Grande v. Bank of New England ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion






    June 1, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




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    No. 93-2049

    VINCENT GRANDE,

    Plaintiff - Appellant,

    v.

    BANK OF NEW ENGLAND OLD COLONY, N.A.
    AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

    Defendants - Appellees.

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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
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    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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    and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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    Robert S. Wolfe, with whom Wolfe Associates, Alan R. Hoffman
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    and Lynch, Brewer, Hoffman & Sands, were on brief for appellant.
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    Claire L. McGuire, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance
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    Corporation, with whom Ann S. DuRoss, Assistant General Counsel,
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    Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance
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    Corporation, Paul R. Devin, Allan N. David, Sandra P. Criss,
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    Peabody & Arnold, Richard E. Gentilli and Kaye, Fialkow, Richmond
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    & Rothstein, were on brief for appellees.
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    Per Curiam. In this action, the plaintiff, Vincent
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    Grande, as Trustee of R. D. Realty Trust, asserts several claims

    against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as

    receiver for the Bank of New England ("BNE"). As the district

    court noted, the form of Grande's claims is substantively driven

    by his desperate attempt to avoid the reach of D'Oench, Duhme &
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    Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942), and
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    its statutory cognate, 12 U.S.C. 1823(e). After a bench trial,

    the district court found that Grande's attempts fell short of

    overcoming the nearly insurmountable hurdle that the D'Oench
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    Duhme doctrine presents, and found in favor of the FDIC on all
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    counts. We affirm.

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
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    BNE held a first mortgage on a condominium development.

    Manchester Properties Limited Partnership ("MPLP") was the

    mortgagor. Grande held a second mortgage on the property.

    Eventually, the BNE loan went into default, the mortgage was

    foreclosed, and the property was sold at a deficiency.

    Grande makes several claims to attempt to recover some

    of the foreclosure proceeds despite BNE's priority in its first

    mortgage over Grande's second mortgage. First, Grande asserts

    that BNE agreed to allow him and MPLP to exchange Grande's second

    mortgage for the first condominium unit built. Second, Grande

    claims that even if D'Oench, Duhme or 12 U.S.C. 1823(e) bars
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    direct claims based on the purported agreement between BNE and

    MPLP to allow an exchange (between MPLP and Grande) of the second


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    mortgage for a condominium unit, BNE's mortgage should be

    equitably subordinated to Grande's claims. Third, Grande points

    to language in the first mortgage that Grande contends should be

    read as permitting him to receive a portion of the proceeds of a

    foreclosure sale, before the first mortgage is satisfied.

    Fourth, Grande claims that he is entitled to recovery because BNE

    negligently supervised construction at the condominium project,

    and this caused a loss of approximately $200,000 which harmed

    Grande.1

    GRANDE'S CLAIMS
    GRANDE'S CLAIMS
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    With respect to Grande's first contention, we agree

    with the district court that Grande's claim is barred by D'Oench,
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    Duhme and 18 U.S.C. 1823(e).2 We will not rehash the district
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    1 Grande has raised other subsidiary contentions on appeal. We
    have reviewed these issues and believe that they are meritless.

    2 12 U.S.C. 1823(e) expressly provides:

    No agreement which tends to diminish or
    defeat the interest of [the FDIC] in any
    asset acquired by it under this section or
    section 1821 of this title, either as
    security for a loan or by purchase or as
    receiver of any insured depository
    institution, shall be valid against [the
    FDIC] unless such agreement --

    1) is in writing,

    2) was executed by the depository
    institution and any person claiming an
    adverse interest thereunder, including
    the obligor, contemporaneously with the
    acquisition of the asset by the
    depository institution,

    3) was approved by the board of directors
    of the depository institution or its loan

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    court's thorough discussion of the barriers D'Oench, Duhme and 12
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    U.S.C. 1823(e) present to claims against the FDIC, and the

    expansive reach of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. See Grande v.
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    Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., No. 91-10080, slip op. at 3-6
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    (D. Mass. September 7, 1993). Rather, we conclude that Grande's

    claim that BNE agreed to an exchange of Grande's second mortgage

    for a condominium unit does not comport with the requirements of

    D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. 1823(e), and therefore Grande
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    cannot rely on this agreement as a basis for recovery against the

    FDIC. Under D'Oench, Duhme, bank borrowers or guarantors are
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    prohibited from using secret or unrecorded side agreements to

    defend against efforts by the FDIC to collect on promissory notes

    that it has acquired from a failed bank. See D'Oench, Duhme, 315
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    U.S. at 460. Similarly, 12 U.S.C. 1823(e) codifies this

    principle and requires, in pertinent part to this appeal, that no

    agreement which tends to diminish the interest of the FDIC in any

    asset acquired by it as receiver, shall be valid against the FDIC

    unless it is "approved by the board of directors of the

    depository institution or its loan committee, which approval

    shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee."

    Grande has failed to prove that the exchange was

    approved by the relevant BNE credit committee, and more

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    committee, which approval shall be
    reflected in the minutes of said board or
    committee, and

    4) has been, continuously, from the time
    of its execution, an official record of
    the depository institution.

