Lovell v. Peoples Heritage ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion












    January 7, 1994 [Not for Publication]
    [Not for Publication]

    United States Court of Appeals
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 93-1552

    ANN B. LOVELL, ETC.,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    PEOPLES HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    ____________________
    No. 93-1553

    ANN B. LOVELL, ETC., ET AL.
    Plaintiffs, Appellants
    v.
    THE ONE BANCORP, ET AL.
    Defendants, Appellees
    ____________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________
    ____________________
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________
    ____________________
    Richard E. Poulos with whom John S. Campbell and Poulos &
    ___________________ __________________ _________
    Campbell, P.A. were on brief for appellants.
    ______________
    Robert S. Frank with whom Christopher J. Devlin and Verrill &
    ________________ ______________________ __________
    Dana were on brief for FDIC as receiver for Maine Savings Bank.
    ____
    Rufus E. Brown with whom Drummond Woodsum Plimpton & MacMahon was
    ______________ ____________________________________
    on brief for Frederick W. Pape, Jr.
    John F. Batter, III with whom Hale and Dorr was on brief for
    _____________________ ______________
    Nancy Masterton, as personal representative of the Estate of Robert
    Masterton.
    Thomas D. Warren, Director, Litigation Unit, with whom Michael E.
    ________________ __________
    Carpenter, Attorney General, and Peter J. Brann, Assistant Attorney
    _________ ______________
    General, were on brief for Maine Superintendent of Banking.
    Catherine R. Connors with whom Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., Daniel M.
    ____________________ _______________________ __________
    Snow, and Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster were on
    ____ ____________________________________________________
    brief for Peoples Heritage Savings Bank.
    ____________________

    ____________________

















    Per Curiam. In these consolidated appeals,
    ___________

    plaintiffs-appellants argue that the district court erred in

    summarily disposing of their claims relating to their right

    to a distribution of the net worth of two mutual savings

    banks (MSBs) following the banks' conversion to stock savings

    institutions. See generally Lovell v. Peoples Heritage Sav.
    ___ _________ ______ _____________________

    Bank, 818 F. Supp. 427 (D. Me. 1993); Lovell v. One Bancorp,
    ____ ______ ___________

    818 F. Supp. 412 (D. Me. 1993). We affirm.

    Plaintiffs failed to come forward with proof of a

    constitutionally-protected property interest in a

    distribution of the surplus of the MSBs, the linchpin of the

    bulk of their claims. In answering questions certified by

    the district court, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)

    held that Maine law does not give plaintiffs any right to a

    distribution of the surplus of MSBs as part of the conversion

    process. Lovell v. One Bancorp, 614 A.2d 56, 67 (Me. 1992).
    ______ ___________

    Absent a state property right, plaintiffs' plea for federal

    constitutional protection is in vain. Chongris v. Board of
    ________ ________

    Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.) ("[P]roperty rights,
    _______

    while protected by the federal Constitution, are creatures of

    state law.") (citing, inter alia, Board of Regents v. Roth,
    _____ ____ _________________ ____

    408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021
    _____ ______

    (1987).

    Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the

    Constitution at least protects their contingent interest in a



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    distribution of the "liquidation accounts" of the new

    institutions. These accounts are the current repository of

    the reincarnated surplus of the former MSBs. While the SJC

    opinion does support plaintiffs' claim to such an interest,

    see Lovell, 614 A.2d at 67 (recognizing depositors'
    ___ ______

    contingent interest in a pro rata distribution of a bank's

    surplus), plaintiffs have not produced trial-worthy proof

    that the contingency -- a solvent liquidation -- would ever

    occur. In fact, as the record stands now, it is essentially

    undisputed that a solvent liquidation is a very remote

    possibility. As a result, the district court may have been

    correct in concluding that the contingent interest in the

    liquidation accounts did not rise to the level of an

    expectancy deserving constitutional protection. See One
    ___ ___

    Bancorp, 818 F. Supp. at 420-21; Peoples Heritage, 818 F.
    _______ ________________

    Supp. at 431; cf. Society for Sav. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143,
    ___ ________________ ______

    150 (1955) (observing that interest of mutual savings bank

    depositor in bank's undivided earnings, contingent on the

    "unlikely event of a solvent liquidation, . . . hardly rises

    to the level of an expectancy"). Nonetheless, rather than

    basing the availability of constitutional protection on the

    expected value of an alleged property interest, we focus

    instead on the alternative reasoning offered by the district

    court.





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    Even if plaintiffs could prove a cognizable

    property interest in the liquidation accounts, the undisputed

    facts would still support summary judgment for defendants

    with respect to each alleged violation of constitutional

    property rights. Plaintiffs have proven themselves

    singularly unable to show any tangible financial harm

    sufficient to support a claim under the Takings Clause, see
    ___

    Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
    _______________________ ______________

    (1978) (suggesting that proof of economic impact is essential

    to show a violation of the Takings Clause), or the Contract

    Clause, see General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105,
    ___ ____________________ ______

    1109 (1992) (holding that "substantial impairment of a

    contractual relationship" is an essential component of a

    Contract Clause claim) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co.
    ____________________________

    v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). Nor would a trial
    ________

    serve any useful purpose with respect to the alleged

    violations of procedural due process; it is a matter of

    record that plaintiffs had notice of the proposed conversion

    and an opportunity to respond. We agree with the district

    court that plaintiffs were "entitled to accurate, informative

    notice, not to their particular characterizations of the

    information being disseminated." One Bancorp, 818 F. Supp.
    ___________

    at 426.

    We likewise fail to see any merit in the allegation

    that defendants violated plaintiffs' substantive due process



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    and equal protection rights. As explained in the district

    court's trenchant opinions below, there are entirely rational

    reasons for the transfer of the surplus of the MSBs to the

    liquidation accounts of the new stock institutions, as well

    as the differing rights of account holders in the conversion

    of an MSB and policy holders of a mutual insurance company

    during an arguably analogous conversion. See id. at 423-24;
    ___ ___

    Peoples Heritage, 818 F. Supp. at 431.
    ________________

    We also agree with the district court concerning

    plaintiffs' state law claims. In response to another

    certified question, the SJC held that plaintiffs were

    procedurally barred from pursuing their state common law

    claims following (1) the issuance of a certificate of

    conversion by the state and (2) the failure of plaintiffs to

    seek judicial review under Maine's Administrative Procedure

    Act. Lovell, 614 A.2d at 62. Plaintiffs' attempt to have
    ______

    this court overrule or modify Maine's highest court on this

    point of state law is entirely unavailing. Moreover, the

    district court is unquestionably correct in concluding that

    the logic used by the SJC in deciding the viability of the

    common law claims disposes of the state statutory claims as

    well. See One Bancorp, 818 F. Supp. at 425-26; Peoples
    ___ ___________ _______

    Heritage, 818 F. Supp. at 431. As all of plaintiffs' state
    ________

    law claims are procedurally barred, summary judgment was

    inescapably appropriate.



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    Accordingly, the judgments of the district court

    are

    Affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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