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USCA1 Opinion
January 17, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1519
KAVIN CORNERS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PAUL SACCOCIA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Kavin Corners on brief pro se. _____________
David J. Gentile on brief for appellees. ________________
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. We affirm the judgment substantially for __________
the reasons recited in the magistrate-judge's comprehensive
report (as modified in part by the district court), adding
only the following observations.
Plaintiff insists that the lower court erred in invoking
the doctrine of qualified immunity. In order to overcome
such a defense, plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating
that the law regarding a prison disciplinary board's reliance
on information from a confidential informant was "clearly
established" by May 1991. See, e.g., Horta v. Sullivan, 4 ___ ____ _____ ________
F.3d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 1993). Yet the sole law to which
plaintiff has referred in this regard is that contained in
the so-called "Morris Rules"--a set of procedures governing
prison administration first adopted in 1972 as part of a
consent decree and later promulgated as state law. See, ___
e.g., Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23, 26-27 (1st Cir. ____ ____ __________
1991).1
While the Morris Rules were designed to implement
various constitutional protections, not every violation of
those rules results in a claim of constitutional dimension.
See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 509 F.2d 1358, 1362 (1st Cir. ___ ____ ______ _________
1975) (noting that Morris Rules embody both "what is ...
constitutionally necessary and what is not"); Nicholson v. _________
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1. The current version of the rules is reproduced in Morris ______
v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149, 161-74 (D.R.I. 1980). _________
Moran, 835 F. Supp. 692, 697 n.18 (D.R.I. 1993); see also _____ _________
DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Not __________ _____
every breach of [the Morris Rules] will give rise to an
Eighth Amendment claim."); cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. ___ _____ _______
183, 194 (1984) ("Officials sued for constitutional
violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely
because their conduct violates some statutory or
administrative provision.") (footnote omitted).2
Plaintiff's reliance on the Morris Rules provides no guidance
as to what is independently required in this context as a
matter of federal due process. See generally, e.g., Russell _____________ ____ _______
v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (on petition ______
for rehearing); Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 701-02 (10th ______ _______
Cir. 1991) (reviewing cases); Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, _____ _____
931-33 (4th Cir. 1990); Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 235 _______ ______
(1st Cir. 1981). Inasmuch as neither side has addressed the
contours of the constitutional right at stake, we shall
likewise decline to do so. See, e.g., Wilson v. Brown, 889 ___ ____ ______ _____
F.2d 1195, 1196 n.3 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's pro se
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2. In turn, to the extent plaintiff's argument rests on our
holding in Rodi that the Morris Rules "imbue prison inmates ____
with a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison
population," 941 F.2d at 23, it suffices to note that such
opinion was issued after the events in question here. See, ___
e.g., id. at 30-31 (finding such result not to have been ____ ___
clearly established prior thereto); Morgan v. Ellerthorpe, ______ ___________
785 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.R.I. 1992).
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status "does not make us more inclined to interpret damage
pleas further than their plain language permits").
Plaintiff also challenges the district court's refusal
to order that he be reclassified to minimum security/work
release status.3 His sole argument in this regard is that
the applicable regulations endow him with an enforceable
liberty interest. We are unable to address this contention
inasmuch as the regulations are not in the record--although
we note that similar arguments have been unavailing in the
past. See, e.g., Cugini v. Ventetuolo, 781 F. Supp. 107, ___ ____ ______ __________
112-13 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1440 (1st Cir. 1992) _____
(table); State v. Pari, 553 A.2d 135, 137-38 (R.I. 1989). _____ ____
Nor need we decide whether the court abused its discretion in
declining to direct reconsideration of plaintiff's
classification status purely as a remedial measure, inasmuch
as the Morris Rules themselves contemplate such relief. See ___
Morris v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149, 162 (D.R.I. 1980) ______ _________
(directing reclassification meeting to be held "whenever a
major change in an inmate's program appears indicated").4
The expungement of the disciplinary violation from
____________________
3. Although the magistrate-judge recommended that the
classification board be directed to review plaintiff's
status, the district court declined to adopt this measure.
4. Moreover, if plaintiff currently resides in "B" status (a
matter unclear from the record), his classification status
would have to be reviewed "at least" every 90 days. See ___
Morris, 499 F. Supp. at 166. ______
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plaintiff's record--which violation led to his
reclassification in the first place--would obviously fall
within this category. Any grievances plaintiff might harbor
regarding his entitlement to work release status are
collateral to the instant proceeding and can, if necessary,
be pursued separately.
We have reviewed plaintiff's remaining claims and find
them without merit.5
Affirmed. _________
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5. Plaintiff is correct that defendant Saccoccia's failure
to interview witnesses was cited in the complaint (contrary
to the finding made below). Yet such failure was clearly
harmless in light of the magistrate's findings as to the
anticipated testimony of such individuals. In turn,
plaintiff's claim for loss of "potential earnings" is
subsumed within his claim for damages, and so is barred on
qualified immunity grounds.
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Document Info
Docket Number： 94-1519
Filed Date： 1/17/1995
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015