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    importantly, that this approval was officially recorded in the

    requisite committee minutes. Rather, Grande proffers and relies

    upon evidence of negotiations between BNE, MPLP, and Grande,

    regarding the proposed exchange. As the district court found,

    this evidence is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 12

    U.S.C. 1823(e). Furthermore, Grande's arguments that certain

    documents were incorporated into other documents that were

    approved by the credit committee are unsubstantiated. Put

    simply, the minutes of BNE's credit committee do not contain any

    mention of an agreement permitting the exchange of Grande's

    second mortgage for the condominium unit. Therefore, 12 U.S.C.

    1823(e) and D'Oench, Duhme bar Grande's claims against the BNE
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    based on this alleged agreement.

    Grande alternatively claims that even if his claims are

    barred by D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. 1823(e), the doctrine of
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    equitable subordination requires that Grande's mortgage be given

    priority. To make out a claim for equitable subordination,

    traditionally a bankruptcy doctrine, a party must prove that 1)

    the claimant engaged in some sort of inequitable conduct; 2) the

    misconduct resulted in injury to the bankrupt's creditors or

    conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and 3) equitable

    subordination of the claim is not inconsistent with the

    provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In re 604 Columbus Ave.
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    Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1353 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations
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    omitted). Thus, to support a claim in this context, Grande must

    first prove that BNE engaged in some sort of inequitable conduct.


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    As evidence of such inequitable conduct, Grande contends that the

    BNE improperly administered the construction loan and, as a

    result, some $200,000 of construction funds were not properly

    disbursed. The district court found, however, that there was no

    evidence that these unaccounted for funds did not, in fact, go

    into the project, and thus there is no predicate for a finding

    that any wrongdoing occurred on the part of any BNE employee.

    Additionally, the district court found that Grande did not suffer

    any harm based on the alleged inequitable conduct of BNE. We

    see no reason to disturb either of the district court's factual

    findings.3 Grande has therefore failed to sustain his burden of

    proof on the equitable subordination claim, and we need not reach

    the question of whether Grande's equitable subordination claim is

    barred as a matter of law based on D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C.
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    1823(e).4


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    3 We review a district court's finding of facts in a bench trial
    under the clear error standard. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
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    Farms Dairy, 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1992).
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    4 Grande also brought a claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A based
    upon alleged unfair actions taken by BNE. The district court
    found that Grande failed to satisfy his burden of proving that
    BNE made misrepresentations or otherwise acted unfairly toward
    MPLP or Grande. While Grande argues that the district court's
    factual Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A findings were "fatally flawed," he
    has not pointed to any specific evidence in the record which
    demonstrates that these findings were clearly erroneous. The
    fact that certain evidence was susceptible of another
    interpretation is insufficient to show that the interpretation
    chosen by the district court was erroneous. Rather, where there
    are two permissible views of the evidence, the interpretation
    assigned by the district court must be adopted. Williams v.
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    Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 278 (1st Cir. 1993). Therefore, we credit
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    the district court's findings and affirm its ruling on the Mass.
    Gen. L. ch. 93A claim.

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    Grande's third contention is a breach of contract claim

    to the effect that language in BNE's first mortgage should be

    read as modifying the priorities of the mortgages to permit

    Grande to receive a portion of the proceeds of the foreclosure

    sale. We agree with the district court's ruling that the

    language in the documents that Grande relies upon simply does not

    support his interpretation that the priority of the mortgages

    should be altered. For instance, Grande points to language in

    Schedule A of the first mortgage deed, which provided for the

    payment of release fees to Grande under the following

    circumstances:

    The Mortgagee shall issue partial
    releases of this mortgage for each newly
    constructed unit upon the payment to it
    by the Mortgagor of ninety percent
    (90.0%) of the proceeds, net reasonable
    costs of conveyance and partial release
    fee of Forty-seven thousand two hundred
    twenty-two and 22/100 ($47,222.22)
    dollars per unit to the Mortgagee,
    Vincent Grande, Trustee . . .

    This language cannot reasonably be read to change the priority so

    that the first mortgage is subordinated to the interest of the

    second mortgagee. Rather, the provision seems to simply

    anticipate the payment of release fees on completed units at the

    time they were sold. No units were completed prior to the

    default. Moreover, upon foreclosure, Grande's rights under the

    second mortgage, including the payment of release fees, were

    extinguished. See Duff v. United States Trust Co., 327 Mass. 17,
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    20, 97 N.E.2d 189, 191 (1951) (an agreement to give a partial

    release is only effective until default under the mortgage).

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    Grande's final contention is that he is entitled to

    recovery based upon BNE's negligent supervision of construction

    on the project, causing a loss of approximately $200,000. The

    district court found that Grande failed to proffer credible

    evidence demonstrating that BNE negligently inspected

    construction on the project and/or improperly advanced funds

    under the construction loan agreement. The district court also

    found that Grande failed to prove that he was damaged, or that

    the value of the property was impaired, by BNE's alleged

    negligence. Again, we have not been shown any evidence in the

    record which demonstrates why these findings were clearly

    erroneous. Therefore, Grande's claim based on negligent

    supervision also fails.

    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district

    court is affirmed.
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