Silva v. Witschen ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    March 31, 1994
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________

    No. 93-1720

    RICHARD SILVA, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    PETER WITSCHEN, CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees,


    STEPHEN LINDER,

    Appellant.


    ____________________


    ERRATA




    The opinion of this Court issued on March 24, 1994, is amended as
    follows:

    On Page 13, Paragraph 2 on Line 3, please insert "sanction" after
    "Rule 11".



































    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________

    No. 93-1720

    RICHARD SILVA, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    PETER WITSCHEN, CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees,


    STEPHEN LINDER,

    Appellant.


    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________


    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Cyr and Stahl,

    Circuit Judges.
    ______________


    ____________________


    Edward Greer, Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties
    _____________ _________________________
    Union, was on brief for appellant.
    _____
    William J. Conley, Jr., City Solicitor, for appellee City of East
    ______________________
    Providence, Rhode Island.


    ____________________

    March 24, 1994

    ____________________
















    CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellant Stephen Linder, Esquire,
    CYR, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    challenges the sanction imposed against him pursuant to Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 11 for filing a groundless complaint against defendants-

    appellees. After careful review, we affirm the district court

    sanction order in all respects.


    I
    I

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
    __________

    In the fall of 1985, the City of East Providence, Rhode

    Island, announced that an independent testing service would

    administer a competitive examination for the position of Chief of

    Police. A city ordinance empowered the City Manager, defendant-

    appellee Peter Witschen, to fill the position from among the top

    three performers on the examination. See Civil Service Ordinance
    ___

    of East Providence, R.I. 11-66(c),(d). It was no secret that

    some members of the City Council, including defendants-appellees

    in this action, favored the appointment of defendant Anthony

    DeCastro. DeCastro achieved the highest examination score and,

    in January 1986, was appointed by the City Manager.

    Following the appointment, a rift arose between Chief

    DeCastro and the Fraternal Order of Police Union (Union). At a

    public session of the City Council years later, it was disclosed

    that several defendants had discussed beforehand with DeCastro

    the likelihood that a competitive examination would be adminis-

    tered and that DeCastro's test-taking skills were weak. Finally,

    it was also disclosed at the City Council meeting that DeCastro

    2














    had attended a preparatory course in "executive development" on

    his own time, for which he was reimbursed pursuant to a City

    policy permitting reimbursement for "in-service training."

    Present at the City Council meeting were several of the

    plaintiffs, all disappointed applicants for the position, and

    appellant Linder, counsel to the Union. Shortly after the City

    Council meeting, two of the plaintiffs met briefly with Linder

    and discussed factual grounds for a possible lawsuit in their

    behalf. Thereafter, Linder conducted limited discussions with

    other plaintiffs along similar lines.

    On January 3, 1990, Linder initiated the present action

    under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in the United States District Court for

    the District of Rhode Island, charging deprivations of plaintiff-

    s' due process right to a fair and impartial promotional examina-

    tion as provided by the City ordinance, and of an alleged right

    of "equal protection" to compete for the position. Although the

    complaint pleaded relevant circumstances which the district court

    later characterized as "suspicious," see supra pp. 2-3, it
    ___ _____

    neither alleged nor asserted facts sufficient to support an

    inference that the examination was either "rigged" to favor

    DeCastro or administered or graded unfairly.

    Prior to filing the complaint, Linder made a copy

    available to the City Solicitor, who advised Linder that it was

    "unjustified," and warned that the City was likely to demand

    attorney fees for defending against it. Linder was not deterred.

    Ultimately, the district court entered summary judgment


    3














    for all defendants on the ground that "the complaint made no

    allegations of 'exam rigging,'" which was the essence of plain-

    tiffs' claim. Silva v. Witschen, 745 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. R.I.
    _____ ________

    1990).1 The defendants thereafter requested attorney fees,

    either under 42 U.S.C. 1988 or as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ.

    P. 11.

    In due course, the district court conducted a lengthy

    hearing to determine whether the fee request should be allowed on
    _______

    either ground. The amount of any fee award was not before the

    court at the hearing. Following the hearing, the court denied

    the request for an award under section 1988, on the ground that

    the plaintiffs had not acted in bad faith. The court found,

    however, that Linder was subject to sanction under Rule 11 for

    filing a groundless complaint. The defendants later requested

    fees and costs totalling almost $250,000, which the court reduced

    to $75,349.96, approximately two-thirds of which was attributed

    to the merits phase and one-third to the sanctions phase of the

    district court litigation.


