UD DOL v. Total Property ( 1994 )

USCA1 Opinion

          December 8, 1994
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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        No. 94-1719

                              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                        TOTAL PROPERTY SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.


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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before

                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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            James Lawson on brief pro se.
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            Thomas S. Williamson,  Jr., Solicitor of Labor, Monica  Gallagher,
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        Associate  Solicitor,   William  J.   Stone,  Counsel   for  Appellate
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        Litigation, and Joan  Brenner, Attorney, U.S. Department  of Labor, on
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        brief for appellee.


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                      Per Curiam.  We have reviewed the record and briefs
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            and now  affirm  the default  judgment  entered below.    The

            district court  implicitly authorized the  extension of  time

            for  service  when  it  granted the  Secretary's  motion  for

            appointment of a special process  server, vacated its July 6,

            1993  judgment  of  dismissal, and  granted  the  Secretary's

            motion  for  entry  of  a  default  judgment.      We  reject

            appellant's hypertechnical  reading of  Fed. R. Civ.  P. 4(j)

            and 6(b)(2), and we find no abuse of the court's considerable

            discretion in extending the time for service.  Similarly, the

            court  did not  abuse its  discretion in  denying appellant's

            motion to vacate the default judgment.

                      Affirmed.
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