Figueroa v. United States ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    March 22, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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    No. 93-2028

    ANGEL LUIS FIGUEROA,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Defendant, Appellee.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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    Angel Figueroa on brief pro se.
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    A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Dina Michael
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    Chaitowitz, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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    Per Curiam. Angel Luis Figueroa appeals pro se from the
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    denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set

    aside, or correct his sentence. In 1990, upon being

    convicted of both conspiring and attempting to possess with

    intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, Figueroa

    was sentenced to a prison term of 188 months. This court

    thereafter affirmed both his conviction and his sentence.

    United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446 (1st Cir. 1992),
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    cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1346 (1993). Figueroa now advances
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    a pair of challenges to his sentence, claiming that (1) the

    quantity of drugs for which he was held accountable was

    improperly inflated because of "sentencing entrapment" and

    other reasons, and (2) his base offense level was improperly

    enhanced by four levels because of his alleged leadership

    role. As a corollary complaint, he argues that his counsel

    was ineffective in failing to raise these issues earlier.

    Assuming arguendo that such contentions are cognizable in a
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    2255 proceeding, we find each of them unpersuasive and

    therefore affirm.

    As explained in greater detail in our earlier opinion,

    Figueroa and his confederates were apprehended as a result of

    a "reverse-sting" operation involving their attempted

    purchase of drugs from an informant for the Drug Enforcement

    Agency (Estaban Mendoza). See id. at 1450-51. During the
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    course of his negotiations with Mendoza, Figueroa discussed



















    purchasing anywhere from three to five kilograms of cocaine,

    explaining that his organization had been selling

    approximately $6,000 worth of the drug per day in "dime"

    bags. The parties settled upon an initial sale of two

    kilograms, with $30,000 being paid up-front and $10,000 to

    follow. The sum of $29,850 was in fact seized at the time of

    arrest. At sentencing, the court determined that Figueroa

    was responsible not only for the two kilograms involved in

    the attempted sale, but for an additional three kilograms as

    well. This latter figure was reached by extrapolating the

    approximate amount of cocaine distributed over the course of

    the conspiracy based on Figueroa's acknowledged sales of

    $6,000 per day.1 Figueroa now contends that it was error to

    hold him accountable for five kilograms for purposes of

    sentencing.

    The basis for this challenge is amorphous in nature. In

    his petition, Figueroa devotes considerable attention to the

    notion of "sentencing entrapment" (or, more properly,

    "sentencing factor manipulation"). Whatever the theoretical

    viability of such a doctrine, see, e.g., United States v.
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    Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
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    Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 262 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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    1. The indictment charged that the conspiracy occurred
    between December 24, 1989 and January 25, 1990. A DEA agent
    testified that one kilogram of cocaine would generate
    approximately $70,000 when distributed in "dime" bags. See
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    976 F.2d at 1461 n.19.

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    113 S. Ct. 220 (1992); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d
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    191, 194-97 (1st Cir. 1992) (all rejecting such a claim on

    basis of facts presented), the instant case provides no

    occasion to address it. Figueroa's claim in this regard is

    based on the misimpression that the additional three

    kilograms in question were those that he and Mendoza

    discussed for possible sale during their negotiations (beyond

    the two kilograms actually agreed upon). Instead, as

    mentioned, this figure reflected the quantity of drugs that

    Figueroa had admitted selling to others during the previous

    month. Figueroa specifically disclaims any suggestion that

    the two kilograms involved in the attempted sale were the

    subject of "manipulation." And any such argument would have

    faltered for the reasons recited in Brewster, 1 F.3d at 55.
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    In a related (if inconsistent) vein, Figueroa contends

    that the evidence was insufficient to hold him responsible

    for the three kilograms sold by his organization during the

    course of the conspiracy. We rejected the identical argument

    on direct appeal. Referring to (Angel) Figueroa and his

    brother Tomas, we stated:

    Tomas, as well as Angel, admitted that $6,000 worth
    of "dime" bags were being sold daily through the
    record shop during the alleged conspiracy.
    Although appellants characterize these statements
    as mere "puffery," the sentencing judge who heard
    the trial testimony was entitled to credit their
    admissions. The court permissibly extrapolated the
    approximate amount of cocaine distributed during
    the relevant period based on the sums of money
    admittedly received. There was no clear error in


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    the determination of the quantity of cocaine for
    which Angel and Tomas Figueroa were responsible.

    976 F.2d at 1460-61 (citations and footnotes omitted).

    Figueroa's challenge to the determination regarding his

    role in the offense is likewise unavailing. The district

    court held that he was "an organizer or leader" under

    U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) and thus was subject to a four-level

    enhancement. On appeal, Figueroa argues only that the

    evidence was insufficient to establish that he occupied a

    leadership role. To the contrary, as our earlier opinion

    amply demonstrates, see 976 F.2d at 1450-51, the district
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    court supportably found that he "directed ... all the

    activities of his co-conspirators" and that he was "the

    controlling participant in negotiating the amount [of cocaine

    to be purchased], the price, and the arrangements for

    delivery of the money to the confidential informant." App.

    44. "Role in the offense" determinations are subject to

    review only for clear error. See, e.g., United States v.
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    Ruiz-Del Valle, 8 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 1993). We find none
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    here.

    Finally, as each of Figueroa's central arguments proves

    wanting, his subsidiary allegations regarding ineffective

    assistance of counsel must also fail.

    Affirmed.
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