    II
    II

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________

    All aspects of the Rule 11 sanctions decision are

    reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
    ______________ ________

    Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Metrocorps, Inc. v. Eastern
    _____ _________________ _______

    Mass. Junior Drum & Bugle Corps Ass'n, 912 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
    _______________________________________


    ____________________

    1The judgment on the merits is not challenged on appeal.

    4














    1990). As the party challenging the sanctions award, Linder

    bears the formidable burden of establishing abuse of discretion.

    See Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1425 (1st Cir. 1992).
    ___ _____________ _____

    An abuse of discretion occurs only if "'a material factor deserv-

    ing significant weight is ignored, . . . an improper factor is

    relied upon, or . . . all proper and no improper factors are

    assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing

    them.'" Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st
    ________ __________________

    Cir.) (quoting Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d
    ____________________ _____________

    1076, 1081 (1st Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 891 (1990).
    ____ ______


    A. Amended Rule 11
    A. Amended Rule 11
    _______________

    On December 1, 1993, during the pendency of the present

    appeal, an amended version of Rule 11 became effective, governing

    "all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar
    _______

    as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then
    __ ____ ___ ___________

    pending." Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 113

    S. Ct. CDLXXVIII (Apr. 22, 1993) (emphasis added).2 Linder

    ____________________

    2The sanctions provision in the pre-amendment version of
    Rule 11 stated:

    If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
    violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
    its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
    _____
    signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
    sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
    other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
    expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
    ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
    attorney's fee.

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1987) (emphasis added).

    The relevant portion of the sanctions provision in the

    5














    therefore contends that amended Rule 11 applies on appeal in the

    present case.

    We need not decide whether a case pending on appeal

    December 1, 1993 is subject to the amended rule. The promulga-

    tion order precludes application of the amended rule even in


    ____________________

    amended version reads as follows:

    (c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable
    Sanctions
    opportunity to respond, the court determines that
    subdivision (b) [Representations to Court] has been
    violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
    ___
    stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
    attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
    subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.

    (1) How Initiated.
    How Initiated
    ______________

    (a) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under
    By Motion
    __________
    this rule . . . shall describe the specific con-
    duct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall
    be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be
    _____ ___ __
    filed with or presented to the court unless, with-
    _____ ______ _____
    in 21 days after service of the motion (or such
    __ __ ____ _____ _______
    other period as the court may prescribe), the
    ___
    challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
    __________ _____
    allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appro-
    __ ___ _________ __ ______
    priately corrected. If warranted, the court may
    ________ _________
    award to the part prevailing on the motion the
    reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred
    in presenting or opposing the motion.

    (2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction
    Nature of Sanction; Limitations.
    ______ __ _________ ____________
    imposed for violation of this rule shall be limit-
    ed to what is sufficient to deter repetition of
    such conduct or comparable conduct by others simi-
    larly situated. . . . [T]he sanction may consist
    of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary na-
    ture, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if
    imposed on motion and warranted for effective
    deterrence, an order directing payment to the
    movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys'
    fees and other expenses incurred as a direct re-
    sult of the violation.

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Dec. 1, 1993) (emphasis added).

    6














    "cases then pending" insofar as it would be unjust or imprac-
    ______ __ _______

    ticable to do so. Id. To remand for a district court determina-
    _______ ___

    tion under amended Rule 11 in these circumstances is not only

    infeasible but would work an injustice to plaintiffs-appellees.

    See Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications, Inc., 784 F.2d 1581, 1584
    ___ _______ _____________________________

    (11th Cir. 1986) (finding no reason to test Rule 11 sanctions

    under amendment to 1983 rule not in effect when sanctioned

    conduct occurred) (decided under virtually identical terms of

    1983 promulgation order: "shall govern . . . , insofar as just
    _

    and practicable, in proceedings then pending." Order Amending

    Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983)). Cf. Freund v.
    ___ ______

    Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 956 F.2d 354, 363 (1st Cir. 1992)
    ________________________

    (declining to apply amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) which would

    work "manifest injustice");3 Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc.,
    _______ _______________________

    No. 89 C 5492, 1994 WL 46670, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 1994)

    (finding retrospective application of 1993 amended Rule 11

    "neither just nor practicable"); In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec.
    ______________________________

