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USCA1 Opinion
January 18, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1543
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MONTERREY, INC.,
Defendants, Appellants.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
John M. Garcia with whom Garcia & Fernandez was on brief for _______________ ___________________
appellants.
David A. Felt, Counsel, with whom Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior _____________ ______________________
Counsel, Ann S. Duross, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Deposit ______________
Insurance Corporation, and Gustavo A. Gelpi and Feldstein, Gelpi & _________________ ___________________
Gotay were on brief for appellee. _____
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Having heard oral argument, and read __________
the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of
the district court. We see no need to add substantially to
the rationale in the district court's opinion and order. See ___
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Monterrey, Inc., 847 F. Supp. ___________________________ _______________
997 (D.P.R. 1994).
While, on appeal, appellants still contest and
struggle to overcome the burden of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc. _________________________
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), the district court's analysis ____
of that issue is plainly correct. See also FDIC v. Caporale, ________ ____ ________
931 F.2d 1 91st Cir. 1991). We find nothing convincing in
appellants' arguments based on the purported lack of
consideration to Monterrey. Monterrey was not incorporated
at the relevant time, and lack of consideration is unavailing
for other reasons set out by appellee.
Nor, viewing the summary judgment materials in a
light most favorable to plaintiff, do we find anything that
could overcome the presumption of liability of the conjugal
partnership. Mr. Pou's alleged reservations on this score,
supposedly made verbally to agents of the failed bank, could
not accomplish this for present purposes. While Mrs. Pou did
not sign the note, the conjugal partnership was liable for
the debts and obligations of either of its members. As one
partner, Mrs. Pou stood to benefit from use of the loan
proceeds to reduce her husband's debt unless it could be
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demonstrated, for some reason, that that particular debt was
beyond the joint and several liability of the partnership.
Evidence showing this is lacking. See FDIC v. Perez Perez, ___ ____ ___________
637 F. Supp. 358 (D.P.R. 1986); WRC Properties, Inc. v. ______________________
Santana, 16 Official Translations of the Supreme Court of _______
P.R. 160 (1985).
Nor is there reason to treat the Mi Tacita stock,
although registered to Mr. Pou, as beyond the purview of the
conjugal partnership. No reason is suggested that the stock
should be deemed to belong to Mr. Pou exclusively, rather
than forming part of the pool of assets within the conjugal
partnership and belonging to both spouses. If so, the use of
loan proceeds to pay Mi Tacita's debt and to whatever extent,
enhance the value of its stock, benefited both partners, not
just Mr. Pou alone.
We have considered appellants' other arguments and
are satisfied that the judgment below was correctly rendered.
Affirmed. Costs for appellee. ________
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Document Info
Docket Number: 94-1543
Filed Date: 1/18/1995
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/21/2015