United States v. Figueroa ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    June 10, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 93-2150

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    THOMAS FIGUEROA,

    Defendant, Appellant.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. A. David Mazzone, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Torruella, Selya and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
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    Thomas Figueroa on brief pro se.
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    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Dina Michael
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    Chaitowitz, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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    Per Curiam. Thomas Figueroa appeals pro se from the
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    denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set

    aside, or correct his sentence. Following his conviction for

    conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute

    500 or more grams of cocaine, petitioner received a prison

    term of 97 months. This court thereafter affirmed his

    conviction and his sentence. United States v. Figueroa, 976
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    F.2d 1446 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1346
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    (1993). Petitioner now raises three issues, two relating to

    his sentence and a third involving his underlying conviction.

    He first contends that the district court improperly

    calculated the quantity of cocaine for which he was

    responsible for purposes of sentencing. We rejected this

    identical contention on direct appeal, see id. at 1460-61,
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    and so will not revisit the issue here. See, e.g., Barrett
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    v. United States, 965 F.2d 1184, 1190 n.11 (1st Cir. 1992)
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    (issues decided on direct appeal will not be reviewed again

    by way of 2255 motion).

    Petitioner's second claim involves the determination as

    to his role in the offense. The court reduced his offense

    level by two levels on the ground that he was a "minor"

    participant under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). Petitioner now

    asserts that the court was clearly erroneous in declining to

    impose a four-level reduction under 3B1.2(a) for "minimal"

    participation, or alternatively that his counsel was



















    ineffective in failing to seek such a reduction. He contends

    in this regard that his alcoholism was so disabling during

    the relevant period that he was incapable of anything more

    than tangential involvement in the conspiracy. To the

    contrary, the evidence of petitioner's participation--as

    revealed especially in two recorded telephone conversations

    he had with the government informant and as otherwise

    described in our earlier opinion--demonstrates that his role

    was more considerable than he suggests. We also note that

    counsel did, in fact, initially propose that a four-level

    reduction be applied. We find no clear error on the part of

    the court, and no substandard performance on the part of

    counsel.

    Petitioner's final argument is difficult to decipher.

    To the extent he is alleging "sentencing factor

    manipulation," see, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d
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    51, 55 (1st Cir. 1993), as the district court assumed, we

    reject such claim for the reasons recited in the recent

    appeal of a codefendant. See Figueroa v. United States, 19
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    F.3d 7, No. 93-2028, slip op. at 3-4 (1st Cir. 1994) (table).

    To the extent he is alleging governmental entrapment (or

    ineffective assistance for failure to pursue such a defense),

    it suffices to note that the record utterly belies any

    suggestion of "government inducement" or "lack of

    predisposition." United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 468
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    (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
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    1535 (1992)). Indeed, the two recorded conversations by

    themselves demonstrate that petitioner was anything but a

    reluctant participant. To the extent he is arguing that

    counsel improperly dissuaded him from testifying, we observe

    that petitioner personally disclaimed any interest in doing

    so in response to inquiries from the court. See, e.g., Lema
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    v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1993)
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    (evidence that petitioner "knowingly and voluntarily" waived

    right to testify defeated ineffective assistance claim). And

    to the extent he is seeking to vacate his conviction due to

    newly discovered evidence, we reject the claim on the grounds

    that it was not advanced below and is in any event entirely

    conclusory.

    Finally, as each of petitioner's claims (where

    possessing the requisite factual specificity) was subject to

    refutation on the basis of the existing record, the court was

    justified in dismissing the petition without a hearing. See,
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    e.g., United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225-26 (1st Cir.
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    1993).

    Affirmed.
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