Oropallo v. Parrish ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    May 5, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ___________________


    No. 93-1953




    CHARLES J. OROPALLO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    RICHARD L. PARRISH, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________
    Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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    ___________________

    Charles J. Oropallo on brief pro se.
    ___________________
    Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General, and Lucy C. Hodder,
    __________________ _______________
    Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.



    __________________

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    Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Charles J. Oropallo, a
    __________

    New Hampshire inmate, appeals pro se from the dismissal of

    his amended civil rights complaint for failure to state a

    claim. For the reasons stated below, we modify the dismissal

    in part, and, otherwise, affirm.

    BACKGROUND

    On June 8, 1993, appellant filed an in forma pauperis

    complaint in the district court alleging violations of 42

    U.S.C. 1983, 1985 against various prison employees and

    officials, as well as against two fellow inmates. The

    complaint also included two pendent state law claims.

    The following facts were alleged by Oropallo, and we

    assume for purposes of this opinion that they are true. In

    early 1991, defendant Viola Lunderville, Administrator of

    Security, terminated appellant from his job at the prison

    recreation department. Appellant filed a civil suit

    regarding this termination.1 In April 1991, approximately

    six weeks after terminating appellant from his job,

    Lunderville allegedly conspired with defendant Richard L.

    Parrish, a prison official, to fabricate charges against

    appellant. Parrish subsequently authored a false

    disciplinary report stating that he had received information






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    1. The complaint does not state when this suit was filed.

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    from two inmates leading him to search appellant's hobby

    craft locker where Parrish found state property.2

    After what Oropallo alleges was a sham disciplinary

    hearing, he was found guilty of unlawful possession of state

    property. The guilty finding was upheld by defendant Michael

    Cunningham, the prison warden, and defendant Ronald Powell,

    Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections.

    Thereafter, Oropallo filed a civil suit challenging the

    disciplinary proceeding.

    Since April 1991, and in connection with the

    "fabricated" charge, Oropallo allegedly has been banned from

    entering the North Yard area of the prison. Defendants

    Donald G. Robb and George R. Sasser, both prison employees,

    have allegedly participated in banning him from this area.

    Oropallo avers that he has been denied use of the prison

    gymnasium, hobby craft shop, North Yard ball field and

    attendance at a jazz concert and a power lifting event.

    Oropallo further avers that this "punishment" is in excess of

    that normally handed down for disciplinary violations.3


    ____________________

    2. The complaint alleges that these two inmate informants,
    identified as defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2,
    conspired with Parrish to deprive appellant of his civil
    rights.

    3. Although the complaint is far from clear on this point,
    it appears that the ban from entering the North Yard area of
    the prison and from participating in recreational activities
    was imposed prior to the disciplinary hearing. The ban is
    allegedly still in effect. It appears from Oropallo's brief
    that the sanctions imposed following the disciplinary hearing

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    In May 1992, Oropallo made inquiries of various prison

    officials, including defendant Powell, regarding his being

    banned from the North Yard area of the prison. Several days

    later, appellant's typewriter and legal papers were

    confiscated by defendant Loran Ackerman, a prison official.

    Appellant filed a civil suit contesting the confiscation of

    his legal materials.

    Based on these facts, the complaint alleged a violation

    of Oropallo's constitutional rights to due process and equal

    protection, citing the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

    to the Constitution. In addition, the complaint alleged that

    Oropallo has been unconstitutionally subjected to cruel and

    unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

    Amendments.

    The complaint was initially referred to a magistrate

    judge (hereinafter, magistrate) who reviewed it prior to

    completing service. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(d); Neitzke v.
    ___ _______

    Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989) (to avoid wasteful
    ________

    litigation, under 1915(d) the court may dismiss claims

    which are based on indisputably meritless legal theories or

    delusional factual scenarios). The magistrate concluded that

    Oropallo's "claims concerning attendance at the jazz concert

    and special event and use of the hobby craft shop and ball



    ____________________

    and guilty finding were suspended loss of good time and
    suspended punitive segregation time.

