United States v. Zuleta ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    September 22, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 92-2430

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    NERIO ZULETA,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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    Nerio Zuleta on brief pro se.
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    Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, and Zechariah Chafee,
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    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


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    Per Curiam. Appellant Nerio Zuleta pleaded guilty
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    to two counts of an indictment charging him with possession

    with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and

    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or

    more of cocaine all in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) &

    (b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2. Appellant was sentenced to

    an 87-month term of imprisonment, a supervised release term

    of five years, a fine of $50,000 and was required to pay

    $5,799.60 -- the cost of his supervised release. On direct

    appeal, he challenged only a two-level enhancement to his

    base offense level for his role as a "supervisor" in the

    conspiracy. We affirmed his conviction in an unpublished

    opinion.

    Appellant then filed a motion, under 28 U.S.C.

    2255, to remit or reduce his fine, alleging that he was

    indigent and that prison officials would remove appellant

    from rehabilitative activities if he did not pay the fine.

    The district court denied the motion. On appeal, appellant

    first alleges that the district court failed to consider the

    factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3572(a) prior to making its

    determination that appellant had the financial ability to pay

    a fine. In addition, appellant argues that the court did not

    explicitly discuss or provide support for its imposition of

    the fine. Next, appellant argues that the provision

    requiring the court to impose a fine to pay the government



















    the cost of his supervised release is not authorized by the

    Sentencing Reform Act or the terms of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

    Rather, he argues, the Commission was granted the power only

    to study the question.
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    Because appellant failed to raise the claim

    concerning his fine on direct appeal, he faces a

    significantly higher hurdle to obtaining relief. That is,

    such nonconstitutional claims may not be presented for the

    first time in a 2255 motion unless the alleged errors

    amount to "``a fundamental defect which inherently results in

    a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Davis v. United States,
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    417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
    ____ _____________

    U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).

    1. The $50,000 fine.
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    Section 3572(a) lists the factors a court must

    consider in determining whether to impose a fine and the

    amount of the fine:

    (1) the defendant's income, earning
    capacity, and financial resources;

    (2) the burden that the fine will
    impose upon the defendant [or] any person
    who is financially dependent on the
    defendant . . . relative to the burden
    that alternative punishments wold impose;

    (3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon
    others as a result of the offense;

    (4) whether restitution is ordered or
    made and the amount of such restitution;




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    (5) the need to deprive the defendant
    of illegally obtained gains from the
    offenses. . . .
    18 U.S.C. 3572(a).

    Similarly, 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing

    Guidelines provides that "[t]he court shall impose a fine in

    all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is

    unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any

    fine." U.S.S.G. 5E1.2(a). The other factors listed in the

    Guidelines relevant to the setting of a fine include the need

    for the fine "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, . .

    . to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment

    and to afford adequate deterrence. . . ." Id. 5E1.2(d)(1).
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    We will not presume that the trial court failed to

    consider the pertinent factors contained in 3752. See
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    United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 953 F.2d 717, 719
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    (1st Cir. 1992) (construing predecessor statute -- 18 U.S.C.

    3622(a)). Nor is the district court required to make

    "specific oral or written findings" relating to the

    enumerated factors. See id. at 720; United States v.
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    Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 185 (5th Cir. 1991) (considering
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    3572(a)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992). Finally, the
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    burden is on appellant to establish his inability to pay a

    fine. See United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 722 (5th
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    Cir. 1991); United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th
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    Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989).
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    Turning to the merits of appellant's claims, we

    first note that the district court had before it financial

    information included in the Presentence Report (PSI). This

    information indicated that, as of November 30, 1990 (prior to

    his arrest), appellant had an income of $1,000 per month and

    expenses of $694 per month.1 Appellant points to another

    part of the PSI which states that he has no "significant

    assets." The court plainly considered this factor in its

    decision to impose a fine. At the sentencing hearing, the

    court stated:

    I recognize that the pre-sentence report
    indicates that you do not have
    significant assets but, frankly, it's
    difficult for me to understand or accept
    that someone who has been dealing in the
    amounts of cocaine that you have been
    involved with doesn't have those assets.
    That's a matter for you to take up, I
    suppose, with the Bureau of Prisons when
    the time comes.

    Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 30.

    We find that there was no defect in the sentencing

    process which resulted in a "complete miscarriage of

    justice." Indeed, the court acted well within its discretion

    in imposing the $50,000 fine, especially given appellant's

    role as a supervisor in the conspiracy and the need to make

    sure he does not retain any illegally obtained gains. The



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    1. In the financial statement submitted by appellant with
    his 2255 motion, he stated that prior to his arrest, he had
    worked in a factory for $800 per month.

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    fact that the court imposed a fine that is only a fraction of

    the maximum of $4,000,000 is further evidence that the court

    considered appellant's ability to pay in setting the fine.

    Finally, we do not agree with appellant that his

    current financial state should have precluded the imposition

    of any fine. The reference in 3572(a)(1) to "earning

    capacity" makes plain that appellant's future ability to pay

    is part of the equation. See Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 185-86 (a
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    defendant's indigency at the time the fine is ordered does

    not preclude imposition of a fine); Perez, 871 F.2d at 48
    _____

    (current assets do not determine whether defendant should be

    excused from paying a fine mandated by the Sentencing

    Guidelines). As we noted, supra, appellant was employed
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    prior to his arrest and had a steady income which exceeded

    his expenses. Should this prediction prove wrong and should

    the government seek to punish or imprison appellant for non-

    payment, there are administrative remedies to which he can

    turn. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 598
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    (1st Cir. 1990); Santiago v. United States, 889 F.2d 371,
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    373-74 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

    2. Cost of supervised release.
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    Section 5E1.2(i) provides that "the court shall

    impose an additional fine amount that is at least sufficient

    to pay the costs to the government of any imprisonment,

    probation, or supervised release ordered." We reject



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    appellant's claim that justice has obviously miscarried here

    because the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize this

    fine. Respectable authority holds to the contrary. See
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    United States v. Turner, No. 93-1148, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
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    17472 (7th Cir. July 14, 1993) (fine for cost of imprisonment

    authorized by Sentencing Reform Act); Hagmann, 950 F.2d at
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    186 (fine derived from fine table under 5E1.2(b) and the

    additional fine required under 5E1.2(i) both realize the

    goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)). Although

    appellant cites to a case in which the Court of Appeals for

    the Third Circuit held that the Act did not authorize the

    fines provided for in 5E1.2(i), see United States v.
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    Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1992), we do not agree
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    with the reasoning contained therein.

    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

    district court is affirmed.
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