United States v. Doward ( 1994 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 93-2249

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    JOHN R. DOWARD,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________


    Before

    Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges, ______________

    and DiClerico,* Chief District Judge. ____________________

    ____________________


    Paul J. Garrity for appellant. _______________
    Jean L. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paul M. ____________ _______
    Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief. ______

    ____________________

    December 14, 1994
    ____________________


    ____________________

    *Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.












    CYR, Circuit Judge. After entering a conditional plea CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________

    of guilty, and reserving the right to appeal an earlier order

    rejecting his motion to suppress a .38 caliber handgun seized

    incident to his arrest, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), defendant ___

    John R. Doward was convicted and sentenced in the District of New

    Hampshire on a one-count indictment charging possession of a

    firearm by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), ___

    924(e)(1). Doward contends that a warrantless search of the

    hatch area of the two-door Ford Mustang which he was driving

    immediately before the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. See ___

    U.S. Const. amend. IV. We affirm the district court judgment.


    I I

    BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________


    The relevant facts are not in dispute. On October 18,

    1992, Officers James Tareco and Robert Oxley of the Manchester

    Police Department stopped the Ford Mustang after it made an

    illegal turn. Ten minutes later, a routine license check dis-

    closed that Doward was wanted in Ohio on an outstanding arrest

    warrant. Doward was ordered out of the car, arrested, hand-

    cuffed, and then placed in a nearby police cruiser, awaiting

    transport to the police station.

    Meanwhile, the male passenger in the right front seat

    had been instructed to get out of the Ford Mustang and remain on

    the sidewalk as the front and back seat areas were searched.

    Although the hatch area was accessible from the back seat,


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    Officer Tareco chose to gain access by unlocking the hatch from

    outside the vehicle. The hatch area was found to contain two

    partially zipped suitcases. In the first suitcase he searched,

    Tareco discovered a gun cleaning kit and ammunition.

    During the search, Doward's daughter suddenly emerged

    from the gathering crowd and informed Tareco that the Ford

    Mustang belonged to her, but the suitcases did not. At this

    point, the police van arrived and Doward was transported to the

    station. Resuming the search, Officer Oxley seized the loaded

    .38 caliber handgun from the second suitcase discovered in the

    hatch area. Three minutes had elapsed since Doward's arrest;

    thirty seconds since he was transported from the scene. Doward's

    daughter was arrested shortly thereafter, when a further check

    revealed that she too was wanted on an outstanding arrest war-

    rant.


    II II

    DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________


    The government is required to establish that the hatch-

    area search which yielded the .38 caliber handgun came within a

    recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

    See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). The ___ ______________ _______

    government defends the search as "a contemporaneous incident of

    [Doward's] arrest." See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 ___ ________ ______

    (1981).

    Doward argues that the search which yielded the handgun


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    was not sufficiently contemporaneous with his arrest because the

    handgun was seized after he had been removed from the scene, at a _____

    time when there was no conceivable risk that he could have

    reached it. Thus, even if the handgun were the fruit of an

    automobile passenger-compartment search commenced as a contem- _________

    poraneous incident of his arrest, Doward would urge a per se ___ __

    suppression rule as to any evidence seized after the arrestee has

    been removed from the scene and the security rationale for the

    Belton rule no longer obtains. See, e.g., State v. Badgett, 512 ______ ___ ____ _____ _______

    A.2d 160, 169 (Conn.) (holding that the right to continue a

    Belton search "ceases the instant the arrestee departs the ______

    scene"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); State v. Fry, 388 ____ ______ _____ ___

    N.W.2d 565, 577 (Wis.) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (19- ____ ______

    86).1 Alternatively, Doward argues that the hatch area was not
    ____________________

    1Since Doward simply contrasts the present case with those
    in which an arrestee remains in close proximity to the vehicle
    and continues to pose at least some unpredictable, albeit slight,
    risk to the security of the officers or the evidence (e.g., ____
    arrestee handcuffed in back of guarded police cruiser), we do not
    understand him to challenge the great weight of authority which
    holds that Belton's bright-line rule applies even in cases where ______
    the arrestee is under physical restraint and at some distance
    from the automobile during the search. See, e.g., United States ___ ____ _____________
    v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1990) (arrestee hand- _______
    cuffed in police cruiser); United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, _____________ _____
    43 (6th Cir. 1989) (in police cruiser); United States v. Karlin, _____________ ______
    852 F.2d 968, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1988) (handcuffed in police
    cruiser), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); United States v. _____ ______ _____________
    Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1985) (handcuffed); ______
    United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1982) ______________ _______
    (same); see also Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. ___ ____ _______ _____
    1983) (outside car, handcuffed); State v. Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501, _____ _______
    502-03 (Idaho 1992) (handcuffed in police cruiser); State v. _____
    Miskolczi, 465 A.2d 919, 920-21 (N.H. 1983) (same); State v. _________ _____
    Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849, 852-53 (N.D. 1988) (same); State v. ______ _____
    Fladebo, 779 P.2d 707, 711-12 (Wash. 1989) (in cruiser); cf. _______ ___
    United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing _____________ _____

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    subject to a warrantless "contemporaneous" search incident to

    arrest, because the hatch area is more akin to an automobile

    trunk, which the Belton Court clearly differentiated from the ______

    "passenger compartment." Consequently, he insists, the trial

    court was required to conduct a post hoc analysis as to whether ____ ___

    either vehicle occupant could have reached into the hatch area

    for a weapon or evidence.

