Morrissey v. Boston Five Cent ( 1995 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 94-2220

    WILLIAM P. MORRISSEY,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    THE BOSTON FIVE CENTS SAVINGS BANK, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge] ___________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Robert H. Quinn, with whom John P. Morrissey and Quinn & Morris ________________ __________________ ______________
    were on brief for appellant.
    Robert B. Gordon, with whom David M. Mandel and Ropes & Gray were ________________ _______________ ____________
    on brief for appellees.


    ____________________

    May 15, 1995
    ____________________


















    BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. ____________________

    William Morrissey, a twenty-year employee of defendant-

    appellee Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, F.S.B. ("the Bank"),

    was involuntarily retired from his position as Executive Vice

    President for Corporate Affairs on November 1, 1992,

    approximately one month after his sixty-fifth birthday, and

    approximately one week after he filed age discrimination

    claims against the Bank and its holding company, the Boston

    Five Bancorp, with the Massachusetts Commission Against

    Discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity

    Commission. It is undisputed that the Bank forced

    Morrissey to retire because of his age. The question before

    us is whether the Bank's action was lawful under a narrow

    exemption to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

    U.S.C. 621-34 ("ADEA"), which permits compulsory

    retirement, at age sixty-five and older, of certain employees

    who occupy "bona fide executive" or "high policymaking"

    positions for the two-year period immediately preceding

    retirement, if such employees are entitled upon retirement to

    an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit of at

    least $44,000. See 29 U.S.C. 631(c)(1). We answer this ___

    question in the affirmative, and therefore affirm the

    district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of

    the Bank.





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    I. Background I. Background __________

    On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view

    the facts and all inferences that may fairly be drawn from

    them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

    Coll v. PB Diagnostic Systems, Inc., No. 94-1680, slip op. at ____ ___________________________

    10-11 (1st Cir. March 30, 1995).

    The Bank hired Morrissey as a Vice President in

    June of 1972, and later promoted him to the position of

    Senior Vice President. In 1978 or 1979, the Bank's then

    Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), Robert Spiller, promoted

    Morrissey to Executive Vice President for Corporate Affairs.

    Morrissey continued to hold this position until the Bank

    forced him to retire, at which time he was the fifth highest

    paid employee at the Bank.

    In his capacity as Executive Vice President for

    Corporate Affairs, Morrissey reported directly to the CEO and

    was responsible for (i) monitoring state and federal

    regulations and advising the Bank with respect to the

    influence and effect of these regulations upon the business

    of the Bank, and recommending action where appropriate; (ii)

    developing and recommending merger and acquisition

    candidates; and (iii) developing sources of loan and deposit

    business for the Bank. In addition to these duties,

    Morrissey served as a member of the Asset and Liability

    Committee, and regularly attended the meetings of the Board



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    of Directors. He also attended the weekly meetings of the

    Bank's six most senior officers ("Senior Officers Group").

    In 1990, Robert Spiller retired and defendant

    Peter Blampied succeeded him as CEO. The Bank does not

    contest Morrissey's assertion that this event took place

    shortly before the statutory two-year period immediately

    prior to his involuntary retirement. By Morrissey's account,

    his role in the formulation of Bank policy was greatly

    diminished after Blampied took over as CEO. Morrissey

    contends, for example, that whereas under former CEO Spiller,

    the weekly meeting of the Senior Officers Group served as an

    opportunity for the officers to discuss and to participate in

    policymaking decisions, under CEO Blampied, this meeting

    ceased to serve the same policymaking function. Instead, all

    high policy decisions were made by the Board of Directors, or

    by a subset of senior officers that did not include

    Morrissey, which specifically excluded him from high policy

    discussions of important issues such as the Bank's distressed

    real estate holdings, its dealings with regulators, and its

    three-year strategic business plan. Morrissey also asserts

    that Blampied did not specifically solicit policy

    recommendations from him, and that, at his deposition,

    Blampied could recall specific comments by Morrissey with

    respect to only one policy matter.





