve its purpose is obvious.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554
(1984); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
464 U.S. 501, 515 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining
that "the defendant has an interest in protecting juror privacy in
order to encourage honest answers to the voir dire questions").
Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by agreeing
to a procedure meant to obtain more truthful answers from potential
jurors. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2004)
(explaining that defense counsel engaged in "objectively
reasonable strategy designed to elicit forthcoming responses from
the jurors about racial bias" by agreeing to individual voir dire
being conducted in private room).
Beyond that, Wilder did not meet his burden to show
actual prejudice. The district court did not err in finding that
there was not a reasonable probability that his presence during
the individual voir dire would have resulted in a different jury
composition or verdict. While Wilder argues that his presence
would have affected the outcome because he would have asked certain
jurors follow-up questions, requested more definite answers, or
made additional for-cause challenges, it requires too much
speculation to say that the outcome would have been different.
See United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d 581, 603–04 (1st
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Cir. 2010) (finding no prejudice from district court's individual,
ex parte voir dire of fifteen prospective jurors, reasoning that
finding prejudice would require "too many assumptions" about how
the jurors would have answered any further questions, whether any
for-cause challenges would have been attempted and been
successful, and whether any replacement jurors would have voted to
acquit); United States v. Gonzalez-Melendez, 594 F.3d 28, 34 (1st
Cir. 2010) (finding no prejudice from procedural error in exercise
of peremptory challenges, on the basis that "[i]t is not evident
that the composition of the jury would have differed . . . [and]
there is no basis in the record for concluding that the alteration
in jury composition had an injurious influence on the verdict").
The claim that a different jury composition would have changed the
outcome is especially speculative here. As we noted on direct
appeal, the evidence against Wilder was "more than sufficient."
Wilder, 526 F.3d at 9. As a result, Wilder's Fifth Amendment claim
is procedurally defaulted.
C. Sixth Amendment Claim
As part of the right to a public trial, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees public jury selection. Presley v. Georgia,
558 U.S. 209, 212–13 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510).
Wilder argues that this right was violated by the exclusion of his
family and friends from the closed-door individual voir dire.
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Wilder, though, cannot overcome his failure to raise this claim at
trial or on direct appeal.
The district court correctly decided that Wilder failed
to meet the cause requirement for overcoming procedural default.
Wilder argues that because his counsel's failure to object was due
to ignorance of the law, he received ineffective assistance of
counsel that satisfies the cause requirement. However, the
ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry is concerned with
objective reasonableness rather than what counsel did or did not
know. See Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 31–32 & n.11 (1st
Cir. 2011) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel even when
counsel did not recognize potential Sixth Amendment violation);
see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011)
("Strickland . . . calls for an inquiry into the objective
reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective
state of mind."). Objectively reasonable counsel could have made
a strategic choice not to object to the selection procedure here,
for the same reason that the district court found Wilder's counsel
reasonably advised him to waive his Fifth Amendment right. See
Horton, 370 F.3d at 82–83. Indeed, it is difficult to think that
trial counsel, having advised Wilder against coming to the jury
room under the Fifth Amendment, would have advised the contrary
for him or his family under the Sixth Amendment.
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As to the prejudice requirement for overcoming
procedural default, Wilder cannot show actual prejudice for the
same reasons that he cannot show actual prejudice on his Fifth
Amendment claim. Instead, Wilder relies on a characterization of
the jury selection process as a complete closure of the courtroom
and argues that because a complete closure is a structural error,
he need not show actual prejudice. See Owens, 483 F.3d 65–66.
The district court, however, correctly found that the procedures
used were "the functional equivalent" of a sidebar conference.
The only difference between these procedures and a sidebar
conference was that members of the public could not observe the
individual questioning from their seats in the spectator gallery
and attempt to discern facial expressions or body language, and
the district court did not err in finding no functional difference
between the two.
Wilder does not claim that holding portions of voir dire
at sidebar violates the Sixth Amendment. See Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.23 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that public trial right
does not extend to sidebar conferences); United States v. Vaghari,
500 F. App'x 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that conducting
portions of voir dire at sidebar is a "commonly accepted
practice"); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 661 (3d Cir.
2011) (describing jury selection procedures like those at issue
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here and stating that "we are aware of no case holding that such
procedures offend the Sixth Amendment"). Indeed, peremptory
challenges in this case were exercised at sidebar, and Wilder does
not challenge that part of the procedure. As such, we find no
error in the district court's conclusion that there was no complete
closure and thus no structural error and no per se prejudice from
any alleged error. Wilder cannot overcome procedural default on
his Sixth Amendment claim.1
III.
