Hodge v. American Home ( 1994 )


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    May 27, 1994 [Not for Publication]
    [Not for Publication]

    United States Court of Appeals
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 93-2091

    WALTER HODGE,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin, and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________


    ____________________

    Carlos R. Noriega for appellant.
    _________________
    John E. Mudd with whom Dario Rivera-Carrasquillo and Cordero,
    _____________ _________________________ ________
    Miranda & Pinto were on brief for appellees.
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    Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Walter Hodge
    ____________

    appeals the district court's grant of defendant-appellees',

    American Home Assurance Co. and Underwriter Adjustment Co.,

    motion to dismiss with prejudice. We affirm.

    I.
    I.
    __

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
    __________

    Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 3, 1989,

    alleging that defendants had failed to reimburse him for

    damages to his insured property resulting from a series of

    earthquakes on the island of St. Martin. Defendants argued

    that the damages were the result of faulty construction and

    therefore exempt from coverage.

    On the eve of the trial and almost four years after

    the date of filing of the complaint, defendants filed a

    motion in limine, seeking to disqualify plaintiff's liability
    __ ______

    expert for lack of qualifications. The motion was granted

    and thereafter, plaintiff's counsel sought to withdraw as

    counsel, claiming irreconcilable differences with his client.

    This motion was denied and the trial began as scheduled.

    During opening arguments, in clear disregard of

    Fed. R. Evid. 408, plaintiff's counsel referred to an offer

    of settlement apparently made by defendants. After

    sustaining defendants' objection and warning plaintiff's

    counsel not to refer to settlement negotiations, the court

    instructed the jury to disregard counsel's remark.



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    Notwithstanding the court's admonition, plaintiff's counsel

    resumed his opening by telling the jury that the defendants

    were unwilling to settle. Defendants objected and

    immediately moved for a mistrial. After discussion with both

    parties, the court declared a mistrial and informed

    plaintiff's counsel that "Upon request of counsel I will

    impose what I consider a non resident bond, to defray some

    costs in this case." Plaintiff's counsel did not object.

    On May 10, 1993, the court issued a written order

    setting forth its reasons for declaring a mistrial. In the

    same order, the court also granted defendants' D.P.R.L.R.

    3041 motion requesting plaintiff post a $3000 non-resident


    ____________________

    1. D.P.R.L.R. 304 states, in relevant part, that:

    When the plaintiff is domiciled
    outside of Puerto Rico or is a foreign
    corporation, a bond shall be required to
    secure the costs, expenses and attorneys'
    fees which may be awarded. All
    proceedings in the action may be stayed
    until bond is posted, which shall not be
    less than $250.00. The Court may require
    an additional bond upon a showing that
    the original bond is not sufficient
    security, and may stay the proceedings in
    the action until such additional bond is
    given.

    After the lapse of sixty (60) days
    from the service of the order requiring
    bond or additional bond, without bond
    having been posted, the Court may dismiss
    the action.

    This rule shall be liberally
    interpreted in favor of the plaintiff so
    as not to preclude his or her right to

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    bond "to secure the costs, expenses and attorneys' fees which

    may be awarded." Plaintiff neither objected to nor

    complied with this order. Subsequently, defendants filed a

    verified, detailed bill of costs in the amount of $73,079.99

    for expenses incurred in preparation for the defense,

    together with a motion requesting the non-resident bond be

    increased to $50,000. The court granted defendants' motion.

    Again, plaintiff neither objected to nor complied with this

    court order.

    After plaintiff had ignored the court's bond order

    for sixty days, the time prescribed by D.P.R.L.R. 304,

    defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 41(b)2 and D.P.R.L.R. 304.




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    sue through excessive bond requirement.
    Consistent with this, the Court, for good
    ________
    cause shown, may dispense with this
    ____________
    requirement. (emphasis supplied).

    2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states:

    (b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect
    Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
    prosecute or to comply with these rules
    or any order of court, a defendant may
    move for dismissal of an action or of any
    claim against the defendant. Unless the
    court in its order for dismissal
    otherwise specified, a dismissal under
    this subdivision and any dismissal not
    provided for in this rule, other than a
    dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
    improper venue, or for failure to join a
    party under Rule 19, operates as an
    adjudication upon the merits.

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    On August 25, 1993, the court, in a lengthy written

    order, dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 41(b) citing, inter alia, plaintiff's extreme
    _____ ____

    misconduct in failing to obey court orders and warnings. The

    following day, plaintiff's counsel, who had not yet received

    a copy of the August 25, 1993 order, requested, inter alia,
    _____ ____

    an additional thirty days to post bond. On September 20,

    1993, the court issued a separate order restating that the

    case was dismissed with prejudice as of August 25, 1993.