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    On July 28, 1992, Blampied advised Morrissey that,

    in view of the fact that his sixty-fifth birthday was

    approaching, he should be thinking about retiring. Morrissey

    replied that he had no intention of retiring and that he

    could not afford to retire because he had to provide for his

    young family. Morrissey turned sixty-five on September 29,

    1992. On October 6, 1992, Blampied again told Morrissey

    that, because he was sixty-five, he should be thinking of

    retiring. Blampied also suggested the possibility of a year-

    to-year paid consulting arrangement. The following day,

    Morrissey received a memorandum outlining this arrangement,

    to which he responded later in the day. Morrissey told

    Blampied that he had not agreed to the proposed arrangement

    and asked whether Blampied had consulted with any attorneys

    on the matter. Blampied replied that he had "checked every

    base," that he was going to "play hardball," and that the

    proposed consulting arrangement was rescinded. At some point

    during this meeting, Morrissey asked for the opportunity to

    review the matter with attorneys and other consultants.

    On October 13, 1992, Morrissey received written

    notification that his retirement would be effective November

    1, 1992. At the time of this notification, Morrissey was

    entitled to receive $38,352 annually in nonforfeitable

    pension benefits under his Qualified Benefit Plan ("QBP"),

    plus $17,592 annually in pension benefits under his Executive



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    Supplemental Benefits Plan ("SERP"). The SERP benefits were

    forfeitable upon certain conditions specified in the

    contract. On October 26, 1992, Morrissey filed state and

    federal age discrimination claims with the Massachusetts

    Commission Against Discrimination and the Equal Employment

    Opportunity Commission. By his account, Morrissey gave the

    Bank written notice of these claims on his October 28, 1992

    application for pension benefits.

    On October 29, 1992, the Executive Committee of the

    Board of Directors held a special meeting via telephone

    conference, during which the Committee voted to waive

    irrevocably the forfeitability conditions of Morrissey's SERP

    as to $6,000 of the annual pension benefit to which he was

    entitled under that plan, as of November 1, 1992. The effect

    of the Committee's vote was to increase the total amount of

    Morrissey's nonforfeitable annual pension benefit from the

    $38,352 to which he was entitled under his QBP, to slightly

    more than the $44,000 minimum required under the ADEA

    exemption. Morrissey was informed of the increase in the

    amount of his nonforfeitable pension benefit on October 30,

    1992. On November 1, 1992, he was forced to retire.

    On August 20, 1993 (after having been granted

    permission to withdraw his administrative claims), Morrissey

    filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court against the

    Bank, the Boston Five Bancorp, the individual members of the



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    Executive Committee, and the administrators of the Bank's

    pension benefits plan.1 The complaint alleged age

    discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADEA, the

    Massachusetts Unlawful Discrimination Act, Gen. L. ch. 151B

    4, and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Under Law Act, Gen. L.

    ch. 93 102 and 103.2 The Bank removed the case to the

    United States District Court for the District of

    Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441, and subsequently

    filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, which the

    district court granted.

    II. Standard of Review II. Standard of Review __________________

    On appeal, we review a grant of summary judgment de __

    novo, evaluating the record in the light most favorable to ____

    the party opposing the motion, and drawing all reasonable

    inferences in that party's favor. Coll, No. 94-1680, slip ____

    op. at 10-11. Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the

    pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

    admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact


    ____________________

    1. The individuals named as defendants are John R. Furman,
    William F. McCall, Jr., Richard J. Testa, George R. Baldwin,
    Peter J. Blampied, Allan W. Fulkerson, Ernest E. Monrad,
    Webster Collins, and Karen Hammond.

    2. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B is the exclusive remedy under
    Massachusetts law for employment discrimination claims. See ___
    Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. _____ ________________________
    1994). Thus, we need not consider the ch. 93 claims.


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    and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

    matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

    "By its very terms, this standard provides that the

    mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the ____

    parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

    motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

    no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty _______ ________ ________ _______

    Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are ___________

    those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

    governing law." Id. at 248. See also Coll, No. 94-1680, ___ ___ ____ ____

    slip op. at 11. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine

    "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

    a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "If the evidence is ___

    merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary

    judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 ________

    (internal citations omitted).