    Litig., No. MDL 863, 1994 WL 34924, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1994)
    ______


    ____________________

    3Freund rests upon the principle that "a court is to apply
    ______
    the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless
    doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory
    direction or legislative history to the contrary." Bradley v.
    _______
    Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). In the instant
    _________________
    case, such "statutory direction" derives from the Supreme Court's
    power to prescribe rules of procedure. See generally 28 U.S.C.
    ___ _________
    2071-2113. Section 2074(a) of Title 28 states that "the
    Supreme Court shall not require the application of such [amended]
    rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in
    __
    the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending,
    ___ _______ __ ___ _____ __ _____ ____ ___________ ___ _______
    the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be
    feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule
    applies." 28 U.S.C. 2074(a) (emphasis added).

    7














    (declining to apply 1993 amended rule where sanctioned conduct

    occurred prior to Dec. 1, 1993 and pre-amendment standards had

    been applied at sanctions hearing).4 This is particularly true

    since Linder's sanctionable conduct was solely responsible for

    the satellite proceedings relating to Rule 11 sanctions. More-

    over, it would be impracticable, not only to undo the harm

    actually occasioned defendants, but to review the district court

    order under the altered standards established by amended Rule





    ____________________

    4Linder argues that he would not have been sanctioned under
    the amended rule, because he would have withdrawn the complaint
    as allowed under the 21-day "safe harbor" provision. See Fed. R.
    ___
    Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (Dec. 1, 1993); supra note 2. Linder cannot
    _____
    have it both ways, however. His argument is based on the assump-
    tion that he would have availed himself of a "safe harbor"
    provision had he received notice of the particular deficiencies
    __________
    in the complaint. This retrospective appraisal ignores the
    reality that Linder flatly disregarded a substantially equivalent
    warning from the City Solicitor before the complaint was ever
    filed. See supra p. 3-4. Thus, Linder's argument cannot prevail
    ___ _____
    unless appellees failed to point out particular deficiencies in
    the complaint. However, appellees' statement of relevant facts
    on appeal represents, and Linder does not deny, that the City
    Solicitor "informed [Linder] of the pleading deficiencies, and of
    ___ ________ ____________
    the City's probable attempt to collect sanctions, before the
    pleading was even filed." (Appellees' Br. at 16) (emphasis
    added). Since Linder neither denies appellees' representation
    nor included the relevant portions of the hearing transcript to
    which appellees' statement of facts cites, see Fed. R. App. P.
    ___
    10(b), 11(a) (appellant bears burden of including material items
    in appellate record), we will not indulge an assumption fore-
    closed by the record before us. It would be unjust to permit yet
    a second "safe harbor" refuge for Linder to escape responsibility
    ______
    for the expense occasioned an innocent party which forewarned him
    that the complaint was unjustified. Furthermore, even if the
    cost and expense occasioned by Linder's sanctionable conduct were
    to be disregarded, it would be unjust to permit these satellite
    proceedings to be further extended by remanding to the district
    court to afford Linder the opportunity to "withdraw" a groundless
    complaint previously dismissed on the merits.

    8














    11.5 See Hashemi, 784 F.2d at 1583-84 (rejecting claim, under
    ___ _______

    virtually identical 1983 promulgation order, that amended Rule 11

    standards should apply "because the case was pending on appeal by

    the plaintiff at the time the Rule became effective"); cf.
    ___

    Freund, 956 F.2d at 363 (refusing to apply amended rule which
    ______

    would work "manifest injustice"). Since an unwarranted remand

    would otherwise be necessary in these already protracted satel-

    lite proceedings, at inordinate delay and expense to innocent

    parties, we review the district court sanction order under the

    pre-amendment Rule 11 standards in force at the time the sanc-

    tioned conduct occurred.


    B. Appropriateness of Rule 11 Sanctions
    B. Appropriateness of Rule 11 Sanctions
    ____________________________________

