United States v. Garafano ( 1994 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 93-2379

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    GARY GARAFANO,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
    __________________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________

    and Young,* District Judge.
    ______________

    ____________________

    John A. MacFadyen for appellant.
    _________________
    Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    ___________________
    Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Craig N. Moore,
    ___________________ ________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, was on brief for the United States.


    ____________________

    September 23, 1994
    ____________________



    ____________________

    *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.















    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. In December 1992 a grand jury
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    indicted Gary Garafano on one count of extortion under color

    of official right under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The

    gist of the charge was that from spring 1989 to December

    1990, Garafano, then an official in the Providence, Rhode

    Island, Department of Public Works, had extorted payments

    from a road paving firm doing work for the city, Forte

    Brothers Construction Corporation ("Forte Brothers").

    At a first trial in June 1993 the jury deadlocked. A

    second trial was conducted in the fall. At trial, the

    government offered testimony of James Forte, vice president

    of Forte Brothers, that during 1988 and 1989 the firm was

    engaged in road repair work for the city. In or about March

    1989, said Forte, he met with Garafano and agreed to the

    latter's demand for $8,000, without which Garafano threatened

    to cease authorizing work to be performed by Forte Brothers.

    Forte also testified that he gave the money to Steven Tocco,

    the firm's supervisor for the road repair work, to deliver to

    Garafano.

    Tocco testified that he delivered the money to Garafano.

    Tocco also testified that in response to further demands

    from Garafano, Tocco made somewhere between 12 and 20

    additional payments to Garafano between April 1989 and

    December 1990, and that the total amount of the payments to

    Garafano was around $100,000. Much of the money came from



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    inflated billings by Forte Brothers on individual road repair

    and other projects for the city. According to prosecution

    testimony, Garafano authorized various of these projects and

    expedited payments.

    Garafano himself testified and denied demanding or

    receiving any money from Forte Brothers. Various of

    Garafano's subsidiary statements were contradicted by the

    director of his city department but the director had no

    direct knowledge of whether Garafano had received bribes. On

    October 4, 1993, the jury in the second trial found Garafano

    guilty. The verdict was a general verdict on the single

    count charged and provided no indication of which episodes

    the jury found to have occurred.

    On December 14, 1993, the trial judge held a sentencing

    hearing. At the hearing defense counsel took the position

    that only the first payment of $8,000 in March 1989 had been

    adequately supported by evidence and that Tocco's testimony

    as to further payments was not credible. It was apparently

    the defense position that after the first incident Tocco

    himself had been stealing from the firm and claiming falsely

    that the payments had been made to Garafano. This contention

    was pertinent to sentencing in several respects.

    The presentence report had proposed that Garafano be

    sentenced under the November 1993 version of the Sentencing

    Guidelines which was in effect at the time of sentencing.



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    The report recommended that the court fix the base offense

    level at 10, as provided by U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(a), and that it

    add two levels as a specific offense adjustment because the

    offense involved more than one bribe or extortion. Id.
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    2C1.1(b)(1). In addition, the report recommended a further

    six-level adjustment based on the amount of the payment

    received by Garafano; the guidelines provide a table fixing

    such an adjustment at six levels where the amount is greater

    than $70,000. Id. 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), 2F1.1(b)(1)(G). A
    ___

    payment of $8,000 would have added only two levels. Id.
    ___

    Prior to November 1989, the guidelines did not included

    the two-point adjustment for multiple bribes. Garafano's

    counsel objected that without the additional payments

    allegedly made through Tocco, the extortionate conduct would

    have ceased prior to the effectiveness of that guideline

    amendment. Counsel argued that if the conduct did cease

    before the amendment, then ex post facto concerns required
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    that the two points not be included. Our decisions confirm

    that where a guideline amendment increases the sentence after

    the offense, the guidelines in effect at the time of the

    offense should be used. See e.g., United States v.
    ___ ____ ______________

    Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994).
    _________

    More important, if Tocco's testimony were disregarded,

    then the total amount gained by the extortionate conduct

    would be only $8,000. This would eliminate not only the two-



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    point adjustment for multiple bribes (since there would be no

    second bribe proved) but also the proposed six-point

    adjustment based on "the loss or gain table". Of course,

    Forte's testimony alone, not challenged at the sentencing

    hearing, established that Garafano had solicited a bribe in

    the amount of $8,000, whether or not Tocco delivered the

    money; but a single $8,000 bribe would have reduced the

    guideline range.