    III. Discussion III. Discussion __________

    Morrissey raises three issues on appeal. First, he

    argues that during the last two years of his employment with

    the Bank, he was not, in fact, a high policymaker within the

    meaning of the ADEA exemption, and that the district court

    erred by failing to apply a functional test to determine his

    status. Second, he contends that the district court erred in

    interpreting the pension benefit prong of the exemption so as

    to permit an employer to increase the amount of an employee's



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    nonforfeitable pension benefit after the alleged act of

    discrimination in order to meet the statutory minimum amount.

    Finally, Morrissey argues that the district court's grant of

    summary judgment was improper because the supplemental

    affidavits he submitted in support of his Fed. R. Civ. P.

    56(f) ("Rule 56(f)") motion demonstrated a genuine issue of

    material fact. Alternatively, he argues that, in view of

    these affidavits, the district court should have exercised

    its discretion under Rule 56(f) to defer judgment until he

    had an opportunity to depose the affiants. We address these

    issues in turn.

    A. The Bona Fide Executive or High Policymaker Exemption A. The Bona Fide Executive or High Policymaker Exemption _____________________________________________________

    The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to

    "discriminate against any individual with respect to his

    compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

    because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1).3

    The prohibition applies only to individuals who are at least

    forty years of age. 29 U.S.C. 631(a). The ADEA provides

    the following narrow exemption from this prohibition:

    Nothing in this chapter shall be
    construed to prohibit compulsory
    retirement of any employee who has
    attained 65 years of age and who, for the
    2-year period immediately before
    retirement, is employed in a bona fide
    executive or a high policymaking

    ____________________

    3. Because Massachusetts age discrimination law tracks
    federal law in all relevant respects, see Mass. Gen. L. ch. ___
    151B 4(1B), we will confine our discussion to federal law.

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    position, if such employee is entitled to
    an immediate nonforfeitable annual
    retirement benefit from a pension,
    profit-sharing, savings, or deferred
    compensation plan, or any combination of
    such plans, of the employer of such
    employee, which equals, in the aggregate,
    at least $44,000.

    29 U.S.C. 631(c)(1).

    The parties agree that Morrissey was not a "bona

    fide executive" under the ADEA; the dispute concerns whether

    he was a "high policymaker." The ADEA itself does not define

    the term "high policymaking position," and few published

    opinions address the exemption. We find guidance, however,

    in the EEOC interpretive regulations set forth in 29 C.F.R.

    1625.12 (1994).

    Section 1625.12(e) defines high policymakers as

    "``certain top level employees who are not "bona fide

    executives,"'" and as "``individuals who have little or no

    line authority but whose position and responsibility are such

    that they play a significant role in the development of

    corporate policy and effectively recommend the implementation

    thereof.'" 29 C.F.R. 1625.12(e) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep.

    No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978)). For example, the

    chief economist or chief research scientist of a corporation

    would likely be a high policymaker:

    His duties would be primarily
    intellectual as opposed to executive or
    managerial. His responsibility would be
    to evaluate significant economic or
    scientific trends and issues, to develop


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    and recommend policy direction to the top
    executive officers of the corporation,
    and he would have a significant impact on
    the ultimate decision on such policies by
    virtue of his expertise and direct access
    to the decisionmakers. Such an employee
    would meet the definition of a ``high
    policymaking' employee.

    Id. ___

    As to the scope of the exemption, 1625.12(b) of

    the regulations admonishes that it should be construed

    narrowly, and that "the burden is on the one seeking to

    invoke the exemption to show that every element has been

    clearly and unmistakably met."

    Morrissey does not dispute that, as Executive Vice

    President for Corporate Affairs, he held the title of a high

    policymaker. Indeed, he concedes that under former CEO

    Spiller, he was a high policymaker. Instead, he argues that

    the district court failed to apply the proper standard in its

    analysis and overlooked genuine issues of material fact.