    Prior to December 1, 1993, Rule 11 mandated sanctions

    for interposing a filing either for an improper purpose or under
    ______ __


    ____________________

    5For example, deterrence was the primary purpose served by
    Rule 11 sanctions prior to December 1, 1983. See Cooter & Gell,
    ___ _____________
    496 U.S. at 393. Yet "courts . . . ha[d] noted that compensatory
    and punitive purposes also [we]re served by sanctions [under old
    Rule 11]." Charles A. Wright & Arthur Miller, 5A Federal Prac-
    _____________
    tice and Procedure 1336 at 100-101 (1990); Anderson, 900 F.2d
    ___________________ ________
    at 394-95. Under amended Rule 11, however, "the purpose of . . .
    sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate . . . ." Fed. R.
    ______
    Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). Thus,
    under amended Rule 11, "if a monetary sanction is imposed, it
    should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty," id., though
    ___
    the court may award monetary sanctions to a party in "unusual
    circumstances," id. Although sanctions were mandatory under old
    ___
    Rule 11, Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1990), but
    ___________ ___
    are discretionary under the amended rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)
    (Dec. 1, 1993) (if court finds a violation, "the court may . . .
    ___
    impose an appropriate sanction" (emphasis added)), in these
    circumstances we believe it would be a gross injustice to deprive
    defendants-appellees of compensation for the costs caused by
    Linder's reckless disregard for the requirements of Rule 11
    despite the City's advance warning.

    9














    circumstances in which a competent attorney, on objectively

    reasonable inquiry, could not have believed that the filing was

    grounded in fact and warranted either by existing law or by a
    ___

    good-faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal

    of existing law. Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir.
    ___________ ___

    1990).



    1. Legal Basis for Action
    1. Legal Basis for Action
    ______________________

    Linder "concedes" that the complaint violated Rule 11,

    in that he failed to make the objectively reasonable legal

    inquiry required under our case law. He argues, however, that

    Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordina-
    __________ ___________________________________________________

    tion Unit, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993), struck down the
    _________

    heightened pleading requirement previously espoused by this court

    in section 1983 actions.6 Since Leatherman should be given
    __________

    retroactive effect, see Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, ___
    ___ ______ __________________________

    U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2516-17 (1993) (general rule of

    retroactivity in civil cases), Linder contends that sanctions

    were improperly imposed. This argument is a red herring.

    The district court order neither mentioned nor applied

    a heightened pleading standard, nor did it cite to any case

    involving a heightened pleading requirement. See Silva, 745 F.
    ___ _____

    Supp. at 801. Rather, the court determined that there was no


    ____________________

    6In Leatherman, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's "more
    __________
    demanding rule for pleading a complaint under section 1983 than
    for pleading other kinds of claims for relief." 113 S. Ct. at
    1162-63.

    10














    legal basis whatever for Linder's reliance on a federally pro-

    tected property interest, in principal part because plaintiffs

    made no allegation of "exam-rigging." See Burns v. Sullivan, 619
    ___ _____ ________

    F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980).7
    ____ ______

    Compare Silva, 745 F. Supp. at 803, with Hermes v. Hein, 511 F.
    _______ _____ ____ ______ ____

    Supp. 123, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (complaint alleging exam-rigging

    states 1983 claim in circumstances where unwavering custom and

    policy is to promote applicant achieving highest score). The

    court concluded that the only protected property interest at

    issue was plaintiffs' due process right to compete fairly for the

    position of Chief of Police,8 and since they had alleged no

    facts evidencing such a deprivation the action was groundless as

    a matter of law. Silva, 745 F. Supp. at 805. Neither before the
    _____

    district court, nor on appeal, has Linder raised doubt as to the

    soundness of the district court ruling that the complaint failed

    to state a cause of action.


    ____________________

    7As the district court observed:

    Like the City Manager in Burns, City Manager Witschen
    _____
    had discretion to make an appointment "after interview
    and investigation," from among "the names of the three
    persons standing highest on the appropriate list."
    Since the City Manager could appoint any one of the top
    three certified candidates, none of these candidates
    had a clearly defined property interest in promotion to
    Chief of Police.

    Silva, 745 F. Supp. at 803.
    _____

    8The court rejected the claim that plaintiffs were deprived
    of "equal protection" by the dissimilar treatment accorded
    DeCastro, citing Di Piro v. Taft, 584 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978),
    _______ ____
    cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979). See Silva, 745 F. Supp. at
    ____ ______ ___ _____
    805 (finding no evidence of intentional discrimination).

    11














    2. Improper Purpose
    2. Improper Purpose
    ________________

    The district court further found that Linder attempted

    by bringing the present action to intimidate "the City into

    terminating DeCastro . . . . [thus] using this case to further an

    improper objective." Silva v. Witschen, C.A. No. 90-0005L, slip
    _____ ________

    op. at 18-19 (D. R.I. Nov. 5, 1992) (order imposing sanctions).

