Moore v. Murphy ( 1995 )


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    [Appendix not attached to this copy of the opinion. Please
    contact Clerk's Office for copy of opinion with appendix.]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    _________________________

    No. 94-1974

    GREGORY MOORE,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    PAUL MURPHY,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    _________________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    _________________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

    Circuit Judges. ______________

    _________________________

    Jennifer Petersen, with whom Andrew Stockwell-Alpert __________________ _______________________
    and Joanne S. Forkner were on brief, for appellant. _________________
    Howard Friedman and Sarah Wunsch on brief for Civil ________________ ______________
    Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae.
    Thomas C. Tretter, Asst. Corporation Counsel, City of ___________________
    Boston, with whom Albert W. Wallis, Corporation Counsel, was on _________________
    brief, for appellee.

    _________________________

    February 1, 1995
    _________________________

















    SELYA, Circuit Judge. Appellant seeks to have us SELYA, Circuit Judge. ______________

    prescribe a remedy, yet denies us access to any authoritative

    information about the etiology of the patient's condition.

    Consequently, we cannot dispense the requested relief and,

    therefore, decline to disturb the district court's treatment of

    the case.

    I I

    During the evening of February 8, 1991, defendant-

    appellee Paul Murphy and his partner, Andrew Garvey, were working

    as undercover police detectives. They observed plaintiff-

    appellant Gregory Moore on the street near 2 Waverly Street, in

    the Roxbury section of Boston, Massachusetts. Believing Moore to

    be engaged in a narcotics transaction, the officers approached

    him. Violence erupted. Moore sustained injuries.1

    In due course, Moore sued the officers in federal

    district court for, inter alia, federal civil rights violations, _____ ____

    42 U.S.C. 1983 (count 1), state civil rights violations, Mass.

    Gen. L. ch. 12, 11I (MCRA) (count 2), and common law assault

    and battery (count 3). These three counts were tried to a jury.

    At the close of the evidence, the court instructed on the law and

    gave the jurors a verdict form (the Form) soliciting special

    findings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a). When the jury finished its ___

    ____________________

    1The parties offer markedly different versions of the
    critical events. Moore claims that Murphy placed him in a
    chokehold, from behind, without warning or cause. The officers
    claim that Moore, fearing arrest, attempted to swallow several
    packets of crack cocaine, and that a struggle ensued when they
    tried to prevent him from doing so.

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    deliberations, it tendered the completed Form to the court.2 On

    the Form, the jury found for both defendants on the section 1983

    claim; found that Murphy, not Garvey, had violated the MCRA, but

    that, in all events, no "harm" was "proximately caused" by

    Murphy's transgression; and found for both defendants on the

    common law claim. A few days later the district court entered

    judgment in favor of both defendants on all three counts.

    Moore moved for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), and

    to alter or amend the judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The

    district court denied the motions. This appeal followed.

    II II

    On appeal, Moore does not contest the jury's findings.

    Instead, he argues that, given those findings, the district court _____ _____ ________

    had an obligation to enter judgment in his favor, against Murphy,

    on count 2 of the complaint (for nominal damages). This argument

    depends on a synthesis of federal and state law, leading Moore to

    conclude that, once the jury found that Murphy violated the MCRA,

    Moore's entitlement to a favorable judgment vested, and the

    jury's subsequent finding that the violation caused no harm

    was relevant only to damages. Moore's argument in support of

    this thesis is intellectually interesting, but eludes meaningful

    appellate review. Hence, we cannot honor it.

    The mission of the appellate judiciary is neither to

    mull theoretical abstractions nor to practice clairvoyance.

    Rather, appellate judges fulfill their review function by
    ____________________

    2We reproduce the Form as Appendix A.

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    matching applicable principles of law to the discerned facts and

    circumstances of litigated cases. Where, as here, a party

    seeking appellate review fails to furnish the basic tools that

    the court needs to carry out its task, that party loses by

    default. In the succeeding sections, we expound upon this

    doctrine and demonstrate its applicability here.

    A A

    Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) directs parties seeking

    judicial review to procure and file "a transcript of such parts

    of the proceedings [below] not already on file" as is necessary

    to enable the court of appeals to place the parties' contentions

    into perspective.3 This rule imposes a duty upon an appellant

    "to print all of the evidence, good and bad, material to the

    point he wishes to raise." Chernack v. Radlo, 331 F.2d 170, 171 ________ _____

    (1st Cir. 1964). Should an appellant spurn this duty and drape

    an incomplete record around the court's neck, the court in its

    discretion either may scrutinize the merits of the case insofar

    as the record permits, or may dismiss the appeal if the absence

    of a full transcript thwarts intelligent review. See Fed. R. ___

    App. P. 3(a); United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 _____________ _____________________________

    F.2d 1112, 1113 (1st Cir. 1975). In this vein, we have held with

    a regularity bordering on the monotonous that, should the record

    provided on appeal prove to be so deficient as to preclude us
    ____________________

    3Rule 10 also describes alternate devices that may from time
    to time obviate the need for a trial transcript. See, e.g., Fed. ___ ____
    R. App. P. 10(d) (permitting use of an agreed statement of the
    record on appeal). Appellant did not employ any such surrogate
    here.

