United States v. Rijos ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    September 28, 1994
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 93-1647

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    SANTOS RIJOS,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    ____________________
    Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    ____________________

    Benicio Sanchez Rivera, Federal Public Defender, and Miguel A.A.
    ______________________ ____________
    Nogueras-Castro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief for
    _______________
    appellant.
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa,
    _____________ ________________________
    Senior Litigation Counsel, and Miguel A. Pereira, Assistant United
    __________________
    States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    ____________________

















    Per Curiam. Santos Rijos appeals his sentence on
    __________

    the ground that the district court mistakenly believed that

    it lacked authority to depart downward from the Sentencing

    Guidelines. We dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

    Rijos pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment

    charging him with unlawfully reentering the United States

    after deportation following a felony conviction, in violation

    of 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1). The pre-sentence report (PSR)

    calculated a total offense level of 21, as follows: the base

    offense level of 8 was increased by 16 levels because the

    felony that led to Rijos' deportation was an aggravated

    felony; three levels were subtracted for Rijos' acceptance of

    responsibility for his actions and for timely notifying

    authorities of his intention to plead guilty. The PSR

    computed a criminal history category of III, resulting in a

    guideline imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months. The

    district court sentenced Rijos to 46 months in prison.

    At the sentencing hearing, Rijos' attorney asked the

    district court to make a downward departure from the

    Guidelines sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. The two

    grounds for the requested departure were: 1) economic

    hardship in the Dominican Republic, the country to which

    Rijos had been deported, and 2) Rijos' cooperation with the

    government. The district court denied the request. With





















    respect to the first ground, the district court found as

    follows:

    [Rijos] was deported September, 1992, he was back
    here in November of 1992 by plane not by boat, so
    apparently his hardship isn't that bad because he
    came by plane, and of course if he has family in
    New York I am sure that that was his primary
    concern, to come and see his family. Of course, he
    could have waited until his supervised release was
    over and then requested permission in writing.

    With respect to the second ground (cooperation with the

    government), the court responded "that's why I gave him a 3

    level reduction."

    On appeal, Rijos argues that the court erred in refusing

    to consider appellant's extent of cooperation with the

    government and his "family ties and responsibilities," since

    neither feature is a forbidden basis for departure. Rijos

    states in his brief that "the district court failed to

    consider the relevant facts and to what extent if any he

    could exercise his discretion." Therefore, Rijos seeks a

    remand to the district court for re-sentencing.

    In deciding whether we have jurisdiction to review this

    sentencing we apply the following rule:

    Ordinarily a district court's refusal to exercise
    its discretion to depart downward from the
    sentencing guidelines is not reviewable on appeal.
    Appellate jurisdiction does attach, however, where
    the sentencing court's decision not to depart is
    based on the court's mistaken view that it lacks
    the legal authority to consider a departure. In
    other words, where the court errs in determining
    whether the allegedly special circumstances are of
    the "kind" that the Guidelines, in principle,
    permit the sentencing court to consider, we may


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    proceed to review the court's sentencing decision
    not to depart. On the other hand, if "we find that
    the court properly understood its power to depart,
    but refused to exercise that power, we lack
    jurisdiction to consider the appeal."

    United States v. Romero, No. 93-2187, slip op. at 28-29 (1st
    ______________ ______

    Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (citations omitted).

    Here, the district court did not possess a mistaken

    belief that it lacked the authority to depart from the

    guidelines. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review its

    departure decision. If the district court erred, it was in

    believing that it had discretion to depart where there was

    none, not the reverse. The "special circumstances" for which

    Rijos requested a downward departure were financial hardship

    and cooperation with the government. Economic hardship is

    one of the few "forbidden" features which may not be the

    basis for a decision to depart from the guideline sentence.

    See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.
    ___ _____________ ______

    1993); U.S.S.G. 5K2.12, p.s. Nonetheless, the district

    court considered Rijos' alleged hardship and concluded that

    "his hardship isn't that bad."

    Rijos also sought a downward departure for his

    cooperation with the government by pleading guilty to the

    offense. Assistance to the government in the investigation

    or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense

    is "encouraged" as a ground for departure. See U.S.S.G.
    ___

    5K1.1. The voluntary disclosure of an offense prior to its



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    discovery is also an "encouraged" feature. See U.S.S.G.
    ___

    5K2.16, p.s. Here, however, Rijos requested a downward

    departure solely on the basis of his acceptance of

    responsibility at the time of his guilty plea.

    The Guidelines specifically provide for a three-level

    reduction in the offense level for such circumstances. See
    ___

    U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. That provision does not preclude the court

    from departing from the Guidelines, however, "if the court

    determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the

    guideline level attached to that factor is inadequate."

    U.S.S.G. 5K2.0, p.s. There is nothing in the record to

    support Rijos' contention that the district court

    misunderstood that it could depart downward based upon a

    defendant's cooperation with the government in "unusual

    circumstances," notwithstanding 3E1.1. Rather, we think

    that the district court concluded that there were no "unusual

    circumstances" present to render the three-level reduction in

    the offense level under 3E1.1 inadequate.

    In his appellate brief, Rijos seems to allege that the

    district court erred in not considering his "family ties"

    before denying his departure request. The record does not

    indicate, however, that family ties was one of the grounds

    upon which Rijos requested a departure. Therefore, the

    district court cannot be faulted for failing to consider

    whether family ties, although a "discouraged" feature, were



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    "present in a manner that is unusual or special rather than

    'ordinary.'" Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948.
    ______

    We conclude that the district court did not mistakenly

    believe that it lacked the authority to depart from the

    Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, its departure decision is

    not reviewable by this court. This appeal is summarily

    dismissed pursuant to Loc. R. 27.1.







































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Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1647

Filed Date: 9/28/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015