    Although Linder admits to a "dual motive," he argues that Rule 11

    sanctions may not be imposed for commencing an action for an

    "improper purpose" if there was also a proper motive, in this

    case vindicating plaintiffs' rights. The district court found

    that

    Linder, who was also the attorney for the
    Union, was wearing two hats here. Although
    he purported to represent the plaintiffs in
    this case, all his actions were calculated to
    ___ ___ _______ ____ __________ __
    achieve the goal of the Union, the ouster of
    _______ ___ ____ __ ___ _____
    DeCastro. While plaintiffs honestly believed
    in their cause of action, Linder was using
    their lawsuit as a bargaining chip to pres-
    sure the City on behalf of the Union to ter-
    minate DeCastro as Chief of Police.

    Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
    ___

    Linder's contention that his conduct is not sanctiona-

    ble because he intended to protect plaintiffs' legal rights is

    yet another red herring. We are aware of no authority or other

    basis for the view that an attorney who files a groundless

    complaint, for an improper purpose and without reasonable inqui-

    ry, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, is exonerated from sanctions because
    ___

    he was simply asserting groundless nonexistent legal claims in

    behalf of his clients. Cf. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788
    ___ ____ ______________________

    F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[P]leader may not escape liability

    12














    because he did not intend to bring about additional delay or

    expense. If reasonable preparatory steps would have avoided

    those consequences, sanctions are appropriate."). Accordingly,

    we uphold the district court finding of improper motive. Cf. Mir
    ___ ___

    v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1988)
    _________________________

    (using litigation to force party to grant privileges previously

    denied is "improper purpose").


    C. Appropriateness, Nature and Severity of Sanctions
    C. Appropriateness, Nature and Severity of Sanctions
    _________________________________________________

    1. Rule 11 Hearing
    1. Rule 11 Hearing
    _______________

    The procedure for determining whether a sanction should be

    imposed and, if so, its nature and severity, is left in the first

    instance to the trial court's sound discretion. Linder contends

    that the district court abused its discretion, see Cooter & Gell,
    ___ _____________

    496 U.S. at 405, by unnecessarily convening a hearing on the

    request for Rule 11 sanctions. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
    ___ ____

    advisory committee's note (sanctions procedure depends on circum-

    stances and severity of sanction under consideration); Muthig v.
    ______

    Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988)
    ____________________________

    (similar). He argues that there was no reason to conduct a Rule

    11 hearing once the court found no legal basis for the complaint,

    see Silva, 745 F. Supp. at 803, since sanctions were mandatory
    ___ _____

    under the pre-amendment version of Rule 11, Jensen v. Frank, 912
    ______ _____

    F.2d 517, 524 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990).

    Linder once again mischaracterizes the proceedings

    below. The grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs did not

    preordain the imposition of any Rule 11 sanction against Linder.

    13














    Rather, the hearing was necessary to determine whether Linder had
    _______

    violated Rule 11 and, if so, to determine an appropriate sanc-
    ________

    tion. Additionally, defendants requested a fee award against

    plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 as well, which the court consi-

    dered at the same hearing and later denied. The claim that the

    district court abused its discretion by conducting a hearing to

    resolve defendants' fee requests under Rule 11 and section 1988

    is frivolous.

    Linder has fallen far short of a showing of abuse of

    discretion.9 Rule 11 contemplates "giv[ing] effect to [its]

    central goal of deterrence," Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405,
    ______________

    while avoiding unnecessary satellite litigation; the proper

    balance is left to the reasoned discretion of the district court,

    id. Cf. Fashion House, 892 F.2d at 1082 (district court is in
    ___ ___ _____________

    best position to determine appropriate remedy). The hearing was

    necessary for two reasons: to determine whether there was a
    _______

    proper basis for assessing attorney fees against plaintiffs under

    42 U.S.C. 1988, and whether Linder's filing of the groundless
    _______

    complaint warranted imposition of a Rule 11 sanction. Silva,
    _____

    slip op. at 2-3 (Nov. 5, 1992); Silva, 745 F. Supp. at 806.
    _____

    Thus, among the matters at issue in the Rule 11 sanctions hearing


    ____________________

    9Though hampered by the absence of a sanction-hearing tran-
    script, we have reviewed Linder's claims on the available appel-
    late record, see United States v. One Yacht Named Mercury, 527
    ___ _____________ ________________________
    F.2d 1112, 1113 (1st Cir. 1975) (despite incomplete record,
    appellate court reviews merits as record allows), cognizant that
    it was Linder's burden to ensure an adequate appellate record,
    see Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1425; see also Fed. R. App. P.
    ___ _____________ ___ ____
    10(b), 11(a) (requiring appellant to assemble requisite record).