    At the sentencing hearing defense counsel asked the

    court to find that the 1989 version of the guidelines

    applied, asserting that the jury may have based its verdict

    only on the first $8,000 bribe, which counsel described as

    "the only corroborated event" that the government had proved

    to the jury. The court replied, "how can you ask me to

    dissect what a jury has done?" Counsel responded that "[t]he

    guidelines allow you exactly that power . . . ." Pressed as

    to why the court should disbelieve Tocco, defense counsel

    offered an example of an asserted contradiction between the

    testimony of Tocco and other government witnesses.

    The prosecutor replied that Tocco's testimony had been

    corroborated, and then added: "I don't think the Court has

    the discretion to piecemeal the jury's verdict in this case."

    The court replied: "I quite agree with you," adding (to

    defense counsel) that "the reasons [the prosecutor] stated

    are ample in and of themselves." The court went on to say



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    that it agreed that "the facts of the case reflect" that the

    offense occurred between April 1989 and December 1990 and

    showed the receipt of between 12 and 20 payments.

    Accordingly the court rejected the ex post facto claim.
    _____________

    Defense counsel then went on to argue at even greater

    length that Tocco should not be believed. This time the

    argument was to support counsel's claim that, in applying the

    loss or gain table, the court should treat as proved only the

    first $8,000. The court listened courteously to the argument

    and then rejected it, saying that "there was substantial

    evidence . . . [that] could convince a jury beyond a

    reasonable doubt." Defense counsel then said that the jury

    could have convicted solely on the basis of the $8,000 bribe.

    The court replied: "I'm not going to dissect this jury's

    verdict."

    After other largely unrelated discussion, the court

    heard final statements from defense counsel and Garafano. It

    then summed up:

    We have a base offense level of 10 in this case,
    and since there was more than one bribe, two points
    have to be added. And since the amount involved
    approximately $100,000.00, that's an additional six
    points, which gives a total adjusted level of 18.
    He has a criminal history category of one, which
    means the sentencing range is from 27 to 33 months.

    Concluding that Garafano had been motivated by "sheer greed

    and nothing else," the court imposed a sentence of 31 months

    imprisonment and a $6,000 fine, together with an order



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    requiring Garafano to make restitution of $100,000 to the

    city. This appeal followed.

    The only issue on appeal is the defense claim that the

    district court erred because it allegedly refused to make an

    independent assessment of the Tocco testimony and make its

    own finding as to whether bribes of approximately $100,000

    had been paid during a period extending to December 1990.

    The government agrees that an independent determination was

    required but says that the district court made such an

    assessment. We agree with the government that the district

    court probably did make an independent assessment but to

    remove the shadow of uncertainty, we have decided to remand.

    The uncertainty is apparent from our recitation of the

    facts. Normally the trial court makes its own assessment of

    the facts that pertain to sentencing, drawing on trial

    evidence, the presentence report, any evidence offered at the

    hearing, and other appropriate sources. See United States v.
    ___ _____________

    Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 306-07 (1st Cir. 1993). Indeed, we have
    ______

    held that a judge may attribute conduct to a defendant for

    "relevant conduct" purposes even where a jury has declined to

    convict on counts pertaining to such conduct. United States
    _____________

    v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 80 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
    ________ ____________

    S.Ct. 1644 (1994); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13,
    _____________ ________

    16-17 (1st Cir. 1989).





