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USCA1 Opinion
December 28, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1607
DENNIS J. QUINTAL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and ____________________
Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Dennis J. Quintal, Sr., on brief pro se. ______________________
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Charlene A. Stawicki, ________________ _____________________
Assistant United States Attorney, and Thomas D. Ramsey, Assistant _________________
Regional Counsel, Region I Department of Health and Human Services.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Claimant is a convicted felon. He has __________
been both sentenced to a 12 to 15 year prison term and
civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person to the
Massachusetts Treatment Center at M.C.I. Bridgewater for a
period of one day to life. An ALJ found claimant to be
disabled, but suspended benefits under 42 U.S.C. 402(x)(1)
because of claimant's confinement. The Appeals Council
upheld the ALJ's determination. Claimant then filed a
complaint for judicial review in the district court, which
the court dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) as frivolous.
While we question whether the complaint was correctly
characterized as frivolous, claimant has since had an
opportunity to present any additional arguments he may have
in his appellate brief. We have considered all of claimant's
arguments. They are all legally meritless, and we conclude
that benefits were properly suspended. In these
circumstances, no purpose would be served by a remand, and we
affirm the district court's judgment, but for different
reasons. Bristol Energy Corporation v. New Hampshire Public ___________________________________________________
Utilities Commission, 13 F.3d 471, 478 (1st Cir. 1994) (court ____________________
of appeals may affirm on any theory supported by the record).
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I
We start with the words of the relevant statute, 42
U.S.C. 402(x)(1)1:
(x) Limitation on payments to prisoners
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subchapter, no monthly benefits
shall be paid under this section or under
section 423 of this title to any
individual for any month during which
such individual is confined in a jail,
prison, or other penal institution or
correctional facility, pursuant to his
conviction of an offense which
constituted a felony under applicable
law, unless such individual is actively
and satisfactorily participating in a
rehabilitation program which has been
specifically approved for such individual
by a court of law and, as determined by
the Secretary, is expected to result in
such individual being able to engage in
substantial gainful activity upon release
and within a reasonable time.
Claimant's arguments, as we understand them, are
that (1) he is a patient in a medical facility--and not a
prisoner in a "jail, prison, or other penal institution or
correctional facility" within the meaning of 402(x)(1)--
because the treatment center is under the jurisdiction of the
department of mental health, not the department of
corrections; (2) he qualifies for benefits under the
"participating in a rehabilitation program" provision; and
(3) hehas been deniedequal protection. We addresseach inturn.
____________________
1. Section 402(x) was recently amended. Pub. L. No. 387,
4, 108 Stat. 4071, ___ (1994). Our references are to the
version in effect prior to the 1994 amendment.
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II
A. Confinement in a jail, prison, or other penal
institution or correctional facility.
Claimant was convicted in 1986 of rape of a child
and/or indecent assault and battery on a child. He was
sentenced to 12 to 15 years' imprisonment. Claimant was also
found to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), as defined in
Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 1 (1985), and civilly committed to
the treatment center for a period of one day to life, Mass.
G. L. ch. 123A, 5 (1985)2, where he will remain until he
is no longer sexually dangerous, Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 9
(1989). The "primary objective" of a civil commitment to the
treatment center is "the care, treatment and rehabilitation
of the sexually dangerous person." Commissioner of _________________
Correction v. McCabe, 410 Mass. 847, 852-53, 576 N.E. 2d 654, __________ ______
657 (1991). While in the treatment center, claimant serves
his criminal sentence. Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 5, (1985).
Discharge from the treatment center prior to the expiration
of the 12 to 15 year criminal sentence will not terminate
that sentence, id., and will result in claimant's transfer to __
a regular prison.
The treatment center is under the jurisdiction of
the department of mental health, Mass. G.L. ch. 123A, 2
____________________
2. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of ch. 123A have been repealed
prospectively, Mass. Acts of 1990, ch. 150, 304, 104, but
the repeal does not affect claimant in any way material to
the present opinion.
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(1985), although the commissioner of correction appoints the
custodial personnel for the treatment center. Id. Custodial __
personnel are "subject to the control of the commissioner of
mental health with respect to the care, treatment and
rehabilitation of persons in their custody," but are "under
the administrative, operational and disciplinary control of
the commissioner of correction." Id. __
Claimant seems to contend, essentially, that he is
a patient at a treatment center and not a prisoner in a jail
and that consequently 402(x)(1) does not allow the
suspension of his disability benefits so long as he remains
at the treatment center. We uphold the Secretary's contrary
conclusion.