    Finally, on September 22, 1993, the court formally denied

    plaintiff's request for additional time. It is from the

    court's judgment of dismissal with prejudice that plaintiff

    now appeals.

    II.
    II.
    ___

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________

    Plaintiff avers that the court abused its

    discretion because it never gave consideration to the

    problems that had ensued between plaintiff and counsel and

    because the court never considered plaintiff's inability to

    pay the required bond. The basis of plaintiff's argument is

    that the court should have inferred from his motion filed

    August 26, 1993, the day after the court dismissed the action
    _____

    with prejudice, that plaintiff was seeking a new attorney and

    that he did not have the finances to pay the bond. We are

    not persuaded by either argument.



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    The parameters of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) dismissals

    are very clear:

    Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure expressly authorizes a district
    court to dismiss a case "[f]or failure of
    the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with
    . . . any order of court.' Dismissal
    with prejudice is a ``harsh sanction,'
    _______________
    Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d
    _______ ____________________
    196, 199 (1st Cir. 1971), which ``should
    be employed only when a plaintiff's
    misconduct has been extreme,' Figueroa
    ________
    Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 647 (1st
    ____ _______
    Cir. 1990), and ``only after the district
    court has determined ``that none of the
    lesser sanctions available to it would
    truly be appropriate,'" Enlace Mercantil
    ________________
    Int'l, Inc. v. Senior Indus., Inc., 848
    ___________ ____________________
    F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1988). A finding
    of extreme misconduct is justified if
    there is extremely protracted inaction,
    disobedience of court orders, ignorance
    of warnings, contumacious conduct, Cosme
    _____
    Nieves v. Deshler, 826 F.2d 1,2 (1st Cir.
    ______ _______
    1987), or "some other aggravating
    circumstance such as ``prejudice to the
    defendant, glaring weaknesses in the
    plaintiff's case, and the wasteful
    expenditure of a significant amount of
    the district court's time.'" Figueroa
    ________
    Ruiz, 896 F.2d at 648 (quoting Enlace
    ____ ______
    Mercantil, 848 F.2d at 317).
    _________

    Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
    ______________________ _____________

    Cir. 1993). We review a court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)

    dismissal for abuse of discretion. Pinero Capo v. United
    ___________ ______

    States, 7 F.3d 283, 284 (1st Cir. 1993).
    ______

    We begin by noting that plaintiff has waived any

    complaint he may have with the amount of the non-resident

    bond imposed by the court below. A review of the record

    reveals that each of the bond orders was issued without


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    prejudice to either party to request an increase or

    reduction. Nonetheless, plaintiff neither objected to the

    imposition of the bonds nor argued to the court that there

    existed circumstances which demanded a reduction in the

    amount. Rather, plaintiff silently ignored the bond orders

    thereby waiving his right to challenge them on appeal.3 See
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    McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.3d 13,
    _____ ______________________________________

    22 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is hornbook law that theories not

    raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for

    the first time on appeal.").

    Moreover, we are not concerned with the personality

    conflicts that may have existed between plaintiff and

    counsel. Although unfortunate for the two men, we do not

    understand how the fact that there may have been friction

    could possibly have prevented the plaintiff from posting the

    required bond.

    Finally, in light of plaintiff's repeated inability

    to comply with court warnings and court orders, i.e.,
    ____


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    3. Even had we not found waiver, we see no error in the
    court's orders. As previously held, when reviewing Local
    Rule 5, D.P.R.C.R. 304's predecessor, the court "should
    consider, upon proper motion, reducing the . . . minimum bond
    ____ ______ ______
    requirement, or dispensing with it altogether . . . ." Hawes
    _____
    v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 144 (1st Cir.
    ____________________________
    1976)(emphasis supplied). Only then should the court
    consider "ownership by a nondomiciliary plaintiff of
    attachable property in the district, the likelihood of
    success on the merits, the presence of a co-plaintiff who is
    domiciled in the district, the probable length and complexity
    of the litigation, the conduct of the litigants, and the
    purposes of the litigation." Id. (footnotes omitted).
    ___

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    plaintiff's failure to comply with the court's order

    addressed to the expert witness requesting documents

    regarding his qualifications as an expert, plaintiff's

    counsel's repeated in- court references to settlement

    negotiations in flagrant disregard of the court's warning,

    and plaintiff's refusal to comply with the court's two bond

    orders, together with what the court perceived as a weakness

    in plaintiff's case due to the lack of expert testimony to

    support his claims, we do not find that the court's action in

    dismissing the case with prejudice was an abuse of

    discretion.

    III.
    III.
    ____

    CONCLUSION
    CONCLUSION
    __________

    For the foregoing reasons, the order of the

    district court is

    Affirmed. Costs to Appellees.
    Affirmed. Costs to Appellees.
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