FDIC v. Monterrey, Inc. ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    January 18, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________

    No. 94-1543

    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    MONTERREY, INC.,

    Defendants, Appellants.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    John M. Garcia with whom Garcia & Fernandez was on brief for _______________ ___________________
    appellants.
    David A. Felt, Counsel, with whom Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior _____________ ______________________
    Counsel, Ann S. Duross, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Deposit ______________
    Insurance Corporation, and Gustavo A. Gelpi and Feldstein, Gelpi & _________________ ___________________
    Gotay were on brief for appellee. _____

    ____________________


    ____________________
















    Per Curiam. Having heard oral argument, and read __________

    the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of

    the district court. We see no need to add substantially to

    the rationale in the district court's opinion and order. See ___

    Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Monterrey, Inc., 847 F. Supp. ___________________________ _______________

    997 (D.P.R. 1994).

    While, on appeal, appellants still contest and

    struggle to overcome the burden of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc. _________________________

    v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), the district court's analysis ____

    of that issue is plainly correct. See also FDIC v. Caporale, ________ ____ ________

    931 F.2d 1 91st Cir. 1991). We find nothing convincing in

    appellants' arguments based on the purported lack of

    consideration to Monterrey. Monterrey was not incorporated

    at the relevant time, and lack of consideration is unavailing

    for other reasons set out by appellee.

    Nor, viewing the summary judgment materials in a

    light most favorable to plaintiff, do we find anything that

    could overcome the presumption of liability of the conjugal

    partnership. Mr. Pou's alleged reservations on this score,

    supposedly made verbally to agents of the failed bank, could

    not accomplish this for present purposes. While Mrs. Pou did

    not sign the note, the conjugal partnership was liable for

    the debts and obligations of either of its members. As one

    partner, Mrs. Pou stood to benefit from use of the loan

    proceeds to reduce her husband's debt unless it could be



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    demonstrated, for some reason, that that particular debt was

    beyond the joint and several liability of the partnership.

    Evidence showing this is lacking. See FDIC v. Perez Perez, ___ ____ ___________

    637 F. Supp. 358 (D.P.R. 1986); WRC Properties, Inc. v. ______________________

    Santana, 16 Official Translations of the Supreme Court of _______

    P.R. 160 (1985).

    Nor is there reason to treat the Mi Tacita stock,

    although registered to Mr. Pou, as beyond the purview of the

    conjugal partnership. No reason is suggested that the stock

    should be deemed to belong to Mr. Pou exclusively, rather

    than forming part of the pool of assets within the conjugal

    partnership and belonging to both spouses. If so, the use of

    loan proceeds to pay Mi Tacita's debt and to whatever extent,

    enhance the value of its stock, benefited both partners, not

    just Mr. Pou alone.

    We have considered appellants' other arguments and

    are satisfied that the judgment below was correctly rendered.

    Affirmed. Costs for appellee. ________

















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Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1543

Filed Date: 1/18/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015