Under 402(x)(1), benefits must be denied not only
while a convicted felon is incarcerated in a jail or prison,
but also while he is "confined" in any "other penal
institution or correctional facility" pursuant to his felony
conviction. In the circumstances of this case, we think it
is fair to say that claimant is "confined" in a "correctional
facility" during the period he serves his criminal sentence
at the treatment center. Claimant is certainly "confined,"
for he is not free to depart. And his confinement is in an
institution, which, under state law, is considered to be a
"correctional" facility. See Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 2 ___
(1985) (treatment center must be located "at a correctional
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institution approved by the commissioner of correction");
Commonwealth v. Geary, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 579 N.E.2d 172 ______________________
(1991) (concluding that a defendant who had been both
criminally convicted and civilly committed to the treatment
center was a "prisoner in any . . . correctional institution
of the commonwealth" for purposes of a statute proscribing
attacks by "prisoners" in any "correctional facility" upon
guards and rejecting defendant's claim that he was no more
than a patient in a mental health facility).
Treating claimant as a prisoner and the treatment
center as a correctional facility is consistent with the
legislative history, which reflected the view that convicted
felons incarcerated at public expense did not need benefits:
The committee believes that the basic purposes
of the social security program are not served by
the unrestricted payment of benefits to individuals
who are in prison . . .. The disability program
exists to provide a continuing source of monthly
income to those whose earnings are cut off because
they have suffered a severe disability. The need
for this continuing source of income is clearly
absent in the case of an individual who is being
maintained at public expense in prison. The basis
for his lack of other income in such circumstances
must be considered to be marginally related to his
impairment at best.
Sen. Rep. No. 96-987, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4787, 4794-95. Claimant, who, ____________
but for his civil commitment to the treatment center would be
in a regular prison, similarly is not dependent upon
disability benefits for subsistence.
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In sum, the Secretary's determination that claimant
was subject to 402(x)(1) so long as he was serving his
criminal sentence in the treatment center accords with the
language of the statute and its legislative history and
therefore must be upheld. Davel v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559 _________________
(7th Cir. 1990) (upholding suspension of disability benefits
to convicted felon serving two concurrent commitments--one
civil and one criminal--in a mental health institute operated
by the state's department of health and social services).
B. Eligibility under rehabilitation provision.
Under 402(x)(1), an incarcerated felon may
nevertheless receive disability benefits if he
is actively and satisfactorily
participating in a rehabilitation program
which has been specifically approved for
such individual by a court of law and, as
determined by the Secretary, is expected
to result in such individual being able
to engage in substantial gainful activity
upon release and within a reasonable
time.
Claimant contends he is engaging in various
rehabilitation programs at the treatment center, which the
state court approved for him when it decided to civilly
commit him to the treatment center rather than have him serve
his sentence in a regular prison. See Thibodeau v. ___ ______________
Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 452, 454, 319 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1974), ____________
Mass. G.L. ch. 123A, 5 (1985) (sentencing judge has
discretion whether to commit an SDP to the treatment center).
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The ALJ disagreed, noting that a treatment plan is not drawn
up until sometime after commitment and therefore its details
are not before the court or approved by the court at
commitment. Consequently, claimant's program had not been
"specifically approved for [claimant] by a court of law," the
ALJ reasoned.
We need not decide whether claimant is
participating in a rehabilitation program "specifically
approved" for him by a "court of law" because the ALJ denied
benefits for an independent, unassailable reason. The ALJ
concluded that the program was not likely to result in
claimant being able to engage in substantial gainful
employment "within a reasonable time," as required by
402(x)(1):
At present, the claimant is no more than
in the early stages of his rehabilitation
program. His commitment to [the
treatment center], if he fails to meet
the standards for dropping his SDP
status, could conceivably extend for the
remainder of his natural life -- possibly
for another 40 years or more. Given the
slow progress described by the
[Restrictive Integration Review Board] in
its periodic findings, it is highly
unlikely that he will be released prior
to the expiration of his sentence more
than 7 years hence. Under any
circumstance, it is unreasonable to
conclude that "release and a regained ___
ability for substantial gainful activity
will be achieved within a reasonable
time.
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Claimant has not challenged the ALJ's summary of
the evidence. Based on that summary as well as a review of
the materials provided to us, we conclude that the ALJ's
factual determination that claimant is in the early stages of
rehabilitation and not likely to be able to engage in
substantial gainful employment within a reasonable time is
amply supported. Indeed, claimant has not articulated any
argument to the contrary. Claimant was not entitled to
payment of benefits under the participation in a
rehabilitation program provision.
C. Equal Protection
Claimant asserts that some people who have been
both criminally convicted and civilly committed to the
treatment center receive benefits while others do not. To
deny claimant benefits, while others in the exact same
situation receive them, violates the equal protection clause,
he claims.
Neither in the district court nor in his appellate
brief has claimant provided any clarifying details. He has
not identified any inhabitant of the treatment center who
receives social security benefits while concurrently serving
his criminal sentence. It may be that some have received
benefits after their criminal sentence has expired, but if
that is the substance of claimant's complaint, there is no
equal protection violation. Once a criminal sentence is
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served, the person is no longer "confined pursuant to his
conviction," 402(x)(1) no longer applies, and the person is
not similarly situated to claimant.
We have considered all of claimant's arguments.
None warrant relief.
Affirmed. ________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 94-1607
Filed Date： 12/28/1994
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015