Toro-Aristizabal v. United States ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    February 15, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 93-1888

    JAIME TORO-ARISTIZABAL,

    Petitioner, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Respondent, Appellee.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________
    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    Jaime Toro-Aristizabal on brief pro se.
    ______________________
    A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Stephen P.
    ____________________ ___________
    Heymann, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    _______


    ____________________


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    Per Curiam. Appellant Jaime Toro-Aristizabal was
    __________

    charged, in a multi-count indictment, with conspiracy to

    possess with intent to distribute and distribution of a

    quantity of cocaine between August 1986 and March 1988, in

    violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 (count 1), possession with

    intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine in August

    1986, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (count 3) and

    eleven separate incidents of possession with intent to

    distribute cocaine (counts 4 through 14) during the period

    November 1986 through July 1987. He was convicted of all of

    these violations after a jury trial. We affirmed his

    conviction on direct appeal. See United States v. David, 940
    ___ _____________ _____

    F.2d 722, 739 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 605
    ____________

    (1991).

    In this 2255 motion, appellant raises his

    inability to pay the $20,000 fine he received on the count 3

    conviction. He also, in other pleadings filed in the

    district court, alluded to the following issues: (1) the

    court should not have considered, in determining appellant's

    sentence under the sentencing guidelines, any quantities of

    cocaine involved in transactions which occurred prior to the

    effective date of the guidelines; (2) the sentencing court

    incorrectly sentenced him to a term of imprisonment which

    included a term of supervised release in violation of 21

    U.S.C. 846 and contrary to the policy of lenity in



















    construing ambiguous statutes; and (3) he received

    ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Subsequently, an attorney was appointed to

    represent appellant. He filed a new memorandum in which only

    the issue concerning the fine was raised. The district court

    then denied the petition. This appeal ensued. We have

    reviewed the parties' briefs and the record and affirm the

    judgment of the district court as to the $20,000 fine for

    essentially the reasons stated in the court's memorandum,

    dated July 26, 1993. We only add that the fine comports with

    the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3622(a), which applied to

    the count 3 conviction.

    As for appellant's assertion that he should not

    have received a term of parole or supervised release, we

    first note that this argument is relevant only to counts 3

    and 4 to 14. On Count 1, he was sentenced to a term of

    imprisonment; this sentence did not include a term of
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    supervised release or parole. Second, 846 applies to

    conspiracies. The remaining counts did not charge violations

    of 846. In any event, the sentences imposed on these

    counts were not illegal.

    Under count 3 -- the August 1986 conviction for

    possession and distribution -- the court sentenced appellant

    to 15 years imprisonment. In August 1986, 841(b)(1)(B)

    provided that "[a]ny sentence imposing a term of imprisonment



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    under this paragraph shall . . . impose a special parole term

    of at least 3 years in addition to such term of imprisonment

    . . . ." Thus, the special parole portion of the sentence

    under count 3 is correct.

    The court sentenced appellant on the remaining

    eleven counts to concurrent terms of imprisonment of

    seventeen years and six months and concurrent five-year terms

    of supervised release. These counts covered the period

    November 13, 1986 to July 15, 1987. Section 1002 of the

    Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, enacted on October 27, 1986,

    replaced "special parole term" with a "term of supervised

    release" for narcotic offenses committed in violation of 21

    U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C). In the Sentencing Reform

    Act of 1984, however, Congress had deferred the effective

    date for the elimination of special parole to November 1,

    1987. In Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S.
    _____________ _____________

    395 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the supervised

    release provisions of the ADAA applied for the interim period

    October 27, 1986 to November 1, 1987. Id. at 410. Because
    ___

    the dates of counts 4 to 14 fall in this time period,

    appellant was correctly sentenced to terms of supervised

    release.

    Because appellant's sentences were legal, his claim

    of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. As for his claim

    that the court erred in calculating his sentence on the



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    conspiracy count by referring to conduct predating the

    effective date of the sentencing guidelines, we already

    rejected this argument in appellant's direct appeal. See 940
    ___

    F.2d at 740. Finally, because the grounds presented in the

    2255 motion turned on legal issues, we reject appellant's

    claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1888

Filed Date: 2/15/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015