Smith v. WGBH-TV ( 1994 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion









    September 27, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 94-1341

    LEANDERS H. SMITH,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    WGBH-TV,

    Defendant, Appellee.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    Leanders H. Smith on brief pro se.
    _________________
    Alan D. Rose, Paul G. Lannon and Nutter, McClennen & Fish on
    _____________ _______________ _________________________
    Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Summary Disposition for appellee.


    ____________________

    ____________________























    Per Curiam. Leanders H. Smith appeals the district
    __________

    court's order denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

    to reopen Smith's previously dismissed case against appellee

    WGBH Educational Foundation, Inc. We affirm.1

    Smith's motion alleged that Smith had new evidence

    that the court's dismissal of his Title VII action against

    WGBH had been based on WGBH's "fraud, misrepresentation, . .

    . or other misconduct." According to Smith's affidavit,

    which was attached to the motion, the tape given by WGBH to

    the district court in 1989 recorded a 1981 telephone

    conversation with his supervisor at WGBH, John Plausse, and

    not a face-to-face conversation with Plausse in 1984-85, as

    WGBH had apparently represented. Smith also submitted a

    notation made by a union attorney, Eugene Salisbury, in

    connection with a 1982 labor grievance settlement. In

    relevant part, the notation stated simply "tapes," but

    Salisbury's December 1993 letter to Smith explained that

    "[t]he notation with respect to tapes has to do with your

    destroying certain tapes which you alleged contained John

    Plausse's voice in some threatening episodes and to furnish a

    copy to the company."






    ____________________

    1. Since the facts and legal arguments are adequately
    presented in the briefs and record and our decisional process
    would not be significantly aided by oral argument, we hereby
    deny Smith's motion for oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P.
    ___
    34(a).















    Smith's motion clearly had no merit. As Smith

    himself acknowledges in his brief, he had already presented

    the same argument about WGBH's alleged misrepresentation to

    the district court in his Motion for Relief From All Pending

    Orders of the Court and for the Court to Enter Default

    Judgment Against WGBH, dated February 27, 1990. That motion

    also indicated that Smith had actually submitted a copy of

    the 1981 tape to the court. In hearings before the court,

    Smith had also testified that the tape given the court by

    WGBH dated from before 1982. The court's order dismissing

    the case explicitly rejected that testimony, concluding that

    at least portions of the tape had dated from the relevant

    time period (March 15, 1982-June 4, 1986).

    Nor does Salisbury's notation or letter constitute

    evidence of misrepresentation by WGBH. Neither one states

    that the tape WGBH gave the district court was one of the

    tapes involved in the 1982 grievance settlement, or a tape

    that did not date from 1984-85, as WGBH had apparently

    asserted. It is Smith's affidavit that does so. But that

    affidavit was based on knowledge Smith obviously possessed in

    1990, when he submitted his Motion for Relief to the court,

    and so was not newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the

    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith's motion

    to reopen his case on the ground that Smith had newly

    discovered evidence about WGBH's alleged misrepresentation.



    -3-















    Smith also argues that Salisbury's notation and

    letter show that the tape presented to the court was subject

    to the 1982 labor grievance settlement, in which WGBH had

    waived its right to litigate any claims arising out of the

    grievance. For that reason, argues Smith, the district court

    had no jurisdiction to base its dismissal of his Title VII

    action against WGBH on that tape.

    Smith's argument in this respect fails for a

    variety of reasons. First, no one questioned that the court

    had jurisdiction over Smith's Title VII action. WGBH had not

    given the court the tape in an attempt to relitigate

    substantive issues resolved in the 1982 grievance settlement,

    but to show the court that Smith had tapes he had denied

    possessing, a relevant question in the Title VII case.

    Second, Smith's argument assumes that the tape given to the

    court was a tape dating from 1981, but the court had found

    that at least portions of the tape dated from the relevant

    portion of the 1982-86 discovery period. Third, Salisbury's

    notation and letter do not say, let alone show, that the

    tapes discussed in connection with the 1982 grievance

    settlement included the one actually given to the district

    court in 1989 by WGBH. Finally, Smith failed to explain to

    the district court when he had first discovered Salisbury's

    notation, or why he could not have discovered the notation at

    some earlier time. (On appeal to this court, he says that



    -4-















    the notation was sent to him anonymously in December 1993.)

    Thus, the district court had no reason to believe that

    Smith's motion met the requirements for Rule 60(b) relief.

    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (permitting relief from a final
    ___

    judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence "which by

    due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move

    for a new trial under Rule 59(b)"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (b)

    (permitting a motion for a new trial to be brought within 10

    days of entry of final judgment).

    As the above discussion shows, Smith's motion

    lacked any merit, and Smith had no legitimate basis for

    believing that the court would reopen his case against WGBH.

    This is especially so, since the allegedly new evidence did

    not show that WGBH had intentionally engaged in any

    misrepresentation as alleged, nor did it relieve Smith of

    culpability for the other instances of misconduct which had

    motivated the court to dismiss his action in the first place.

    Accordingly, we think that this appeal was frivolous within

    the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 38, and we award double costs

    to WGBH.

    Affirmed. Double costs awarded to appellee WGBH.
    _________________________________________________











    -5-







Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1341

Filed Date: 9/28/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015