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    field are frivolous," and that his claim concerning

    deprivation of exercise is insufficient to make out an

    actionable constitutional violation. The magistrate granted

    Oropallo thirty days in which to amend his complaint or face

    a recommendation of dismissal.

    Oropallo filed an amended complaint which restated his

    1983 causes of action as claims for harassment, constituting

    cruel and unusual punishment, and discrimination, in

    violation of his rights to due process and equal protection.

    The amended complaint was otherwise identical to the original

    complaint. Oropallo did not aver that the alleged

    discrimination was directed towards him as a member of a

    particular class, or offer any other reason for the alleged

    disparate treatment.

    After reviewing Oropallo's amended complaint, the

    magistrate recommended that the complaint be dismissed for

    failure to state a claim.4 See Forte v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d
    ___ _____ ________

    1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991) (a district court may sua sponte dismiss

    an in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim

    following notice and an opportunity to amend in a manner that

    would satisfy the procedural safeguards of Fed. R. Civ. P.

    12(b)(6)). In support of his recommendation, the magistrate

    stated:


    ____________________

    4. The magistrate did not state whether this dismissal was
    intended to be pursuant to 1915(d) or Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6).

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    In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged that
    he had been deprived of certain recreational
    activities. Plaintiff was ordered to amend his
    complaint to state facts that show an indefinite
    limitation on exercise that could be harmful to his
    health. However, the amended complaint does no
    more than repeat the conclusory allegations of
    plaintiff's initial complaint, namely, that he has
    been deprived of "various recreational activities."
    Amended Complaint at paras. 29, and 30. Thus, the
    court finds that plaintiff has failed to show that
    he has suffered any constitutional deprivation.

    Oropallo filed a timely objection in which he disavowed

    ever making a claim concerning lack of exercise, and argued

    that he had stated a valid claim for harassment and

    discrimination in violation of 1983. In his objection,

    Oropallo, for the first time, articulated a motive for the

    alleged discrimination. Oropallo stated that he was being

    discriminated against in retaliation for the exercise of his

    first amendment right to file complaints.

    The district court reviewed the matter, and approved the

    magistrate's report without stating additional reasons.

    Judgment of dismissal entered on August 12, 1993. This

    appeal ensued.

    DISCUSSION

    Oropallo argues that his amended complaint should not

    have been dismissed because it states valid claims under

    1983 for violations of his constitutional rights to be free








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    from cruel and unusual punishment, to equal protection, to

    proceduraldue process,and topetition thecourts.5 We disagree.

    Since appellant was placed on notice of the inadequacy

    of his complaint and has had an opportunity to amend, we

    construe the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure

    to state a claim as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Guglielmo
    ___ _________

    v. Cunningham, 811 F. Supp. 31 (D.N.H. 1993). Appellate
    __________

    review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See,
    ___

    e.g., Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.
    ____ _______ ________________

    1991). The standard for assessing the adequacy of a civil

    rights claim is whether, accepting the factual allegations in

    the complaint as true, and construing these facts in the

    light most favorable to the plaintiff, the pleading shows any

    fact which could entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g.,
    ___ ____

    Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
    __________ ____________________________________________

    Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1161-63 (1993); Gooley v.
    _________________ ______

    Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). Because
    _______________

    appellant appears pro se, we read his complaint with an extra


    ____________________

    5. Oropallo does not raise on appeal the dismissal of his 42
    U.S.C. 1985 claim and it is, therefore, deemed waived.
    Even if we were to address this issue, we would hold that
    this claim was properly dismissed. Appellant does not
    specify the subsection of 1985 upon which he relies.
    However, the complaint can only conceivably be construed as
    asserting a claim under 1985(3) which prohibits
    conspiracies to interfere with the civil rights of
    individuals. As so construed, the complaint fails to state a
    cause of action because plaintiff does not allege that
    defendants' actions were directed at a protected class. See
    ___
    Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
    ____ __________________________________
    (1993).

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    degree of solicitude. Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23
    ____ __________

    (1st Cir. 1991).