    Morrissey's argument rests upon two premises, one legal and

    one factual. The legal premise is that the law requires that

    his status as a high policymaker be determined, not on the

    basis of what he calls the "appearances" or "trappings" of

    his position -- i.e., title, salary, access to decisionmakers

    -- but on the basis of his effectiveness as a policymaker, as

    judged by his actual impact on Bank policy and

    decisionmaking. The factual premise is that, although he may

    have been a high policymaker under former CEO Spiller, and


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    while he continued to hold the same title until the Bank

    forced him to retire, he no longer functioned as a true high

    policymaker during the two-year statutory period, with

    Blampied as CEO.

    We find that, even assuming arguendo the truth of ________

    Morrissey's legal premise and applying the effectiveness test

    he urges, the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that he

    was a high policymaker during the relevant time period.

    Significantly, Morrissey does not dispute the following: (i)

    He reported directly to the CEO and had direct access to the

    Bank's decisionmakers. (ii) He attended the weekly meetings

    of the Senior Officers Group. (iii) He alone was responsible

    for monitoring state and federal legislative and regulatory

    developments, and in that capacity recommended policies to

    ensure that the Bank remained in compliance with them. (iv)

    He worked closely with state legislators on legislation that

    was important to the savings bank industry, and that had a

    substantial impact on the welfare of the Bank. (v) He was

    responsible for monitoring and coordinating important tax

    litigation involving the Bank, and made recommendations

    regarding the choice of legal counsel to handle it. (vi) The

    Bank acted upon Morrissey's strong recommendation that it

    lower the interest rate on its passbook savings accounts.

    (vii) He recommended that the Bank acquire the First American





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    Bank. (viii) He was responsible for the sale of the Bank's

    deposits in a branch office.

    Even assuming that a high policymaker within the

    meaning of the ADEA must function at some minimum level of

    effectiveness, Morrissey was more than effective enough to

    make precise line-drawing unnecessary here. As the district

    court stated:

    Morrissey had direct access to the top
    decisionmakers, he was responsible for
    evaluating significant legislative and
    regulatory trends and issues and working
    with legislators on these issues, and he
    recommended policy on acquisitions and
    mergers, capitalization, and other areas
    of importance to the Bank. If
    Morrissey's position, the fifth highest
    in the Bank, were not to qualify as a
    high policymaking position, it would be
    difficult to find a position that did.

    Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 866 F. _________ _____________________________________

    Supp. 643, 647 (D. Mass. 1994).

    Given our conclusion, based on the undisputed

    facts, that Morrissey was a high policymaker during the

    statutory two-year period, we need not dwell on his argument

    that the district court failed to apply the "functional

    analysis" set forth in Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 __________ ___________________

    F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. _____

    1984) (concluding that the test Congress intended is "one of

    function," and rejecting the argument that plaintiff's high

    salary and title as chief labor counsel automatically brought

    him within the ADEA exemption). We note, however, that the


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    court in Whittlesey anticipated and rejected Morrissey's __________

    attempt to turn

















































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    the functional test into a test of policymaking

    effectiveness: _____________

    I would be inclined to agree that if the
    organizational structure of the
    enterprise makes clear that the position
    in question has bona fide executive rank
    or serves a high policymaking function,
    courts probably should not allow the
    occupant to disavow the attributes of his
    position by seeking to prove, for
    example, that no one paid attention to
    his policy recommendations or followed
    his executive orders. But such
    considerations are not involved in this
    dispute.

    Id. at 1328. See also Colby v. Graniteville Co., 635 F. ___ ___ ____ _____ ________________

    Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Plaintiff's attempt to

    diminish the importance of his duties as a bona fide

    executive not only flies in the face of the undisputed facts,

    but also common sense."). Moreover, as the district court

    below stated, "[i]t is unlikely that Congress intended, in

    amending the ADEA, to allow compulsory retirement for only

    the most effective movers and shakers, while prohibiting such

    retirement for high level employees who have less impact,

    despite their significant responsibilities." Morrissey, 866 _________

    F. Supp. at 648.

    It follows from this analysis that any remaining

    facts that truly are in dispute are not material. Anderson, ________

    477 U.S. at 247-48.

    B. The Pension Benefit Prong of the High Policymaker B. The Pension Benefit Prong of the High Policymaker _________________________________________________
    Exemption Exemption _________




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    The ADEA exemption applies only "if [the high

    policymaker] is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable

    annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing,

    savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of

    such plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals,

    in the aggregate, at least $44,000." 29 U.S.C. 631(c)(1).