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    from reaching a reasoned determination on the merits, "it is the

    appellant who must bear the brunt of an insufficient record on

    appeal." Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1987); accord ____ _____ ______

    Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1559 n.5 _____________________ ____________

    (1st Cir. 1989); Valedon Martinez v. Hospital Presbiteriano de la ________________ ____________________________

    Comunidad, Inc., 806 F.2d 1128, 1135 (1st Cir. 1986); One Motor _______________ _________

    Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d at 1113. ___________________

    B B

    In prosecuting the instant appeal, Moore created just

    such a problem: he failed to provide this court with any part of

    the trial transcript. In the particular circumstances of this

    case, his omission leaves us no choice but to jettison his

    appeal. We explain briefly.

    Moore's appeal depends on the viability of his

    contention that causation is not an element of liability under

    the MCRA. However, the Form strongly suggests that the trial

    court told the jury the opposite; after all, the Form directed

    the jurors, if they answered either part of Question #3

    affirmatively (that is, if they found that one or both of the

    defendants "violate[d] Gregory Moore's state constitutional

    rights by threat, intimidation or coercion"), to "proceed to

    Question #4" (the inquiry into causation), and further directed

    the jurors to proceed to Question #9 (the inquiry into damages)

    only upon an affirmative answer to Questions #2, #4, #6, or #8

    (not upon an affirmative answer to Question #3). See infra ___ _____

    Appendix A. The judge's entry of a judgment in Murphy's favor on


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    count 2 suggests the same perceived linkage between a MCRA

    violation and some ensuing harm. Even if this insistence on

    proof of a causal connection were error in the abstract a

    matter on which we do not opine it would be reversible error

    only if properly preserved. And there is simply no way, without

    a more complete record, that we can make such a determination.

    Murphy asserts and, in the absence of a full record,

    we take as true that appellant did not make timely,

    appropriately specific objections to the district court's jury

    instructions or to the court's promulgation of the Form. These

    are important points, not mere technicalities.

    The Civil Rules declare that parties must object to the

    court's charge at a particular time and with reasonable

    specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. The failure to object to ___

    the instructions at the time, and in the manner, designated by

    Rule 51 is treated as a procedural default, with the result that

    the jury instructions, even if erroneous, become the law of that

    particular case. See La Amiga del Pueblo, Inc. v. Robles, 937 ___ __________________________ ______

    F.2d 689, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1991); Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., ______ ___________________

    847 F.2d 35, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1988); Murphy v. Dyer, 409 F.2d 747, ______ ____

    748 (10th Cir. 1969). Federal court practice imposes the same

    duty of diligence in regard to special verdict forms. "Silence

    after instructions, including instructions on the form of the

    verdict to be returned by the jury, typically constitutes a

    waiver of any objections." Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d ________________ _______

    448, 456 (1st Cir. 1992) (collecting cases).


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    To be sure, an appellate court may review an

    unpreserved error if the error is "plain." See, e.g., Poulin v. ___ ____ ______

    Greer, 18 F.3d 979, 982 (1st Cir. 1994). However, this doctrine _____

    is reserved for use in only the most egregious circumstances.

    See id. Normally, the appellant must show that the alleged ___ ___

    error seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the trial.

    See Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991); ___ _______ ______________

    United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st Cir.), cert. ______________ _______ _____

    denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987). ______

    The mistake that Moore attributes to the lower court in

    this case cannot by any stretch of the most vivid imagination

    vault the plain error hurdle.4 Given the unchallenged jury

    verdicts on counts 1 and 3, and the findings that underpin those

    verdicts, we see no manifest injustice in the district court's

    entry of judgment against the plaintiff on count 2.

    III III

    We need go no further.5 It is apparent that we cannot

    intelligently determine the merits of this appeal without a trial

    transcript. Since appellant bears the responsibility for this

    omission, he must bear the resultant onus. Cf. Hosea 8:7 ___

    (explaining that those who "sow the wind . . . shall reap the

    ____________________

    4Indeed, to the extent that Moore relies upon the plain
    error doctrine to extricate himself from his self-dug hole, he is
    at a decided disadvantage; lacking a trial transcript, an
    appellate court is unlikely to be able to determine the
    egregiousness of many types of errors. So it is here.

    5Murphy argues, inter alia, that, causation aside, the _____ ____
    jury's answers on the Form established only a putative violation
    of plaintiff's rights, not an interference with some right to
    which the MCRA pertains. We need not reach this somewhat
    convoluted argument, and, accordingly, we take no view of it.

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    whirlwind"). The judgment below is, therefore,



    Affirmed. Affirmed. ________



















































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