Cronkite v. FDIC ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    September 23, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-2467

    RAYMOND E. CRONKITE and MAINE
    AQUARIUM, INC.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr, and Boudin,

    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Valeriano Diviacchi with whom Diviacchi Law Office was on brief
    ___________________ _____________________
    for appellants.
    Claire L. McGuire, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance
    _____________________
    Corporation, with whom Ann S. DuRoss, Assistant General Counsel,
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    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior
    _____________________
    Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Robert
    ______
    McGillicuddy, Deputy Senior Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance
    ____________
    Corporation, were on brief for appellee, Federal Deposit Insurance
    Corporation.
    John J. Wall, III with whom Thomas F. Monaghan and Monaghan,
    ___________________ ___________________ _________
    Leahy, Hochadel & Libby were on brief for appellee, Archie Maxwell.
    _____ _________________

    ____________________


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    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Raymond Cronkite purchased 46
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    acres of land in 1982, giving the seller a note on which

    Cronkite later defaulted. In April 1985, the then holder of

    the note, Maine National Bank, entered into a settlement

    agreement with Cronkite, who agreed to a revised payment

    schedule for the 1982 note and gave the bank a blanket

    mortgage on all his property in York County, Maine. The

    agreement also included a paragraph obligating the bank at

    Cronkite's request to "release parcels" from the blanket

    mortgage, provided that Cronkite met four conditions:

    --that he not be in default under the agreement;

    --that he not be in default as to his existing payment
    obligations to the bank;

    --that he show the bank a net worth of over 150
    percent of the remaining principal and accrued
    interest on the note; and

    --that he seek the release in order "to complete a
    fair market value sale" and provide the bank with a
    copy of the contract showing the sales price and a
    with a good faith estimate of the distribution of
    the sales proceeds.

    In December 1985, Cronkite arranged to sell a parcel of

    property that he owned ("lot 8") which was not subject to

    Maine National Bank's blanket mortgage. Lot 8, however, was

    subject to a mortgage held by the Saco and Biddeford Savings

    Bank ("the Saco Bank"). To obtain release of that mortgage,

    Cronkite proposed that Maine National Bank subordinate its

    interest in lot 136, which was subject to the blanket

    mortgage, to the interest of the Saco Bank. The Saco Bank


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    was willing to release its mortgage on lot 8 if Maine

    National Bank would allow lot 136 to be substituted as

    collateral for Cronkite's debt to the Saco Bank.

    Although what happened next is the subject of some

    dispute, ultimately Maine National Bank declined to

    subordinate its interest in lot 136, taking the position that

    it had agreed to release parcels under certain conditions but

    not to subordinate its interest. Thereafter the Federal

    Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") became the receiver of

    Maine National Bank. After exhausting the required

    administrative remedies, Cronkite brought the present suit in

    the district court against the FDIC for breach of the

    settlement agreement based on Maine National Bank's failure

    to subordinate its interest in lot 136.1

    The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the

    FDIC, ruling that the settlement agreement on its face

    required the bank to release property but not to subordinate

    it. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's

    recommended decision. This appeal followed. Cronkite's main

    argument is that since "subordination" is a lesser sacrifice

    of interest than a full "release," the latter term


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    1Cronkite joined as plaintiff a corporation that he
    hoped to assist through the sale of lot 8 and named as
    defendants two former officers of Maine National Bank. He
    also made other claims in addition to breach of contract.
    Since the presence of other parties does not affect the legal
    issue, and the other claims have not been briefed on appeal,
    we need not discuss the other parties or other claims.

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    encompasses the former and the settlement agreement should be

    read as if it said "release or subordinate." At the very

    least, Cronkite says that he should have been allowed to

    offer extrinsic evidence.

    Considering the issue of interpretation de novo, In re
    ________ _____

    SPM Mfg. Corp, 984 F.2d 1305, 1311 (1st Cir. 1993), we agree
    _____________

    with the magistrate judge's reading. It is sound policy to

    read commercial documents according to their terms.

    Subordination may often have less severe consequences for the

    holder of an interest than does release, but it is still a

    different legal arrangement. And agreements relating to

    loans and mortgages are instruments in which words are

    normally used with some precision. If one begins by

    departing from the plain meaning of a familiar term one may

    end by enlarging the contract to embrace transactions never

    contemplated. This case well illustrates these precepts of

    construction.

    The transaction that Cronkite seeks to bring within the

    "release" paragraph of the settlement agreement is by no

    means the same as the type to which the paragraph is

    directed. In the former case, the bank would know not only

    that Cronkite was current in his obligations to the bank and

    had a net worth of 150 percent of his remaining obligations,

    but also that he was selling the released property in "a fair

    market value sale." In other words, his secured real



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    property would be diminished but he would increase his

    immediate net worth by the fair market value of the property,

    giving the bank some additional protection.

    In the subordination transaction proposed to Maine

    National Bank, Cronkite was asking the bank to subordinate

    its interest not so that the subordinated property could be

    sold but so that some other piece of property could be sold.

    There is nothing in this arrangement to assure that the sale

    price of the property sold would be as high as the value of

    the property with respect to which Maine National Bank was to

    subordinate its interest. That bank could easily find that

    it had given another creditor a superior position on a very

    valuable piece of property so that Cronkite could make a sale

    of a much less valuable one. It does not matter whether this

    was or was not the case here. The point is, rather, that the

    transaction is in no sense the one to which the bank had

    committed itself.

    Under certain circumstances, extrinsic evidence may be

    admissible to cast light on the intention of the parties and

    the meaning of their agreement. For the sake of

    completeness, we note that Cronkite did not in opposing

    summary disposition point to any extrinsic evidence that

    would alter the result even if extrinsic evidence were

    admissible. Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider





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    when under Maine law extrinsic evidence is admissible in

    interpreting written contracts.

    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 92-2467

Filed Date: 9/24/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015