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USCA1 Opinion
April 12, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 95-2130
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
HUMBERTO PRADA CORDERO,
Defendant, Appellant.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[HON. HECTOR M. LAFFITTE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE] ___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
_________________________
Ramon Garcia on brief for appellant. ____________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jos A. Quiles- _____________ _________________
Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Warren V zquez, ________ _______________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the United States.
_________________________
_________________________
Per Curiam. A petit jury found defendant-appellant Per Curiam. ___________
Humberto Prada Cordero (Prada) guilty, in absentia,1 of aiding __ ________
and abetting the possession, with intent to deliver, of just
under one kilogram of cocaine. The district court imposed a
lengthy incarcerative sentence. Prada appeals. We summarily
affirm.
I I
A criminal defendant who essays a claim of evidentiary
insufficiency must scramble across rocky terrain. As long as the
proof presented, taken in the light most amiable to the verdict,
suffices to allow a rational jury to find each essential element
of the offense of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, the claim
fails. See United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.), ___ _____________ ______
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 522 (1995); United States v. Gifford, 17 _____ ______ _____________ _______
F.3d 462, 467 (1st Cir. 1994). In other words, if the aggregate
evidence, examined in the required light, justifies a judgment of
conviction, "it need not rule out other hypotheses more congenial
to a finding of innocence." Gifford, 17 F.3d at 467. _______
In applying these criteria, all the evidence, direct
and circumstantial, must be viewed from the government's
perspective, and the viewer must credit all reasonable inferences
consistent with the verdict. See United States v. Taylor, 54 ___ _____________ ______
F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d _____________ _______
703, 706 (1st Cir. 1994). Phrased another way, "the trial judge
____________________
1The appellant fled midway through his trial. The trial
continued in his absence. On appeal, he does not challenge the
district court's decision to proceed.
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must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and credibility questions
in the prosecution's favor; and, moreover, as among competing
inferences, two or more of which are plausible, the judge must
choose the inference that best fits the prosecution's theory of
guilt." Olbres, 61 F.3d at 970. ______
The appellant's insufficiency claim cannot pass muster
under these straightforward rules. An overview of the crime is
set forth in United States v. Rullan-Rivera, 60 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. _____________ _____________
1995), in which we affirmed the conviction of one of Prada's
codefendants. The record on appeal makes pellucid that the
appellant, at a bare minimum, recruited Erasto Miranda-Rodriguez
(Miranda) as a courier, and determined the amount to be paid to
this somewhat reluctant dragon for his services in the smuggle.
All incoming calls from Miranda were routed to Prada and, when
the day arrived on which the cocaine was to be transported to the
mainland, Prada personally delivered it to Miranda, urged him on,
and accompanied him to the airport. This, and other, evidence,
if credited by the jury as it plainly was left no reasonable
doubt but that the appellant associated himself with the overall
venture, participated in it as an enterprise he wished to bring
to fruition, and endeavored by his actions to make it succeed.
No more is exigible to sustain a conviction for aiding and
abetting. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 ___ _____________ _____________
(1949); see also 18 U.S.C. 2. ___ ____
II II
The appellant also challenges the district court's
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calculation of the guideline sentencing range (GSR) in two
respects. Both sorties are unavailing.
1. The appellant claims that he was not a principal
participant in the offense of conviction, and that the lower
court erred in designating him as a "manager" or "supervisor" and
increasing his offense level accordingly. See U.S.S.G. ___
3B1.1(c). We discern no error.
Absent a mistake of law and we see none here we
review a district court's factual findings concerning a
defendant's role in the offense for clear error. See United ___ ______
States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1991); United ______ _______ ______
States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990). Although ______ ______
this is not an insurmountable barrier, it is nevertheless a
daunting one. Debates over a defendant's role in the offense are
fact-based and, therefore, "will almost always be won or lost in
the district court." United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 _____________ ________
(1st Cir. 1995). There is no justification for a different
result here.
We will not belabor the obvious. See, e.g., United ___ ____ ______
States v. Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2d 474, 477 (1st Cir. 1989) ______ ___________
(warning, in a sentencing appeal, that an appellate court should
not "wast[e] overtaxed judicial resources razing castles in the
air"). In determining whether the government satisfied its
burden of proving the appellant's liability for a two level role-
in-the-offense adjustment, the sentencing court was not obligated
to accept the appellant's self-interested account of his
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involvement as a mere courier. See United States v. Paz-Uribe, ___ _____________ _________
891 F.2d 396, 399 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990). _____ ______
The record strongly suggests that, in this case, the appellant
was Miranda's immediate supervisor: he persuaded him to
undertake the journey, authorized his compensation, brought him
the contraband, urged him to go forward, accompanied him to the
airport, and, presumably based on the appellant's own (nearly
identical) itinerary and tickets planned personally to oversee
the contraband's safe arrival.2 These facts adequately support
the district court's assessment of the appellant's role in the
offense. See, e.g., Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 227; United States v. ___ ____ _______ ______________
Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 48-49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 ______________ _____ ______
U.S. 862 (1989).
2. The appellant also assails the district court for
refusing to grant a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. See U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. This is merely sound and ___
fury, signifying little. The appellant steadfastly denied his
guilt, fled in mid-trial when matters did not go well, and
continued to minimize his involvement in the affair up to (and
including) the time of sentencing. Thus, the district court had
a plausible basis for concluding that the appellant had not
forthrightly accepted responsibility.
We need go no further. As we wrote on an earlier
____________________
2The appellant and Miranda were both scheduled to take Delta
Flight No. 189 from Carolina, Puerto Rico, to Atlanta, Georgia.
Their tickets had been purchased simultaneously at the same
travel agency.
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occasion, "[t]he guidelines do not require a sentencing judge to
play the ostrich, burying his head in the sand, struthiously
accepting every allocution at face value, and ignoring the stark
reality of events." United States v. Royer, 895 F.2d 28, 30 (1st _____________ _____
Cir. 1990). The discount for acceptance of responsibility is not
automatic; achieving it "necessitates candor and authentic
remorse not merely a pat recital of the vocabulary of
contrition." Id. The district court's finding that the ___
appellant did not meet this standard easily survives clear-error
review.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R.27.1. Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R.27.1. ______________________________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 95-2130
Filed Date： 4/12/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015