    Since Doward's arguments test the temporal and spatial

    limits of the bright-line rule announced in Belton, its context ______

    and rationale must be parsed exactingly at the outset. As a

    general rule, a lawful custodial arrest may be accompanied by a ______

    warrantless search not only of the arrestee's "person" but the ______

    area within the arrestee's "immediate control" for "any _________ _______

    weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist

    arrest or effect his escape [and jeopardize] . . . the officer's

    safety," as well as for "evidence on the arrestee's person [or in

    'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a

    weapon or evidentiary items'] in order to prevent its concealment

    or destruction . . . ." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762- ______ __________

    63 (1969) (invalidating, as overbroad, search of entire residence _________

    in which owner was arrested) (emphasis added). Some years later,

    in Belton, supra, the Court outlined the scope of the zone of ______ _____ _____

    "immediate control," see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, in the context ___ ______

    of a warrantless security search of an automobile passenger

    compartment conducted as a contemporaneous incident of the
    ____________________

    United States v. Abel, 707 F.2d 1013, 1015 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1983)). _____________ ____

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    arrests of all its occupants. Belton upheld a warrantless search ______

    of the entire "passenger compartment" against a claim that all

    its occupants were outside the vehicle at the time of the search _______

    thus, as a practical matter, no longer within "reach" of any

    weapons, evidence or contraband located within the passenger

    compartment. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. ______

    Alluding to the difficulties encountered by lower

    courts in adapting for application to arrest-related automo-

    bile searches the "immediate control" concept announced in

    Chimel, the Belton Court's opinion stressed that its bright-line ______ ______

    rule was designed to foster both privacy and law enforcement

    interests: "[T]he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth __________

    Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a ___ ____ __ ________ __

    set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach ___ __ _____ __ ____ _________ _____ __ ________ __ _____

    a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of _ _______ _____________ __________

    privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement,'" id. at ___

    458 (citation omitted) (emphasis added), especially since police

    officers engaged in an arrest on the highway have "only limited

    time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and

    individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they

    confront." Id. at 458-59 (noting earlier Supreme Court cases ___

    rejecting the view that "there must be litigated in each case the

    issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons

    supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a ______

    lawful arrest") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

    The Belton Court explicitly predicated its bright-line ______


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    rule on "the generalization that articles inside the relatively ______________

    narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are

    in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into ____ __ ___ __________ ____

    which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or _____

    evidentiary [item].'" Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at ___ ______

    763) (emphasis added). Against this pragmatic framework the

    Court articulated its bright-line rule: "we hold that when a

    policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of

    an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that _______________ ________ __ ____

    arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile," and ______

    "examine the contents of any [open or closed] containers found

    within the passenger compartment . . . ." Id. (footnote omitted) ___

    (emphasis added).2 Finally, the scope of the "passenger com-

    partment" under the bright-line rule announced in Belton would ______

    not encompass the trunk. Id. at 460-61 n.4. ___

    We think Belton leaves no doubt that post hoc analyses ______ ____ ___

    like those presently urged by Doward are precluded. The Belton ______

    majority's circumspect use of the discrete phrase "contemporane-

    ____________________

    2The Belton bright-line rule likewise extends to any con- ______ ___
    tainer within the passenger compartment even though its outward
    appearance might foreclose the possibility that it could hold a
    weapon or evidence: "The authority to search the person incident ___ ______
    to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm
    and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may ___ ______
    later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation ___________
    that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person
    of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on proba-
    ble cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
    that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
    requires no additional justification." Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 ______
    (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)) _____________ ________
    (emphasis added).

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    ous incident of that arrest," rather than the less expansive ________

    phrase "contemporaneous with that arrest" as Doward would have ____

    us read it plainly implies a greater temporal leeway between

    the custodial arrest and the search than Doward advocates.

    Moreover, the temporal limitation urged by Doward would undermine

    Belton's bright-line rule by requiring courts to second-guess the ______

    security assessments made by law enforcement officers at the

    scene.3

    Nor is the variant urged by Doward consonant with the

    bright-line rule as the Court articulated it. Nothing in the

    majority opinion even remotely implies that law enforcement

    officers must discontinue a passenger-compartment search ___________

    properly initiated as a contemporaneous incident of an occupant's ________

    arrest the instant the arrestee is transported from the scene.