For the reasons stated, we affirm.
-Concurring Opinion Follows-
1 There was also no error under Waller. The full procedures
outlined in Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, do not apply where the trial
court was conducting the functional equivalent of properly
conducted sidebar portions of voir dire.
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, concurring. For Wilder's
Sixth Amendment claim, the majority explains that there was no
error under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), as these
proceedings were tantamount to a sidebar. In this way, the
majority has effectively written closure out of this case. But to
characterize this event as anything other than a closure is to
ignore the egregious facts at issue: whereas a sidebar is held in
open court, where all the public can observe (even if they cannot
hear) the proceedings, here, the most critical portion of voir
dire was held behind closed doors.2
This reasoning is a far cry from Owens v. United States,
483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007), where we discussed the central
importance of the public trial guarantee. In Owens, the courtroom
had been "closed to the public for an entire day" of jury selection
due to space constraints. Id. at 64. We found that the denial of
a public trial is a structural error, a "basic protection[] whose
precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal
trial cannot reliably function." Id. (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993)). As a result, a defendant
denied a public trial need not show prejudice for procedurally
defaulting his claim. Id. at 66; see also United States v. Negrón-
2
I note that the jury deliberation rooms in the Moakley
Courthouse are positioned to the rear of the courtrooms and are
therefore only accessible by a key card.
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Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 305-06 (1st Cir. 2015). We did not cabin
the structural error analysis to complete closures, instead
speaking broadly of the importance of the Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial. Owens, 483 F.3d at 65-66 ("[B]ecause denial of a
public trial is structural error, it would be impossible for Owens
to establish actual prejudice, and as such, it must be presumed.").
Later, in Bucci v. United States, this Court did not reach the
question of whether "a partial public trial
violation . . . constitutes structural error." 662 F.3d 18, 29
(1st Cir. 2011). Now, by effectively finding that the procedure
here did not qualify as a closure, the majority has further
undercut the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a public trial and
chipped away at the constitutional protections articulated in
Owens.
To be sure, the majority is correct that Wilder must
show that his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to demonstrate
cause for his procedural default. Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. Further,
I agree that Wilder cannot make that showing here, and I therefore
concur in judgment.3 But, even if this Court were to accept Bucci's
3I make this determination based on Judge Casper's finding
that defense counsel had informed Judge O'Toole that Wilder did
not wish to be present in the jury room. After an evidentiary
hearing, Judge Casper credited the prosecutor's testimony that
Wilder's counsel had done so, explaining that this testimony was
not inconsistent with defense counsel's recollection that he
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suggestion that a partial closure is not structural error, Wilder
has demonstrated that this was a full closure for which there was
no "overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 61-62 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). Accordingly, he need
not show prejudice. Id. at 66.
typically advised defendants that jurors would be more candid
during voir dire if the defendant were not present. Such a factual
finding is reviewed for clear error, Owens, 483 F.3d at 57, and
Judge Casper's determination, made after reviewing affidavits and
observing a comprehensive evidentiary hearing, is not clearly
erroneous. Nevertheless, I am troubled that there is no indication
of Wilder's waiver on the record. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1, 4 (1966) ("There is a presumption against the waiver of
constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be
clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" (internal citations
omitted)).
Further, I dispute the majority's suggestion that defense
counsel's ignorance of the law is irrelevant to the ineffective
counsel inquiry for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis. See
Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1049 (10th Cir. 2002) ("An
attorney's demonstrated ignorance of law directly relevant to a
decision will eliminate Strickland's presumption that the decision
was objectively reasonable because it might have been made for
strategic purposes . . . ."). That said, defense counsel explained
that he thought that jurors would give more candid responses in
the defendant's absence and that "it was awkward for jurors to
face the defendant at such a small, confined space." This
strategic decision is not objectively unreasonable and could have
been made by an attorney fully informed of the law. See Horton v.
Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Defense counsel's
decision to agree to a closed individual voir dire was an
objectively reasonable strategy designed to elicit forthcoming
responses from the jurors . . . ."); Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1053-54(finding that a determination made when an attorney was ignorant
of the applicable law could have been made by "a fully informed
attorney" and, thus, "was not objectively unreasonable").