    The Bank contends that this requirement has been satisfied

    because, as of the first day of his retirement, Morrissey was

    immediately entitled to receive slightly more than the

    statutory minimum nonforfeitable annual benefit through a

    combination of his QBP benefit and the nonforfeitable portion

    of his SERP benefit. Morrissey argues that the requirement

    has not been met because the law forbids "last-minute

    manipulations of the pension benefit to bring an employee

    within the exemption." The district court's analysis of the

    intended function of the pension benefit provision compels us

    to agree with the Bank.

    The district court considered two possible

    interpretations of the pension benefit prong. Under one

    interpretation, the exemption would apply to employees who

    qualify as high policymakers "provided that these employees _____________

    receive an adequate pension." Morrissey, 866 F. Supp. at _________

    649. This view holds that the pension benefit prong is not

    "part of the test to determine if an employee can be retired, __

    but rather [i]s simply a requirement imposed on the employer



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    to pay out $44,000 annually in benefits for every high

    policymaker compelled to retire." Id. Under the second ___

    interpretation, both the job function and pension benefit ____

    prongs of the exemption comprise the test to determine

    whether compulsory retirement is permitted. Id. ___

    We think the first interpretation is more faithful

    to the statute. After all, Congress did not impose the same

    two-year minimum on both prongs of the exemption. By the

    district court's analysis, the exemption contains two

    distinct temporal restrictions, one of which applies to the

    high policymaker prong, and the other of which applies to the

    pension benefit prong:

    On the one hand, Congress prevented
    manipulation of the high policymaker
    prong of the exemption by requiring that
    high policymakers serve for two years ___ _____
    before the exemption applies; thus,
    promotions followed by quick retirement
    are not permissible. On the other hand,
    more modest time restrictions attach to
    the pension funds prong: Congress merely
    required that an employee be entitled to
    an immediate benefit of $44,000 annually _________
    upon retirement.

    Id. ___

    Had Congress meant for both prongs to be subject to

    the two-year minimum, it presumably would have limited the

    exemption to the employee who "for the 2-year period

    immediately before retirement, is employed in a . . . high

    policymaking position, [and] . . . is entitled to an ___

    immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit . . . . "


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    That, however, is not what Congress wrote. Under the ADEA,

    the high policymaker who is compelled to retire need only be

    entitled to the statutory minimum amount in nonforfeitable

    annual pension benefits immediately upon retirement.

    In sum, we find the district court's analysis to be

    persuasive and consistent with what the plain language of the

    exemption would seem to require.4

    C. The Rule 56(f) Motion C. The Rule 56(f) Motion _____________________

    In opposition to the Bank's motion for summary

    judgment, Morrissey submitted a Rule 56(f) affidavit, urging

    that summary judgment be denied or, alternatively, deferred

    on the ground that he had not had an opportunity to engage in

    ____________________

    4. Our reading of the exemption forecloses Morrissey's other
    argument, that both prongs of the exemption must be satisfied
    at least as of the date the employee receives notice of his
    involuntary retirement. Morrissey characterizes the date of
    notice of retirement as the time of the act of
    discrimination. As we construe the statute, as long as the
    employee is entitled to the statutory minimum benefit as of
    the day of his involuntary retirement, and as long as the
    employee is otherwise within the exemption, the act of
    compelling the high policymaking employee to retire does not
    constitute an act of discrimination.
    It also forecloses his argument that the Bank's
    modification of his benefits should be viewed as
    "manipulation." In support of this argument, Morrissey urges
    the case of Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322 ______ _____________________
    (D.C. Cir. 1991). As the district court noted, Passer is ______
    distinguishable from the case before us because it involved
    "a material dispute of fact as to whether the employee was
    ``genuinely entitled by the terms of the governing pension ____________________________________________________________
    plan to at least $44,000 in annual retirement income.'" ____
    Morrissey, 866 F. Supp. at 650 (quoting Passer, 935 F.2d at _________ ______
    330) (emphasis added). The "manipulation" in that case was a
    matter of interpretive and accounting legerdemain. Here,
    there is no question that Morrissey was genuinely entitled to
    at least this amount by the terms of his plan as amended.