    14














    were whether Linder: (1) brought the action for an improper

    purpose and (2) after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a

    reasonable belief that the complaint was well grounded in fact
    __________ ______

    and "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the

    extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 11 (1987); see Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 19. The court
    ___ ___________

    found that "Linder failed to make a reasonable inquiry to deter-

    mine that the complaint was well founded in fact . . . [and] even

    more important [the] lawsuit was baseless as a matter of law."

    Silva, slip op. at 17 (Nov. 5, 1992). See Unanue-Casal v.
    _____ ___ ____________

    Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839, 841-42 (1st Cir. 1990) (Rule 11
    ____________

    sanctions against counsel warranted for filing frivolous removal

    petition with "no plausible legal basis" and for "improper

    purpose").10


    2. Reasonableness of Sanctions
    2. Reasonableness of Sanctions
    ___________________________

    Linder's remaining claim is that the attorney fee award

    is excessive. Compensatory sanctions under Rule 11 must be




    ____________________

    10Linder claims that the district court did not need to
    address the "improper purpose" prong of Rule 11 once it had been
    determined that he had failed to make a "reasonable inquiry." We
    find no abuse of discretion. The appellate record provided by
    Linder, see supra note 9, does not indicate which issue was first
    ___ _____
    decided, why the hearing proceeded to the second issue, or even
    whether Linder preserved this claim by asserting it in timely
    fashion below. Moreover, the further inquiries as to the appro-
    priateness and severity of Rule 11 sanctions were significantly
    informed by the court's determination that not one but two
    grounds existed for sanctioning Linder. See Unanue-Casal, 898
    ___ ____________
    F.2d at 841-42 (Rule 11 sanctions against counsel warranted by
    both prongs of rule).

    15














    reasonable in amount.11 Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427 (cit-
    _____________

    ing cases).


    a. Merits Phase
    a. Merits Phase
    ____________

    The district court awarded the City12 $53,528.81 in

    attorney fees and costs incurred during the merits phase of the

    litigation by all defendants, representing approximately 487

    hours devoted to legal services by counsel appearing for the five

    individual defendants, and by the City Solicitor in behalf of the

    City and the same five individual defendants in their official

    capacities. Linder does not challenge the individual fee appli-

    cations, but asserts that the aggregate hours were not reasonably

    required because defendants did not take proper measures to

    mitigate fees by delegating jointly-required in-court services

    and submitting unitary filings to avoid unnecessary duplication

    of services. See Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427 (compensatory
    ___ _____________

    sanctions allowed only for costs reasonably incurred) citing
    __________ ______

    Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th
    ______ _____________________________

    Cir. 1988); see also Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th
    ___ ____ _______ _____

    ____________________

    11Another Linder claim that attorney fees are not allow-
    able under Rule 11 directly contradicts the express language
    of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ("an appropriate sanction . . . may include
    . . . a reasonable attorney's fee"). See also Mariani v. Doctors
    ___ ____ _______ _______
    Assocs., Inc., 983 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1993); see generally
    ______________ ___ _________
    Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5A Federal Practice &
    ___________________
    Procedure, 1336 at 113 (1990) ("attorneys' fees have become the
    _________
    Rule 11 sanction of choice").

    12The district court found that the City is the "only party
    interested in receiving sanctions," Silva, slip op. at 4 (May 6,
    _____
    1993), because it had agreed to pay the defendants' counsel fees
    incurred in this action, id. Consequently, it ordered all
    ___
    sanctions paid to the City.

    16














    Cir. 1988) (similar).