    As must be the usual case in automobile-related arrests, Belton

    and the three passengers were no longer in the vehicle when the

    automobile search began. Although their location outside the

    vehicle virtually eliminated any chance that they could "reach"
    ____________________

    3We need not consider whether the time span between an
    automobile-related arrest and the initiation of a warrantless __________
    search of the passenger compartment might become so protracted as
    to raise judicial eyebrows in an exceptional case, see, e.g., ___ ____
    United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (dis- _____________ _____
    tinguishing invalid automobile search, occurring 30-45 minutes
    after arrest, from searches which "followed closely on the heels
    of the arrest"), since this is anything but an exceptional case.
    The officers initiated the three-minute contemporaneous search _________
    immediately after Doward was placed under arrest, and completed
    it within thirty seconds after he was transported from the scene. ______ _______
    Compare United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1992) _______ _____________ ____
    (invalidating search initiated after arrestee left scene) with _________ ____
    United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1985) ______________ _______
    (upholding search initiated after arrestee left scene). _________

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    into the passenger compartment for any purpose, the Court con-

    spicuously passed up the opportunity to limit its bright-line

    rule by requiring that the warrantless search cease once all

    occupants were removed from the passenger-compartment.4 In-

    stead, the Belton majority opted to relax Chimel's residence- ______ ______ _________

    related arrest rationale in automobile-related arrests lest its

    fact-intensive inquiries immerse the courts in second-guessing

    security decisions made by law enforcement officers in rapidly

    evolving circumstances fraught with unpredictable risks to life

    and limb. See, e.g., United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 ___ ____ _____________ ______

    (7th Cir. 1988) (hindsight-based probability determinations would

    eviscerate Belton bright-line rule); see also United States v. ______ ___ ____ ______________

    McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding search _______

    initiated after arrestee had left the scene).5 _________
    ____________________

    4Indeed, as the dissent noted, see Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 ___ ______
    (Brennan, J., dissenting), "the result would presumably be the
    same even if [the police officer] had handcuffed Belton . . . in
    the patrol car . . . ." See also supra note 1. ___ ____ _____

    5Although such considerations are not determinative, the
    unpredictable developments ultimately confronting the officers in
    this case clearly vindicate the Belton rationale. The male ______
    passenger in the Ford Mustang remained in close proximity to the
    vehicle during the arrest and the ensuing search. Moreover,
    Doward's daughter, who also unbeknownst to the officers was
    subject to an outstanding arrest warrant, unexpectedly approached
    the officers from out of the gathering crowd. With only two
    officers available to search the vehicle and deal with this
    potentially dangerous situation, a decisional rule which would
    require judicial second-guessing of the need to continue the
    passenger-compartment search after Doward had been transported
    from the scene would eviscerate Belton's bright-line rule. ______
    Furthermore, the Belton rationale would be undermined were a ______
    temporal limit to be drawn, as Doward urges, after Officer _____
    Tareco's valid warrantless search of the first suitcase had
    disclosed the gun cleaning kit and ammunition, which afforded
    reasonable cause to believe that the passenger compartment would

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    Doward further contends, in the alternative, that the

    hatch area was not subject to contemporaneous search under the

    bright-line rule announced in Belton, as it is more akin to an ______

    automobile trunk, which Belton was careful to differentiate from ______

    the "passenger compartment." See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4. ___ ______

    Consequently, he argues, the district court was required to

    determine whether any vehicle occupant could have reached into

    the hatch area while inside the Ford Mustang. And he asks this

    court to take judicial notice that the Ford Mustang hatchback he

    was driving had large interior dimensions which would make it

    impossible to reach into the hatch area from his position in the

    front seat.

    We believe Belton unmistakably forecloses all such post ______ ____

    facto inquiries on actual "reachability." As we have noted, the _____

    Court expressly predicated its bright-line rule on "the general- ________

    ization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the _______

    passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,

    even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee ____ __ ___ __________

    might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].'"

    Id. at 461 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the only ___

    question the trial court asks is whether the area searched is

    generally "reachable without exiting the vehicle, without regard _______ _______ ___ _______

    to the likelihood in the particular case that such a reaching was

    possible." 3 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on _________________________________

    ____________________

    be found to contain a loaded firearm, a core concern undergirding
    both Chimel and Belton. ______ ______

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    the Fourth Amendment 7.1(c), at 16-17 (2d ed. 1987) (collecting ____________________

    cases) (emphasis added). The uncovered hatch area in this two-

    door Ford Mustang unlike a trunk generally is accessible

    from within the passenger compartment. Consequently, it is

    immaterial to the present analysis that the police elected to

    gain access by opening the outside lock on the hatch.

    The district court judgment is affirmed. The district court judgment is affirmed. _______________________________________








































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