United States v. Frazer ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    September 7, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


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    No. 93-1110




    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    JAMES E. FRAZER,

    Defendant, Appellant.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
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    Robert P. Woodward on brief for appellant.
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    Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, on brief for
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    appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Appellant, James Frazer, pled guilty to a
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    fourteen count indictment charging conspiracy to commit and

    the commission of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371

    & 1344. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty

    months. In imposing this sentence, the court applied a two

    level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant

    to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. The court also denied Frazer's request

    for a two level downward adjustment in his sentence, pursuant

    to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b), on the ground that he had been a minor

    participant. Frazer appeals both the upward adjustment and

    the denial of the downward adjustment in his sentence.



    The facts in this case are not in dispute. According to

    the Pre-Sentence Report, Frazer was a participant with ten to

    fifteen other individuals in a scheme to defraud banks. The

    scheme involved the illegal acquisition of business checks

    and check writing machines, the acquisition of information on

    actual account holders, and the manufacturing of false

    identification. A stolen check was made payable to the

    actual account holder who was identified on the check as an

    employee of the business from which the check had been

    obtained. A conspirator then would go to each branch of the

    actual account holder's bank and, using false identification,

    either cash the check or split deposit it, i.e., the

    conspirator would deposit part and receive part in cash. The



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    scheme defrauded banks throughout New England of tens of

    thousands of dollars. Frazer was one of the "runners" or

    check cashers in this scheme. From July to September 1991,

    Frazer cashed checks which defrauded banks of over eight

    thousand dollars. He received one third of the total take

    from his role in the scheme.

    After pleading guilty, Frazer was released on bail and

    scheduled to be sentenced on December 2, 1992. This was

    later continued by the court until December 7, 1992. Frazer

    did not appear on December 7. A bench warrant was issued and

    Frazer was arrested on January 5, 1993. On January 13, 1993,

    he appeared before the court and was sentenced. Due to his

    previous failure to appear for sentencing, the court found

    Frazer willfully to have obstructed justice and increased his

    sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1.1



    Frazer contends that the court erred when it increased

    his offense level two levels for obstructing justice by

    willfully failing to appear at his sentencing hearing on

    December 7, 1992. Frazer argues first that the court erred

    when it allowed the government to recall a witness to correct

    earlier testimony as to the date of his failure to appear.

    He also contends that the government failed to meet its


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    1. Subsequently, Frazer was indicted and pled guilty to a
    violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) for his failure to appear
    at sentencing.

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    burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his

    failure to appear was "willful." We find merit in neither

    argument.

    On the afternoon of the sentencing hearing on January

    13, 1993, the court allowed the government to recall Deputy

    Marshall Shurtleff. The government had previously rested its

    case after the morning recess. Shurtleff had testified on

    that morning that he had been in court on December 2, 1992,

    and that Frazer had failed to appear for sentencing on that

    date. When the court returned for its afternoon session, it

    became apparent that there was confusion as to whether the

    sentencing hearing at which Frazer had not appeared had been

    on December 2 or on December 7. Over Frazer's objection, the

    court allowed the government to recall Shurtleff who

    testified that he had been mistaken in his morning testimony

    and that in fact the date of the hearing had been December 7.

    We find no merit in appellant's objection to the

    admission of this evidence. To be sure, the defendant enjoys

    a due process right to be sentenced only upon information the

    court has determined to be neither false nor materially

    incorrect. United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 63 (1st
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    Cir. 1991). In this case, however, there is no claim that

    the amended testimony was inaccurate nor that the error in

    the morning testimony was due to anything other than

    confusion caused by the change in sentencing dates. We find



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    the sentencing court to have been well within its discretion

    in allowing the government to recall Shurtleff and in

    permitting him to amend his previous testimony. See Id. at
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    61 ("district court has broad discretion in the information

    it may receive and consider regarding defendant and his

    conduct").

    According to the commentary to Section 3C1.1 of the

    Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's offense level is to be

    increased two levels for obstruction of justice if he

    "willfully fail[s] to appear, as ordered, for a judicial

    proceeding." U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(e)). As with

    other upward adjustments, the government bears the burden of

    proving the requisite facts by a preponderance of the

    evidence. United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 67 (1st
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    Cir. 1991). This court reviews a finding of obstruction of

    justice only for clear error. United States v. McCarthy, 961
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    F.2d 972, 978 (1st Cir. 1992).

    In this case, Frazer stipulated at the sentencing

    hearing that he was aware of the requirement that he attend

    his sentencing hearing on December 7, 1992, and the evidence

    that he did not attend is undisputed. Frazer argues,

    however, that the government presented no evidence that his

    absence was willful. In particular, he suggests that his

    absence may have been due to a "mind-altering state, caused

    by cocaine" and that he thus did not possess the mens rea for
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    obstruction of justice. At the sentencing hearing, however,

    Frazer's attorney only suggested that cocaine use was a

    possible "scenario" for explaining his client's absence.2

    No representation was made that this had in fact been the

    reason for Frazer's absence on December 7. Nor was there any

    proffer of proof to this effect.