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    "meaningful discovery."5 At the summary judgment hearing,

    the court responded to the Rule 56(f) affidavit by ordering

    the Bank to produce documents, including minutes of Board of

    Directors meetings that Morrissey had requested. The court

    also ordered Morrissey to file a more specific Rule 56(f)

    affidavit. Morrissey responded by filing a supplemental

    memorandum and affidavits by four individuals,6 which he

    contends clearly demonstrated that he was removed from a high

    policymaking position when Blampied became CEO. The

    memorandum also requested permission to depose these

    individuals. On appeal, Morrissey contends that, because

    these affidavits demonstrated the existence of a genuine

    dispute of material fact, the district court should have


    ____________________

    5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides as follows:

    Should it appear from the affidavits of a
    party opposing the motion [for summary
    judgment] that the party cannot for
    reasons stated present by affidavit facts
    essential to justify the party's
    opposition, the court may refuse the
    application for judgment or may order a
    continuance to permit affidavits to be
    obtained or depositions to be taken or
    discovery to be had or may make such
    other order as is just.


    6. The affiants were Vernon L. Blodgett, Senior Vice
    President and Treasurer of the Boston Five Bancorp from 1990-
    1993; J. Barbara Magnuson, Corporate Secretary at the Bank
    from 1986-1993; Melissa J. Howard, Vice President for
    Marketing from 1987-1993; and Robert Spiller, President and
    CEO of the Boston Five and the Boston Five Bancorp from 1970-
    1990.

    -19- 19













    denied or deferred summary judgment to allow for further

    discovery under Rule 56(f).

    Rule 56(f) is the means by which a party opposing

    summary judgment may obtain a denial or deferral of judgment

    upon a demonstration of "an authentic need for, and an

    entitlement to, an additional interval in which to marshal

    facts essential to mount an opposition." Resolution Trust ________________

    Co. v. North Bridge Assocs., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. ___ _____________________

    1994). Although the rule is "intended to safeguard against

    judges swinging the summary judgment axe too hastily," id., a ___

    party who seeks to invoke the rule must (i) make an

    authoritative and timely proffer; (ii) show good cause for

    the failure to have discovered these essential facts sooner;

    (iii) present a plausible basis for the party's belief that

    facts exist that would likely suffice to raise a genuine and

    material issue; and (iv) show that the facts are discoverable

    within a reasonable amount of time. Id. See also Paterson- ___ ___ ____ _________

    Leitch v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d ______ _______________________________________

    985, 988 (1st Cir. 1988). We review a district court's

    denial of a Rule 56(f) motion only for abuse of discretion.

    Resolution Trust Co., 22 F.3d at 1203. ____________________

    The supplemental affidavits support the argument

    that, under CEO Blampied, the Bank's high policymaking group

    was no longer the Senior Officers Group, as it had been under

    CEO Spiller, but rather comprised a subset of senior officers



    -20- 20













    that did not include Morrissey. These affidavits do not

    address any of the undisputed facts set forth supra that _____

    unequivocally establish that Morrissey was a high

    policymaker. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

    its discretion by refusing to deny or defer summary judgment

    on the basis of these affidavits.

    IV. Conclusion IV. Conclusion __________

    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district we affirm the district _______________________

    court's order granting summary judgment for the Bank. Costs court's order granting summary judgment for the Bank. Costs _____________________________________________________ _____

    awarded to defendants. awarded to defendants. ______________________

































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