    Oropallo's procedural due process claim is far from

    clear. The disciplinary hearing that appellant claims was a

    sham is the subject of an independent complaint, and he

    disavows any intent to challenge that proceeding in the

    instant amended complaint. Instead, appellant's theory

    appears to be that since the deprivations he complains of

    were not imposed as sanctions following this disciplinary

    hearing, or following any other hearing, they were

    unconstitutionally imposed without any process.

    This claim, however, must fail if there is no liberty

    interest in the activities he alleges he has been denied.

    See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
    ___ ____ _______________________________ ________

    U.S. 454 (1989) (holding that visitation privileges could be

    suspended without hearing where no liberty interest in

    receiving visitors existed). Appellant has abandoned any

    allegation that he has been deprived of adequate exercise,

    and the Constitution does not create an enforceable interest

    in recreational programs designed to relieve the boredom of

    prison life. Although liberty interests may be rooted in

    state law, none of the prison rules invoked by the appellant

    could conceivably be interpreted as creating an entitlement

    to recreation.





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    We need not devote much attention to Oropallo's Eighth

    Amendment claim. The deprivations Oropallo complains of are

    not sufficiently weighty to implicate the Eighth Amendment's

    ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Hudson v.
    ___ ______

    McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (stating that only
    _________

    those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of

    life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

    of an Eighth Amendment violation).

    Appellant's claim that he has been denied equal

    protection because prison officials imposed harsher sanctions

    on him than on others "similarly situated" also fails. A

    person bringing an action under the equal protection clause

    of the Fourteenth Amendment must either show a violation of a

    fundamental right or "intentional discrimination against him

    because of his membership in a particular class, not merely

    that he was treated unfairly as an individual." Huebschen v.
    _________

    Department of Health & Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167, 1171
    _______________________________________

    (7th Cir. 1983). There is no fundamental right to

    recreational activities, and Oropallo makes no allegation

    that race, religion or the like were at work here.

    Finally, we address plaintiff's retaliation claim. It

    is well established that conduct which is not otherwise

    constitutionally deficient is actionable under 1983 if done

    in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected

    first amendment freedoms. See Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d
    ___ ________ _____



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    888, 892 n.4 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[A]ctions otherwise

    supportable lose their legitimacy if designed to punish or

    deter an exercise of constitutional freedoms."); see also
    ________

    Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison
    ____ ______

    officials cannot lawfully impose a disciplinary sanction

    against a prisoner in retaliation for the prisoner's exercise

    of his constitutional right). In McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d
    ________ ____

    16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979), we held that an inmate's allegations

    that he was transferred to another prison in retaliation for

    having earlier filed actions against prison officials

    sufficed to state a cause of action.

    However, even if we construe Oropallo's amended

    complaint liberally to include his later allegation of

    retaliation, we think his complaint falls short of stating a

    cause of action. In contrast to Ferranti and McDonald, where
    ________ ________

    we found that the allegations were sufficient, it cannot be

    said that Oropallo has set forth a chronology of events which

    warrants an inference of retaliation. See Ferranti, 618
    ___ ________

    F.2d at 892 (inference of retaliation warranted from the

    chronology of events recited and from the allegation that

    appellant's first suit complains of prison conditions and is

    directed at prison officials); McDonald, 610 F.2d at 18
    ________

    (chronology of events provided support for inference of

    retaliation). Admittedly, Oropallo does detail in his

    complaint various lawsuits he has filed directed at prison



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    officials. However, it is unclear, based on the complaint,

    whether any of Oropallo's lawsuits antedates the decision to

    ban him from the North Yard area of the prison and from

    participating in recreational activities. If the ban was

    imposed prior to the lawsuits, Oropallo's claim of

    retaliation is seemingly without basis.

    Although we are persuaded that Oropallo has failed to

    state a claim for retaliation, the defect is one that might

    easily be cured by amendment. In light of appellant's pro se

    status, and because the district court did not address this

    claim, we think the dismissal should be modified to be

    without prejudice to the plaintiff's filing a second amended

    complaint realleging this claim. Furthermore, since

    appellant's pendent state claims were not addressed below, he

    should be permitted to reallege these claims. The dismissal

    of plaintiff's remaining claims is affirmed with prejudice.

    Affirmed as modified.
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