Cassell v. Ober ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    October 5, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 94-1796

    JEROME E. CASSELL,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    NANCY OBER,

    Defendant, Appellee.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


    [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]
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    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Stahl,
    Circuit Judges.
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    Jerome E. Cassell on Motion For Stay Or Injunction Pending
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    Appeal, pro se.
    David W. Immen on Motion To Dismiss for appellee.
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    Per Curiam. We have before us a motion by
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    appellant denominated "motion for a stay or injunction

    pending appeal," and a cross-motion by defendant "to dismiss

    the appeal." We construe these filings as cross-motions for

    summary disposition.

    Appellant Cassell was convicted in a New Hampshire

    state court of felonious sexual assault. While his criminal

    conviction was pending on direct appeal, he brought this

    action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the

    defendant had conspired with the police to falsify evidence

    and otherwise cause the plaintiff to be wrongfully convicted

    in the state case. The district court initially determined,

    on a preliminary review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C.

    1915, and circuit precedent, that the federal damages claim

    should be stayed pending exhaustion by plaintiff of his state

    remedies. Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court

    resolved a conflict among the circuits by ruling that "a

    1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an

    unconstitutional conviction does not accrue until the
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    conviction . . . has been invalidated." Heck v. Humphrey,
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    114 S. Ct. 2364, 2373 (1994) (emphasis added); see also
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    Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
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    The district court then correctly determined that application

    of the Supreme Court's decision required the dismissal of

    plaintiff's claim as premature.



















    Plaintiff's motion indicates that he is somewhat

    confused about the effect of the dismissal. We explain,

    first, that plaintiff is not prejudiced by the dismissal

    because it does not prevent him from later filing a proper

    and timely complaint for damages should he first succeed in

    having his conviction reversed on direct appeal, expunged, or

    otherwise declared invalid by a tribunal authorized to make

    such a determination. Id. Second, plaintiff is incorrect in
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    assuming that the dismissal violates this court's mandate in

    an earlier appeal filed by plaintiff in another case. Appeal

    no. 93-16O7 (one of three consolidated appeals) involved the

    dismissal, by a different district judge, of a separate

    lawsuit in which plaintiff had named different defendants.

    Our remand of that case for further consideration as to

    whether some of the claims should be stayed, also predated

    the Supreme Court's decision in Heck. The effect of an
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    intervening Supreme Court decision on claims pending in the

    district court at the time of the decision is a question

    committed in the first instance to the particular judge

    presiding over each case.

    Finding no substantial question presented, and for

    the reasons articulated in the district court's order, the

    judgment below is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1796

Filed Date: 10/5/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015