Calabria v. DuBois ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    May 24, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 93-1742


    DANTE CALABRIA,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    LARRY E. DUBOIS, ETC., ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
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    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ____________________

    Dante Calabria on brief pro se.
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    Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
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    Kathleen J. Moore on brief for appellees.
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    Per Curiam. Plaintiff Dante Calabria, a
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    Massachusetts inmate, appeals the dismissal of his pro se
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    1983 action for failure to state a claim. These facts appear

    from the face of the complaint.

    I
    I
    _

    In November 1992, Calabria, a cook's helper at the

    Old Colony Correctional Center ("OCCS"), was placing potatoes

    in pans preparing to bake them as directed by correction

    officer Borges, the head cook, when another correction

    officer, Hurst, suggested to Calabria that, as the chicken

    was to be baked, the potatoes be boiled. Calabria responded

    that he had been ordered to bake the potatoes and resumed

    work. Hurst repaired to Borges' office, to which Calabria

    was soon summoned, whereupon Borges ordered Calabria to boil

    the potatoes and then threw a radio belt at Calabria causing

    blood to appear at the corner of his mouth. Calabria

    received medical attention soon afterwards, during which time

    Calabria claims to have been informed that Borges had a

    significant history of assaultive behavior towards inmates.

    Upon this recital, Calabria sued Borges, Dubois, the

    Commissioner of the Department of Correction, and Murphy, the

    superintendent of the OCCC, in their individual and official

    capacities. The principal charge is that defendants

    inflicted unnecessary and unjustified force and cruel and


















    unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

    Calabria claims that Dubois and Murphy knew about Borges'

    propensity for assaulting inmates, but were deliberately

    indifferent to the danger in which plaintiff was placed

    because Borges was allowed to work with inmates in an

    unsupervised environment. Calabria seeks declaratory and

    injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages for

    physical pain, stress, and mental anguish.

    Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the

    alternative, for summary judgment, presented a slightly

    different version of the precipitating event, but the basic

    facts were undisputed: while working in the kitchen, Calabria

    was struck on the mouth by an object thrown by Borges; blood

    appeared and medical attention was had. There was no

    disturbance and no disciplinary report was filed. The

    district court acknowledged some conflict in the parties'

    versions of the event, but concluded that even if the court

    were to assume that plaintiff's account was true, Calabria

    had failed to state a claim for which relief could be

    granted. We agree that the single blow described does not

    state a cognizable cause of action under the Eighth Amendment

    and Calabria could not possibly prove an excessive force

    violation based on that recitation, indulging all reasonable

    and plausible inferences in his favor.





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    II
    II
    __

    Calabria's chief premise on appeal is that the

    district court, in dismissing his complaint, misapplied the

    standard for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims

    enunciated in Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), and
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    focused upon the extent of Calabria's injuries rather than

    his allegations regarding the malicious and sadistic nature

    of defendants' conduct. In this regard, Calabria appears to

    argue that because institutional security was not at stake,

    the force used was unnecessary, and the conduct alleged by

    Calabria is sufficient to state a claim. Alternatively,

    Calabria complains that the district court blindly accepted

    defendants' version of the offending conduct, and that

    because the parties' versions of that conduct vary greatly,

    material issues of fact remain to be resolved. However, as

    indicated above, the basic underlying facts are not disputed

    and the district court accepted plaintiff's allegations as

    true for the purpose of deciding the motion.

    In arguing that dismissal for failure to state a

    claim was proper, defendants chiefly rely on (1) the absence

    of factual allegations showing unnecessary and wanton

    infliction of pain; and (2) Calabria's bare recital that he

    was struck once during the normal course of daily activities,





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    reflects, under Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000, a de minimis use
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    of physical force excluded from Eighth Amendment recognition.

    III
    III
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    Generally, an Eighth Amendment claimant must allege

    and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

    Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). Hudson v.
    _______ ______ ______

    McMillian extended Whitley, which involved a prison riot, to
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    any excessive force claim and held: "the core judicial

    inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith

    effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

    sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
    ______

    Further, the Court decided that the "objectively harmful

    enough" component of an Eighth Amendment claim is always

    satisfied when prison officials use force maliciously and

    sadistically to cause harm "whether or not significant injury

    is evident." Id. at 999-1000. In deciding that the extent
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    of Hudson's injuries (bruises and swelling of face, mouth and

    lip, loosened teeth and cracked dental plate) could result

    from non-de minimis force for Eighth Amendment purposes, and
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    were relevant to (but not determinative of) the "unnecessary

    and wanton" Whitley inquiry, the Court nonetheless indicated
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    that there was some quantum of physical force that was

    necessarily excludable from Eighth Amendment recognition,

    unless that use of force was otherwise repugnant. Id. at
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    1000. That not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard



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    gives rise to a federal cause of action," id., suggests that
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    merely superficial injury permits a reliable inference that

    the accompanying force was not "harmful enough," Wilson v.
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    Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991), and is constitutionally
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    de minimis. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (inferences may
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    be drawn from, among other factors, the extent of the injury

    inflicted as to whether the use of force employed evidenced

    wanton conduct); see also Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 701
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    (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, to state a 1983 claim that he was

    subjected to a malicious and sadistic attack in violation of

    the Eighth Amendment, Calabria must allege wrongdoing that

    reasonably and plausibly amounts to more than a de minimis
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    use of force.

    The conduct presented here -- a single blow caused

    by a thrown object and resulting only in a bloody lip -- was

    clearly de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes, and
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    Calabria's complaint was properly dismissed as legally

    deficient. See, e.g., Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699,
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    700 (5th Cir. 1993) (spraying with fire extinguisher); Olson
    _____

    v. Coleman, 804 F. Supp. 148, 150 (D. Kan. 1992), aff'd, 1993
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    U.S. App. Lexis 10086 (10th Cir. 1993) (single blow to head

    while handcuffed); Gabai v. Jacoby, 800 F. Supp. 1149, 1154-
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    55 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (shoved into chair); Candelaria v.
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    Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 979
    ________ _____

    F.2d 845 (2d Cir 1992) (fist pushed against neck); see also
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    Risdal v. Martin, 810 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 & n.12 (S.D. Iowa
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    1993); cf. Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th
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    Cir. 1992) (putting gun to inmate's head could be malicious

    and sadistic precluding dismissal for failure to state a

    claim). Nor can we say that there is any "meaningful

    indication" that further pleading at this stage would make

    any "dispositive difference." Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth
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    College, 889 F.2d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 1989).
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    IV
    IV
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    As a final matter, Calabria complains that the

    district court erroneously removed a default judgment entered

    against the defendants and permitted the late filing of an

    answer. However, Calabria's motion for default was filed

    three weeks after service on the defendants, the default

    entered twelve days later, and defendants moved to remove the

    default two weeks later, less than seven weeks from service

    of the complaint. Under these circumstances, the district

    court acted well within its discretion in allowing relief

    from the default order. Cf., e.g., Clinkscales v. Chevron
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    U.S.A., 831 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987) (six month delay
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    in filing reply brief inexcusable).

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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