    The district court rejected Linder's argument, finding

    instead that "if plaintiffs' case had not been so utterly without

    merit, this 'redundant' representation might have proved essen-

    tial to these defendants," Silva, slip op. at 13 (May 6, 1993),
    _____

    and therefore that the employment of multiple attorneys during

    the merits phrase was reasonably required. We agree that it was
    ______ ______

    reasonable for the five defendants, in their individual capaci-
    __________ _______

    ties, to obtain representation by their own counsel while the
    ____

    merits of plaintiffs' claims remained in litigation, since

    counsel to the City represented the individual defendants in

    their official capacities only. Linder points to no authority
    ________ __________

    for the implicit assumption that reasonable mitigation efforts

    require that the private interests of parties sued in their

    individual capacities must go unrepresented. Cf. Mariani, 983
    ___ _______

    F.2d at 8 n.5. Nor has he shown that the respective private

    interests of these individual defendants during the merits phase

    did not conflict to the point that mutual representation was

    precluded.13 Cf. Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc., 960 F.2d at
    ___ ______ __________________

    640, 648 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[w]e have little sympathy for the

    litigant who fires a big gun, and when the adversary returns

    fire, complains because he was only firing blanks").

    The court further found that "the total time spent by

    ____________________

    13Although the district court did not describe their precise
    nature, Linder does not challenge its finding that there were
    potential conflicts of interest among the various individual
    defendants. Thus, Linder failed to demonstrate an abuse of
    discretion. See Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1425.
    ___ _____________

    17














    each attorney on the merits was not excessive." Silva, slip op.
    _____

    at 13 (Nov. 5, 1992). The court also disallowed all fees for

    legal services, except those services directly rendered to the

    City, after the point in time when it became clear that no

    conflicts of interest precluded the individual defendants' joint

    representation by counsel to the City. See Brandt, 960 F.2d at
    ___ ______

    649 (no failure to mitigate where sanctioned attorney's broad

    complaint necessitated investment of extensive attorney time in

    defense and district court carefully monitored procedure). A

    party is required to mitigate expenses only insofar as is reason-

    able. Our review of the record discloses no basis for supposing

    that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a

    $53,528.81 reimbursement to the City for legal services rendered

    during the merits phase. See Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1426
    ___ _____________

    ("When the district court settles upon a monetary sanction and

    fixes a dollar amount, a reviewing tribunal should defer, within

    broad limits, to the district court's exercise of its informed

    discretion. Nevertheless, the court of appeals must be careful

    not merely to 'rubber-stamp the decisions of the district

    court.'") (citation omitted).


    b. Sanctions Phase
    b. Sanctions Phase
    _______________

    The district court disallowed all fees requested in

    relation to the sanctions phase of the litigation except for







    18














    those incurred by the City.14 The court found that counsel to

    the individual defendants had been notified in advance that the

    City no longer believed there existed any conflict of interest

    precluding joint representation. Thus, the court allowed only

    $21,821.15 in total fees and costs for 188 out of over 1500 hours

    expended by all counsel representing defendants during the

    sanctions phase. Linder does not challenge the reasonableness of

    the fees incurred by the City in the sanctions phase.15

    We therefore affirm the district court judgement.

    Affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ________

    ____________________

    14The district court adjusted for the additional hearing
    time required on the section 1988 motion by allowing fees for
    only 50% of the total time expended by defendants' counsel at the
    sanctions hearing, a finding not challenged on appeal.

    15Linder argues, however, apparently for the first time,
    that the district court abused its discretion by failing to take
    into account his financial ability to respond to the fee award.
    Even assuming this claim has been preserved, Linder presented no
    evidence concerning his financial condition, nor has he alleged
    financial inability to satisfy the sanction. Thus, there was no
    abuse of discretion. See White v. General Motors Corp., Inc.,
    ___ _____ ___________________________
    908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[i]nability to pay what the
    court would otherwise regard as an appropriate sanction should be
    treated as reasonably akin to an affirmative defense, with the
    burden upon the parties being sanctioned to come forward with
    evidence of their financial status"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069
    ____ ______
    (1991).
    We likewise reject Linder's claim that attorney fees reason-
    ably incurred in the sanctions phase may not be made the subject
    of a Rule 11 sanction. See Brandt, 960 F.2d at 651 (costs
    ___ ______
    incurred in litigating request for Rule 11 sanctions in district
    court recoverable as part of Rule 11 sanction); Robinson v. Dean
    ________ ____
    Witter Reynolds, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 15, 22 (D. Mass. 1989). Cf.
    _____________________ ___
    Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 949-50 (1st Cir.
    ___________________ ______
    1984) (reasonable fees and costs incurred in recovering attor-
    ney's fees under 1988 are reimbursable under 1988).
    Finally, although Linder argues that Rule 11 sanctions may
    chill civil rights actions, we cannot agree that a groundless
    civil rights action is any less appropriate a candidate for Rule
    11 sanctions than other groundless actions.

    19