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    Whether the trial court could ever be bound at

    sentencing by the jury's determination against a defendant

    (e.g., through collateral estoppel) is an interesting issue
    ____

    but is irrelevant here: the government agrees that the jury

    could in theory have convicted solely on the evidence

    pertaining to the first $8,000 bribe solicitation; and since

    the jury delivered a general verdict there is no way to tell

    what it actually found as to the number of bribes. In sum,

    even if a jury verdict against the defendant on a fact issue
    _______

    could ever constrain the sentencing judge, but cf. Tavano, 12
    ___ ______

    F.3d at 305, 307, this jury verdict could not resolve the

    amount and timing issues faced at sentencing.

    We have read the sentencing transcript in full and are

    inclined to think that the trial judge, an experienced and

    respected jurist, fully understood that he could and should

    decide himself when the offense ended and how much was paid.

    Further, his statement quoted above ("the facts of the case

    reflect . . .") is reasonably clear evidence that he did

    resolve those issues against Garafano and was not relying

    upon the jury verdict or any misinterpretation of it. Nor

    does Garafano argue on appeal that the evidence at trial was

    insufficient to support findings at sentencing that the

    bribes continued to December 1990 and equaled about $100,000.

    If this were all, we would affirm without a moment's

    hesitation. But we agree with Garafano that the record is at



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    least blurred by the agreement of the trial judge and the

    prosecutor that the jury verdict could not be dissected.

    Quite likely both meant only that peering into the verdict

    was infeasible and served no purpose; but abstractly the

    prosecutor's words could be taken as an argument that the

    jury had resolved the issue of timing and amount against

    Garafano and that this decision was binding.

    The prosecutor's statement--"I don't think the Court has

    the discretion to piecemeal the jury's verdict in this case"-

    - happens to sound like a refutation of defense counsel's
    _____

    earlier argument to the court that "[y]ou [the court] have

    the ability, the discretion in sentencing" to determine the

    amount and timing of the loss. As government counsel

    properly says on appeal, the prosecutor's statement was an

    "unfortunate" choice of words. The district judge then

    followed the prosecutor's statement by saying, "I quite agree

    with you" and telling defense counsel that the prosecutor's

    reasons were "ample" basis for rejecting the defense

    position.

    In saying that these colloquies leave a measure of

    uncertainty, we do not intend the slightest criticism of

    either the court or counsel. Court colloquies are not

    scripted events like television commercials or public

    speeches. Lawyers are usually trying to advance and explain

    conflicting positions, and the judge is seeking to resolve on



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    the spot often arcane issues and tangled factual disputes.

    In this case, it is quite likely that there was no

    misunderstanding whatever.

    Still, the difference between a total offense level of

    18, with a range of 27 to 33 months, and a total level of 12,

    with a range of 10 to 16 months, is substantial; and the

    latter's maximum 16 months is just about half of the sentence
    _______

    actually imposed. It takes very little effort to resolve the

    uncertainty. Defense counsel suggested at oral argument a

    remand for an entirely new sentencing hearing; the government

    said that if any remedy were needed, this court could retain

    jurisdiction and simply ask the district court to clarify the

    record. We have in mind a third course.

    We propose to vacate the existing sentence and remand

    the matter to the district court for resentencing. The

    district court has already given Garafano a chance to argue

    his evidentiary position in full and no request was made by

    defense counsel to offer new evidence; if the district court

    did (at the earlier hearing)--or did not then but now does--

    find (independently of the jury verdict) that bribes

    continued until December 1990 and were around $100,000, the

    court is free to say so summarily and to reimpose the same

    sentence. No additional proceedings, or further explanation

    or findings, are required. See United States v. Savoie, 985
    ___ _____________ ______

    F.2d 612, 620-21 (1st Cir. 1993).



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    Conversely, the district court is free to order any

    further proceedings it deems appropriate before imposing

    sentence. It may do so if there was an actual

    misunderstanding at the original sentencing as to the

    district court's authority, or merely because the court

    thinks that this would be useful to it. But if the court

    does change the factual premise on which it sentences

    Garafano--and thereby alters the guideline range available--

    we think that it would be within the spirit of the rules to

    provide counsel and the defendant an opportunity to allocute

    again.

    The sentence, but not the conviction, is vacated and the
    _______

    case remanded for resentencing in accordance with this
    ________

    opinion.

























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