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Judge O'Toole began jury selection by addressing the
venire in open court and asking them a series of general yes or no
questions. Judge O'Toole stated that he would follow up later
with private questions for those who answered affirmatively to his
initial inquiries. When all the jurors responded that they were
regular users of the internet, Judge O'Toole explained that he
would need to speak to everyone in private. Judge O'Toole and the
attorneys proceeded to the private jury deliberation room, and
defense counsel advised Wilder to wait in the empty courtroom with
his family. Throughout the morning and for a portion of the
afternoon session, Judge O'Toole questioned forty-eight jurors,
one by one, in the private room. Neither Wilder nor any other
members of the public observed the private questioning; only Judge
O'Toole, the lawyers, and the single prospective juror being
questioned were present.
The majority explains, "[t]he only difference between
these procedures and a sidebar conference was that members of the
public could not observe the individual questioning from their
seats in the spectator gallery and attempt to discern facial
expressions or body language." Wilder v. United States, slip op.
at 14 (1st Cir. November 20, 2015). This explanation understates
the importance of such observations: during a sidebar, even though
the jurors' responses are not audible to the public, the
prospective jurors still respond to the judge's queries in an open
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courtroom, and their physical reactions to any questions are
visible to observers. The presumed openness of holding proceedings
in the courtroom is absent when questioning instead takes place
behind closed doors. See Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 507-08(discussing the historical importance of the "open process" in the
legal system, which gives "assurance to those not attending trials
that others were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced
public confidence"); Owens, 483 F.3d at 65 ("Judges, lawyers,
witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions more
responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings." (quoting
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965))).4
The Supreme Court recognized that a complete closure may
be justified where the following four requirements are satisfied:
the party seeking to close the hearing must
advance an overriding interest that is likely
4 The majority does not reach the merits of Wilder's Fifth
Amendment claim in light of his procedural default. While I agree
that his Fifth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted as well,
I note that any similarities between a sidebar and the procedure
here are further minimized with respect to Wilder's right to be
present during trial. During a sidebar, the defendant typically
is seated in the courtroom, only feet away from where the
questioning is taking place. As a result, defense counsel can
consult his client with only minimal disruptions to the
questioning. Conversely, should the defendant wish to ask about
a particular juror based on observations of the juror’s facial
expressions or gestures, he can easily flag his attorney. When
questioning takes place in a separate room, the defendant and
defense counsel can no longer engage in these simple
communications; the questioning must be paused for several minutes
at a time whenever defense counsel seeks to consult his client,
and the defendant must ask to be admitted to the private room to
ask his defense attorney even a simple question.
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to be prejudiced, the closure must be no
broader than necessary to protect that
interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding, and it must make findings adequate
to support the closure.
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). In an affidavit
submitted for the § 2255 hearing, Judge O'Toole explained that he
preferred to conduct questioning of personal matters such as child
or sexual abuse in a private room. I do not foreclose that such
concerns may justify a full closure, see Press-Enter. Co., 464
U.S. at 511-12 (noting that questioning regarding "deeply personal
matters" may justify complete closure), but the record does not
demonstrate that Judge O'Toole considered reasonable alternatives,
see, e.g., id. at 512 (recommending that trial judges "requir[e]
the prospective juror to make an affirmative request . . . [where]
disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy"), as
Waller requires. Moreover, Judge O'Toole's post-hoc
justifications should not excuse the closure; such findings must
be made during jury selection. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209,
213 (2010) ("Waller provided standards for courts to apply before
excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial . . . .");
United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2011) (refusing
to consider a later-filed affidavit "because the court made no
explicit findings before closing the courtroom" (emphasis in
original)); see also Owens, 483 F.3d at 62 ("[A] court must
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consider (and reject) alternatives to closure before barring
public access.").
The government contends that the closure was only
partial, noting that the initial general questions to prospective
jurors and subsequent peremptory challenges were open to the
public; that the courtroom remained open throughout the jury
selection process; and that Wilder and the public could observe
the venire as they proceeded from the courtroom to the jury room
and, again, upon their return. But this argument misses the point:
the public was excluded from the most critical components of the
jury selection process. During the private questioning,
prospective jurors were asked about their feelings on child
pornography and how they would respond to graphic images, among
other things. These queries directly concerned the jurors'
abilities to set aside their biases and return a fair verdict,
inquiries central to the fairness of Wilder's trial. If the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial protects anything, it must
protect access to the most substantive components of the trial.
Cf. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial extended to a suppression hearing, noting
that such "hearings often are as important as the trial itself");
Owens, 483 F.3d at 63 (finding that courtroom closure was not
trivial as "[j]ury selection is . . . a crucial part of any criminal
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case"). To hold otherwise is to reduce the Constitution's fair
trial guarantees to mere formalities.
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