Fox v. SouthEast ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    June 3, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 94-1038




    GERALDINE FOX, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellees,

    v.

    SOUTHEAST TRANSPORT INC.,
    A/K/A BILL MATT ENTERPRISES,
    Defendant, Appellant.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
    Circuit Judges.
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    Steven J. Marullo on brief for appellant.
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    Gary H. Goldberg on brief for appellees.
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    Per Curiam. Appellant Southeast Transport Corporation
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    appeals a judgment by the United States District Court for

    the District of Massachusetts in the amount of $15,000 for

    appellee Geraldine Fox and in the amount of $20,000 for

    appellee Melinda St. John, and the award to appellees of

    reasonable attorneys' fees. We summarily affirm.

    I

    Fox and St. John were hired by appellant as truck

    drivers in June 1988. They were both terminated on August 11

    of the same year. In 1989, appellees brought suit alleging

    that appellant had discriminated against each "based upon her

    sex in the terms and conditions of her employment by creating

    a hostile, offensive and abusive work environment and

    terminating her employment" in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e

    and Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. In July 1991, the court entered

    a default judgment against defendant, pursuant to Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 55(a). The court then conducted an evidentiary

    hearing to determine the amount to be awarded to each

    appellee in damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

    Plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress on

    their Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B claim. They also requested

    reasonable attorneys' fees. Each of the appellees testified

    at the hearing, as did two witnesses for the defendant. The

    court detailed its findings and conclusions in a memorandum

    and order dated December 9, 1993.



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    On appeal, appellant asserts two assignments of error.

    First, appellant claims that certain testimony received by

    the court at the evidentiary hearing should have been barred

    as hearsay, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which

    appellant contends apply to hearings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

    P. 55(b). Second, appellant contends that there was

    insufficient evidence presented to sustain the award of

    damages to each appellee.

    II

    Once the default judgment had entered, it was

    established, as alleged in the complaint, that the appellant

    had discriminated against the appellees both by creating a

    hostile work environment and by terminating their employment

    because they were women. See Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S.
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    218, 225 (1929). Therefore, the only issue to be decided at

    the Rule 55(b)(2) hearing was the amount of damages to which

    appellees were entitled as a result of appellant's illegal

    conduct. See Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, 990 F.2d 1, 4
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    (1st Cir. 1993). In its memorandum and order, the court,

    as required, stated its findings of fact and conclusions.

    See Brown v. Kenron Aluminum & Glass Corp., 477 F.2d 526,
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    530-31 (8th Cir. 1973); Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671
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    F.2d 636, 638 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court found that

    appellees were credible witnesses. It also concluded, based

    in part on its assessment of credibility, that the appellees



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    had suffered "significant emotional distress" because of

    specific illegal conduct by the appellant and, therefore,

    were entitled to damages under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. See
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    Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
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    Discrimination, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182, 478 N.E.2d 1292,
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    1299 (an award of emotional distress damages under ch. 151B

    can be sustained by finding of discrimination alone even in

    the absence of physical injury or psychiatric consultation),

    review denied, 395 Mass. 1103, 482 N.E.2d 328 (1985).
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    Having read the whole of the record, we find no

    reversible error in any of the factual findings or

    conclusions of the district court. See Cumpiano v. Banco
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    Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990) (an
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    appellate court "ought not to upset findings of fact or

    conclusions drawn therefrom unless, on the whole of the

    record, [the appellate judges] form a strong, unyielding

    belief that a mistake has been made"). Furthermore, in light

    of the court's findings and given that damages for emotional

    distress are "not easily computed and, therefore, . . .

    extremely fact-sensitive," we find no abuse of discretion in

    the court's assessment of damages in this case. Jones, 990
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    F.2d at 5 (upholding an award for emotional damages based

    mainly on defendant's statement of damages and sworn

    testimony).





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    Finally, we find no evidence, and appellant has called

    our attention to none, which would indicate that the court,

    in its factual findings and conclusions, explicitly or

    implicitly relied on any of the statements alleged to be

    hearsay. Therefore, even if we were to assume arguendo both
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    that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to a hearing to

    determine damages and that the testimony challenged by

    appellant was inadmissible hearsay, any error in the

    admission which may have occurred was harmless. See Vincent
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    v. Louis Marx & Co., 874 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1989)
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    (admission of evidence harmless when appellate court can say

    "with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not

    substantially swayed by the error") (citations omitted).

    Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
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