    Courts which have considered the mens rea requirement of
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    U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 have found that it "requires that the

    defendant consciously act with the purpose of obstructing

    justice." United States v. Thompson, 962 F.2d 1069, 1071
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    (D.C.Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1418 (1993) (citing
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    United States v. Lofton, 905 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir.),
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    cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990)). "[K]nowledge of the
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    requirements placed upon him by the court and his conscious

    decision to ignore its mandates" have been found central to a

    finding of willfulness. United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d
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    1370, 1376 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Teta, 918
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    F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Perry,
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    908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1002
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    (1990)); see also, McCarthy, 961 F.2d at 980 (upholding
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    upward adjustment under 3C1.1 where "[d]efendant was fully

    aware that he was delaying his sentence by fleeing").




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    2. Frazer's attorney did indicate that Frazer had tested
    positive for cocaine when he reported to the probation office
    in November 1992.

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    In the instant case, the government presented

    uncontradicted evidence that Frazer was, as a condition of

    bail, required to report for the sentencing hearing on

    December 7, 1992 and that he did not appear. Frazer himself

    stipulated to having been aware of the sentencing date.

    Moreover, evidence was presented that he made no effort,

    after the hearing date, to contact the court or the United

    States Marshals Office prior to his arrest in January.3 On

    this basis, the sentencing court found that "the elements of

    the offense of willfully failing to appear have occurred."

    The evidence supporting the finding was circumstantial.

    However, the court did not commit clear error when it

    inferred from this evidence that Frazer's absence from the

    sentencing hearing was willful. See e.g. Teta, 918 F.2d at
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    1332 (upholding finding of "willful" failure to appear where

    sentencing court found credible evidence that defendant knew

    he was to appear on date but did not).



    Frazer also asserts that the sentencing court erred in

    refusing to grant him a two level downward adjustment for


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    3. Frazer unavailingly seeks analogous support in United
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    States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1990), for his
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    assertion that mere failure to appear is insufficient to
    establish willfulness. Stroud found that mere flight in the
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    immediate aftermath of a crime is not obstruction of justice
    because it is "instinctual" and a "natural attempt to avoid
    apprehension." Id. at 508. Frazer's failure to report
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    either for sentencing on December 7 or during the next five
    weeks is clearly more conscious behavior.

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    having been a minor participant in the bank fraud scheme.

    He contends that, while the conspiracy to defraud the banks

    involved a complex scheme, including stealing checks from

    businesses, the acquisition of information on account holders

    and the production of false identification, his role in the

    scheme was limited to the cashing of checks. Moreover,

    Frazer notes that he was not the only "runner" in the

    conspiracy.4 According to Frazer, he was "less culpable

    than most other participants" in the scheme and hence

    entitled to the two point downward adjustment for having had

    a minor role. U.S.S.G. 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). We review

    role in the offense determinations only for clear error.

    United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 705-06 (1st Cir.
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    1992); United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 344 (1st Cir.
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    1992).

    Frazer bears the burden of establishing by a

    preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a

    downward adjustment for his role in the offense. United
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    States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).
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    Furthermore, the mere fact that a defendant is the least

    culpable among those charged does not entitle him to an

    adjustment for having had a minor role. United States v.
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    Daniel, 962 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 1992). Rather, the
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    4. Frazer did, however, cash more checks than any other
    runner in the scheme.

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    defendant must show that his conduct was "substantially less

    culpable than the average participant." U.S.S.G. 3B1.2,

    comment. (backg'd); Gregorio, 956 F.2d at 344.
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    In this case, the court found that Frazer's role in the

    offenses with which he was charged was "no less important and

    significant to the successful completion of this scheme than

    the other participants, with perhaps the exception of the

    organizers." In each instance he was the individual who

    entered the bank and cashed the check.5 The fact that the

    defendant may have had a lesser role in a larger criminal

    activity with which he was not charged is not relevant to any

    role in the offense adjustment. See Id. (appellant's focus
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    on wider fraud rather than the particular offense with which

    he was charged irrelevant to role in the offense adjustment);

    United States v. Cepeda, 907 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1990)
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    (even if defendant had a lesser involvement in the large

    conspiracy he is not entitled to role in the offense

    adjustment because his role in the offense of conviction was

    not "minor"). The court also found that Frazer may have

    contributed to the conspiracy through his involvement in the

    illegal obtaining of one of the check writing machines used

    by the conspirators. Given the deference owed to the

    sentencing court in factual determinations, we cannot say


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    5. Although the bank fraud conspiracy included other
    runners, Frazer was charged only with those instances of bank
    fraud in which he cashed the check.

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    that the court was clearly erroneous in determining that

    Frazer did not have a minor role in the charged conspiracy.

    See Gregorio, 956 F.2d at 344 (criminal conduct not minor
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    where it was "important" to the criminal enterprise charged);

    United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990)
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    (same).

    The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.
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