Cote v. Vetter ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 93-1649

    ALFRED F. COTE,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    WAYNE E. VETTER, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


    [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    Alfred F. Cote on brief pro se.
    ______________
    Mark S. Gearreald and Engel, Gearreald & Gardner, P.A. on brief
    __________________ _________________________________
    for appellees.


    ____________________

    July 8, 1994
    ____________________


























    Per Curiam. In 1993, Alfred F. Cote, a New
    __________

    Hampshire inmate, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983

    claiming that Vetter, a county sheriff, and two deputy

    sheriffs, Janvrine and Powers, had manifested

    unconstitutional conduct when they executed Cote's

    extradition to Illinois on July 22, 1987. The district court

    dismissed the suit as untimely. We affirm.

    The parties do not dispute that New Hampshire law

    applies to this case. Although Cote has attempted to invoke

    other statutory limitations periods, New Hampshire's three-

    year personal injury statute of limitations, N.H. Rev. Stat.

    Ann. (RSA) 508:4, governs this 1983 action. Wilson v.
    ______

    Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985) (state law limitation
    ______

    period, tolling and revival provisions apply). As Cote's

    claim arose out of the events surrounding his extradition

    from New Hampshire to Illinois on July 22, 1987, the

    limitations period under RSA 508:4 expired on July 22, 1991.

    Thus, this action, filed on January 26, 1993 in the New

    Hampshire federal district court, is barred unless Cote can

    take advantage of New Hampshire's saving statute, RSA 508:10.

    The statute, entitled "Second Suit", provides:

    If judgment is rendered against
    the plaintiff in an action
    brought within the time limited
    therefor, or upon a writ of
    error thereon, and the right of
    action is not barred by the
    judgment, a new action may be
    brought thereon in one year


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    after the judgment.

    While the statute is "designed to insure a diligent suitor

    the right to a hearing in court until he reaches a judgment

    on the merits," Adams v. Sullivan, 110 N.H. 101, 105, 261
    _____ ________

    A.2d 273, 276 (1970), "[o]nly where the cause has become

    barred by the general limitation [RSA 510:4] does a plaintiff

    have occasion to rely upon RSA 508:10." Hughes v. Hebert,
    ______ ______

    106 N.H. 176, 178, 207 A.2d 432, 433 (1965). Thus, when a

    timely action is later dismissed "for reasons not barring the

    right of action or determining it on its merits," id., a new
    ___

    action, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,

    may be brought within a year of the judgment, providing the

    general limitation period will or has run.

    According to Cote, this complaint was first filed

    against these defendants, and others, in federal district

    court in the Northern District of Illinois on June 1, 1988.

    On February 8, 1989, the court granted defendants' motion to

    dismiss concluding, inter alia, that it lacked personal
    _____ ____

    jurisdiction over Vetter, Powers and Janvrine because they

    had not performed any acts in Illinois. Cote v. Kontos, et
    ____ __________

    al., No. 88-C-4751, Memorandum Opinion and Order (N.D. Ill.
    ___

    Feb. 7, 1989). Cote's appeal from that judgment was

    voluntarily dismissed under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) on August

    21, 1990.

    Clearly, when judgment entered in the Illinois



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    federal district court on February 7, 1989, the three-year

    limitation period had not yet expired, precluding operation

    of the saving statute. Even if we were to consider the date

    of the voluntary dismissal of the appeal, August 21, 1990, as

    the operative "judgment" under RSA 508:10, Cote would have

    only derived an additional year to revive his suit, that is,

    until August 21, 1991.1 Thus, under either scenario, Cote's

    action is untimely and was properly dismissed.

    Cote attempts to avoid this result by pointing to a

    third and intervening 1983 action which he filed in the New

    Hampshire district court in April 1990, within the three-year

    limitation period. Cote v. Rockingham County, et al., No.
    ____ __________________________

    90-CV-152. Vetter, Powers, and Janvrine were not originally

    named defendants in that action. Cote was allowed to file an

    amended complaint naming them. However, on September 2,

    1992, that amended complaint was dismissed by a magistrate-

    judge and the case proceeded against the original defendants.

    Cote has represented in this complaint, and argues here,

    that, in recommending dismissal of the amended complaint in

    No. 90-CV-152, the district court had "ordered" Cote to

    remove and refile a separate complaint against the

    defendants. However, no such "order" ever issued. The



    ____________________

    1. The defendants-appellees argue that the dismissal in
    Illinois for lack of personal jurisdiction would not, as a
    matter of law, implicate RSA 508:10. However, we see no need
    to reach that issue.

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    district court's November 4, 1992 clarification of its

    September 2, 1992 recommendation states in part:

    The relevant issues in this
    case do not include, and will
    not include, any issues that
    have been finally determined
    during proceedings in the
    United States District Court
    for the Northern District of
    Illinois. Plaintiff is free to
    file any other actions in this
    court as he wishes; however,
    each will be separately
    screened and each will be dealt
    with without reference to the
    others. The court cannot
    estimate the time it will take
    to deal with newly-filed
    actions. Such a determination
    will depend on many intervening
    factors.

    Judgment entered on May 16, 1994, and while Cote may appeal

    the dismissal of these defendants in that case, the time for
    ____

    suing them in this complaint had clearly expired on January
    ____

    26, 1993. We have no occasion to decide whether RSA 508:10

    or any other tolling provision would apply to stop the clock

    and defeat a potential statute of limitations defense in

    Cote's intervening action.

    We have considered appellant's remaining arguments

    and find them without merit.

    Affirmed.
    ________









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Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1649

Filed Date: 7/8/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015