Knight v. INS ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    February 17, 1995
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT







    ____________________


    No. 94-1651



    DONOVAN ALBERT KNIGHT, A/K/A PAUL KNIGHT,

    Petitioner,

    v.

    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

    Respondent.

    ____________________


    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Paul Knight on brief pro se. ___________
    Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Francesco Isgro and _______________ _______________
    Donald E. Keener, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, _________________
    Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.


    ____________________


    ____________________















































































    Per Curiam. The instant pro se petition for review, in ___________

    which petitioner seeks to challenge a decision of the Board

    of Immigration Appeals upholding his order of deportation,

    falters on procedural grounds. In 1992, an Immigration Judge

    found that petitioner, having been convicted of two crimes

    involving moral turpitude, was deportable under 8 U.S.C.

    1251(a)(2) and was undeserving of discretionary relief under

    8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld

    this ruling in a decision dated September 21, 1993.

    Petitioner failed to seek review in this court within 90

    days, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(1). Instead, in

    March 1994, he filed a motion to reopen with the Board,

    claiming that the decision had not been delivered to him in

    prison because its mailing label had omitted the alias ("Paul

    Knight") under which he was incarcerated. The Board denied

    the motion to reopen, and petitioner filed a timely petition

    for review. In his appellate brief, he argues solely that

    the Board's September 1993 decision was in error.

    We lack jurisdiction to review the Board's 1993 decision

    because of petitioner's failure to seek timely review

    thereof. See, e.g., Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. ___ ____ ______ ___

    1992) (compliance with statutory filing period is

    jurisdictional prerequisite); Pimental-Romero v. INS, 952 _______________ ___

    F.2d 564, 564 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). As such, the only

    matter open for review is the propriety of the Board's



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    decision not to reopen the case. Petitioner has waived this

    issue, however, by failing to advance any argument with

    regard thereto in his appellate brief. See, e.g., Lareau v. ___ ____ ______

    Page, 39 F.3d 384, 390 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); Charles v. Rice, ____ _______ ____

    28 F.3d 1312, 1320 (1st Cir. 1994).

    We add that the two Board decisions appear fully

    supportable in any event. Its conclusion that petitioner was

    responsible for any confusion as to the name under which he

    received mail was well within its discretion. See, e.g., INS ___ ____ ___

    v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 725 (1992) (denial of motion to _______

    reopen subject to review under abuse of discretion standard).

    Its determination that petitioner's 1983 conviction was

    "final" for immigration purposes appears unexceptionable.

    See, e.g., Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th ___ ____ ________________ ___

    Cir. 1981) (a conviction is final even though "subject to

    collateral attack") (cited in White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479 _____ ___

    (1st Cir. 1994)). And its finding that petitioner's 1977

    conviction was established by clear, unequivocal and

    convincing evidence appears warranted on the facts presented.

    The petition for review is denied. _________________________________













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